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Foreword 
A stillness was on the desert. Daylight settled unhurriedly down the 
hilltops bordering the triangular valley. The indigo sky above and to the 
west was pierced with the gleam of a solitary planet and the flicker of an 
occasional second- or third-magnitude star. 
The valley bottom was an immense expanse of flatness. Miles of 
mirror-smooth clay were marred by neither hummock nor furrow. No 
tree or bush could be seen on this seemingly endless waterless lake. No 
sound from animal or bird punctuated the silence. Wild creatures found 
little to attract them on the vast empty platter. It was one of nature’s quiet 
hideaways, an outpost of serenity. 
There were intruders. On the western shore of this “lake,” figures 
scurried around a strange assemblage. A small shark-sleek craft was being 
attached to a much larger mother craft. The shark‘s midsection was banded 
with ice crystals; puffs of ashen vapor wafted upward and disappeared 
into the clear sky. The juxtaposition of ancient geology and modern 
technology, curiously, seemed to fit. 
By the mid-twentieth century, the science of aeronautics had grown to substan- 
tial maturity. Aircraft were speeding faster and faster and threatening to outrace 
their own sound. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics had a trio of 
laboratories to study the fundamental problems offiight. They had a wide variety of 
test facilities and a cadre of bright, able, and dedicated scientists who had per- 
formed with remarkable success over the years surrounding the second World War. 
For the testing of very-high-speed aircraft, however, they needed a new laboratory: 
a laboratory in the sky. 
And so it was that the researchers came to Antelope Valley in 
California, a valley blessed with clear and uncrowded skies, a sparse 
population, and Muroc Dry Lake, a natural aerodrome where runway 
length and direction were, for most practical purposes, unlimiting. 
On the shore of Muroc, NACA established its High-speed Flight 
Station and began its challenge of the unknown. The mysteries were 
numerous and perplexing. The search for solutions was tedious, pro- 
tracted, and often dangerous. The research methods placed men and 
machines at the boundaries of understanding. On occasion, fine men 
were lost at those boundaries in the pursuit of knowledge. Their sacri- 
fices will be remembered. 
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At the dawn of the Space Age, the researchers on the shore of the 
dry lake were already actively engaged in its planning. After NACA 
became NASA, their considerable contributions were of substantial signifi- 
cance in the evolution of America’s manned spaceflight program. 
This book is the story of those researchers and their efforts. Richard 
Hallion has recorded the history of their flights and captured the spirit of 
a remarkable and unique institution in the evolution of aerospace progress. 
He tells of the place, the projects, and, most important, the people. It is a 
story of men and machines, of success and failure, of time and circum- 
stance. 
I had the pleasure of living some of the events recorded here. I take 
great personal satisfaction in those years, the projects in which I was 
privileged to participate, and the wonderful and able people I worked 
with and whose friendship I cherish. 
October 1983 Neil A. Armstrong 
... 
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A Most Exotic Place 
Northeast of Los Angeles, beyond the coastal range, lies the Mojave 
Desert, the southwestern corner of which is called Antelope Valley. The 
semiarid area produces alfalfa, turkeys, fruit, almonds-and aircraft. 
The clear weather and vast, unrestricted space have lured the aircraft 
industry as flowers draw bees. Politicians have pragmatically dubbed it 
“Aerospace Valley.” Its two major communities, Lancaster and Palmdale, 
cater to the wants and needs of the aerospace community. At Palmdale 
looms “Air Force Plant 42,” where products of Northrop, Lockheed, and 
Rockwell scoot aloft. Here is the home of Rockwell’s Space Shuttle and 
the B-1 strategic bomber. The valley economy would collapse if the 
aerospace industry declined, and citizens are determined not to let that 
happen. “Vote your pocketbook! Ketcham = B-1” read one 1976 
election poster, and such logic makes sense to desert residents. Lancaster’s 
economic heart is located at the Air Force Flight Test Center and NASA’s 
Hugh L. Dryden Flight Research Center, on the shores of Rogers Dry 
Lake at Edwards Air Force Base. Lancaster received its name in 1887 
from homesick Pennsylvania Amish settlers. In 1950, it had a population 
of 3924 and was a sleepy desert community where a shopper could go to 
a store in the midst of a work day only to find a “Gone Hunting” sign 
posted on the door. Then came the aerospace boom. A decade later, the 
population hit 30 000. Most Edwards workers, be they Air Force, NASA, 
or private contractors, live in Lancaster. 
North of Lancaster is the tiny community of Rosamond, home of the 
Tropico gold mine, a grubby desert town of unadorned houses and 
mobile homes. “Welcome to Rosamond-Gateway to Progress,” pro- 
claims a black-and-white sign on Sierra Highway. Turn right at Rosamond 
Boulevard, and one is soon rolling toward Edwards, running past the 
smooth baked clay of Rosamond Dry Lake. Ahead, over scrub-covered 
low hills, stretches the vast parched-silt bed of Rogers Dry Lake. 
North of Rosamond and 40 kilometers above Lancaster, the town 
of Mojave hugs open desert between brooding Mount Soledad and the 
Tehachapi range. Mojave was once the terminus for borax-laden mule 
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trains, a brawling, hard-living town. Desert winds sweep across Mojave, 
sometimes overturning trailers and vans, often closing the roads to truck 
traffic, usually blowing powdery grit and tumbleweeds across the land. 
Now the mule trains have been replaced by massive diesel-electric 
locomotives running north and south with long strings of hoppers and 
boxcars paralleling the Sierra Highway, then turning west into Tehachapi. 
In the crisp desert days, they can be seen from afar, snaking like 
caterpillars. At night, their thunderous clatter jars the stillness of the 
desert. Mojave is bleak, barely populous enough to rate a few drive-in 
restaurants. Mojave’s chief attraction is air racing. Occasionally sportsmen- 
pilots gather at the old Marine Corps air station with their revitalized 
Bearcats and Mustangs. Amid the throaty rasp of propellers and the 
occasional screech of a blown engine, they pit themselves against one 
another to the vicarious enjoyment of thousands. 
From Mojave one can turn northwest toward Tehachapi and 
Bakersfield, or bear northeast toward Cantil. Here the road again 
branches: north along the Sierra Nevada range toward China Lake, or 
east to the ghost town of Garlock and the old mining towns of Randsburg 
and Johannesburg. Shadowed by Red Mountain, Garlock had six mills 
processing gold ore from Randsburg, but it fell into disuse at the turn of 
the century. The town’s ramshackle buildings are buffeted by winds that 
race off the El Paso Mountains and whip across the flats of nearby Koehn 
Dry Lake. Traces of half the world’s minerals can be found near 
Randsburg. Its numerous mines-with such names as Napoleon, Olympus, 
and The Big Norse-thrived during the gold boom, then played out. 
Prospectors discovered huge tungsten deposits and frantically worked 
them through World War I and until the postwar tungsten market 
collapsed. Red Mountain’s prodigious silver deposits caused a resurgent 
boom until the vein played out in the late 1920s. Now Randsburg is 
almost a ghost town, its original buildings mixed in among mobile homes. 
“Joburg” is saved from extinction only by being on a highway. 
South of Joburg and Red Mountain is the desert intersection of Four 
Corners. On the flat ride down from the old mining camps, one notices 
only the swell of Fremont Peak in the east; the endless transmission lines 
paralleling the road; and to the west, the Air Force tracking station at 
Boron, its radome sprouting from the ground like a white puffball. Four 
Corners sits astride Highway 58, the route of the Okies immortalized by 
John Steinbeck. South of Four Corners is the route to Victorville and San 
Bernardino, across the San Bernardino Mountains. East of Four Corners 
is Barstow, a major intersection for truckers. 
West of Four Corners on Highway 58 is the little town of Boron, 
where the double crack-crack! of sonic shocks is heard so frequently that 
Boron’s citizens coyly proclaim themselves “The Biggest Boom Town in 
... 
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America.” Boron’s chief product is sodium tetraborate, better known as 
borax. Introduced into Europe by Marco Polo in the 13th century, borax 
remained an uncommon mineral until the discovery of the Mojave’s 
deposits in the 19th century. The world’s largest open-pit borate mine is 
just outside the town north of the highway. At night, its high-intensity 
lights can be seen for miles; by day, dust hangs low in the sky. West of 
Boron is the little community of North Edwards; like Lancaster, most of 
its citizens are or have been affiliated with Edwards Air Force Base. At 
North Edwards, the traveler can continue west on Highway 58 to Mojave, 
or (if authorized) can turn south, onto Rosamond Boulevard, driving 
down to Edwards, its hangars gleaming in the distance. And here, the 
visitor sees perhaps the weirdest of sights that the desert has to offer: the 
165-square-kilometer bed of Rogers Dry Lake. 
Dry lakes are the flattest of all geological land forms. Rogers Dry 
Lake is a playa, a pluvial lake, one of 120 such lakes in the western United 
States. Pluvial lakes are believed to have first appeared in the Pleistocene 
epoch, about 1.5 billion years ago. Glacial activity dropped temperatures 
and increased precipitation, creating hundreds of pluvial lakes, which 
fluctuate between wet and dry phases. They appear in arid regions, in the 
lowest areas of basins, and contain great quantities of sediment. Rogers 
originally received its water from overflow of rivers in the Sierra Nevada 
to the northwest. In time, the water sources disappeared, the lake dried, 
and the arid Mojave now keeps it that way except for the briefest of 
periods when rain floods its surface to a depth of a few inches. 
The desert winds blow the water (and suspended sediment) back and 
forth across the lake surface, filling cracks and smoothing the silt. When 
the water evaporates, the lake is perfectly flat and smooth. Once dry, 
Rogers is also hard; the water and winds remove dissolved salts from the 
sediment, which dries to a hard crust-at Rogers, from 19 to 45 
centimeters deep. California has a great number of lakes like Rogers- 
Rosamond, Mirage, Cuddeback, Harper, Searles, Koehn, China, Ballarat. 
Rogers, the largest dry lake in the world, is clearly visible to the traveler 
flying into Los Angeles from the east. In the early part of the 20th 
century, a silver and gold mining firm established a camp on its shores 
and named it Rodriguez, after the company’s name. Rodriguez eventu- 
ally became Rogers. The lake, shaped like a lopsided figure eight, is dry 
for 10 months of each year. During that time its surface can support up 
to 1’760 kilograms per square centimeter (250 pounds per square inch) of 
pressure. Even the heaviest aircraft can take off from and land on the lake, 
making Rogers the largest landing field in the world. 
Aviation was a long time in coming to Rogers. At first the lake served 
only as a bed for the Santa Fe Railway and a small camp specializing in 




permanent settlers, Clifford and Effie Corum, and Clifford’s brother 
Ralph. The Corums were determined to start a farm community in the 
midst of this wasteland; surprisingly, they convinced other settlers to join 
them. The brothers opened a general store, dug wells for water, and held 
church services in their home. The Santa Fe Railway’s freights always 
stopped for water. Encouraged, the Corums decided to name the little 
community after themselves. Here they ran into a snag. Postal authorities 
objected because California already had a Coram township; the similarity 
in spelling would surely cause confusion. The Corums then suggested 
Muroc, created by spelling the name backwards, but the Sante Fe Railway 
objected because of a rail stop named Murdock. The railroad lyrically 
suggested Dorado, Ophir, Yermo, or Istar. (It is puzzling how many truly 
desolate desert communities have names connoting beauty, tranquility, 
and prosperity.) The Corums remained firm. The tiny community 
became Muroc; settlers sometimes applied the name to the dry lake as well. 
Muroc did not prosper and remained little more than a spot on a 
map. The 1930s brought Depression and the Okies wending their way 
along Highway 58, north of the lake. The lake itself gained notoriety as 
the site of what was supposedly the largest moonshine distillery in 
southern California; at night, prohibition agents chased liquor runners 
across the lakebed. Other citizens used the lake to race automobiles. By 
1930, designers and pilots already recognized the value of the dry lakes as 
test sites for new aircraft, and Rogers, together with Harper and 
Rosamond, became a favorite spot for small aircraft companies to fly 
their new designs. Here aviatrix and socialite Florence “Pancho” Barnes 
established a dude ranch and nightclub with a small private airstrip; in 
future years, Barnes “Fly-Inn” became a popular gathering spot for test 
pilots and engineers. 
The military came to Muroc in 1933, at the behest of Col. Henry H, 
“Hap” Arnold, commanding officer of the Army’s March Field at 
Riverside, California. Arnold, later to become the Army Air Forces’ chief 
in World War 11, needed a desolate site for a bombing and gunnery 
range. The Navy having denied Arnold the use of the Pacific Ocean, he 
looked elsewhere. The most logical site for the range was the vast barren 
stretches of the Mojave; most of the land around Rogers Dry Lake 
already belonged to the federal government. In September 1933, a cadre 
of soldiers from March established a camp on the eastern side of the lake 
and laid out the gunnery and bombing range. Over the next decade the 
desert echoed to the snarling throb of brightly painted Boeing P-26A 
fighters, as well as Northrop A- 17 and Martin B- 10 bombers, as Army 
pilots bombed and shot up the desert. The tiny community of Muroc, on 
the west side of the lake, was not really affected. The community’s only 
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live contact with the “Golden Age” of American aviation came in 1935, 
when Wiley Post force-landed his Winnie Mae on the lake. From the 1940s 
to the early 1950s, John Northrop’s ethereal flying wings were a familiar 
sight in Muroc skies. 
In the summer of 1941, when the Third Reich controlled the 
European continent and Japan was firming up plans for the Greater East 
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, 13 Army employees manned the bombing 
and gunnery range. Then on 10 July 140 troops arrived via the railway 
across the lakebed and staked out a tent camp on the southwestern shore 
of the lake. The character of operations at Muroc changed. What had 
been a useful bombing and gunnery site now also became a remote 
testing site. Here, in 1941, Maj. George V. Holloman experimented with 
radio-controlled Douglas B T  - 2 basic trainers, a highly classified project 
with future implications for pilotless robot weapon development. 
On 7 December 1941 the Army’s 41st Bomb Group and the 6th 
Reconnaissance Squadron arrived at Muroc for crew training. That same 
day, Japanese naval aircraft devastated Pearl Harbor and America was at 
war. Two days later, four squadrons of Martin B-26 Marauders arrived 
at Muroc for coastal antisubmarine patrol duty, but left in February 1942 
for Australia and the bitter New Guinea campaign. The war brought a 
rapid influx of people, eventually numbering 40 000. The community of 
Muroc vanished, buried under a tent city erected on the site of what is 
now South Base. On 23 July the rapidly growing site was designated 
Muroc Army Air Base. On 8 November 1943 the Army redesignated it 
Muroc Army Air Field, complete with barracks, sewerage system, control 
tower, and year-round concrete runway. Engineers built a 200-meter 
replica of a Japanese Mogurni-class heavy cruiser on the lake-“Muroc 
Maru” the pilots dubbed her-and antishipping bomber crews honed 
their skills. Fighter pilots in P-38s and bomber crews in B-24s and 
B - 25s flew training missions at Muroc before going overseas. Yet Muroc 
did not remain simply an advanced training base, valuable as this would 
have been to the war effort; it also became a major research and 
development center. 
Before World War 11, the Army’s major aeronautical research and 
development center had been at Wright Field, outside Dayton, Ohio. But 
Wright was in a heavily residential area; hazardous flight testing of 
prototypes could endanger the local population. Also the area was too 
populous to be safe from prying eyes. Anyone could see the latest 
aircraft going through its paces, just by watching from beyond the 
airfield’s boundary. The Army needed a remote test site. Muroc, a mere 
160 kilometers from the center of the West Coast’s aircraft industry, was 
ideal. 
The catalyst that caused the big change from Wright to Muroc was 
the Bell XP-59A program, the United States’ first jet aircraft. In April 
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1941, Hap Arnold had learned of Britian’s jet engine research while on 
an inspection trip to England. In September the Army issued a contract 
to the Bell Aircraft Corporation for a jet airplane using a British- 
developed Whittle engine built by General Electric. The result was the 
Bell XP- 59A Airacomet, a twin-jet single-seat airplane. Obviously, the 
XP-59A was too secret to test at Wright. Lt. Col. Benjamin W. Chidlaw, 
one of Arnold’s deputies, toured the country looking for a suitable test 
site. Without question, Muroc was the best possible choice. In 1942, the 
Materiel Center at Wright Field designated the northwestern end of the 
dry lake as the Materiel Center Flight Test Site. Subsequently, this site 
became known as North Base and the training center on the southwest- 
ern lake shore became known as South Base. Security, already tight, 
became viselike. The XP-59A arrived at North Base in mid-September 
1942 and made its initial flight on 1 October. The U.S. entered the jet 
age, third behind Germany and Great Britain. 
Soon the importance of Muroc as a flight test center overshadowed 
its importance as a training base. North Base conducted its operations 
strictly separate from South Base, and added its own runway, hangar, 
and tower facilities. The first tower was a guard shack mounted on two 
large sawhorses; sometimes it blew over in the desert winds. Known as 
“Oscar Junior,” it had a single Hallicrafter radio connected by a 1 1 0-volt 
extension cord to the operations building, a frame hut. A field telephone, 
binoculars, and salt tablets for the tower crew completed its equipment. 
“Oscar Senior,” a genuine aircraft control tower with a variety of 
communications equipment and clear glass sides, entered service in July 
1944. By that time, the P-59 was no longer queen of the flightline. 
Lockheed’s XP-80 Shooting Star, dubbed Lulu-Belle by Lockheed engineers, 
had completed its first flight at North Base in January 1944. That same 
year the Army redesignated North Base as the Muroc Flight Test Base, 
coequal with its training counterpart to the south. On 15 April 1946, with 
wartime needs buried in an already fading past, the Army Air Forces 
ended all training activities at Muroc, designating Muroc solely as a 
research and development center under the name Muroc Army Air 
Field. This lasted until 12 February 1948, when it became Muroc Air 
Force Base following the establishment of the United States Air Force. 
On 8 December 1949 it was renamed Edwards Air Force Base in honor 
of Capt. Glen W. Edwards, killed in the crash of a Northrop YB-49 
Flying Wing on 5 June 1948. 
Muroc-Edwards after World War I1 remained an important re- 
search center. The war had pointed to the importance of such new 
developments as jet aircraft, and the tempo of wartime research had 
generated new conceptions of aircraft design-such as the swept-wing 
planform-that might prove useful on future military and civil aircraft. 
The rapid disintegration of the wartime Grand Alliance, underscored by 
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the lowering of the “Iron Curtain” in Central and Eastern Europe, acted 
as a spur to continued rapid research on projects that might ultimately 
affect national security. Captured enemy aircraft such as the Heinkel He 
162 flew at Muroc in evaluation programs. Work continued on radio- 
controlled aircraft-two B - 17s flew from Hawaii to Muroc under radio 
guidance in 1946. Weird combination jet-and-piston aircraft such as the 
Convair XP-81 and Ryan XF2R- 1 flew from the lake, as did new 
bombers such as Douglas’s XB -42 and Northrop’s graceful though 
ill-fated XB-35 and YB-49 Flying Wings. But the big news in the fall of 
1946 was not the testing of some new aircraft destined for squadron 
service nor the latest scoop on what the Germans or the Japanese had 
been up to in the war. Rather it was anticipation of a program of such 
significance that the whole fabric of aviation might be transformed. 
The program revolved around a technological challenge: Could 
aeronautical science design an aircraft that could fly faster than the speed 
of sound? Today, what with manned spaceflight and mach 2 commercial 
airline service, such a question seems almost trivial. In 1946, however, 
that question loomed across the face of aeronautics; highly trained 
engineers spoke of a mysterious “sound barrier” through which it might 
be impossible to fly a manned aircraft. The challenge was not simply a 
theoretical one that threatened the imagination of designers hunched 
over drawing boards. Pilots had died as their aircraft approached the 
speed of sound, died when their aircraft broke up in high-speed dives. 
The “sound barrier” threatened to deny aeronautical science the high 
speeds that the jet engine promised, to limit aviation to speeds of about 
950 kilometers per hour. 
In September 1946, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronau- 
tics (NACA), the aeronautical research agency for the United States, sent 
a small band of engineers and technicians from the Langley Memorial 
Aeronautical Laboratory at Hampton, Virginia, to Muroc to assist in a 
supersonic flight research program involving the Bell XS- 1 aircraft. 
This small group became known as the NACA Muroc Flight Test Unit a 
year later. In October 1947 the XS-1 exceeded the speed of sound in 
level flight, the first manned supersonic flight. For the next decade, the 
NACA group continued to explore the problems and conditions of 
supersonic flight. In 1949, the NACA had established the group as the 
NACA High-speed Flight Research Station (HSFRS), a division of 
Langley Laboratory. In 1953, an HSFRS pilot became the first to fly at 
twice the speed of sound. In 1954, the HSFRS was redesignated the 
NACA High-speed Flight Station (HSFS), autonomous from Langley. 
That summer, the station’s 250 employees moved from their shared Air 
Force quarters to new research facilities located midway between South 
Base and North Base. Those facilities are still in use. 
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PROLOGUE 
In 1959, after the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, the High-speed Flight Station became the NASA Flight 
Research Center (FRC). The following decade saw the center embark on 
a strong program of hypersonic research using the North American 
X- 15 aircraft. The X- 15, launched over Utah toward Edwards, could 
streak to mach &six times the speed of sound-over the Nevada and 
California desert. FRC personnel complemented the X- 15 program 
with a flight test program using lifting body reentry vehicles and with 
studies in several space and aeronautics areas. The later 1960s saw a 
resurgence of interest in advanced supersonic research using such 
aircraft as the triple-sonic XB-70A and YF-12 Blackbird. In the 1970s 
the center continued with its lifting body research in support of the Space 
Shuttle program, YF- 12 program, and such development programs as 
the F- 8 Digital Fly-by-Wire and supercritical-wing programs. 
On 26 March 1976, NASA renamed the Flight Research Center the 
Hugh L. Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC), in honor of an 
American aerospace pioneer, a man who was fond of saying “the airplane 
and I grew up together,” and who once remarked that “the most 
important tool in aeronautical research. . . is the human mind.” Not a 
center to remain looking to its past, Dryden looks to the future; less than 
a year after the Dryden dedication, DFRC undertook the first flight tests 
of the Rockwell Space Shuttle orbiter Enterprzse. Five years after dedication, 
the Space Shuttle Columbia landed at the center, having completed the 
first winged reentry of a manned spacecraft from orbit. 
Many decry the cost of flight testing, the cost in both economic and 
human terms. They argue for computer simulation and prediction, a 
turning away from manned vehicle testing, a turning away from actually 
building an aircraft and flying it. There is no better refutation to the 
hypothesis that flight research is unnecessary than the testimony of 
NASA Administrator James E. Webb before Congress in 1967. 
Flight testing of new concepts, designs, and systems is fundamental to 
aeronautics. Laboratory data alone, and theories based on these data, cannot 
give all the answers. . . . Each time a new aircraft flies, a “moment of truth” 
arrives for the designer as he discovers whether a group of individually satis- 
factory elements add together to make a satisfactory whole, or whether their 
unexpected interactions result in a major deficiency. Flight research plays the 
essential role in assuring that all the elements of an aircraft can be integrated 
into a satisfactory system. 
At Dryden, flight research is not simply one phase of the center’s 
operation. Rather, it is the center’s reason for being. 
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Confronting the Speed of Sound: 
1944- 1948 
Since its creation, the NASA Hugh L. Dryden Flight Research 
Center has made two major contributions to aviation. The first and 
most important was its contribution to the early development of super- 
sonic flight technology. The second was its research on the problems of 
flight out of the atmosphere, including lifting reentry during the return 
from orbit. Unlike other NASA research centers, Dryden relies almost 
exclusively on a relatively new kind of research tool-the research 
airplane, which uses the sky itself for a laboratory. Thus its research in 
these two major areas, and many minor ones as well, is bound up in the 
development and testing of a wide range of specialized jet and rocket- 
propelled research aircraft. Some of these exotic vehicles, such as the 
X- I ,  X- 15, and the Space Shuttle, have become well known in their 
own right, but they all play an integral part in the history of the Dryden 
center. The history of Dryden-in many ways a microcosm of the history 
of post-World War I1 flight research-thus falls conveniently into two 
chronological phases: the era of the supersonic breakthrough, 1944- 1959; 
and the heroic era of manned spaceflight, 1959- 1981. Symbolically, the 
landing of the Space Shuttle Columbia on the baked clay of Rogers Dry 
Lake in 1981 brought this first phase of manned spaceflight to a close 
while reaffirming the importance of the role that Dryden plays in the 
development of advanced technology for winged vehicles. 
ORIGINS 
The origins of the Dryden center, “DRFC” as it is known to the world 
aeronautical community, are inseparable from the story of the postwar 
assault upon the speed of sound, the infamous and highly touted “sound 
barrier.” By the late 1950s, supersonic flight-flight faster than sound- 
had become so commonplace that pilots of supersonic planes gave little 
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thought to the cockpit machmeter when its pointer moved above mach 1, 
the speed of sound.” Yet a mere decade before, supersonic flight had 
been a distinct novelty; and two decades before, leading aerodynamicists 
around the world had debated with great intensity whether supersonic 
flight was, indeed, possible. 
During the 1920s and 1930s, aviation technology had advanced 
rapidly. In this period, powerful piston engines had been developed. 
Advances in structural design and a growing appreciation of the need for 
streamlining an aircraft for high-speed flight enabled creation of high- 
speed military aircraft by the end of the 1930s that could approach 
transonic speeds. (The transonic region refers to that area between mach 
0.7 and mach 1.3 where a plane encounters mixed subsonic and 
supersonic airflow.) Many aircraft had highly undesirable behavior charac- 
teristics as they approached high speeds during prolonged dives. The 
airflow over the wings accelerated, shockwaves would form, causing the 
smooth flow of air around the aircraft to be disturbed and end in a 
swirling wake of turbulent flow that flailed at the tail section, sometimes 
inducing structural loads so severe that the tail would be ripped from the 
craft. Because of the inadequacy of high-speed wind tunnel design-a 
shortcoming only overcome by the postwar development by NACA of the 
so-called “slotted-throat” wind tunnel-the problems of transonic flight, 
such as compressibility, increased drag and undesirable trim changes, 
loss of lift, and the onset of “standing” shockwaves could not be 
adequately examined. Many short-cut research solutions were tried, 
including dropping weighted body shapes from high-flying aircraft and 
then tracking their descent with radar, firing small rocket-propelled 
models, and (most useful but also most dangerous) placing small test 
models on the wing of a modified fighter and then diving the fighter to 
more than mach 0.7, when the accelerated flow over the wing would be 
above mach 1. Pending the development of reliable wind tunnel research 
methods, however, the best solution seemed to be a new class of research 
tool: piloted research airplanes powered by jet or rocket engines and 
capable of attaining high speeds in the relative safety of high altitude, 
rather than racing toward Earth in dangerous dives into the dense lower 
atmosphere where a plane experiences its greatest structural loadings. 
The story of supersonic research has not received much attention from 
historians, though accounts of NACA research work, the development of 
specific research airplanes, and foreign work in this field do exist.’ 
*The speed of sound varies with altitude, dropping from approximately 340 meters per second 
at sea level to 295 meters per second at altitudes between 1 1  000 and 20 000 meters. Mach number 
(after the Austrian physicist Ernst Mach) is the ratio of the speed of an object to the speed of sound. 
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The Lockheed P- 38 Lightning, an early victim of compressibility. Official US. Army Air 
Corps. 
A wing-flow research model is mounted on the wing of the NACA-Langley North American 
P-51D Mustang. 
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The establishment of the first research aircraft programs led directly 
to the creation of the Dryden center. The advocates of supersonic 
research aircraft-notably John Stack of NACA, Ezra Kotcher of the 
Army Air Forces, and Walter Diehl of the Navy-did not realize at first 
that a special test facility for these aircraft would have to be created. 
Kotcher and Diehl assumed that the planes would probably pass through 
the standard service test centers-Muroc and the Naval Air Test Center 
at Patuxent River, Maryland. Most NACA personnel simply assumed that 
the planes would fly from the NACA’s major (and oldest) research 
laboratory, the Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory at Hampton, 
Virginia. Several factors worked to change this. First, the NACA did not 
have the resources to undertake development of such craft on its own; 
they had to be sponsored by the military services and manufactured by 
private industry. Second, the aircraft developed had (for their day) 
hazardous or at least unusual flying characteristics. Some were air- 
launched from larger airplanes. Others had strange configurations that 
demanded plenty of room for takeoff and landing. Third, the natural 
location for such testing-a situation offering isolation far away from 
prying eyes, unparalleled year-round flying conditions, and proximity to 
that hub of the American aircraft industry, the Los Angeles basin-was 
Muroc, where the AAF had already established its wartime center for ad- 
vanced aircraft testing. 
Two research aircraft programs had begun in 1945: the rocket- 
propelled and Air Force-sponsored Bell XS- 1 and the jet-propelled and 
Navy-sponsored Douglas D-558. The latter program eventually split 
into a straight-wing D-558- 1 (the Skystreak) and a sweptwing jet-and- 
rocket propelled D-558-2 (the Skyrocket). Of the two, the D-558 came 
closest to meeting what NACA research airplane advocates-especially 
Stack-had envisioned, primarily because of its turbojet engine, which 
enabled the craft to cruise at speeds above mach 0.8 for over half an 
hour. The XS-1 (later designated X-1) represented a more radical 
approach, for at its conception in early 1945 liquid rocket propulsion was 
regarded-rightly-as unproved, dangerous, and unreliable. Yet the 
XS- 1’s rocket engine certainly endowed the craft with much higher 
potential performance than the contemporary D- 558. And the Bell 
aircraft was also the first of these new research airplanes (which subse- 
quently became known as the postwar “X-series”) to be completed. It 
rolled out of the Bell plant at Buffalo, New York, late in December 
1945. 
Within a year of the development of the XS-1 and D-558 series, 
however, the Army Air Forces and the NACA began collaborative 
development of four other research aircraft, adding two more within 
another three years. All of these were aerodynamic testbeds of one sort 
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or another, or designed to explore the potential benefits or difficulties of 
some new design configuration. Table 1 permits comparison of these 
craft, which constituted the nation’s “stable” of transonic and supersonic 
research aircraft for flight testing at speeds up to mach 3. Only one, the 
XF-92A, bore any relationship to a planned military weapon system (the 
abortive XP-92 interceptor), though the XF- 92A was solely intended 
for the delta-wing research role it subsequently fulfilled. The Bell X-5 
derived from a wartime German research project, the Messerschmitt P 
1 10 1, using a generally similar configuration, though its provision for 
variable in-flight wing sweeping was uniquely American. The X-4 was 
greatly influenced by some wartime German research, the contemporary 
British De Havilland D.H. 108 Swallow, and Northrop’s own interest in 
the tailless or semitailless wing configuration. The Dryden center subse- 
quently flew examples of all of these aircraft during 1947- 1958, with the 
exception of the ill-fated Bell X-2. The research programs conducted 
on these aircraft will be discussed later. 
THE ROAD TO MUROC 
In December 1945, the same month that Bell completed the first 
XS- 1, the AAF asked NACA to supervise all details of the XS- 1’s data 
gathering and analysis program. The request was a logical one, since the 
NACA Langley instrumentation staff had drawn up the instrument 
requirements for the craft, and it meant that the NACA would have to 
follow wherever the plane went to fly. The Air Technical Service 
Command opted to fly the XS-1 first as a glider, air-launched from a 
modified Boeing B - 29A Superfortress, at Pinecastle Field, Orlando, 
Florida. The Pinecastle trials would enable researchers to assess the 
craft’s low-speed behavior and general handling qualities in much the 
same way that the Space Shuttle Enterprise first flew as a glider at Dryden 
over 30 years later. Langley Laboratory Director H. J. E. Reid informed 
NACA Headquarters that the Pinecastle tests would determine if the 
XS- 1 could operate from Langley. In fact, the chief of the Air Technical 
Service Command, Maj. Gen. Franklin 0. Carroll, had decided to fly the 
craft from Muroc, where the AAF had tested its first jet airplanes. Thus 
even before the XS-1 first flew, it was evident that the NACA would 
have to establish a team to accompany the craft, first to Pinecastle and 
then to Muroc. 
And so it fell to the Langley flight test branch to select a small team 
under the direction of an engineer to assist the military on the XS-1 
trials. Hartley A. SoulC, chief of Langley’s Stability Research Division, 
together with chief NACA test pilot Me1 Gough and research airplane 
advocate John Stack, selected a young but highly experienced engineer for 
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the job: Walter C. Williams. Williams had worked in Soulc‘s stability and 
control branch at Langley, was one of NACA’s foremost research 
airplane advocates, and had a good background in flight testing of 
high-performance aircraft. A New Orleans native, he was an inquisitive, 
take-charge sort of engineer, a man who believed that useful research 
had to confront actual problems and not be limited to studying theoreti- 
cal aspects of aeronautical science. He had a painstaking obsession with 
planning and safety. Reflecting two decades later on his role in flight 
research, Williams summarized his beliefs by stating: “I never bought the 
philosophy this is a dangerous business, we’re going to kill people. I 
always felt by careful preparation, careful planning in carrying the flight 
out in a careful manner, you can do some pretty exotic things, like orbiting 
a man or breaking the sound barrier, without killing people.” * 
With five technicians, Williams journeyed to Pinecastle early in 
January 1945. The NACA unit used a modified SCR-584 gun-laying 
radar equipped with a camera to provide accurate flight path data. The 
orange XS- 1 completed its first glide flight on 19 January 1946, piloted 
by Bell test pilot Jack Woolams. This and the remaining flights generally 
went smoothly, but the plane’s high sink rate and the problems of 
keeping the plane in sight amid Florida’s frequent clouds added two 
more votes in favor of the AAF‘s decision to go to Muroc. In March 1946, 
the XS- 1 went back to Bell for installation of its four-chamber Reaction 
Motors XLR-11 rocket engine. Over the summer of 1946, NACA 
Langley prepared to send a larger test support team to Muroc under 
Williams’s direction. On 30 September Williams and four other engineers 
(William S. Aiken, Cloyce E. Matheny, George P. Minalga, and Harold H. 
Youngblood) arrived at the desert site. They proceeded to set up an 
SCR-984 radar tracking system. A second group of six (Joel Baker, 
Charles M. Forsyth, Beverly P. Brown, John J. Gardner, Warren A. 
Walls, and Howard Hinman) flew out from Langley, arriving on 9 
October. Subsequently this original group would be completed in Decem- 
ber with the arrival of two “computers,” Roxanah B. Yancey and Isabel1 
K. Martin.5 NACA had arrived at Muroc in force. 
The team, not surprisingly, was composed primarily of engineers, 
instrument technicians, telemetry technicians, and computers. Since 
the 192Os, NACA had instrumented flight research airplanes to record 
various kinds of data, but telemetry was a relatively new field. Telemetry 
involved onboard instrumentation that would measure certain quantities, 
a transmitter to send a signal from the plane to a ground station, and a 
receiver to pick up the signal. Active data transmission (“telemetering”) 
had come into its own with the opening of the Panama Canal, which 
relied extensively on telemetry systems to report on the operation of the 
canal and its physical environment. Aircraft, missile, and ordnance 
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NACAs 1946 Pinecastle test team at Orlando, Florida, including from left to right) 
Gerald Truszynski, John B. Householder, Walter C. Williams, Norman Hayes, and Robert 
Baker. 
telemetry development and systems had proliferated during World 
War IL6 The XS- 1, at NACA’s direction, had a 6-channel telemetry in- 
stallation to transmit airspeed, control surface position, altitude, and 
normal acceleration to the ground so that, as Walter Williams later 
explained, “if we lost the airplane, we could at least find out a little about 
what had happened.”’ 
In contrast to the telemetry technicians, “computers” were an older 
institution of the Federal government’s scientific establishment. In NACA 
terminology of 1946, computers were employees who performed labori- 
ous and time-consuming mathematical calculations and data reduction 
from long strips of instrumentation records generated by onboard 
aircraft instrumentation. Virtually without exception, computers were 
female; at least part of the rationale seems to have been the notion that 
the work was long and tedious, and men were not thought to have the 
patience to do it. Though equipment changed over the years and most 
computers eventually found themselves programming and operating 
10 
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electronic computers, as well as doing other data processing tasks, being a 
computer initially meant long hours with a slide rule, hunched over 
illuminated light boxes measuring line traces from grainy and obscure 
strips of oscillograph film. Computers suffered terrible eyestrain, and 
those who didn’t begin by wearing glasses did so after a few years.8 
The N ACA group quickly-but uncomfortably-settled themselves. 
Walt Williams took an apartment in Palmdale, over 65 kilometers distant. 
Single engineers and mechanics lived in “Kerosene Flats,” a collection of 
kerosene-heated fire-trap Air Force quarters at the town of Muroc, 
shared with visiting military personnel. Late in 1946, when the Navy 
Department closed down the Marine air station in the town of Mojave, 
housing there became available to married N ACA personnel. Adding to 
the unhappy conditions was the attitude of certain senior AAF base 
administrators at Muroc, who tended to regard the NACA contingent as 
visiting contractors, rather than partners on a top-level government 
project. The increasingly acute housing problem and work space situa- 
tion (NACA at first had only two small rooms and shared hangar space 
with the AAF) came to a head in early 1948, triggering action by the 
NACA headquarters to improve the lot of the Langley ~ont ingent .~ 
In early October 1946, the second Bell XS-1, the first destined to 
make a powered flight, arrived at Muroc. In preparation for its testing, 
Army technicians had installed two large liquid-oxygen and liquid- 
nitrogen tanks in the fueling area (the nitrogen was used to pressurize 
the XS- 1’s fuel system, for the plane burned liquid oxygen and diluted 
alcohol) and dug a large loading pit from which the XS-1 could be 
hoisted into the bomb bay of a modified B-29. They also modified a 
standard Army fuel trailer to function as a mixing tank for the XS- 1’s 
diluted alcohol fuel. The Bell test team, headed by project manager Dick 
Frost and including project test pilot Chalmers “Slick” Goodlin-the 
previous Bell pilot, Jack Woolams, having been killed in the crash of a 
racing plane-was ready to fly. Walt Williams’s NACA team had its equip- 
ment set up, including two SCR-584 radars. The technical people on the 
lakebed set about to make their mark upon aeronautical science.” 
PLANNING THE ASSAULT 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to be puzzled at all the fuss 
about transonic flight and the “sound barrier” myth. It is not easy to 
appreciate just how dangerous the sound barrier seemed to be. By the 
fall of 1946, most AAF, Bell, and NACA personnel believed that the 
XS- 1 would probably exceed the speed of sound safely, but they could 
not deny the possibility that it might not. The first group of NACA 
personnel left Langley just after Geoffrey de Havilland died in Great 
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Britain. De Havilland, one of Britain’s finest test pilots, had been killed 
on 27 September 1946 when the tiny De Havilland D.H. 108 Swallow, a 
tailless aircraft resembling the later American X-4, began violent 
pitching during a dive to mach 0.875 while flying at less than 2400 meters 
over the Thames estuary. The D.H. 108 had broken up from the severe 
airloads at lower altitudes, killing the 36-year-old pilot instantly. The 
accident further reenforced the belief of NACA researchers that all such 
testing should be undertaken at higher altitudes where the dynamic 
forces acting on an airplane were less severe. 
On 11 October 1946, the XS- 1 dropped from its launch aircraft on 
a seven-minute glide flight, ushering in the era of the rocket-powered 
research airplane at Muroc. By early December, the craft was ready for 
powered flights, and on the ninth Slick Goodlin reached mach 0.79 at 
11 000 meters, still within the scope of contemporary aerodynamic 
knowledge. Under the terms of the development contract, Bell had to 
demonstrate that the craft had satisfactory flying qualities up to mach 
0.8; beyond this, the company could not be held responsible for any 
quirks the plane might exhibit as it approached the speed of sound. By 
the end of May, both the first and second XS- Is had adequately met the 
demonstration requirements, having completed 20 powered flights with- 
out an accident. The third XS- 1 was still at Buffalo awaiting a decision 
from the Air Force on what kind of a fuel feed system to incorporate in it. 
Bell had assumed that when the time came for the actual assault on 
mach 1,  the company would be called upon to fulfill the mission, using its 
own test pilots. In fact, however, the AAF and NACA had already 
decided otherwise. The NACA was to get one XS- 1 for its own testing. 
At NACA headquarters in Washington 6 February 1947, Colonels J. 
Stanley Holtoner and George Smith, with Gus Crowley, NACA acting 
A ground engine test of the second Bell X S- 1  during the Bell contractor program at 
Muroc. 
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director of research, and Hartley A. SoulC, the de facto chief of NACA’s 
research aircraft program, hammered out a joint agreement for the 
conduct of all research aircraft projects, XS- 1 through XS-4. The 
NACA would furnish its own maintenance and flight crews, as would the 
AAF. ,The AAF would also supply spare parts. To eliminate wasteful 
duplication, the AAF would offer to the NACA any available services 
over which it had control at an AAF base, and the Air Materiel Command 
(which had replaced the earlier Air Technical Service Command) would 
provide office space, shelter, housing, and equipment. In recognition of 
the importance of the growing X-series program, the AAF agreed to 
assign research airplanes a “I - b” priority, higher than that of tactical 
aircraft. For its part, the NACA affirmed that it had already placed 
research airplanes “in the highest priority class of NACA programs.” The 
meeting attendees also agreed that the NACA would “enter research 
aircraft ro ects at their initiation, in any case before configurations are 
fixed.”’PMianwhile, back at Muroc, DeElroy E. Beeler had joined the 
Muroc unit from Langley to supervise the XS- 1 loads research program, 
and in March 1947 Gerald M. Truszynski became project instrumenta- 
tion engineer. Joseph Vensel, a former NACA Langley test pilot, arrived 
in April to supervise NACA flight operations. Three months later, the 
first two NACA pilots arrived for duty at Muroc, Herbert H. Hoover of 
Langley and Howard C. “Tick” Lilly from Lewis Laboratory.12 
On 30 June 1947 NACA and Air Materiel Command (AMC) 
conferees met at Wright Field, Ohio, to discuss the conduct of the XS- 1 
research program. They agreed to a two-phase program. Using the first 
XS- 1, which had a thin (8% thicknesdchord ratio) wing planform, the 
AMC’s Flight Test Division would conduct an accelerated test program, 
with NACA support, to reach mach 1.1 as quickly as was prudent. 
NACA’s Muroc team would conduct slower and more detailed research, 
making thorough examina ns of stability and control and flight loads at 
transonic speeds using e second XS-1 with its thicker (10% 
thicknesdchord ratio) wing planform. Bell was out of the supersonic 
running, though the AMC decided to borrow Dick Frost to run a ground 
school for the AMC test team.13 Col. Albert Boyd, a highly respected test 
pilot who directed AMC’s Flight Test Division, selected Capt. Charles E. 
“Chuck” Yeager as project pilot, assisted by Capt. Jack L. Ridley as flight 
test engineer and Lt. Robert Hoover as chase and alternate pilot. Yeager, 
a 24-year-old fighter ace from Hamlin, West Virginia, was a superlative 
pilot and an intuitive engineer. 
On 6 August 1947 the two-pronged Air Force-NACA program got 
under way with a familiarization glide flight by Yeager in the Air Force 
XS- 1. The take-charge ways of the Air Force jarred the NACA pilots, 
who were used to the staid and sedate ways of Langley and Lewis. Herb 
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Hoover wrote to Me1 Gough at Langley that “this guy Yeager is pretty 
much of a wild one, but believe he’ll be good on the Army ship. . . On 
first drop, he did a couple of rolls right after leaving B-29! On third 
flight, he did a 2-turn spin!” Admiration mixed with shock. But Hoover 
also informed Gough what he thought of Walt Williams. “Williams is 
doing and has done a fine job,” Hoover wrote. “He doesn’t lose sight of 
the fact that a job has to be done.”14 By the end of August, Yeager had 
completed his first powered flight, reaching mach 0.85. With Chuck 
Yeager now fully checked out in the plane, the Air Force and NACA 
could turn to the series of flights that would, they hoped, take the XS- 1 
through the speed of sound. 
It had become clear that the NACA contingent would be at Muroc 
for a long, long time. Hugh Latimer Dryden, an internationally known 
aeronautical scientist, had become the NACA’s director of research on 2 
September 1947. Among his first actions was a directive informing Walt 
Williams on 7 September that henceforth the NACA Muroc unit would 
function as a permanent facility, managed by Langley Laboratory. The 
group, now 27 strong, would be known as the NACA Muroc Flight Test 
Unit and would report to Soul6 at Langley. Before the end of the month, 
Dryden and his deputy, Gus Crowley, visited Muroc, where the director 
of research reaffirmed the agency’s top priority support of transonic 
flight research. The NACA Muroc outpost was but the most recent of a 
series of laboratories and research facilities that Langley had spun off. 
There had been Ames in California, then the propulsion laboratory at 
Cleveland, the small Pilotless Aircraft Research Division at Wallops 
Island, and now the Muroc unit. Langley and its sibling Ames had always 
been friendly rivals. The Navy’s Walter Diehl, for example, used to play 
John Stack and H. Julian Allen off against one another to get things 
done, by going to Langley and goading Stack with the latest news about 
what Allen was doing, and vice versa. Langley engineers unconsciously 
wanted to show that the parent was still ahead, while Ames engineers 
smarted under perceived paternalism. Ames’s director, Smith J. De 
France, suspiciously eyed this Langley offshoot growing in his backyard, 
but remained content to watch what was going on, occasionally sending 
observers to Muroc to monitor the work of the Langley group on the 
XS- 1. l5 One senior NACA Muroc engineer remembers his first meeting 
with the strong-willed De France: “Well,” boomed Smitty, “when are you 
going to blow up the plane, kill the pilot, and go De France later 
proved very helpful to Williams’s band in the desert. And De France was 
no stranger to flight research or to its hazards; one of NACA’s earliest 
flight researchers, he had been seriously injured in an aircraft accident at 
Langley that ended his flying career: 
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THROUGH THE “SOUND BARRIER” 
On the tenth anniversary of the first supersonic flight by a piloted 
airplane, Walt Williams recollected that as the XS-1 had edged closer 
and closer to the magic mach 1 mark on a series of flights, NACA’s 
engineering staff at Muroc “developed a very lonely feeling as we began 
to run out of data.”” The last reliable wind-tunnel data ended at about 
mach 0.85; the last useful information from P-5 1 “wing-flow” dive tests 
ended at about mach 0.93. By early October 1947, Chuck Yeager was 
edging past that, nibbling at the “sonic wall” in the Air Force XS- 1 ,  
which he had named Glamorous Glennis, after his wife. During his flights 
Yeager worked closely with the NACA engineers, especially Williams.* 
With each succeeding flight to an incrementally higher mach number, 
NACA technicians would analyze the telemetry records, pull the onboard 
instrumentation records (lengths of scratchy oscillograph “traces,,), and 
study the results. Then they would meet with Williams and his chief 
assistant, De Beeler, and these two would present the results to the Air 
Force’s Yeager and Jack Ridley. The long strips of oscillograph records 
showed if the plane was losing control effectiveness, if more stabilizer 
trim was needed, if lateral (roll), longitudinal (pitch), or directional (yaw) 
stability was deteriorating. 
Early in October, Yeager reached mach 0.94 and had a nasty 
surprise-he pulled back on the control column and nothing happened. 
The plane continued to fly as if he hadn’t touched the controls. Wisely he 
shut down the rocket engine; as the plane decelerated, control effective- 
ness returned to normal. Williams’s engineers later determined that a 
shock wave had formed on the horizontal stabilizer; as the XS- 1 increased 
its speed, the shock wave had moved rearward, “standing” right along the 
hinge line of the plane’s elevator surfaces (which control pitch) at mach 
0.94, negating their effectiveness. Fortunately the XS- 1 had been 
designed with an adjustable stabilizer, so the NACA-Air Force team 
decided to control the craft with the conventional elevator up to where it 
lost its effectiveness, then use the stabilizer “trimmer” for longitudinal 
(pitch) control as the XS- 1 approached the speed of sound.” 
On 10 October Yeager again reached an indicated mach 0.94. 
During the glide earthwards, frost formed on the inside of the canopy, 
and despite persistent efforts Yeager could not scrape it off. Chase pilots 
Bob Hoover and Dick Frost, flying Lockheed P-80 Shooting Stars, had 
*On the wail of Walter Williams’s office in NASA Headquarters later was a photograph of the 
XS-I in flight with the inscription “To Walt: The mainspring that made it all possible-chuck 
Yeager, Major, USAF.” 
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to “talk” him down to a blind landing on the lakebed. Gerald Truszynski’s 
technicians removed the oscillograph film and started their analysis, 
working long into the night. Engineers Hal Goodman and John Mayer 
compared the data from ground radar tracking with the airplane’s 
internal instrumentation, so t h t  errors in the cockpit machmeter, induced 
by airflow changes around the airplane as it approached the speed of 
sound, could be compensated for. That night, Goodman and Mayer dis- 
covered that instead of mach 0.94, all indications were that the XS- 1 had 
actually reached mach 0.997 at 12 000 meters; this worked out to approxi- 
mately 1059 kilometers per hour, infinitesimally close to the speed of 
sound. Williams had the results by morning and passed them along to the 
Bell representative, Dick Frost. Both men recognized that all that they 
still needed was a clear-cut case; Williams feared that if too much publicity 
from the 10 October flight generated overconfidence, the Air Force might 
storm ahead and wind up losing the aircraft and pilot, with disastrous 
results for the research aircraft program. Besides, listeners on the ground 
had not heard the tell-tale sonic “boom” caused by a plane exceeding the 
speed of sound, a phenomenon already known to aviation science as a 
result of German experience with the supersonic V-2 missile. So Williams, 
De Beeler, and other NACA engineers, after telling Yeager and Ridley of 
the revised results, emphasized the need for a cautious approach to a 
clear-cut case of supersonic flight. Yeager’s enthusiastic reaction sur- 
prised no one; “He was really eager to get out there and bust it [mach 11,” 
Mayer later recollected. 
Supersonic flight was achieved 14 October. Preparations for the 
flight began as the sun peeked over the eastern shore of the lake, bathing 
the desert in a soft orange glow, complementing the saffron XS-1 
surrounded by technicians. There was one well-kept secret from all those 
present except Jack Ridley and Walt Williams-Yeager had two broken 
ribs, courtesy of a horse that had thrown him over the weekend. Stoically, 
Yeager had had the ribs taped by a civilian doctor to avoid being grounded 
by a military one. He confided to Ridley and Williams, however, and 
Ridley had cut the pilot a short length of broom handle to help him lock 
the plane’s entrance hatch in place! The B-29 launch crew knew of the 
fall but not of the broken ribs, and they presented him with glasses, a 
rope, and a carrot. That morning, after preflighting the aircraft, Yeager 
met with Williams and Beeler; they stressed caution, warning the young 
test pilot not to exceed an indicated mach number of 0.96 unless 
absoiutely certain, from the behavior of the plane, that he could do so 
safelv.20 
Technicians winched and locked the Glamorous Glennis snugly into 
the bomb bay of its B-29, then filled its tanks with 1177 liters of 
supercold liquid oxygen and 1109 liters of diluted ethyl alcohol fuel. At 
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Yeager’s suggestion, crew chief Jack Russell rubbed the rocket plane’s 
windshield with Drene shampoo, an old fighter pilot’s trick to prevent 
frost from forming on a canopy at high altitude. Finally, all was ready. 
The NACA team was standing by the telemetry gear and twin SCR-584 
radars. The launch crew and test pilot entered the silver and black B-29, 
and soon its four engines were clattering noisily. At two minutes past ten 
o’clock, the Superfortress taxied away from its hardstand, the orange 
XS - 1 clasped tightly underneath, received takeoff clearance, and roared 
down the runway to the east. At 1500 meters, Yeager squirmed through 
the tiny entrance hatch of the XS- 1 , in acute pain from his broken ribs. 
As the B-29 continued to climb, Yeager readied Glamorous Glennis for 
flight. Two P-80 chase planes accompanied the B-29, one escorting the 
bomber to observe the launch, and the other about 16 kilometers ahead 
of the B-29 to join the XS-1 after it completed its rocket-propelled 
excursion through mach 1. A minute before launch, Jack Ridley raised 
Chuck Yeager on the intercom and asked, “You all set?” “Hell, yes, let’s 
get it over with,” Yeager replied. At 10:26 a.m., at a pressure altitude of 
6000 meters, Glamorous Glennis was launched into the skies over the Mojave 
Desert.*’ 
As the XS-1 dropped earthwards, Yeager briefly checked rocket 
engine operation by firing the four chambers of the XLR- 1 1  engine, 
shutting down two and climbing away to altitude on the remaining two, 
Key members of the X S- 1  test team (14t to right): Joseph Vensel, Gerald Trmszynski, 
Captain Charles “Chuck” Yeager, Walter Williams, MajorJack Ridley, and De E .  Beeler. 
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pulling away from one P-80. He fired the other two chambers and 
under a full 26 800 newtons (6000 pounds) of thrust, accelerated for 
altitude, the XS-1 streaming a cone of fire with bright yellow shock 
diamonds outlined in the exhausts from the rocket chambers. Further 
behind, a broad white contrail formed a long spearpoint with the little 
research airplane at its apex. Second by second the XS-1 was growing 
lighter, its engine gulping propellants, and the thrust-to-weight ratio rose 
higher and higher. The plane passed mach 0.8 and streaked on to mach 
0.9. Above mach 0.93, the adjustable stabilizer provided adequate 
longitudinal (pitch) control. He shut down two chambers briefly while 
he assessed his situation. 
All the signs were good; confident that Glamorous Glennis could safely 
exceed mach 1 ,  Yeager leveled off and fired one of the two shut-down 
cylinders. Now very light from the amount of propellants that had 
already been consumed, the XS-1 shot ahead. At about mach 0.98 
indicated, the needle on the machmeter fluctuated, then jumped off the 
scale, leading Yeager to believe the plane was flying at about mach 1.05. 
In fact, postflight data analysis indicated the XS-1 had reached mach 
1.06 at approximately 13 100 meters, an airspeed of 1125 kilometers per 
hour. The machmeter jump - a hallmark of supersonic flight since - 
registered the passage of the bow shockwave across the nose as the plane 
went supersonic. And on the ground, observers heard the characteristic 
double crack of a sonic boom. Inside the XS-1’s instrumentation 
compartment, the oscillograph recorded the static and impact air pres- 
sure traces’ sudden jump on a strip of film, irrefutable proof that the 
airplane had indeed flown faster than the speed of sound. It remained 
faster than mach 1 for a little over 20 seconds, then Yeager decelerated 
back through the now-crumbled sonic wall. Fully 30% of the craft’s pro- 
pellants remained when Yeager shut down the switches and began the 
long, cold glide back to Earth. There would be time enough to probe 
further beyond the speed of sound. Fourteen minutes after launch, the 
rocket plane’s wheels brushed the baked clay of the dry lakebed. The 
dreaded “sound barrier” was a thing of the past.22 
Shortly after the plane landed, as Yeager shambled off to get some 
well-earned sleep, Walt Williams placed il long-distance phone call to Gus 
Crowley and Hartley SoulC. “We did it today,’’ he said; the message 
required no explanation. At Muroc, the project team planned a party at 
Pancho’s Fly-Inn that night, but two hours after the flight, word came 
from NACA Headquarters that the accomplishment and future flight 
tests were to be regarded as Top Secret. Dryden, Crowley, and SoulC 
wanted to be certain that the XS- 1 had really gone supersonic. They had 
all of the craft’s records sent back to Langley for examination, which 
understandably annoyed Williams and his staff of professionals at the 
lakebed. 23 
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The Bell X S- 1  #I, which completed the world's first manned supersonic flight on 14 
October 1947. 
Despite a leaked account of the first supersonic flight by the trade 
journal Aviation Week in December 1947, the Air Force and NACA did 
not formally reveal Yeager's accomplishment until 15 June 1948 when 
Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Hugh 
Dryden of NACA confirmed that the XS- 1 had repeatedly exceeded the 
speed of sound, flown by military and NACA test pilots. The announce- 
ment triggered a flood of honors and awards, including the prestigious 
1947 Robert J. Collier Trophy shared by John Stack for NACA, Chuck 
Yeager for the Air Force, and Larry Bell for the American aircraft 
industry. By the end of 1947, the XS-1 had flown to over 1490 
kilometers per hour-mach 1.35-twice as fast as a wartime P-51 
Mustang. The XS-1's success encouraged the Air Force to order four 
advanced versions from Bell, of which three were eventually completed 
(the X-lA, X-lB, and X-1D). The Air Force phase of the two- 
pronged assault on the speed of sound had clearly been a success; the 
service reached the maximum flight speed of the XS-1 on 26 March 
1948 with a flight by Chuck Yeager to mach 1.45 (1540 kilometers per 
hour). 
At the same time NACA was turning its efforts away from support of 
the Air Force program and to flying its own XS- 1, the thicker-winged 
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The NACA Muroc Contingent in October 1947, in front of the NACA X S - 1 .  
second aircraft. Herb Hoover had completed its first glide flight on 21 
October, a week after Yeager’s accomplishment; embarrassingly, during 
the landing, Hoover touched down hard upon the nosewheel, collapsing 
it and necessitating repairs that kept the craft grounded until mid- 
December. On 16 December* he checked out the craft at subsonic 
speeds. Though pleased with its flying qualities, he recognized that the 
brief amount of flight time at high speed imposed by the rapid consump- 
tion of rocket propellants reduced the amount of information that could 
be acquired from each flight. “It’s going to take a long flight program 
with a lot of flights,” Hoover pessimistically but accurately concluded in 
his flight report.24 
Another and more critical problem was workload. By early 1948, the 
NACA unit was ministering to three airplanes: the Air Force and NACA 
XS-1s and the second Douglas D-558-1 Skystreak, which the agency 
had received at Muroc for testing by its pilots. Workload posed a serious 
problem for the instrumentation staff, since the NACA believed in 
thoroughly instrumenting and calibrating its research airplanes. In one 
case, three instrument technicians with the Muroc unit put in over 250 
hours of overtime in the period from 10 November through 13 Decem- 
*Because of a peculiar handling characteristic during its landing flare, the XS-1 series was 
prone to land hard, overstressing the nosewheel. Nosewheel collapses plagued the Bell, NACA, and 
Air Force programs on all XS- Is, including the advanced models procured later. 
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ber 1947. Williams placed the XS-1 project ahead of every other 
research activity.25 
There was no longer any doubt that the XS-1 could safely exceed 
the speed of sound, but the NACA test team did wonder what differences 
might stem from the thicker wing on its airplane. Drag would certainly 
increase; there might be other undesirable traits as well. So Hoover 
approached the now-punctured “sound barrier” cautiously. Following a 
series of proving flights to increasing mach numbers, Hoover made his 
first high-speed run on 4 March 1948, when he reached mach 0.943 at 
12 000 meters. Six days later he flew to mach 1.065, slightly over 1100 
kilometers per hour, becoming the first NACA pilot and the first civilian 
to fly faster than sound; subsequently, he received the Air Medal from 
President Harry Truman for the feat. On the last day of the month, 
Howard Lilly became the second NACA pilot to “break the Mach,” and 
NACA had now firmly joined the growing supersonic club. 
The Muroc engineering staff immediately set to reducing the 
accumulated data from the XS-1 program and generated ten formal 
NACA research memoranda on the airplane’s handling qualities, flight 
loads, stability and control characteristics, and pressure distribution 
surveys.26 The XS- 1 tests by Hoover and Lilly-and subsequent ones by 
Robert Champine and John Griffith, who arrived at Muroc in late 1948 
and late 1949, respectively-generated significant aeronautical information. 
NACA continued flying the craft in the vicinity of mach 0.90, for the 
agency was interested in investigating the exact conditions of flight at 
velocities around the speed of sound and in acquiring data that could be 
used for correlation with ground-based wind-tunnel data. The engineers 
were especially intrigued by the pronounced increase in controllability 
that the adjustable stabilizer provided the XS- 1 at transonic speeds; that 
work constituted a pioneering effort in the development of the “all- 
moving” horizontal tail surfaces that later appeared on the first-generation 
supersonic jet fighters such as the F- 100. As a result of XS- 1 research, 
Soul6 could write in late 1949 that “the power-driven adjustable stabi- 
lizer has already become standard equipment in new transonic-speed 
tactical airplane  design^."^' NACA XS - 1 testing also indicated, with 
shocking impact, just how much drag thick wing sections added at 
transonic speeds. The NACA XS-1, with its 10% thicknesskhord ratio 
wing, had 30% more overall drag at transonic speeds than did ‘the 
thinner wing Air Force XS- 1. Thick-wing sections simply imposed 
unacceptable penalties for transonic and supersonic airplane design. 
There were serendipitous benefits from XS- 1 research as well; the 
extensive calibration of airspeed measurement systems in the XS- 1 ,  
together with the results of ground radar tracking, provided a data base 
for building advanced air speed measurement systems for high-speed 
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airplanes. In a short period of time, then, the NACA XS- 1 effort made 
notable contributions to aviation science, complementing the Air Force 
effort with Glamorous GZennis and justifying the hopes of the planners of 
the XS- 1 joint program. The supersonic assault had been a success.28 
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Pioneer Days at Muroc: 1948- 1950 
Muroc Air Force Base in early 1948 was not only remote, it was 
bleak. In December 1947, NACA's work came to a standstill as per- 
sonnel scrambled away to celebrate the holidays in more appealing sec- 
tions of the country. Indeed, one reason for the impressive amount of 
work that got done might have been sociological: there was little else to 
do. Even by automobile, a trip to Los Angeles was a chore; without one, 
the remaining choice was the afternoon Stage Lines bus that left Muroc 
for Los Angeles at about 5 p.m. The voyager had to spend the night in 
Los Angeles and take another bus back the next evening.' Word about 
the discomforts of Muroc soon spread within the NACA labs, making 
recruitment very difficult. Other events soon exacerbated this situation. 
NACA-MUROC: UNWELCOME TENANT OR VALUED PARTNER? 
Over the summer of 1947, when Langley had decided to establish 
the test team at Muroc permanently as the Muroc Flight Test Unit, 
personnel officers had journeyed to Muroc to ask the workers if they 
wished to stay on as regular staff, thus losing their $3 and $4 per diem as 
employees on temporary duty. Those who chose to leave were paid for 
the return to Hampton.2 During the first year of its existence, the Muroc 
unit experienced a high turnover in personnel; workers quickly split into 
two groups-those who adjusted to the heat, dust, and grit of the desert, 
and those who could not stand the environment for more than a few 
weeks. Many stayed because of job satisfactions not readily apparent. 
They believed they were participating in a program of great national 
importance that would radically alter the future development of aviation; 
they considered it both a great responsibility and an honor to have been 
selected to work on the program. Nevertheless, by January 1948 the 
morale of the NACA unit at Muroc had begun to slip; the long days and 
nights of work were taking their toll. Unhappily, the local Air Force base 
administration had to bear a great deal of responsibility for the condi- 
tions at Muroc. 
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In January 1948, Edmond C. Buckley, the chief of Langley’s 
instrument division, visited Muroc and was appalled by what he saw. His 
ascerbic memo to Hartley Soul6 was read by Langley Laboratory 
Director Henry J. E. Reid, who- thought that Buckley had perhaps 
exaggerated the situation. Reid journeyed to Muroc and was equally 
shocked; Buckley had been right on target. Buckley’s memo first dis- 
cussed the housing situation. The junior married professional staff 
quarters were acceptable by Langley standards. The senior married 
professional staff quarters, however, were vastly inferior to what a 
comparable couple could expect at Langley. The married quarters for 
mechanics were “the equivalent of emergency wartime living  condition^."^ 
Quarters for the single engineers or mechanics were “all Grade A fire 
traps.” The Air Force vigilantly made certain that occupants of base 
housing did not have unauthorized furnishings in their domiciles. In one 
case, an Air Force inspector discovered “an illegal broken-down chair” in 
one of the NACA quarters and “left the quarters in such a fury that the 
door came off the hinges and fell on him.” Lavatory facilities were mostly 
communal, and locked doors were not permitted because of fire hazards. 
Buckley disliked the Muroc Officer’s Mess as well, commenting that 
“for cleanliness, this is not equal to a Hampton or Phoebus pool hall. 
There have, however, been no deaths although dysentery had run 
through the group.” Some NACA personnel chose to eat at the GI Mess 
at North Base. Buckley ate there and reflected that “the sad lot of the 
European DPs came to my mind.” 
Work areas consisted of open hangars, bitterly cold in December and 
January, which lacked darkroom facilities. With both XS- 1 aircraft flying 
and the NACA Douglas Skystreak in its checkout stage, the chances for 
leave were poor; most workers were putting in large amounts of 
overtime. For amusement, Buckley concluded, “one has the choice of 
working or going to bed to keep warm. Reading or writing in your 
quarters is impracticable because of facilities and temperature.” As far as 
social life, Buckley wrote, “Muroc should be staffed with misogynists. 
The future offers nothing.” The staff at Muroc was obviously under strength, 
but three new arrivals were all that Buckley thought he could persuade to 
leave Langley for the desert. 
Walt Williams desperately needed better living and working condi- 
tions for his staff. He wanted a hangar for the exclusive use of NACA, 
office areas colocated with the hangar, and men’s and women’s dormitories. 
NACA already shared the East Main Hangar with the Air Force, but it 
had inadequate office, shop, and stock space, and the electrical system 
was incompatible with NACA’s instrumentation requirements. Blowing 
dust seeped into the work area, compromising satisfactory instrumenta- 
tion work. Williams wished to move into another hangar and construct 
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offices from wood and sheetrock with suitable electrical and plumbing 
installations. Not one to make waves, he was willing to get NACA to 
furnish all the materials and labor if the Air Force would just approve the 
construction, though it was simpler for the Air Force to furnish the 
materials through the Air Materiel Command, with NACA furnishing 
the labor.4 Further, Williams wanted the service to turn over a building, 
“T-83,” to the NACA for use as a dormitory. But all his plans hinged on 
winning the cooperation of the base administration. 
During Henry Reid’s Muroc visit, the Langley chief had met with the 
commanding officer of Muroc Air Force Base, mentioning, as Reid later 
noted, that the NACA needed information on the cost of Muroc quarters 
“in order that we might ask Congress for money to construct some for 
our employees.” The base commander, Col. Signa Gilkey, was unimpressed, 
and Reid later wrote that his request “was like waving a red flag, as 
Colonel Gilkey made it very clear that he did not want other activities 
spending money for permanent installations at Muroc.” Colonel Gilkey 
was also opposed to turning over Air Force buildings to the NACA. In his 
notes on the trip, Reid emphatically stated: “In general, the living 
conditions and the attitude of the commanding officer are such as to be 
demoralizing to everyone. . . . My contacts with the commanding officer 
lead me to believe that one of the things he is afraid of is that if 
contractors and the NACA are allowed to fix up quarters and improve 
their situation, they must allow the Navy the same privilege, and 
eventually control of the base would be lost.” Reid concluded that the 
only real solution would come when the NACA personnel had housing 
available in Lancaster, 50 kilometers away, “where civilians can live a 
normal civilian [and, by implication, civilized] life.”5 
In truth, the situation was more complicated than Reid thought. 
Colonel Gilkey had drawn up an ambitious “Master Plan” for the 
expansion of Muroc, wherein the base would expand to take in nearby 
Rosamond Dry Lake to the west, reroute the railroad tracks that bisected 
Muroc’s dry lake and limited its landing area, and add a 4500-meter 
runway and new building and housing areas. All this would take 
approximately $120 million, and the new facility would include schools 
and shopping areas. (Eventually, all this did come to pass, and it is fair to 
say that Colonel Gilkey was the architect of the modern Air Force Flight 
Test Center complex, a tribute to his foresight.) But he feared that 
complying with the NACA’s requests for improvements to existing 
structures would delay implementation of the master plan. 
The NACA quickly solved its Muroc difficulties to its satisfaction. 
After his return to Langley, Reid took up the matter of the Muroc staff 
with SoulC, Crowley, Dryden, and others, and the matter eventually 
went to Jerome Hunsaker and the NACA Main Committee itself. Air 
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Force committee members quickly supported the plans for the Muroc 
unit, and in April, Williams received title to the long-sought hangar and 
access to Air Force materials. Within the NACA structure, Ames Labora- 
tory was directed to support the Muroc effort, and in May NACA 
personnel, including model makers and technicians from Ames, began 
work on lean-to offices along the sides of the newly acquired hangar. 
Construction was completed on the shops and offices in November 1948, 
and the men’s and women’s dormitories were finished the next spring. 
Muroc was still not a bed of roses, but at least conditions were a bit more 
tolerable.6 
In retrospect the brief spat between the local Air Force administra- 
tion and the NACA was a sorry little affair that served to mar the 
otherwise excellent cooperation (if friendly rivalry) that existed between 
NACA and the Air Force at Muroc. It was a remarkably similar pattern to 
that of the Army-NACA relations over the Langley laboratory in 
1918- 1920.’ Certainly on the operating level there were no inter- 
agency problems, just lots of teamwork and sweat. Any lingering difficul- 
ties disappeared in September 1949 when a new commanding officer 
Brig. Gen. Albert Boyd and Walter Williams examine a model of the Northrop X- 4  
research aircraft. 
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arrived on base, Brig. Gen. Albert Boyd, known throughout the service 
as “the test pilots’ test pilot.” One might have expected two strong-willed 
and dynamic individuals such as Boyd and Williams to strike sparks, but 
this was not the case. A strong bond of friendship, respect, and 
cooperation formed between these two, and the Boyd-Williams relation- 
ship soon proved fruitful both for the NACA and the Air Force.8 
NACA- MUROC LOSES HOWARD LILLY 
There was yet another unhappy episode in the spring of 1948, this 
one truly tragic: Howard Lilly was killed on a research flight in the 
NACA Skystreak on 3 May 1948. 
Understandably, the NACA Skystreak program had played second 
fiddle to the XS-1 throughout late 1947 and into 1948. Not only was it 
recognized that the plane could not compete with the XS- 1 in terms of 
maximum speed capability (even while diving, the Skystreak eventually 
touched mach 1 only once), but it had extensive requirements for 
instrumentation that delayed its flight readiness. NACA technicians 
worked on this craft when they did not have anything to do on the 
XS- 1, and were able to make two familiarization flights in Skystreak by 
the end of 1947. 
The Skystreak had the same general aerodynamic configuration as 
the XS- l-a straight wing and tail, both thinner than conventional 
design practice. Here the resemblance ended, for the D-558-1 (as it 
was designated) took off from the ground under its own power, pro- 
pelled by a General Electric TG- 180 turbojet engine. The Douglas 
company had built three of the D-558-1 Skystreaks, which preceded 
the firm’s three D-558-2 Skyrockets. An agreement among all the 
agencies concerned affirmed the planned delegation of responsibilities 
on the Skystreak program: Douglas would fly the first Skystreak in a 
series of company tests; NACA would get the second and third Skystreaks, 
maintain them, fly them with fuel and oil from the Air Force, and 
perform major aeronautical research; the Navy would accept responsibil- 
ity for engine overhaul and replacement; and Douglas would perform 
the major maintenance and modification work, drawing upon Navy 
funding. This arrangement, confirmed for NACA by a Navy memo on 4 
November 1947, was followed until the retirement of the Skyrockets a 
decade later.g 
Though the second Skystreak had earlier set a world’s airspeed 
record of 1047.13 kilometers per hour, the NACA-Muroc unit quickly 
discovered that the craft was something of a jinx. The landing gear often 
failed to lock fully in the retracted position; on one flight, Lilly had to 
land hurriedly after the cockpit filled with dense smoke from a small 
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electrical fire. Ground trackers watching the scarlet-colored airplane 
through tracking photo-theodolites discovered that the aesthetically 
pleasing plane was very difficult to see against the dark blue desert sky, so 
the fuselage was painted glossy white to facilitate optical tracking-aside 
from the high-temperature Blackbirds and X -  15, all NASA research 
aircraft since have been white or other light colors. On 29 April 
1948, Lilly reached mach 0.88 in the plane, part of a planned flight 
program investigating directional stability at transonic speeds. lo 
On 3 May Lilly took off from Muroc at noon; as the maintenance 
staff had come to expect, he had to land because the balky landing gear 
once more failed to lock properly. Minor adjustments occupied most of 
the afternoon, and it was not until late that Lilly tried again. With a 
lowering sun already casting lengthening shadows, the ground crew 
readied the plane for flight. Lilly ran up the engine, the TG-180 
emitting a rising wail, and started his takeoff, the jet finally lifting off 
after a run of about 1 Vi kilometers. Witnesses saw the landing gear fold 
up into the plane; the Skystreak accelerated. Then, somewhere within 
the jet engine’s compressor section, strain became too great and some 
component failed. In the whirling compressor, such a failure had all the 
catastrophic impact of the flywheel of a huge steam engine coming apart. 
Whole sections of the compressor housing and blades slashed through 
the engine casing and through the fuselage skin. Some pieces cut the 
main fuel lines and severed the craft’s control lines as well. Lilly had no 
control over the plane, whose tail section erupted in flames. Today, in the 
era of “zero-zero” (zero altitude/zero airspeed) ejection seats, he might 
Test pilots Eugene May (left) and Howard Lilly at Muroc with the second Douglas 
0-558-1 Skystreak. 
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have had a chance. But all the ailing Skystreak had was a jettisonable nose 
section so the pilot could abandon it at high altitude. Witnesses saw the 
jet, low over the dry lake, shed a large section of fuselage skin, followed 
by a gout of flame-streaked smoke. Horrified, they watched the Skystreak 
wallow along for a few seconds before sickly slipping into a left yaw and 
roll, dive into the lakebed, and explode. Howard Clifton “Tick” Lilly, a 
five-year NACA veteran and the third pilot to fly faster than sound, 
became the first NACA test pilot killed in the line of duty.” 
Lilly’s death deeply affected the Muroc staff. It was still a small 
group, no more than 40, and the gregarious Lilly, with his West Virginia 
twang, had been a close friend of many. The accident especially shocked 
the safety-conscious Williams. Langley Laboratory, the administrative 
headquarters for Muroc, established an accident board, chaired by 
veteran NACA pilot Me1 Gough. The board reached the conclusion that 
disintegration of the engine compressor section had severed critical 
control and fuel lines. Both Williams and the accident board urged that 
all future research aircraft have the latest model engines, incorporating 
all up-to-date engine modifications and changes (the unfortunate Skystreak 
had had an early model TG- 180, not up to standard as compared with 
later TG-180s on other aircraft). They also insisted that all research 
aircraft incorporate armor plating around the engine in the vicinity of 
control lines, fuel and hydraulic lines, and fuel tanks. Subsequently, 
NACA was most uncompromising at contractor’s “mock-up” inspections 
when the question of protecting planes from disintegrating engines came 
up. Lilly had given his life, but he would be remembered: visitors to the 
Dryden Flight Research Center drive down Lilly Avenue from Rosamond 
Boulevard. And inside the administration building, on the second floor, 
hangs a portrait of this promising and sorely missed test pilot. 
Exactly two weeks after Howard Lilly died at Muroc, Ames labora- 
tory test pilot Ryland Carter perished when a P-5 1 H Mustang broke up 
during a dive. These two accidents, coming after years of a safe research 
record, caused certain persons to suggest that the NACA use contract test 
pilots for NACA flight research, offering-as private industry did- 
bonuses for hazardous aircraft testing. Hugh Dryden called a headquar- 
ters meeting to thrash out an answer. Herb Hoover represented the 
Langley-Muroc group, and Larry Clousing, another NACA test pilot 
with a distinguished flying record, represented Ames. Hoover and 
Clousing, as well as the other NACA pilots present, were adamant that 
NACA pilots fly NACA research aircraft. Dryden concurred and rejected 
any further consideration of using non-NACA pilots on NACA research 
aircraft projects. l2  
The death of Lilly caused a temporary shutdown of NACA flight 
operations at Muroc. Herb Hoover had returned to Langley after Lilly 
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The NACA X-  1 (formerly X S-  I )  research aircraft. 
had checked out both in the NACA XS-1 and the ill-fated NACA 
Skystreak. Now Hoover returned briefly to the desert to train a replace- 
ment pilot, Robert A. Champine, who had considerable flying experience 
with the sweptwing Bell L-39 research airplane, a background that 
made him particularly well qualified for the upcoming NACA program 
at Muroc on the sweptwing Douglas Skyrocket. Sweptwing airplanes had 
tricky behavior at low speeds and during abrupt maneuvering flight. 
Champine completed his first flight at Muroc on 23 November 1948, 
when he checked out in the NACA XS- 1. Hoover returned to Langley 
for good in December.* NACA-Muroc was back in the air.13 
“X-SERIES” ADMINISTRATION 
The hiatus in flight operations at Muroc caused by Lilly’s crash did 
not mean that development of the research aircraft program was 
similarly slowed. Any impartial observer of NACA affairs in mid-1948 
would have recognized how the scope of the research airplane program 
had changed. Originally conceived for the XS-1 and D-558, the 
program had expanded to embrace an XS-2 for sweptwing mach 3 
research, an XS-3 for sustained mach 2 turbojet research, an XS-4 for 
*Hoover himself perished in the crash of a B-45 test plane near Langley on 14 August 1952 
when the plane broke up in midair. 
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transonic research on the tailless configuration, and the XF-92A for 
delta wing research at transonic speeds.* Another batch of advanced 
X-1s had been ordered, and one more projected vehicle, a variable 
wing-sweep design that eventually became the X- 5, was being discussed 
by Bell, the Air Force, and NACA. Each of the NACA laboratories was 
busily at work on phases of the research aircraft program: Arnes and 
Langley were doing wind-tunnel research on configurations, Lewis was 
following up with engine work on turbojets, and the Pilotless Aircraft 
Research Division (PARD) at Wallops Island was firing off models of 
proposed research aircraft. l4 The research aircraft program involved 
extensive dealings with outside parties: the military services financed the 
development of the aircraft and their engines, and private contractors 
manufactured them. Already the load of paperwork and administrative 
chores had justified the appointment of an administrative officer, Marion 
Kent, to the Muroc unit in April 1948. Increasingly Hugh Dryden came 
to believe that the NACA research airplane effort required a central 
point of focus for coordination and communication. Eventually, this led 
to the creation of the NACA Research Airplane Projects Panel (RAPP). 
Since 1945, Hartley A. Soul6 had been acting as NACA’s chief of 
research airplane projects and activities, and his duties had dramatically 
increased. On 9 August 1948 Dryden recognized those increased re- 
sponsibilities by making Soul6 a member of his staff as the agency’s 
Research Airplane Projects Leader. The laboratories were told that “the 
research airplane program involves all laboratories as well as the Muroc 
Unit, and the program coordination is therefore a function of NACA 
 headquarter^."'^ Soul6 would report to Dryden’s deputy, Gus Crowley, 
on research airplane matters. Soul6 wasted little time in expanding upon 
the project leader concept. Desiring to improve interlaboratory communica- 
tions and relationships on the research aircraft, Soul6 sent a memo to 
NACA Headquarters at the end of the month recommending the 
establishment of a special research airplane panel, with a representative 
from each laboratory, headquarters, and the chief of the Muroc Flight 
Test Unit. The panel would “effect proper coordination of the interests 
of the three laboratories in Muroc projects [including] the status of the 
research airplane projects at or proposed for Muroc, the current position 
of supporting investigations at each of the laboratories, and technical 
problems relating to each project.”16 On 2 September 1948, the plan was 
approved and Soul6 was appointed  hairm man.'^ Over the next two 
weeks, Soul6 notified each of the labs and Walt Williams of the panel’s 
*“XS became simply “ X  after 1 1  June 1948 as a result of a change in Air Force aircraft 
designation policy. “ X  is used subsequently throughout the text. 
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creation, receiving in return their concurrence in the decision and 
nomination of representatives to the panel.’* 
Establishment of the Research Airplane Projects Panel under SoulC’s 
leadership codified an existing administrative relationship by giving 
SoulC’s actions the trappings of a formal bureaucratic structure. The 
action demonstrated that the program had grown to such size that it was 
no longer possible to manage or monitor it on a laboratory level. It 
required management directly from Headquarters-though, wisely, Dry- 
den selected SoulC, the former Langley boss, for the position. With 
Dryden and Crowley at the helm, and Soul6 next, the research airplane 
program had the unequivocal support of the highest NACA echelons. 
Further, the creation of RAPP gave the NACA better and more 
streamlined coordination of the laboratories’ activities on research air- 
craft projects. RAPP fit smoothly into NACA’s lifestyle; since its inception 
NACA had been governed by the Main Committee and its fields of 
research overseen by specialized committees or panels. Every year, until 
abolishment of the panel on the eve of the X-15’s flight program, 
Williams submitted a detailed annual report to the panel, outlining the 
research programs at the dry lake, and the programs being planned. The 
panel was somewhat of a formality as far as Williams was concerned. In 
most cases, he won easy endorsement of his plans from the panel at its 
annual meetings, usually held early in February. Through RAPP 
participation, the laboratories learned some of the operating problems 
facing the Muroc unit, and the RAPP played a crucial role in sorting out 
some of the difficulties in the X-series development programs. 
Creation of RAPP also marked implicit recognition of another 
factor, almost a political one: the research airplane program was NACA’s 
most visible symbol of postwar research, and to an agency desirous of 
retaining its image as a far-seeing, up-to-date scientific organization (an 
image tarnished by its prewar failure to pursue turbojet propulsion), the 
glamorous research aircraft gave NACA’s public image a badly needed 
shot in the arm. Participation in the research aircraft effort had begun in 
almost casual fashion; in the memoirs of one engineer, “it took form 
gradually, manipulated and developed in innumerable lunchroom con- 
versations and other  contact^."'^ But by mid- 1948, the program had 
assumed such stature that it provided some of NACA’s strongest cards 
whenever Jerome Hunsaker or Hugh Dryden took the agency’s budget 
to Congress for approval. RAPP helped by drawing greater attention to 
the agency’s commitment to the research aircraft effort. Interestingly, it 
imposed few administrative or bureaucratic chores on program adminis- 
trators at Muroc and the NACA laboratories. NACA’s traditional pattern 
of delegated authority for project management minimized paperwork 
and meetings. While the Wallops model-rocket testing program and the 
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Muroc effort were exceptions-requiring interlaboratory ties within 
NACA and ties to outside organizations as well-management, in the 
reflective words of engineer John Becker, remained “delightfully simple, 
direct, unobtrusive, and inexpensive.”“ 
The same climate that helped create the RAPP and elevate Hartley 
A. Soul6 to the position of Research Airplane Projects Leader generated 
the next change in the status of the Muroc unit itself: it was time to raise it 
organizationally from the level of a detached unit under the direction of 
a remote parent (Langley Laboratory) to that of a semiautonomous 
NACA “station,” only one notch below a “laboratory.” Langley had 
designated the Muroc Flight Test Unit as a permanent appendage of the 
parent center in September 1947. Certainly, by mid-1949, NACA admin- 
istrators could foresee a continuing need for the Muroc facility for at 
least a decade: the agency had plans for participation in the X- 1, X-2, 
X-3, X-4, D-558-1, D-558-2, advanced X-1, and the XF-92A 
program, as well as consultant status on some of the Air Force projects 
being tested at Muroc. Other projects, such as the gestating X-5, were in 
the discussion stage. By now, the value of having a single, specialized 
locus in the agency for flight testing of high-performance aircraft was 
also readily apparent. Muroc offered unsurpassed year-round flying 
conditions, permitting maximum utilization of research aircraft. It was 
also the Air Force flight testing center, the service that played the major 
role in financing and supporting the postwar X-series. For the NACA 
Muroc Flight Test Unit to fulfill its growing responsibilities in testing and 
research on these aircraft, it would have to expand. Already growth was 
rapid. At the time of Yeager’s flight, the unit had 27 workers. A little over 
a year later, in January 1949, it had 60. In January 1950, this had 
doubled again, to 132. Through fiscal 1949, Langley Laboratory had 
carried responsibility for funding the Muroc unit; but in August 1949, 
with the onset of FY 1950, Muroc appeared for the first time as a line 
item on its own: NACA’s FY 1950 budget, approved by Congress on 24 
August 1949, included $685 072 for the NACA Muroc unit. (By comparison, 
Langley received over $16 million.) On 14 November 1949 the Muroc 
unit was redesignated the NACA High-speed Flight Research Station 
(HSFRS), a title more accurately reflecting the broad scope of flight 
research contemplated for Muroc than the previous one.“ 
EXPANDING UPON THE SONIC BREAKTHROUGH 
The year 1949 was important to the NACA Muroc installation in 
several ways; there were, of course, the changes in the administration of 
the field site, reflected in its new title. But 1949 held particular impor- 
tance as the year that the Muroc unit really resumed its research flying, 
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suspended with the death of Howard Lilly and the loss of the NACA 
Skystreak. The year also saw active involvement with three new research 
airplanes: a replacement Skystreak, the Northrop X-4, and the swept- 
wing D-558-2 Skyrocket. By 1950, the Skystreak and Skyrocket had 
added significantly to the transonic aerodynamic information acquired 
by the two X-Is, and the X-4 program was causing Williams and the 
NACA staff innumerable headaches, as will be seen. 
Although in retrospect there proved to be little reason to build both 
the Skystreak and the Bell XS-1, it would have taken a gambler to 
predict that outcome before the sonic barrier was breached. The major 
reason for the Skystreak was that it could cruise for an extended time 
above mach 0.8, freeing the XS-1 for mach 0.9 and higher, thus 
complementing the research program on the rocket airplane. But this 
was a justification after the fact; when the Skystreak was first proposed, it 
was competing for the same mission as the rival XS- 1. And unlike the 
AAF-sponsored XS- 1, the Skystreak was a Navy-sponsored program. 
John Stack, NACA’s leading research airplane advocate, saw the Skystreak 
as much more in line with what the NACA wished a transonic research 
airplane to be-jet propelled and relatively conventional in concept. The 
Navy, for its part, hoped that the D-558-1 Skystreak would lead to a 
military fighter derivative. The XS- 1, in fact, was almost single-handedly 
the result of AAF research airplane advocate Ezra Kotcher and his 
unrelenting efforts to develop a mach 1.2 rocket-propelled craft. As John 
Becker has stated, it is ironic that Stack and NACA eventually shared the 
Collier Trophy for the achievements of the research airplane they least 
favored, the XS- 1 .22 Nevertheless, one should not minimize the impor- 
tance of the Skystreak to NACA’s flight research effort: from 1948 
through 1952 it was the nation’s most sophisticated straight-wing turbojet- 
powered research airplane for transonic flight testing. 
The NACA resumed its research with the Skystreak in early 1949; by 
the end of the year, SoulC was writing that the data from the X- 1 and the 
D-558- 1 were affording “very complete coverage of design informa- 
tion for high-speed straight-wing airplanes from takeoff to the transonic 
speed ranges.”23 Despite its sleek appearance, tests of the Skystreak 
quashed hopes by the Navy and Douglas that they might spin-off a 
tactical fighter. As it neared mach 1, Skystreak‘s handling qualities 
deteriorated rapidly. The force a pilot had to exert on its control wheel 
for longitudinal trim increased some six times-from 22 newtons to 133 
(from 5 pounds to 30)-between mach 0.82 and 0.87. It tended to wallow 
about the sky at transonic speeds, certainly not an efficient weapon 
platform for service use.24 
The Skystreak did make one major contribution to aeronautical 
engineering practice, a contribution indicative of the relatively easy- 
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NACA’s D o u g h  Skystreak cruises high over the Antelope Vallej during a transonic 
research flight. 
going and freewheeling managerial style that governed Muroc in the 
late 1940s. Langley’s John Stack had concluded that adding little metal 
tabs or vanes (called vortex generators) in a row running in a spanwise 
direction (wingtip to wingtip) on the top and bottom of a wing might act 
to stabilize the position of shock waves on the wing, reducing undesirable 
trim changes and raising the so-called “limiting” mach number of the 
plane. He called Walt Williams, who installed the tabs on the Skystreak by 
simply gluing them to the wing-the Skystreak had a fuel-filled “wet” 
wing that prohibited riveting. The row of generators indeed worked, 
raising the plane’s maximum controllable speed by 0.05 mach, a signifi- 
cant increase. Industry quickly applied the results to new aircraft such as 
the Boeing B -4’7 Stratojet medium bomber. Vortex generators subse- 
quently appeared on many other aircraft as well. Williams was criticized 
in certain administrative circles for not securing prior approval from 
NACA Headquarters; but in his mind it was more important to secure 
results quickly and expeditiously than tie a project up in bureaucratic 
approvals. One need only compare the rapid implementation of the 
vortex generator idea with the 19’70s winglet research program to 
appreciate the simplicity and directness of the earlier approach. The 
Skystreak completed its last vortex generator research flight in June 
1950, when it reached mach 0.99, the limits of its performance. Though 
not retired until 1953, Skystreak .had reached its zenith.25 
It fell to the sweptwing Douglas Skyrocket to explore another 
interesting aerodynamic situation, this one a potentially dangerous 
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instability predicted by wind-tunnel tests-the pitch-up phenomenon, 
which plagued early sweptwing aircraft designs. 
The Skyrocket seemed an unlikely choice for a successful research 
airplane, given its early history. Designed for both a jet and a rocket 
engine-the rocket for high-speed boost-and to take off from the 
ground, the Skyrocket appeared in early 1948 as a graceful sweptwing 
design having only its jet engine installed because the planned rocket 
propulsion system was well behind schedule. The first Skyrocket (the 
D-558-2, as it was known) flew at Muroc on 4 February 1948, piloted 
by company test pilot John Martin. The NACA received the second one 
built at the end of the year. Following installation of an instrumentation 
package, the plane completed its first NACA research flight on 24 May 
1949, piloted by Bob Champine. The Skyrocket was not viewed favorably 
by the NACA Muroc unit. Without its planned rocket engine, the 
Skyrocket lacked the necessary thrust for really meaningful- transonic 
research. As Walt Williams later recalled, “We had to get off the ground 
before the temperature reached 80” F. You’d struggle to get to 24 000 
feet [9300 meters], using almost all your fuel for the climb, and then you 
had to dive to get to 0.9 mach. Flight endurance was thirty minutes or 
less.”26 Nevertheless, the NACA hoped that flight testing of the craft 
would complement earlier low-speed work at Langley with the L- 39, 
and a companion effort at Ames laboratory with a specially instrumented 
North American F-86A jet fighter. Happily, the NACA’s expectations 
for the Skyrocket were met, and the D-558-2 program joined the X- 1 
as one of the two most successful of the early research airplane programs. 
Skyrocket’s first brush with pitch-up came on 8 August 1949, when 
test pilot Champine banked into a tight 4-g turn at the modest speed of 
The NACA Douglas 0-558-2 Skyrocket research aircraft. 
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mach 0.6. Suddenly, without warning, the Skyrocket nosed upward 
violently-its gravity force recorder indicated that the structure had 
sustained a momentary 6-g loading. Shaken, Champine applied down 
elevator, regained control, and landed. Wind-tunnel studies had indi- 
cated that sweptwing airplanes might experience the pitch-up phenome- 
non during “accelerated” maneuvers such as high-g turns because of 
changes in the lifting characteristics of the wing and a decrease in 
effectiveness of the horizontal tail, particularly if the plane’s flight 
attitude “blanketed” the tail from the oncoming airflow. Champine’s 
flight gave NACA aerodynamicists the first opportunity to study data 
taken during an actual pitch-up excursion, as well as a new appreciation 
of the seriousness of the problem. (During takeoff and landing, for 
example, pitch-up might stall a sweptwing airplane and plunge it into the 
ground before the pilot had a chance to recover; at high speeds, the 
danger of pitch-up might unduly restrict the maneuvering performance 
of sweptwing jet fighters.) Subsequently NACA Muroc pilot John Grif- 
fith had an even more serious encounter with pitch-up, during a similar 
4-g turn. He tried to fight the maneuver by forcing the nose down, but 
Skyrocket’s tail effectiveness was low, and the plane commenced rolling 
and yawing before spasmodically snap-rolling. Griffith recovered handily, 
but later in the same flight, while performing an approach to stall with 
the craft’s wing flaps and landing gear extended, Skyrocket abruptly 
pitched up as its airspeed dropped below 2 10 kilometers per hour; again 
Griffith tried to fight it, and this time the plane rolled into a spin, 
dropping 2 100 meters before Griffith was able to return it to level flight. 
NACA Muroc discontinued Skyrocket’s pitch-up program in 1950, when 
the agency and Navy sent the craft back to Douglas to be modified 
exclusively for rocket propulsion and air-launch from a mother airplane, 
like the Bell X- 1 .  Nevertheless, the NACA realized that it had encoun- 
tered a serious aerodynamic problem, and the 1949 pitch-up studies 
presaged a much more thorough investigation during 195 1 - 1953 using 
another Skyrocket, about which more will be said.*’ 
In contrast to the productive work on Skystreak and Skyrocket, the 
Northrop X-4 program caused the NACA a great deal of concern 
during 1948-1950. The X-4 was a small twin-jet airplane having a 
swept wing but no horizontal tail surfaces. Instead it relied on combined 
elevator and aileron control surfaces called elevons for its control in pitch 
and roll. It was similar in general configuration to Britain’s ill-fated De 
Havilland D.H. 108 Swallow which had crashed in 1946, and NACA 
suspected (rightly so) that the X-4 might suffer from the same stability 
and control problems-especially a dangerous pitching oscillation as it 
neared the speed of sound. Some engineers within the Air Force and 
Northrop hoped that the X-4 might offer a reasonable configuration 
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for high-speed flight. NACA was under no such illusions, though 
engineers thought the craft might prove very useful for dynamic stability 
studies and studies of varying an airplane’s lift-to-drag ratio so as to 
understand better the behavior and handling qualities of airplanes hav- 
ing extremely low lift-to-drag ratios. Much of this latter work benefited 
the later X-15 program. 
The NACA had hoped to receive in December 1948 one of the two 
X-4 airplanes being built, but because of manufacturing delays the first 
airplane only completed its maiden flight that month. The contractor 
program on the X-4 did not go smoothly; the plane was, in pilot’s 
parlance, a maintenance “dog,” far worse than the Skystreak that had 
killed Lilly. Northrop’s test pilot completed only three flights in the plane 
in six months. Much against its will, the NACA Muroc technical staff 
found itself increasingly involved with the plane. It should not have been 
involved until its own aircraft arrived for testing, but Northrop needed 
help and drew upon the Muroc unit for analysis of flight test data. 
Normally, Williams would not have objected, but he had his hands full 
with the NACA X- 1,  Skystreak, and Skyrocket. He simply lacked the 
manpower to perform data reduction and even engineering duties in 
support of a contractor’s program. Adding insult to injury, the company 
alleged that its delays stemmed from NACA’s slowness in working up 
data from the flights! In response to a puzzled inquiry from Hartley 
SoulC, Williams sent back a blistering memo castigating Northrop’s 
operating procedures and mechanical problems, concluding that “the 
airplane is a difficult machine to operate and the research information to 
be gained is of small value for the work involved.”28 NACA, Williams 
promised, would do what it could to support the Northrop program; 
“We, however, have better use for these people, and as has been stated 
before, the sooner we drop the project the better off we will be.”29 
The X-4 did have some NACA friends, especially Smitty De France 
of Ames, who wanted to use the aircraft as a dynamic stability research 
vehicle in support of some Ames research. Headquarters had already 
planned to rotate certain engineers through the Muroc site to familiarize 
other laboratories with the work being done in the desert, and Ames 
detailed a staff engineer, Melvin Sadoff, to the Muroc station as X-4 
project engineer. Eventually, nearly two years behind schedule, NACA 
received the second X-4, the one built for agency research; the first 
airplane made only 10 flights before being grounded as a source of spare 
parts for the second. Completing its first NACA mission in November 
1950, the second X-4 soon proved a valuable research tool for dynamic 
stability research, largely because it was a much more reliable craft than 
its predecessor. Delays such as the X-4‘s were not uncommon in 
first-generation research airplanes: with the exception of the first X- 1 s 
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and the Skystreaks, all subsequent programs experienced greater or 
lesser delays-primarily, it appears, from contractors underestimating 
the work required to develop specialized research airplanes3’ 
THE END OF THE BEGINNING 
In November 1949, the Air Force had offered Glamorous Gbnnis, the 
original X- 1, to NACA as a research airplane. But NACA was already so 
committed to advanced research aircraft that Soul6 was not about to 
accept a well-worn if historic hand-me-down. He recommended instead 
that the X-1 be sent to the Smithsonian Institution. Following its last 
flight-fittingly enough, by Chuck Yeager-on 12 May 1950, it was. 
The retirement of the X-1 marked the end of the first tentative 
phase of supersonic research, the first nibbling away at the speed of 
sound, the first cautious edging beyond mach 1. The next phase would 
come with the detailed examination of transonic flight by such craft as 
the X-3, X-4, X-5, XF-92A, and D-558-2; and the continuation of 
frontier-pushing to mach 2 and 3 with the advanced X- Is, the all-rocket 
D-558-2, and the X-2. 
By 1950, the NACA was readying two large “slotted throat” tunnels 
for transonic research, one having a 2.4-meter test section useful to mach 
1.15, and the second having a 4.8-meter test section and capable of mach 
1.08. Even now, there still was a small “grey area” just around the speed 
of sound beyond about mach 0.98. The absence of ground-based 
research facilities for transonic testing that led to the early X-series 
aircraft had been overcome in rapid order largely because the X-series 
provided a research focus and an urgency that stimulated development 
of new methods of ground research and new tools such as the slotted 
throat tunnel. Because of the forcing function that the X-series imposed 
upon the development of ground research methods and tools, the 
principal accomplishments of the early X-series (the X-1 and the 
D-558- I)  lay less in their providing unique new information than in 
their validating the utility of new laboratory research techniques by 
providing “real-world” comparison data taken from flight testing3’ 
Finally and most important, though, was an undeniable psychologi- 
cal benefit coming from the first supersonic flights of these first research 
aircraft, a benefit aptly summarized by one program participant: “The 
most basic value was the liberation of researchers and aircraft designers 
from their fears and inhibitions relative to the ‘sonic barrier.’ The 
awesome transonic zone had been reduced to ordinary proportions, and 
aeronautical engineers could now proceed with the design of supersonic 




Testing the Shapes of Planes 
to Come: 1950-1956 
On 27 January 1950 the Air Force held a special dedication 
ceremony at Muroc, renaming the desert facility Edwards Air Force 
Base, in honor of test pilot Glen Edwards, who had died in a test flight 
from the site in 1948. The ceremony symbolized the increasing emphasis 
that the Air Force was placing upon flight testing, an emphasis that led to 
the designation of Edwards in 1951 as the Air Force Flight Test Center 
(AFFTC) with responsibility for testing aircraft, operating other test 
facilities, and providing support and services for contractors and other 
government agencies, such as NACA. The 1950s, old-timers recall, were 
the “Golden Years” of Edwards, a period of unparalleled expansion, a 
time when new speed and altitude records were set almost monthly, and 
the boom of igniting rocket engines punctuated conversations, giving the 
center its own distinct and exciting character. The Korean War stimu- 
lated expansion at Edwards. Air Force expenditures for the base leapt 
from $3.5 million in FY 1950 to $28.7 million in FY 1955, and to $82.3 
million in FY 1960; personnel grew from 3938 to 8278 in the same 
period. The base expanded from 795 square kilometers in 1952 to over 
1214 square kilometers by mid-1955, making it the largest flight test 
center in the world.’ 
In the nine years after 1950, the NACA station at Edwards worked at 
an intensive level. The unit concluded its major role in the supersonic 
breakthrough (fittingly enough, it was a NACA pilot who first exceeded 
mach 2), tested and evaluated a wide range of vehicles having new 
configuration concepts for high-speed flight, supported the development 
of military service aircraft, and undertook theoretical studies that eventu- 
ally prepared the way for the hypersonic X- 15 of the following decade. 
The station’s growth mirrored that of the Air Force installation, though 
on a smaller scale. The total complement grew from 132 in January 1950 
to 332 in December 1959, and its budget rose from $685 thousand for FY 
1950 to $3.28 million for FY 1959. (A year later, reflecting the X-15 
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NACA pilots plan an X- 1  research flight. 
drive, this had jumped to $6.99 million, rising to $32.97 million by 1968.) 
During the 1950s the NACA Edwards installation gained complete 
autonomy from Langley. When NACA became NASA in 1958, the station 
was redesignated the NASA Flight Research Center (FRC) on 27 Septem- 
ber 1959, making it coequal administratively with the other NASA 
centers. * 
AUTONOMY ARRIVES 
The cutting of the umbilical with Langley was not surprising. Since 
1946, the Muroc-and then Edwards-facility had moved steadily and 
surely away from the parent. Though the work of the two centers 
complemented one another, Langley’s aeronautical thinking would al- 
ways be dominated by the wind tunnel; just as thinking at Edwards would 
always be dominated by the research airplane. Since the High-speed 
Flight Research Station already reported directly to headquarters through 
Hartley Soul6 as Research Airplane Projects Leader, there was little need, 
except nostalgia, to keep the center allied firmly with Langley. But an 
autonomous center required all the trappings of a major research facility: 
it must have good quarters, research areas, and work space; an indepen- 
dent administration; and fiscal organization defensible before outside 
agencies. Assisting the hopes of those who sought autonomy was the 
situation with the Air Force: with the adoption of the Edwards “Master 
Plan,” the Air Force had committed itself to moving from its old South 
Base to a new location midway between the South and North Bases. The 
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NACA would have to move as well-so why not take advantage of the 
situation and move into a full-blown research facility rather than sorne- 
thing less? In August 1951 Congress approved $4 million for construc- 
tion of new laboratory facilities for the NACA at Edwards, supplementing 
a previous grant of $919 281 covering the station’s salaries and expenses 
for FY 1952. The Air Force issued a lease to the NACA for more than ?h 
square kilometer on the northwestern shore of the dry lake, and con- 
struction started on the NACA station in early February 1953: one 
large building would have hangar space to house the research airplanes, 
shop and instrumentation facilities, and  office^.^ 
By early 1954, the new site was nearing completion. A headquarters 
directive on 17 March 1954 designated it an autonomous unit effective 1 
July 1954, with the title NACA High-speed Flight Station (HSFS). The 
transition to autonomy involved a lot more than just a change in title; 
Ground-breaking for the new High-speed Flight Station facilities, 27 January (lefit to 
right): Gerald Truszynski, Joseph Vensel, Walter Williams, Marion Kent, and California 
state official Arthur Samet. 
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The NACA High-speed Flight Station, completed in 1954 at a cost of $3.8 million. This ZS 
still the core of the Dryden Flight Research Center. 
Edwards did not play Minerva to Langley’s Zeus. Every facet of center 
administration and operation had to be accounted for, expanded upon, 
and separated from Langley. This included budget, center management 
(already autonomous except in name), safety, establishment of a center 
library, preparation of a procedures manual, appointment of a legal 
officer, appointment of a procurement officer, selecting a color code for 
center correspondence, design of an HSFS letterhead, transmittal of 
NACA general directives and policy letters, issuance of a code letter for 
use in designating HSFS reports, appointment of a Defense Materials 
Officer, and transmitting a complete set of NACA reports to the center. 
All this took weeks to sort out. Finally, all was ready. On 26 June 1954 the 
NACA group moved from its make-do offices and hangar space on 
South Base to the nucleus of the present Dryden Flight Research Center 
facilities. They were on their 
By 1954, the NACA station at Edwards already was a research 
facility with strong in-house technical capabilities; likewise the fundamen- 
tal organization of the station was well established, a basic arrangement 
still generally followed over two decades later. There were four branches- 
later termed divisions and then, under NASA, directorates. These were 
administration, research, operations, and instrumentation. 
Administration, of course, meant Walt Williams and his staff. He did 
not have a deputy, though in his absence De E. Beeler often assumed the 
role of acting chief. Williams’s managerial style emphasized minimal 
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NACA Headquarters officials inspect the High-speed Flight Station’s new facilities in 
1954 (left to right, front row): Jerome Hunsaker, Walter Williams, Hugh Dryden; (middle 
row) Scott Crossfield, Joseph Vensel, John Victoly; (back row) Marion Kent, De E .  Beeler, 
Gerald Truszynski. 
paperwork, informal communication and decision-making, rigorous at- 
tention to time and cost schedules and, above all, an unwavering 
commitment to safety. His great flexibility in structuring management 
defies placing Williams within any of the standard industrial-organization 
schools of management such as “Theory X,” “Theory Y,” “MBO,” etc. It 
most closely mirrors the “gamesman” approach but without the “games- 
man’s’’ frequently cynical view of his role within an institution. Williams 
was without question a highly effective administrator, as was his successor 
Paul F. Bikle, a man who reflected the same attributes. 
Research was supervised by De E. Beeler, an intense, hard-driving 
individualist. Research involved the center’s mathematicians, engineers, 
and physicists. This branch did the work on aircraft stability and control, 
flutter and vibration, loads, structures, performance, and other special 
research, including design conceptualization of advanced aerospace 
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vehicles. This group supervised the flight research portion of the aircraft 
flight-testing programs. Eventually the research branch got into aircraft 
simulation as well, for flight planning, pilot training, systems analysis, 
and performance prediction. 
Operations was the feifdom of Joe Vensel, a veteran NACA test pilot 
who ran the pilots’ office, supervised flight operations and maintenance 
of the aircraft, and helped plan and monitor the flight programs. Crusty 
but fatherly, Vensel ruled with an iron hand; somewhat deaf from his 
years in open-cockpit biplanes, Vensel had the habit of turning off his 
hearing aid and going to sleep if a meeting became boring. The test pilots 
under him maintained close liaison with the engineers in research. 
Instrumentation was the responsibility of Gerald M. Truszynski, who 
established a reputation for thoroughness that helped make him a senior 
NASA administrator a decade later. This branch undertook the instru- 
mentation and calibration of the various research airplanes, and pro- 
vided flight tracking and data acquisition services. Though HSFS occa- 
sionally did its own instrument fabrication, it generally relied upon 
Edmond Buckley’s instrumentation group at Langley for development. 
NACA still relied on a pair of old SCR- 584 radars, though it was obvious 
that as the capabilities of the X series advanced to mach 3 and beyond, so 
would the need for a specially instrumented high-speed flight corridor 
with several data-linked tracking stations. This would come to pass with 
the establishment of the X- 15 High Range. 
In a broad sense, the research aircraft program involved a coopera- 
tive effort among three parties-industry, the military services, and 
NACA. This was reflected in the way testing took place at Edwards. The 
testing process closely followed the military pattern of airplane acquisi- 
tion and testing, with the difference that NACA added another aspect all 
its own. First, a contractor would build a research airplane to military 
specifications, usually derived in conjunction with NACA; this was 
particularly true for the rocket-research aircraft and the D - 558 series. 
Standard practice called for the contractor to deliver the first aircraft 
built to Edwards for so-called Phase I testing. This involved the contractor’s 
own pilots demonstrating that the airplane had generally satisfactory 
handling qualities and conformed to the contract. Then the contractor 
would usually deliver the aircraft to the Air Force, with a second craft 
going to NACA for detailed research investigations. The NACA HSFS 
would generally provide data acquisition and analysis support to the 
contractor and the Air Force on their programs. 
Despite the oft-heard claim that the military and contractor pro- 
grams were “scientific research,” more often than not, especially on the 
rocket-propelled aircraft, the programs were little more than contractor 
verification of the plane’s flying qualities, followed by repeated attempts 
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by the contractor and, later, the service, to set new speed and altitude 
records. Such flying was always viewed with disfavor by the NACA 
because it seemed an unnecessary risk of expensive research tools. The 
De Havilland D.H. 108 lost in Britian, for example, had been destroyed 
during a practice speed run for a planned airspeed record flight attempt. 
Aside from seeking records, service research tended to emphasize 
pragmatic military values rather than the niceties of aerodynamic and 
propulsion studies; as has been mentioned, the Navy closely watched the 
Skystreak program to see if it could spawn a tactical airplane. The Air 
Force evaluated the Bell X-5 variable-sweep aircraft to see if it could be 
modified into a cheap fighter for NATO and other foreign countries. As 
part of the Air Force Cook-Craigie acquisition plan (to be discussed 
subsequently), NACA laboratories around the country received current- 
generation military aircraft for flight testing in support of the military 
research and development programs on these aircraft. NACA-Edwards 
tested many of these aircraft as well. 
Generally speaking, then, flight testing at NACA-Edwards during 
the 1950s involved research on the X-series aircraft and research support 
on various military aircraft programs. The X series itself broke down into 
two major subcategories of aircraft: configuration explorers-aircraft 
having unique and unusual design shapes requiring verification or 
refutation, such as the X-3, X-4, X-5, XF-92A, and, to a lesser 
extent, the D -558 - 2 Skyrocket-and supersonic aerodynamic research 
vehicles having rocket propulsion and being air-launched from modified 
Boeing B-29 or B-50 bombers-such as the advanced X- Is, the 
all-rocket D-558-2 Skyrocket, and the Bell X-2. The configuration 
testbeds were rarely flown beyond mach 1, because most were simply 
transonic in performance. The X-3, for instance, was a planned mach 2 
configuration testbed that failed to fly anywhere near that mark because 
the manufacturer had to use less powerful engines than originally 
intended. The third D-558-2 Skyrocket, which retained both jet and 
rocket propulsion, is included in the configuration group because of its 
extensive sweptwing pitch-up investigations undertaken during the 1950s. 
The rocket-propelled supersonic research aircraft, on the other hand, 
were the aircraft that first exceeded mach 2 and 3. 
In the mid-1950s the research aircraft program continued to expand. 
Soul6 and other program officials could see three broad streams: the 
early rocket research airplanes and configuration explorers, a hypersonic 
research vehicle that soon became the X- 15, and, beyond, a true winged 
orbital spacecraft (termed a “boost-glider”) known as “Dyna-Soar” (for 
Dynamic Soaring). These roughly sequential streams or “rounds” caused 
Hartley Soul6 to dub the early rocket research aircraft and configuration 
explorers “Round One.” The X-15 became “Round Two,” and the 
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Dyna-Soar became “Round Three.” This after-the-fact classification 
quickly passed into the NACA’s official records and n~menclature.~ 
NACA’s CONFIGURATION EXPLORERS 
The High-speed Flight Research Station’s research on new aircraft 
really involved studies of aerodynamic, stability and control, and han- 
dling qualities on five basic configurations: the sweptwing, the semitailless, 
the delta wing, the variable-sweep wing, and the low-aspect-ratio thin 
wing. 
Configuration Aircraft Speed Range 
Sweptwing Douglas D-558-2 #3 Mach 1.0 
Semitailless Northrop X-4 #2 Mach 0.9 
Delta wing Convair XF-92A Mach 0.9+ 
Variable-sweep Bell X-5 # 1  Mach 0.9+ 
Low AR thin wing Douglas X-3 Mach 0.95 
All these aircraft were also associated with particular aerodynamic 
research or dynamic stability problems as well. 
Aircraft Research Problem 
Douglas D-558-2 #3 Sweptwing pitch-up during 
maneuvering. 
Northrop X-4 #2 Pitching oscillation of increasing 
severity approaching mach 0.95. 
Convair XF-92A Delta pitch-up during maneuvering. 
Bell X-5 #1 
Douglas X-3 
Unacceptable stall-spin behavior: 
sweptwing pitch-up during 
maneuvering. 
Coupled motion instability during 
abrupt rolling maneuvers. 
Each of these problems was a major concern to an aircraft industry 
undertaking the design of new combat aircraft vastly different in 
configuration and speed potential from those of only five years before, 
and to the Air Force and Navy, whose pilots might have to fly and fight in 
these new designs. Thus, any detailed understanding of these difficulties 
would be welcomed as a significant contribution. 
With the exception of the Douglas X-3, each of the other four 
configuration explorers exhibited some degree of pitch-up problem, 
ranging from moderate to severe. Of all five aircraft, the only one having 
generally pleasant flying characteristics was the D-558-2. The others 
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NACAs early X-series fleet (from lgt): Douglas 0-558-2 Skyrocket, Douglas 0 - 5 5 8 - 1  
Skystreak, Bell X-5, Bell X- 1, Convair XF-92A, Northrop X- 4.  
exhibited the following behavior characteristics, which generally stemmed 
either from the peculiar configuration or the lack of a powerful enough 
engine: 
Aircraft Behavior Problem 
Northrop X-4 #2 Poorly damped “hunting” motion 
about all three axes; “washboard 
road”motion. 
Convair XF-92A Sluggish and underpowered. 
Bell X-5 # I  Dangerous stall approach and spin 
tendencies. 
Douglas X-3 Sluggish and very underpowered. 
After exploring the basic behavior of the aircraft and its characteristics, 
NACA generally made aerodynamic modifications to the design to 
evaluate whether certain concepts such as wing leading edge extensions 
or wing fences would improve the behavior. If they did, NACA con- 
cluded that these were generally applicable design features that could 
improve the behavior characteristics of that type of configuration. Such 
modifications were not attempted with the X-3 and X-5 because of cost 
and complexity considerations. Modifications evaluated on the other 
three aircraft were: 
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Aircraft Modifications 
Douglas D-558-2 #3 Various wing slat and wing fence 
combinations, leading edge 
extensions. 
Northrop X-4 #2 Increasing the thickness of the 
trailing edge of the wing and elevon. 
Convair XF-92A Various combinations of wing fences. 
Aside from a coupled-motions instability investigation on the X-3, the 
problem of greatest interest to the industry and military services was that 
of pitch-up, encountered in various forms by the D-558-2, the XF-92A, 
and the X-5. 
Pitch-up was a problem inherent in any sweptwing or delta airplane. 
As a sweptwing airplane approaches a stalled flight condition-either at 
low speed by flying at an increasingly higher nose-up angle of attack and 
a lower and lower speed, or at high speed in an abrupt turning maneuver 
at a high-g loading-the natural tendency of the airflow around the wing 
is accentuated, notably the tendency of the airflow to flow outward 
toward the wing tips (spanwise flow), promoting the development of 
so-called “separated” airflow, causing a loss of lift at the wing tips. As the 
stall condition progresses, the area of the stall moves progressively “up” 
the wing toward the wing root, followed by the center of lift of the wing. 
Put another way, the zone of wing lift becomes smaller and smaller and 
concentrated toward the fuselage, hence further “forward” along the 
plane’s longitudinal axis. The change of lift vector to a point further 
forward along the len th of the plane causes the plane to nose abruptly 
Pitch-up could be overcome by several “fixes”: a “sawtooth” leading 
edge extension would promote the formation of “active” airflow, defeat- 
ing the tendency of the wing to exhibit spanwise flow; wing fences, 
literally small “fences” running in a chordwise (leading edge to trailing 
edge) direction to divert the spanwise flow into chordwise flow; and open 
wing slats (dating from the 1920s) to delay the onset of turbulent 
separated airflow over the wing at high angles of attack. All these were 
examined on Skyrocket and XF-92A. The best solution was to place the 
horizontal tail low on the aft fuselage of an aircraft, where it would be 
below the wing wake and downwash of the wing. Skyrocket and the X-5 
both had highly placed horizontal tails, giving them particularly objection- 
able pitch-up characteristics. The RAPP suggested adding a low horizon- 
tal tail to both for evaluation purposes, but the problems and cost 
outweighed the potential benefits. In any case, the obvious conclusion 
from NACA testing as to the desirability of the low horizontal tail surface 
led to that configuration’s becoming standard on the first-generation 
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One NACA attempt to remedy pitch-up: chord extensions on the NACA 0-558-2 #2, 
photographed in February 1953. 
supersonic sweptwing fighters such as the North American F- 100 Super 
Sabre and the Vought F8U Crusader. Sweptwing supersonic aircraft 
lacking such a feature-such as the McDonnell F- 101 Voodoo-proved 
to have dangerous and mission-limiting pitch-up characteristics. Tail 
changes, of course, could not be made with the triangular or delta wing 
configuration; rather, designers had to rely on various combinations of 
wing fences. 
The several NACA programs on Skyrocket, the X-4, XF-92A7 
X-5, and X-3 went relatively smoothly from a standpoint of data 
collection, analysis, and reporting. But maintenance often proved 
troublesome; highly complex experimental aircraft, then and now, are 
notoriously difficult to keep up even under the best of circumstances. 
NACA workload, program, and weather considerations also played a 
role, often forcing a stretch-out of planned flights. Skyrocket, for 
example, took 27 months to complete 29 pitch-up research flights. In the 
following comparison, contractor and military test flights prior to NACA's 
acquisition of the aircraft are excluded. 
Aircraft Number of Flights Duration of NACA Tests 
Douglas D - 558 - 2 #3 66 1950- 1956 
Northrop X-4 #2 82 1950- 1953 
Convair XF - 92A 25 1953 
Bell X-5 #I 133 1952- 1955 
Douglas X-3 20 1954- 1956 
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The NACA test pilot staff at Edwards approached all these aircraft 
with caution.* Skyrocket had its quirks, but was generally pleasant. The 
X-4 could be annoying. The XF-92A required good piloting skills. The 
X-3 and X-5 had truly vicious characteristics, particularly the latter’s 
violent stall-spin instability, which eventually killed Air Force test pilot 
Ray Popson. Not unexpectedly, research aircraft often have characteris- 
tics that are demanding, but the X-5 was simply a flawed design, 
although this had nothing whatsoever to do with the feature the craft was 
developed to verify, the variable-sweep wing. Rather, it had to do with its 
aerodynamic layout, especially the poor position of the tail and vertical 
fin. An excerpt from a pilot report gives some idea of its qualities as the 
plane approached a stall: 
As the airplane pitches, it yaws to the right and causes the airplane to roll to 
the right. At this stage aileron reversal occurs; the stick jerks to the right and 
kicks back and forth from neutral to full right deflection if not restrained. It 
seems that the airplane goes longitudinally, directionally, and laterally 
unstable in that order.’ 
During one flight pilot Joe Walker lost 6000 meters while recovering 
from a stall; fortunately, the stall had occurred at 12 000 meters.8 
Despite its faults, the X-5 was an outstandingly productive airplane. 
Early testing of the craft had demonstrated that the variable-wing-sweep 
principle worked-that it endowed a plane with good low-speed perfor- 
mance when the wing was fully extended for takeoff and landing, and 
that it offered good high-speed performance as well when the wing was 
swept fully aft. The actual mechanism by which the X-5 “translated” its 
wing from fully extended to fully swept and back again was quite another 
matter, for it was complex and hindered the utility of the design. Indeed, 
variable sweep aircraft did not become a practical reality until after the 
conceptualization of the outboard wing pivot by NACA engineers at 
Langley in the mid-1950s. NACA was not too concerned over the 
variable-sweep aspect of the plane once it had been proved to work. 
Rather, the NACA and the RAPP viewed the unique advantage of the 
X-5 to be its ability to provide a whole range of sweptwing research 
aircraft in one vehicle. Since the wing could be swept to many different 
positions, a variety of measurements were possible over a wide range of 
sweep angles, up to 60O-the same angle as the XF-92A deltasg The 
pitch-up investigation on the X- 5 complemented the extensive work 
undertaken in Skyrocket, especially since the craft could furnish aerody- 
*NACA pilots Champine and Griffith were joined by A. Scott Crossfield, Walter P. Jones, 
Joseph A. Walker, Stanley P. Butchart, John B. McKay, and Neil A. Armstrong. 
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At top, NACA’s Bell X - 5  variable-sweep research aircraft with wings fully extended at 
minimum sweepback. Below, wings of the X- 5  are fu lb  swept to maximum sweepback. 
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namic information on how a wide range of sweptwings reacted as a plane 
approached its pitch-up point. NACA also used the X-5 as a chase plane 
for other research aircraft, because it could vary its flying characteristics 
to suit the airplane it was chasing. It was retired from service in late 
1955.’’ 
NACA’s research program on the little X-4 was particularly fruit-‘ 
ful for reasons not expected when the airplane was under development. 
NACA had never been a strong supporter of the X-4, a sweptwing 
airplane designed for transonic flight minus a horizontal tail to damp out 
any pitching tendencies. Indeed, the craft came about as a result of two 
factors: John Northrop’s own firm belief in the value of the tailless 
concept, and German interest in the idea, which had spawned the 
wartime Messerschmitt Me 163, a plane with very poor high-speed 
behavior. In the postwar climate of military research, any idea the Nazi 
government had been working on often assumed an imagined worth all 
out of proportion to its true value. Then the airplane had encountered 
development delays, and the first prototype proved, in-Walt WilliTms’S 
own words, a “lemon.” But the second was quite reliable mechanically, 
and the NACA program proceeded smoothly following the first NACA- 
flight in November 1950. 
At first the NACA program concentrated on the X-4’s dynamic 
stability problems. At about mach 0.88, it began a longitudinal pitching 
motion of increasing severity; test pilots compared it to riding over a 
washboard road. But it also exhibited combined pitching, rolling, and 
yawing motions of increasing severity, a “hunting” about all three axes 
marked by inadequate motion damping as mach number increased. The 
Edwards project team decided to thicken the trailing edge of the wing in 
an effort to cure the motions, not difficult since the X-4 had huge 
speedbrake surfaces above and below the wing that could be wedged 
open, the gap between their surfaces forming the necessary “edge.” In 
1952 the engineers went further and thickened the trailing edge of the 
elevons (the control surfaces the X-4 used for pitch and roll control) 
using balsa wood attachments. The thickening worked in part, increasing 
the craft’s roll rate by 25%, and longitudinal control effectiveness was 
improved as well. But the persistent motions still appeared above mach 
0.9, and at 0.94 were so severe the plane porpoised along at vertical 
accelerations of 2 1 ?42 g. Clearly the semitailless configuration was unsuit- 
able for transonic applications if one chose any shape resembling the Me 
163, D.H. 108, or X-4.” 
But if the X-4 configuration itself proved unsuitable, the amount of 
research data returned was substantial, particularly on the interactions of 
combined pitching, rolling, and yawing motions-an interaction soon to 
be of critical concern with high-performance military fighters. The blunt 
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NACA’s Northrop X - 4  semitailless research aircrafi, one of the smallest ever flown. 
elevon research with the X-4 directly benefited the Bell X-2 then 
under development, which featured ailerons having a blunted trailing 
edge on the basis of models tested at Wallops. The High-speed Flight 
Research Station was able to verify the full-scale concept by demonstrat- 
ing the pronounced benefits the blunted trailing edge gave the X-4 in 
rolling performance. Finally, Williams and his researchers recognized 
that the X-4’s speedbrake enabled the plane to vary its lift-to-drag ratio 
to such a degree that it could simulate the approach of what are now 
termed lifting reentry spacecraft. The X-4 had a minimal lift-to-drag 
ratio of less than 3, giving it X- 15-like performance. And, indeed, it was 
with the upcoming generation of X- 15-like craft in mind that the NACA 
undertook approach and landing studies of their predicted behavior 
using the X-4. It ended its days as a pilot trainer before being retired in 
1954.’* 
By NACA standards, the HSFRS program on the XF-92A delta- 
wing research aircraft was a brief one, lasting only six months in 1953 
with 25 flights. The XF-92A had an interesting past, for it was not 
originally conceived as a research craft at all, but rather as a testbed for a 
proposed interceptor that failed to materialize. Once the Air Force had 
abandoned the proposed interceptor, the service continued to support 
development of the XF-92A, only one of which was built, as a delta 
testbed. NACA interest in the plane was immediate, for the delta wing 
planform offered exceptional wing area plus a thin airfoil cross section 
and low aspect ratio, combined with low weight and high structural 
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strength-all desirable attributes for a supersonic airplane. Even before 
its first flight in 1948, NACA had tested the plane in the full-size 
low-speed tunnel at Ames. The RAPP closely followed the actual Convair 
and Air Force program on the airplane, which the Air Force relinquished 
to the NACA in early 1953. 
Besides validating the thin delta principle, the XF-92A played a 
major role in supporting the development of the Convair F-102A 
interceptor, the Air Force’s first attempt at an all-weather supersonic 
interceptor. The XF- 92A had surprisingly violent pitch-up characteris- 
tics during turns, often exceeding 6 g and once going above 8 g. NACA 
technicians at Edwards equipped the craft with various wing-fence 
combinations planned for the F- 102, which had a similar wing planform, 
The Convair XF- 92, a delta-wing research aircraft. 
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and the Air Force’s Wright Air Development Center requested that 
NACA send any data from its flight program that might prove beneficial 
to the F- 102 program. This NACA did, especially with regard to fence 
combinations to alleviate pitch-up. Eventually, however, the F- 102 faced 
major redesign anyway, to take advantage of the Whitcomb area rule 
principle derived at Langley and the conical wing camber concept 
derived at Ames. Nevertheless, the contributions of the XF-92A to the 
F-102, and through the F-102 to the XF2Y-1 Sea Dart, the F-106 
Delta Dart, and’ the B-58 Hustler, were substantial. (It is interesting to 
note that, like Convair with the XF-92A7 F-102, F-106, and B-58, 
French aircraft manufacturer Marcel Dassault followed a similar develop- 
ment path, going from a small delta testbed, the Mirage I, to the Mirage 
I11 fighter family, and thence to the B-58-class Mirage IV supersonic 
bomber.) The XF-92A was retired in October 1953, the progenitor of 
America’s delta aircraft. l 3  
Of all NACA’s configuration explorers, the only disappointment was 
the best-looking of the lot, the Douglas X-3. Conceived for supersonic 
research above mach 2, the X-3 had been victimized by an experimental 
engine installation that failed to live up to its promise. Rather than two 
powerful turbojets, the X-3 had to be completed with puny (by 
comparison) Westinghouse J34s, which could not propel the airplane 
past mach 1 in level flight. The X-3 proved frustrating for NACA. It 
had perhaps the most highly refined supersonic airframe of its day as 
well as other important advances, including one of the first machined 
structures and the first use of titanium in major airframe components. It 
had a long fuselage, giving it a high fineness ratio, and a low aspect ratio 
(low ratio of span to chord) wing having a thicknesskhord ratio of only 
41/2%. Despite this potentially supersonic configuration, the maximum 
speed ever attained by the X-3 was mach 1.2 1 , during a dive. For a while, 
the RAPP thought about replacing the jet engines with two rocket 
engines and after fairing over the plane’s air intakes, launching it from a 
modified jet bomber to reach mach 3.5. But the X-3 was overtaken by 
events-namely, the development of the F-104, a genuine mach 2 
airplane to which it directly contributed. 
The X-3 had made its first flight in Ocotber 1952. It was so badly 
underpowered that on the first flight its test pilot, Bill Bridgeman, 
complained into his mike, “This thing doesn’t want to stay in the air,” 
which might have been taken as an epitaph for the whole program. In 
July 1954, the Air Force completed its own brief evaluation of the craft, 
by now regarded as a glamorous “hangar queen,” and turned it over to 
the High-speed Flight Station, whose engineers judged the plane to have 
only “limited” research utility. It did have some contributions it could 
make. One-not to be minimized-was to tire studies: the plane routinely 
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shed its small tires during high-speed landing and taxi runs, forcing 
revision of tire design criteria for high-performance aircraft. l4 
The X-3 completed its first NACA flight in August 1954, and by 
late October, the HSFS X-3 project team expanded the planned 
program on the aircraft to include investigating its lateral and directional 
stability and control during abrupt rolls with the pilot holding the rudder 
“fixed” (centered). These studies had particular significance, for the X-3 
closely approximated the then-current generation of military fighters 
entering testing or production. They had a short wingspan and a long 
fuselage, with the aircraft “loaded” primarily along the fuselage rather 
than along the wing. This lack of spanwise loading greatly increased the 
plane’s inertia characteristics in yaw and pitch. On 27 October 1954 NACA 
test pilot Joe Walker had the dubious honor of demonstrating just how 
dangerous flight testing can unexpectedly be, and how courage must 
always be the constant attribute of the successful test pilot. As planned for 
this flight, Walker initiated an abrupt left roll at mach 0.92 and an alti- 
tude of 9100 meters. The plan rolled rapidly, but as it did so the nose 
rose in pitch and simultaneously slewed in yaw, reaching combined val- 
ues of 20” in pitch and 16” in yaw. After five wildly gyrating seconds, 
Walker regained control. He had every reason to call it a day and land, 
but such was not Joe Walker’s style. With curiosity aroused, Walker accel- 
erated in a shallow dive past mach 1 and then executed an abrupt left 
roll. This time the reaction was more than violent; it was berserk, with the 
plane attaining a sideslip angle of 2 lo, imposing a transverse load of 2 g. 
Simultaneously, the plane pitched violently downward, reaching - 6.7 g, 
then violently pitched upward to + 7 g before Walker could regain control. 
Fortunately, the rolling motions subsided; without further difficulty 
Walker damped the yawing and pitching motions and landed immediately. 
Postflight analysis indicated that the fuselage had sustained but fortu- 
nately had not exceeded its maximum limit load, while the high angle of 
attack has prevented the wing from reaching its limit load. Joe Walker 
was a skillful-and lucky-man. l5 
NACA wisely decided not to duplicate the flight conditions Walker 
encountered that exciting day over the Mojave. The “inertial coupling” 
phenomenon that Walker encountered had first appeared in very mild 
form in the dynamic instability of the X-4 at transonic speeds. Concur- 
rently with the X-3 experience, however, were a series of accidents 
occurring on the first production F-100A Super Sabre jet fighters. 
Though attributable in part to a serious lack of directional stability, the 
progression of violent motions mimicked the X- 3 experience closely. 
Inertial coupling, also called roll coupling or roll divergence, had first 
been predicted by William H. Phillips of Langley Laboratory in a classic 
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theoretical study.16 One important cure was to increase the wing area 
and, especially, the tail surface area of the aircraft. Such a cure turned 
the F-100 from a killer into a reliable airplane. Walker’s experience- 
like the early pitch-up encounters of Champine and Griffith-gave 
agency engineers their first “real-world’ appreciation of how serious the 
inertial coupling problem could be. What pitch-up was to the early 
sweptwing jet aircraft, inertial coupling became to the first-generation 
supersonic airplanes. Generally speaking, the current-generation aircraft 
having twin vertical fins and generous wing areas plus other aerodynamic 
refinements are monuments to the lessons learned from the X-3 and its 
brethren. 
In many ways, Walker’s flight remained the apex of the X-3 
program. Though it returned the X-3 to the air, NACA was most 
reluctant to probe its lateral (roll) stability and control characteristics 
further, and finally retired the craft in 1956.” 
One little-known configuration program run by the High-speed 
Flight Station involved a special investigation for the Navy and the 
Atomic Energy Commission on the transonic drag characteristics of 
bomb and tank shapes-“external stores”-hung off the wing of an 
airplane. The bomb and tank shapes of the early 1950s did not differ 
appreciably from those of World War 11, and aerodynamicists faced 
The Douglas X-3, NACA’s glamorow hangar queen. 
59 
ON THE FRONTIER 
serious fI ow-interference problems generated by hanging these bulky 
shapes on otherwise streamlined airplanes. “Low drag” external stores 
shapes compatible with the new generation of attack aircraft-attack 
aircraft designed to carry nuclear weapons-were still largely a thing of 
the future. The military services and agencies such as the AEC that had 
to generate new weapons wondered how these new shapes would affect 
the transonic drag rise of high-speed attack and fighter aircraft. The 
danger, of course, was that the shapes would impose unacceptable 
penalties in range and maximum speed. 
In 1951-1952, the AEC and Navy approached NACA, urging the 
agency to study the problem. Walt Williams proposed a program to add 
stores pylons to the Skyrocket, the aircraft used for NACA’s pitch-up 
research, and test bomb shapes and fuel-tank shapes produced by 
Douglas. Douglas was a natural choice and was in on the program from 
the start: it designed the Navy’s string of first-line attack aircraft, the AD 
Skyraider, A3D Skywarrior, and A4D Skyhawk. The RAPP quickly 
assented to Williams’s proposal, and D-558-2 #3 began its stores 
research program in the summer of 1954, continuing until December 
1955, when NACA engineers concluded they had sufficient information. 
The data were delivered to the Navy and AEC for use in weapon 
design.18 Nine months later, this Skyrocket was retired from service, the 
last of the “Round One” configuration explorers to fly. 
MAKE-WORK OR VALUABLE CONTRIBUTORS? 
The progression of aeronautical technology has been accompanied 
by radical changes in the shapes of aircraft. Certainly, designers in the 
mid-to-late 1940s and early 1950s faced conflicting choices of configura- 
tions for high-speed aircraft. There were some general trends, such as 
lengthening a plane’s fuselage to increase its fineness ratio while reduc- 
ing the wingspan to lower its aspect ratio, reducing the thickness of 
wings, and placing the horizontal tail clear of the wing wake. But a 
diversity of choices and decisions faced designers as well: should a plane 
have a moderately sweptback wing (say 35”) or a sharply sweptback wing 
(45” or more)? How thin should a wing be? Should supersonic aircraft 
employ delta wings? Should the plane have a horizontal tail? What 
high-lift devices would work best on a sweptwing plane for low-speed 
flight? These and many other questions required answers, answers that 
the “Round One” configuration explorers provided. 
NACA always maintained that its work on the configuration explor- 
ers was of critical importance to postwar aircraft design. A few critics in 
industry (perhaps motivated, as historian Alex Roland has suggested, by 
a “not invented here” syndrome) believed that the postwar X-series 
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program did not materially assist the design development of subsequent 
high-performance aircraft. Specifically, these critics of the program 
attacked it on three general grounds: 
The program was expensive, time consuming, and distracted the 
industry and military services from developing practical, opera- 
tional supersonic aircraft. 
o The program failed to generate any improvements to turbojet 
engine propulsion systems. 
The stability and control information gathered was not applicable 
to advanced aircraft design because it was gathered from shapes 
not representative of what future high-performance aircraft would 
look like.” 
The first charge is easy to refute. Industry and military researchers 
had no clear ideas of what a “practical,” “operational” supersonic aircraft 
should look like. In retrospect, the designs they generated prior to access 
to X-series information were almost always wildly impractical.“ The 
leading service aircraft of the 1950s and 1960s (especially the Air Force’s 
“Century Series” fighters, the F- 100, F- 101 , etc.) were all designed to 
incorporate features recommended as the result of the X-series testing 
program. 
The second charge is really a non-issue. The X-series program began 
as an aerodynamic research program concerned with transonic and 
supersonic flight conditions, including stability and control and flight 
loads. To acquire these data, rocket-propelled aircraft had to be designed, 
because conventional turbojets lacked the necessary power to propel craft 
past mach 1. Had the services insisted upon jet propulsion for these 
aircraft, perhaps some acceleration of jet engine development would 
have taken place, but it is doubtful. Instead, it is likely that the acquisition 
of supersonic flight data would merely have been delayed. The first 
supersonic jet fighter flew in 1953 and by that time the rocket-propelled 
advanced X-1 was pushing mach 2.5. In any case, responsibility for 
advanced turbojet studies was not a concern of the X series; it was a very 
separate issue, involving industry, the military services, and, within NACA, 
the specialists of the Lewis laboratory. 
The third charge is simply false. Of all the “Round One” configura- 
tion explorers, only the X-4’s weird semitailless shape did not appear on 
subsequent high-performance aircraft-and for good reason. Much of 
the stability and control information gathered from these aircraft warned 
designers what to adopt and, perhaps more important, what to avoid: 
high horizontal tails, small and inadequate vertical fins, configurations 
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prone to pitch-up or inertial coupling, etc. And this was the purpose of 
the program. 
The cost criticism is not a serious one, either. The original XS-1s 
cost approximately $500 000 apiece, equivalent to the purchase of five 
production Lockheed P-80 subsonic jet fighters, a reasonable price for 
the information gained. What was often annoying about the X-series was 
how demanding their maintenance could be, but that has been and 
continues to be a facet of research aircraft operation. Even this could be 
misleading. Sometimes the rocket research aircraft were grounded for 
extended periods of time because of engine maintenance for their launch 
aircraft-the B -29 family always had a history of troublesome engine 
problems. In sum, the X-series program and especially the configuration 
explorers did not constitute a drain or a waste of valuable research 
resources. In fact, quite the opposite is true. 
Finally, one must remember that a most important NACA function 
was its communication of research results to industry and other govern- 
ment branches. The results of X-series research did not lie buried in the 
files of the High-speed Flight Station, but entered the technical literature 
through the standard NACA reporting format, chiefly the research 
memorandum. Typically slightly less than a year would pass between the 
gathering of results from a research flight and its publication in RM 
form. Informally, many NACA reports were circulated to the other NACA 
laboratories and to industry in advance of their actual publication date. 
Even the few critics of the X-series program admit that it was standard 
design practice for industry to rely on NACA reports for data and 
information. This same pattern was repeated with the reports generated 
by X-series testing, including tests of X-series aircraft in NACA wind 
tunnels.*l 
In conclusion, the X-series aircraft program and the extended 
NACA testing of these aircraft constituted an important and valuable 
aspect of post-1945 American aviation. The work the agency did on the 
early supersonic configuration testbeds gave the United States a com- 
manding lead in the field of supersonic aircraft design, so that by the end 
of the 1950s the military services were equipped in numbers with a wide 




Through Mach 2 and 3: 195 1 - 1959 
While exceeding the speed of sound had been a great unknown, 
there were other no less important unknowns involved at double or triple 
the velocity of sound. What particularly interested researchers were the 
potential problems of stability and control that might arise at mach 2 or 3. 
They already recognized that above mach 2, aerodynamic heating would 
become an increasingly serious problem to conventional aluminum 
aircraft structures and would favor more exotic alloys and structural 
materials. 
There was no organized program to develop specialized mach 2 
research vehicles as there had been to develop the XS- 1 and Skystreak; 
there did not need to be, for the X- 1 family proved perfectly amenable 
to the task, as did Skystreak's follow-on, the D-558-2 Skyrocket. To 
see why this was so, it is necessary to consider briefly the technical 
development of the X- 1 and Skyrocket families. 
When first designed by Bell, the original XS- 1s were planned for a 
maximum speed potential of around mach 2, thanks to a large fuel 
capacity that gave the craft about four minutes of powered flight time. 
But during development, troubles with a special kind of fuel pump (a 
turbine-driven device powered by steam generated by the decomposition 
of concentrated hydrogen peroxide passed over a catalyst) forced Bell to 
complete the first two airplanes with a fuel-feed system incorporating 
high-pressure nitrogen; this reduced the amount of fuel that could be 
carried and limited the design to a maximum speed of about mach 1.45. 
Bell retained the third of the three planned XS- 1s for later completion 
with a turbopump system if it became available. Thus equipped, the 
X- 1-3 (as it was known) would be capable of exceeding mach 2, possibly 
reaching mach 2.4. In 1948 the Air Force began development of the 
advanced X- 1 s, which not only incorporated turbopump fuel systems, 
but were lengthened to give even greater fuel capacity for potential 
performance well in excess of mach 2, and possibly beyond mach 2.5. 
The advanced X- 1s were all intended for Air Force military-related 
testing. With these aircraft under development, the Air Force lost all 
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interest in the incomplete X-1-3 and went so far as to cancel its 
development. NACA interest in acquiring a mach 2 X- 1 to continue the 
work begun with the agency’s own X-1 caused the Air Force to 
reconsider its decision. The X- 1 - 3 arrived at Edwards for contractor 
testing in 195 1, the same time that the first of the advanced X- 1s (the 
X-ID) arrived at the lake. 
The Skyrocket program had taken a different turn. Douglas had 
completed the first and second of the sweptwing planes with only jet 
engines, pending installation of a rocket engine when it became available. 
As events turned out, the company was not able to fly the rocket in the 
plane until 1949. After takeoff from the ground, even using both jet and 
rocket engines, the Skyrocket could reach a maximum speed of mach 
1.08 in level flight at 12 200 meters, disappointingly low. Also there were 
safety problems: the heavily laden Skyrocket, brimming with fuel, 
required a 5-kilometer ground run for takeoff, imposing severe strain on 
its landing gear. Douglas sometimes fired the rocket engine to assist the 
takeoff, but this burned valuable fuel and limited the plane to about 
mach 0.95 at altitude-a speed the jet-only NACA airplane could already 
reach in a dive. NACA engineers recommended modifying the NACA 
Skyrocket to an all-rocket, air-launched research airplane. First, air 
launching would improve safety. Second, the conserved rocket fuel 
would enable the plane to exceed mach 1.5, far higher than it could attain 
from the ground. Third, an all-rocket version of the sweptwing Sky- 
rocket could substitute in part for the lagging Bell X-2 program, already 
falling behind schedule (as will be discussed).* Accordingly, in 1949 
Hugh Dryden proposed to the Navy that the NACA Skyrocket then 
being tested at Muroc be modified for all-rocket air-launch configuration, 
giving it potential mach 1.6 + performance. The Navy agreed to sponsor 
the project, amended the Skyrocket development contract, and in early 
1950 the NACA Skyrocket left Muroc for the Douglas plant, returning as 
an all-rocket research airplane in November of that year. 
T H E  YEAR OF PROMISE 
The year 195 1 offered the possibility that either the Navy-sponsored 
Skyrocket or the Air Force-sponsored advanced X- 1 (the X- ID) would 
*It must be remembered throughout the story of the postwar high-speed aircraft research 
program that design of new fighter aircraft followed hard on the heels of flight-testing of research 
aircraft. Not until the large advances in research data provided by the X-15 in the 1960s did the 
data base outdistance the needs of the day. Throughout the 1950s a gain of even a few months in the 
availability of high-speed research data could mean marked improvement in operational aircraft 
then in design. 
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be the first aircraft to exceed mach 2. The genuine sense of scientific 
urgency that had attended the first mach 1 flights did not exist to the 
same degree for the mach 2 mark, which was more of a psychological 
goal than a critical technological challenge. It was NACA’s nature to 
undertake a detailed step-by-step flight testing program, increasing 
mach number slowly, until the mach 2 was attained. NACA really did not 
have any control over the situation, except in the case of their own 
X- 1-3, newly arrived at the lake and awaiting its first tests. Otherwise, 
the situation was in the hands of the Navy and the Air Force, the 
respective champions of the Skyrocket and the X- ID. NACA had always 
been torn between the public-relations payoff of record-setting versus 
the dangers it entailed for expensive research aircraft. With detailed 
research programs ready for the Skyrocket, the RAPP and Williams’s 
station engineers could do little but watch and wait, concerned at the delay 
before they would get the plane and also concerned lest this bit of rivalry 
between the services lead to recklessness. Ironically, the NACA had the 
last word in the mach 2 sweepstakes, for the crown others so eagerly 
sought eventually fell into the hands of the High-speed Flight Research 
Station. 
The Douglas test team on the Skyrocket had the first shot at mach 2. 
All through the spring and summer of 1951, company test pilot Bill 
Bridgeman piloted the D-558-2 at increasingly higher speeds. On 7 
August he attained mach 1.88 (2027 kilometers per hour), well above the 
previous 1540 kilometers per hour attained by Chuck Yeager in the 
X-I, but still short of the magic mach 2. During its supersonic flights, 
the Skyrocket exhibited a highly objectionable and possibly extremely 
dangerous rolling motion (lateral instability) that was apparently aggra- 
vated by a basic flaw in the craft’s dynamic stability characteristics. NACA 
studied its behavior in detail before attempting its own high-mach flights 
in the plane. Douglas wisely never attempted to go beyond the mach 1.88 
mark, and, having done its best for the company and the Navy, delivered 
the plane to NACA toward the end of the summer.’ 
All eyes next turned to the Air Force on the X-1D. Though this 
plane had made but one contractor test flight-a glide flight at that-the 
Air Force was so eager to break mach 2 that the test pilot, Frank “Pete” 
Everest, had been advised to “see what it could do wide open.”2 On 22 
August 1951 the launch plane went up carrying the X-ID but had to 
cancel the planned launch because of mechanical problems. On the way 
back to base, the X- 1D exploded and caught fire, and the launch aircraft 
crew had to jettison it hastily into the desert, fortunately without injury to 
anyone in the planes or on the ground. With the demise of the X-1D 
vanished Air Force hopes to break mach 2 before year’s end. Then, on 9 
November 1951, following a “captive” flight, the X- 1-3 blew up under 
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its own launch airplane, seriously injuring Bell test pilot Joe Cannon. 
Accident investigators blamed the loss of X- 1D on electrical ignition of 
fuel vapor, and the loss of the X-1-3 on possible fracturing of a 
high-pressure nitrogen gas storage system used to purge propellants 
from the rocket plane’s tankage and propellant lines. While investigators 
may have been correct about the loss of the X- 1-3 (independent testing 
by HSFRS confirmed the tendency of its nitrogen “bundle” to fracture 
when jolted, and scattered tubing was discovered as far as 75 meters from 
the accident site), such was not the case with the X- 1D. The X- ID was 
the first in a series of three accidents that finally would be attributed to 
explosive gasket material used in its fuel system.” 
The year ended, then, with the loss of two valuable research planes, 
one launch aircraft, and the injuring of a test pilot who fortunately 
recovered to fly again. Mach 2 remained unattainable for the near 
future, pending the arrival of the remaining advanced X- 1s or the 
resumption of high-mach flights by the Skyrocket. In any case, the 
NACA was still several years away from acquiring a mach 2 straight- 
wing research aircraft, a most frustrating and annoying situation. 
Preparing to mate the Bell X-1-3 to its Boeing B- 50 Supef’tress launch vehicle. 
*The cause, discovered by HSFS in 1955, will be discussed subsequently in relation to NACA’s 
X- 1A program. 
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THROUGH MACH 2, OR NACA IN THE LIMELIGHT 
On 20 November 1953 A. Scott Crossfield, a NACA research pilot, 
became the first human to exceed mach 2. NACA had seized the chance 
to surpass mach 2 before the Air Force succeeded in doing so with the 
Bell X-1A. It came as a logical result of a two-year flight testing 
program that had so thoroughly explored the Skyrocket’s behavior above 
mach 1 that no nasty surprises would await the Skyrocket team as the 
plane approached mach 2. 
The testing had revealed that the Skyrocket’s major difficulties 
above mach 1 stemmed from dynamic instability when the plane flew at 
low angles of attack with low load factors - for example, pushing over 
into level flight from a climb while having less than a l-g force on the 
airplane. Under these circumstances, the craft’s lateral stability decreased 
markedly, and it would manifest the dangerous rolling characteristics 
noted by Bridgeman during the Douglas program In August 1953, 
Crossfield equaled Bridgeman’s earlier mach 1.88 mark. Now the Navy 
entered the scene. 
By the summer of 1953, the advanced X-1A had arrived at 
Edwards for testing, and the “racetrack” atmosphere that permeated the 
base sharpened. As with the Skyrocket-X-1D rivalry of two years 
previously, it now appeared that the Skyrocket and X- 1A were locked in 
a friendly but serious rivalry to first exceed mach 2. None of this 
would have meant much had the traditional NACA posture of leaving 
record-setting to others remained in effect. But now two factors changed 
this, one from the Navy, and the other from inside the High-speed Flight 
Research Station itself. 
The year 1953 held special significance for the American aviation 
community, for it was the 50th anniversary of the Wrights’ first flight at 
Kitty Hawk. The Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics requested that a Marine 
test pilot, Marion Carl, be allowed to make a series of high-altitude 
high-mach flights using the NACA Skyrocket, NACA facilities, and the 
NACA Skyrocket launch team. Williams recognized that the flights were 
more for publicity than scientific reasons. He himself had been petition- 
ing NACA headquarters (to no avail) for permission to exceed mach 2 for 
scientific purposes, and he was not enthusiastic about the Navy reenter- 
ing the program with a new pilot. Williams sidestepped the first request. 
But NACA was pursued by increasingly higher circles within the Navy- 
“School ties,” Williams recollected later, “started flying all over the 
country.” The marine’s flights received NACA’s go-ahead.3 There was a 
legitimate research objective: Carl would be testing an experimental 
pressure suit for high-altitude flight. Though he came close, Carl did not 
exceed Crossfield’s speed mark even when he reached a new unofficial 
altitude record of 25 370 meters. By the end of August 1953, the 
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Skyrocket once again seemed out of the running for mach 2-unless 
NACA tried its hand. 
But by then the record-setting bug had clearly bitten the NACA 
Skyrocket test team, especially its project pilot, Scott Crossfield. After 
Carl’s flights, the Skyrocket team had added extensions to the nozzles on 
the plane’s rocket engine, boosting its thrust by a small but important 
amount and also preventing the exhaust flow from impinging upon the 
rudder of the plane at supersonic speed, thus improving the plane’s 
chances for mach 2. On 14 October 1953, six years to the day since 
Yeager’s historic flight, Crossfield touched mach 1.96. NACA pilot and 
plane were now the fastest in the world, but Hugh Dryden immediately 
clamped secrecy on the accomplishment and told Crossfield not to 
attempt mach Z4* Dryden would have had to ground Crossfield and 
disband the rocket team to stop them, however; mach 2 had become their 
Holy Grail. 
Crossfield set out to work around the restriction. He approached an 
old friend who worked for the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics. The friend 
spoke to former Navy test pilots at higher levels in the Pentagon. Within a 
week of Crossfield’s entreaty, Dryden notified Williams that the Sky- 
rocket was cleared to attempt a mach 2 flight. Of course, Williams had 
been pressing for such a clearance for months, as the next logical step in 
the ongoing high-speed  investigation^.^ 
NACAs 0-558-2 #2 Skyrocket, thefirst aircraft tofly twice the speed of sound, piloted by 
Scott Crossfield. 
*As the negotiator of the interagency agreements on the research aircraft program, Dryden was 
well aware of the services’ intention that records were to go to them, data to the NACA. 
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The race was on. Over on the Air Force side of the base, a technical 
team readied the X-1A. The Air Force had definite plans to exceed 
mach 2 before the anniversary of the Wrights’ flight and, of course, 
before the Skyrocket as well, if possible. Yeager, the service’s best 
rocketplane pilot, had been instructed to make the attempt. But the 
X- 1A was brand new and required a lot of preparation. The Skyrocket 
team, on the other hand, was used to operating that aircraft and had 
learned its operating quirks and problems. Skyrocket had the first crack 
at the mach 2 mark and the NACA team did not miss its shot. In 
preparation for the flight, engineers under the direction of Donald R. 
Bellman computed an optimal flight path for the aircraft so that it would 
waste neither fuel nor energy. Technicians chilled the plane’s alcohol fuel 
so that the craft could carry more of it and then insulated it by taping all 
panel cracks before covering the plane with a coat of wax. 
At mid-morning on 20 November 1953, Skyrocket took off from 
Edwards under its Superfortress launch aircraft. The climb to launch 
altitude took over an hour, during which time Crossfield-sick with 
flu-entered the plane and readied it for flight. Finally came the launch, 
and Skyrocket dropped away from the bomber, its sleek waxed shape 
glistening in the sun. Crossfield fired the engine and began its carefully 
progammed climb, neither too steep nor too shallow. At 22 000 meters 
he began a pushover into level flight, continuing until the Skyrocket was 
in a shallow dive. The machmeter edged toward 2. Everything worked: 
the nozzle extensions provided extra thrust, Bellman’s flight plan was the 
right one, the engine ran longer than normal because of the extra fuel, 
and Crossfield’s piloting was excellent. At 18 900 meters the Skyrocket 
nosed past mach 2, reaching mach 2.005. The engine continued to run 
for a few more seconds before starving itself. The deceleration jerked 
Crossfield forward in the straps; the plane had a lot of drag. He edged 
out of the shallow dive and set up a deadstick approach to the lake. While 
coasting down, he exuberantly victory-rolled the airplane before landing. 
The Skyrocket never again approached mach 2; NACA could not again 
justify the extensive preparations. In any case, the plane simply had no 
additional performance left in it. It soldiered on for a few more years in 
mundane research tasks until its retirement in mid-1957. The X- 1 had 
reached mach 1, but mach 2 belonged to the Skyrocket.‘ 
The Air Force was not about to let the NACA’s record stand for any 
length of time. By early December, Yeager was fully checked out in the 
X- 1A. The friendly rivalry between the Skyrocket and X- 1A teams at 
Edwards in 1953 did not damage the close cooperation between NACA 
and the Air Force on the actual flight testing of the rocket airplanes. The 
X- 1A depended for instrumentation support upon the NACA station, 
and though the NACA engineers were not able to instrument the aircraft 
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as thoroughly as they would have had it been a NACA vehicle, they did 
install an airspeed-altitude recorder and an accelerometer that later and 
unexpectedly proved quite valuable. They also provided radar tracking 
for the flight. On 12 December 1953, Yeager set out to break the 
Skyrocket’s records.’ 
Were this simply a good story, it would play little part in the history 
of Dryden; but Yeager’s flight was one of the most significant of the early 
rocket flights. It highlighted the serious stability difficulties that could be 
encountered at mach 2 speeds, a subject of vital interest to NACA and 
particularly the Edwards station. 
On the basis of NACA Langley wind-tunnel studies, data taken from 
previous flights, and analog simulations using a Bell Corporation perfor- 
mance analyzer, program engineers suspected that the X- 1A and other 
advanced X- 1 aircraft would have rapidly deteriorating directional 
stability above mach 2.3. During Yeager’s flight, the X- 1A reached mach 
2.44 at an altitude of 22 600 meters. At that altitude, despite the plane’s 
speed, the dynamic pressure was so low that the X-1A’s controls were 
not completely effective in damping any sudden motions the craft might 
begin. The expected deterioration in directional stability simply reflected 
the need for much larger vertical fins for high-speed flight. Now, at mach 
2.44, the plane suddenly went out of control, beginning a slow roll to the 
left. As Yeager corrected, the roll reversed and the plane began a rapid 
The Bell X -  1A glides back to a landing at Edwards after a research flight, trailed by a 
North American F-86D Sabre chase plane. 
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roll to the right; he attempted to correct, but the X-1A violently 
snapped to the left and then tumbled completely out of control, throwing 
Yeager about the cockpit-he cracked the inside of the canopy with his 
helmet. In 51 seconds the aircraft fell 15 000 meters, decelerated from 
2570 to 270 kilometers per hour, and encountered a maximum of 1 1  g. 
Yeager kept seeing the Sierra Nevadas flash by; he wondered where the 
plane would hit. It eventually wound up in an inverted spin; thanks to his 
consummate piloting skills, Yeager was able to recover into a normal 
(upright) spin, and thence into level flight at very low altitude. He glided 
back onto Rogers Lake. The NACA accelerometer told an eloquent story 
of the forces the plane had encountered. 
The High-speed Flight Research Station issued a summary report by 
Hubert M. Drake and Wendell H. Stillwell explaining as fully as possible 
the difficulties likely to be encountered by a straight-wing airplane with a 
relatively small vertical tail area during a flight in the tricky regions near 
mach 2.” The X-1A never again flew near mach 2; its sister ship, the 
X- lB, made one flight to mach 2.3 a year later. Its wings rocked as much 
as 70 degrees before test pilot Pete Everest cautiously slowed the plane 
and regained stability. The advanced X- 1s might be capable of reaching 
mach 2 safely, but any edging beyond was risky at best.8 
So 1953 ended with mach 2 having been attained a mere six years 
after mach 1 had fallen to the X- 1. As with the first mach 1 flights, 
however, the attainment of mach 2 still left a great deal of research to be 
done on particular flight conditions at this speed. Indeed, the detailed 
work still lay in the future, with other aircraft programs. The NACA 
looked forward, for example, to the X-IA, which it hoped to use in a 
detailed program of high-altitude mach 2 research. The agency also 
hoped to use the X-1B for a study of aerodynamic heating conditions 
near mach 2. But events can have a funny way of working out; in this case, 
NACA’s plans would fall completely apart. 
THE DEMISE OF THE X- 1A 
In 1951, the X-ID and X-1-3 had blown themselves out of 
existence, and in May 1953 the second X-2 did likewise. The X-2’s 
accident was truly tragic, for the explosion occurred as it was being 
carried in the bomb bay of its Superfortress mothership over Lake 
Ontario. The rocket plane vanished in a fiery red blast that killed its Bell 
*NACA RM-H55G25, “Behavior of the Bell X- 1A Research Airplane during Exploratory 
Flights at Mach Numbers near 2.0 and at Extreme Altitudes,” NACA HSFS, 7 July 1955. Like 
RM-H55A13 (the X-3 and F- 100 stability study), this RM was widely circulated throughout 
industry and was very influential. 
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test pilot and another Bell flight crewman. The launch plane returned to 
base, mangled by the blast. On 8 August 1955 it was NACA’s turn, with 
the X-1A. 
The NACA High-speed Flight Station had made only one flight with 
the X-1A before the accident. That day, at 9450 meters and less than 
one minute from launch, the X- 1A’s liquid oxygen tank burst from an 
internal low-order explosion, expelling a shower of debris that fractured 
the canopy of one of the chase planes. NACA test pilot Joe Walker 
scrambled back into the B-29, and the Superfort’s crew began a steady 
descent, anxiously watching the steaming rocket plane. For a while, it 
appeared that they might be able to land; Dick Payne, the X- 1A’s crew 
chief, entered the X- 1A’s cockpit to jettison the remaining fuel. However, 
the blast had also caused the rocket plane’s landing gear to extend, 
making a landing attempt questionable. For over half an hour, the 
Superfortress and its potentially deadly cargo cruised east of Rogers 
Lake, as the NACA flight crew pondered what to do, with Joe Vensel and 
Scott Crossfield offering advice from the ground. But there was no real 
option. Resigned, Vensel radioed Stan Butchart, the B-29 pilot, “Butch, 
you might as well drop it. Pick a good place.” They did, over the Edwards 
bombing range.* The X- 1A entered a flat spin and fell into the desert, 
exploding in an orange ball of flame and starting a small brush fire.g 
And now the task of sorting out the cause began. Walt Williams was 
away fishing in the mountains, so De Beeler formed an accident board 
under his direction, consisting of representatives from the High-speed 
Flight Station, the Air Force Flight Test Center, Bell Aircraft Corporation, 
the Air Force Office of the Inspector General, NACA’s Langley laboratory, 
and the Air Force’s Power Plant Laboratory at Wright-Patterson AFB. 
Fortunately, the X- IB, sister of the X- IA, was available for examination, 
having just returned from Langley where it had been instrumented for 
aerodynamic heating studies. The X- 1A’s wreckage-what was left of 
it-was placed in the HSFS Loads Calibration Hangar, and the X-1B 
wheeled alongside for comparison. Investigators quickly ruled out electri- 
cal detonation of fuel vapor (blamed previously for loss of the X- ID), or 
fatigue fracturing of the liquid oxygen tank. The tank pressure regula- 
tors were recovered in good condition, ruling out inadvertent overpres- 
surization. The craft’s nitrogen tanks had even survived the ground 
*Subsequently Butchart, Payne, and Walker received the NACA Exceptional Service Medal. 
B-29 crewmen Charles Littleton and John Moise received the NACA Distinguished Service Medal, 
and crewmen Jack McKay, Rex Cook, Richard De More, and Merle Woods received letters of 
commendation. NACA also commended chase pilot Maj. Arthur “Kit” Murray (pilot of the damaged 
chase plane) in a letter from the Committee chairman to the secretary of the Air Force. 
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impact, and thus could not have triggered the explosion-yet something 
had blown the oxygen tank apart. 
The vital clue was discovered by Donald Bellman of the HSFS staff. 
As members of the NACA board peered into the liquid oxygen tank of 
the X-lB, they noticed a slimy, oily residue coating the bottom of the 
tank. “What’s that?” one of them asked. “Oh,” a Bell representative 
replied, “We have that all the time. We just wipe it out.” Suspicious, 
Bellman gathered up the sludge in small bottles and sent one sample to a 
highly touted laboratory in Los Angeles, another to the Air Force’s own 
chemical laboratory at Edwards. The Los Angeles laboratory returned a 
superficial report stating, in essence, that the residue was a hydrocarbon 
product that had no business being around liquid oxygen. But the Air 
Force’s chemists did a detailed analysis, identifying the substance as 
TCP-tricresyl phosphate, a substance used to impregnate leather. All of 
the destroyed rocket planes-as well as those still flying-had gaskets 
made of Ulmer leather-leather impregnated with a 50-50 mix of TCP 
and carnauba wax. 
Subsequent experiments showed that when compressed between 
flanges and allowed to stand overnight at room temperatures, the TCP 
would separate from the leather and wax, running and pooling as it had 
in the X-1B’s lox tank. Commercial bottled gas experts informed 
Bellman that at high pressures and law temperatures, Ulmer leather 
could be extremely dangerous, exploding at a comparatively low impact. 
As early as 1950- 1951, this information, on the basis of laboratory tests, 
had been known to commercial bottled gas companies. Bellman super- 
vised construction of a test apparatus to drop a 2-kilogram steel bar three 
meters onto lox-soaked samples of Ulmer leather and on frozen drops of 
TCP; the results of 30 tests were 30 explosions.” 
The accident board theorized that when the gaskets compressed 
under pressure, the TCP exuded and ran into all available crevices. In 
the supercold environment of the lox tank, abrupt movements of the 
tank bulkhead or lox tubing could detonate this residue. Reexamination 
of the other rocket airplane explosions found a lot of supporting 
evidence, especially in the location and sequence of the explosions, for 
the Ulmer leather theory. The board’s final report blamed explosive 
gaskets for the loss of the X- 1A and concluded that it could have caused 
the previous explosions as well. Thus the culprit was identified, cause of a 
series of accidents that had cost two lives and one serious injury, the 
destruction of four rocket research airplanes and two launch aircraft, 
and a two-year delay in the first mach 2 flight.” Never again did any of 
the early rocket research aircraft suffer a catastrophic blast. The Air 
Force, anxious to begin flight testing on the more powerful X-2, went 
ahead with renewed confidence on that behind-schedule program. 
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NACA, on the other hand, was still frustrated-it had lost yet another 
mach 2 X- 1. The program so carefully planned for the X- 1A had to be 
abandoned, with some portions taken over by the X-1B and others by 
the X-lE, a mach 2 “homebuilt” designed at the High-speed Flight 
Station. These two programs will be discussed subsequently. Meanwhile . 
the Air Force, as the possessor of the fastest flight research aircraft at the 
lake, the X-2, set its sights on mach 3. 
T H E  GOTTERDAMMERUNG OF THE x-2 
No program caused the NACA, especially the engineers of the 
High-speed Flight Station, more frustration and disappointment than 
the X-2. It highlighted the terrible effects of underestimating the 
technical complexities involved in developing a radical new aircraft. It 
also highlighted the dangers of succumbing to the pressure to set records 
in the guise of research. The X-2 program was an unqualified failure, 
despite achieving both altitude and speed records. It failed to return any 
of the high-speed aerodynamic heating information anticipated from the 
program. Two aircraft were built; both were destroyed with three 
fatalities. 
The X-2 was the most exotic and complex of the early rocket- 
propelled research aircraft. Designed for supersonic tests of the swept- 
wing shape, the plane had an estimated performance in excess of mach 3. 
The first plane designed to withstand the rigors of aerodynamic heating, 
its structure was fabricated from stainless steel and a nickel alloy. To be 
air-launched and propelled by a two-chamber rocket engine, it would 
land on retractable landing skids. Bell had hoped to complete the first 
aircraft in 1948, but construction delays caused by the complex alloy 
structure and problems with its explosion-prone Curtiss-Wright 6’7 000- 
newton (15 000-lb) rocket engine stretched the development program by 
years. 
The ill-fated Bell X-2 rocket research aircraft. 
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As time went on, NACA's interest in the airplane declined markedly. 
By 1953, much of the sweptwing information that the X-2 could have 
provided had already been derived from the Skyrocket. Initial glide trials 
with the first of two X-2s took place in 1952, demonstrating that the 
plane flew well at low speeds (its engine was still not ready for installation). 
Then in 1953 the second X-2 was lost over Lake Ontario with two 
crewmen, delaying the program yet again. Problems with its planned 
electrical flight control system forced a change to a conventional hydro- 
mechanical system patterned on that of the F-86 fighter. The sole 
surviving X-2 flew again on another series of glide trials in 1954-still 
lacking its rocket engine-which forced redesign of the landing skids 
and shock-absorbing strut system. At last, the Curtiss-Wright engine was 
ready for installation, and the X-2 arrived back at Edwards in the 
summer of 1955, ready for its powered flight trials. Then the loss of the 
X- 1A and the subsequent accident investigation grounded the X-2 for 
replacement of its dangerous gaskets. 
Management responsibilities for the X-2 lay between the Air Force 
and Bell. NACA participated in some X-2 support research, primarily 
Langley wind-tunnel studies and Wallops rocket-model tests, and the 
RAPP made many recommendations, suggesting unsuccessfully that its 
trouble-prone Curtiss-Wright engine be replaced. By October 1955 the 
Air Force had lost patience with the program and issued an ultimatum: if 
the X-2 did not complete a powered flight before the end of the year, the 
project would be terminated. l2 NACA still retained a little enthusiasm for 
the plane, wanting it for aerodynamic and structural heating studies. The 
X- 1B was making similar studies, but the X-2 could go far beyond the 
X- lB, up to mach 3. Even though the NACA recognized that the X-2 
would soon be overshadowed by the X- 15 then under development, the 
agency still believed that the near-term availability of the plane would 
furnish much information unavailable from other flight testing pro- 
grams on the heating conditions encountered at mach 3. 
The X-2 completed its first powered flight on 18 November 1955. 
Piloted by Air Force test pilot Pete Everest, it featured brief but not 
damaging fire in the engine bay. Nevertheless, the Air Force ruled the 
test a success, giving the program its reprieve. For various reasons, the 
plane did not fly again until March 1956. During these Air Force trials, 
the plane remained the property of the Bell Aircraft Corporation, which 
did not deliver it to the Air Force until 23 August 1956. Walt Williams 
and his engineering staff, watching patiently from the sidelines, were 
occasionally asked to furnish technical assistance. 
On the advice of the NACA, the Air Force had bought a special 
computer, the Goodyear Electronic Digital Analyzer, which would pre- 
dict aircraft behavior by extrapolation of results from test flights. This 
would give engineers and pilots some indication of what to expect as they 
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flew higher and faster. NACA had designated Richard Day as the HSFS 
program engineer for the X-2; he helped with the new computer, 
providing equations and motions data. Day routinely briefed project pilot 
Pete Everest and, later in 1956, Iven Kincheloe and Me1 Apt, Everest’s 
replacements. l3  
The simulations confirmed predictions from N ACA wind tunnel 
tests that the X-2 would have rapidly deteriorating directional and 
lateral (roll) stability near rnach 3. Aileron deflection (to roll the plane) 
could lead to an aerodynamic condition known as adverse yaw, followed 
by increasingly rapid rolling until the rolling motions reached a “critical 
roll velocity,” the point where the plane would roll into inertial coupling 
and tumble. During 1956, as Pete Everest moved up in speed, NACA’s 
Dick Day and Hubert “Jake” Drake anxiously watched the directional 
stability curves, compared them to flight data, and urged the Air Force to 
move in smaller increments, not in great leaps of half-a-mach number.14 
In May 1956, Everest achieved mach 2.53, making the X-2 the fastest 
aircraft in the world. By this time, NACA’s patience was running 
somewhat thin; in early June, at a joint NACA-Air Force -Bell meeting 
at Edwards, the NACA representatives requested that the X-2 be 
delivered to NACA sometime between 15 September and 1 October, so 
that the High-speed Flight Station could complete a few flights before 
winter rains flooded the lakebed. The Air Force agreed, stating that the 
service’s program would be “to expand the speed and altitude envelope 
to at least nominal values”-30 000 meters and mach 3.15 Everest came 
close to this on 23July, when he reached 2.87 (3057 kilometers per hour), 
his last flight before moving to a staff assignment in Norfolk, Virginia. 
Following Everest’s final flight, the Air Force momentarily lost 
interest in mach 3 in favor of attaining the craft’s maximum altitude. Test 
pilot Iven Kincheloe flew the plane to 38 470 meters, the first flight above 
30 500 meters. At that altitude, aerodynamic controls were useless. The 
X-2’s behavior in this region of low dynamic pressure (“low q” in 
engineer’s shorthand) pointed to the need for reaction controls. Above 
30 000 meters, still in a ballistic arc, the X-2 began a left bank which 
Kincheloe wisely did not attempt to correct, for fear of tumbling the 
airplane. He experienced less than 0.05 g for approximately 50 seconds, 
a foretaste of weightless spaceflight; popular science writers dubbed the 
pilot the “First of the Spacemen.”” In late August the Air Force had 
taken delivery of the X-2 and then extended its program for an 
additional month (before the plane would be turned over to the NACA), 
announcing the purpose as “to obtain an incremental value of the 
high-speed performance of the X- 2 airplane.”” Into the cockpit stepped a 
new Air Force pilot, Capt. Milburn G. Apt. 
Though he had flown chase on many X-2 missions, Me1 Apt had 
never flown a rocket-powered airplane. He was perhaps the most 
experienced pilot at Edwards on the phenomenon of inertial coupling, 
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having flown many inertial coupling research flights in the F-100 
fighter. Apt had received computer-based briefings on 29 July and 24 
September, but the briefings had a flaw. The X-2 flights had accumu- 
lated useful data only up to mach 2.4. Engineers extrapolated all data 
beyond that, and the predictions were dubious. One study, at a simulated 
mach number of 3.2 at 21 300 meters, showed the aircraft “diverging” 
(going out of control) during lateral (rolling) maneuvers. Being 
extrapolations, none of these studies could be conclusive. On 27 Septem- 
ber 1956 Me1 Apt dropped away from the Superfortress mothership in 
the X-2 at 8:49 a.m. His flight plan called for “the optimum maximum 
energy flight path,” one certain, if successful, to exceed mach 3. In a 
postflight question-and-answer session, a senior program official said, 
“Captain Apt was instructed to make no special effort to obtain maxi- 
mum speed but rather to stay within previous limits and to concentrate 
on the best flying technique possible.”’* Clearly some confusion existed in 
the minds of mission planners. And there was the matter of experience; 
Apt had not even had the benefit of a glide flight in the X-2; his sole 
time in the cockpit was spent in several ground engine runs and posing 
for publicity photographs with Kincheloe. He had been cautioned to 
decelerate rapidly if he encountered stability difficulties and not to make 
rapid control movements above mach 2.7. 
As Apt climbed away after launch, he followed a predetermined 
schedule matching the airplane’s g loading versus altitude, based on 
code numbers radioed from ground radar tracking. He reached high 
altitude, nosed over and dived past mach 3, reaching mach 3.2 (3370 
kilometers per hour) at 20 000 meters. His rocket engine burned for 
another 10 seconds, longer than previously. The flight had been flawless, 
but now victory turned to ashes. Apt began an abrupt turn back for the 
lake. Perhaps he believed the X-2 was traveling slower than it was. Like 
all early X-series aircraft, the X- 2 had lagging instrumentation. The 
cockpit camera film showed the machmeter indicating mach 3 for over 10 
seconds. As the X-2 turned, it started a series of rapid rolls and the 
“critical roll velocity,” an engineering construct, now became a brutal 
reality. The X-2 coupled, tossing Me1 Apt violently about the cockpit, 
knocking him unconscious. Apt slowly came to, tried to regain control, 
then jettisoned the craft’s nose section in preparation to bail out. The 
shock of jettisoning the nose knocked him unconscious again, and before 
he could recover, the capsule plunged into the desert, killing him 
instantly. The rest of the X-2 spun into the desert eight kilometers away. 
Barely three minutes after launch, Me1 Apt had become the first pilot to 
reach mach 3, and then died. Kincheloe’s voice continued on the radio, 
“Mel, can you read me, Mel?”lg 
A valued pilot had died. A research airplane had crashed just as it 
might have begun justifying its development. A record had been set, but 
to little purpose. The accident illustrated the acute need for reliable 
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cockpit instrumentation for high-speed flight research, and this eventu- 
ally helped spawn the special gyro-stabilized inertial guidance system 
used on the X- 15. Some tried to point to “research accomplishments” of 
the X-2, citing limited heating data acquired from seared samples of 
temperature-sensitive paint-which rocket models could more easily 
have acquired. In reality, its research was nil. Groping for significance, 
the Edwards historian asked one program official, “I imagine the X-2 
program contributed greatly to aeronautical knowledge, didn’t it?” 
“More than ever before,” answered the official, “we appreciate the 
requirement of providing the pilot with the information he needs to do 
his job.”” Back in Washington, the NACA staff fired off a series of 
messages to Walt Williams, fearful lest the High-speed Flight Station had 
condoned the flight. One, from Dryden’s deputy, got right to the point: 
WHAT DOES OPTIMUM MAX ENERGY FLT PATH MEAN 
PD SGND CROWLEY 
The Air Force Flight Test Center issued its accident report in November 
1956; it concluded that the fatal turn at peak velocity had led inevitably 
to coupled motion instability.21 
The loss of the X-2 once again robbed the NACA of a research tool 
just at a time when it might have proved worthwhile. Previously, the 
NACA had lost its planned programs on the X- 1-3 and X- 1A because 
of the gasket explosions. The X-2 fiasco removed the last chance to get 
mach 3 heating data prior to the X- 15. The agency had to make do with 
the X-lB, capable only of approaching mach 2, an unpleasant price to 
pay for a speed record. It was particularly galling because Apt’s flight was 
to have been the last Air Force flight before the X-2 was turned over to 
the NACA. 
The X-2 program was disaster masquerading as research organization, 
and subsequent program reviewers could not ignore the facts. The Air 
Force’s program historian argued that Me1 Apt had certainly needed at 
least one low-supersonic familiarization flight in the X- 2, questioning 
why “a pilot with limited experience like Captain Apt [was] shoved into 
the cockpit of the X-2 on an optimum flight at the last minute.”22 NACA 
would certainly have agreed with his overall conclusion: 
Only one conclusion can be reached and that is that the Air Force in its 
determination to attain a record speed and altitude with the X-2 which it did 
achieve assumed a calculated risk of losing the pilot and the aircraft in the 
process. . . . Fatigue, miscalculations, and poor judgment entered into the 
program at a time when unhurried flights were in order and good judgment 
should have directed and supervised the pr0gram.2~ 
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“ROUND ONE’S” TWILIGHT YEARS 
The High-speed Flight Station continued flying the two remaining 
rocket research airplanes, the X- 1B and the X- lE, until mid-1958. 
Both assumed some of the tasks envisioned for the lost X- 1A and X-2, 
but they also took on new ones as well. After the Air Force had delivered 
the X- 1B to the High-speed Flight Station in 1954, NACA shipped the 
airplane back to Langley for installation of 300 thermocouples and 
related instrumentation to measure structural temperatures. It had 
arrived back at Edwards in time to assist in the X- 1A accident investiga- 
tion and did not fly until August 1956, embarking on its heating research 
program the next month. In January 1957, NACA test pilot Jack McKay 
extended the investigation to mach 1.94, bringing the program to a 
conclusion. Project engineers believed the data to be representative of 
heating conditions that could be expected on future mach 2 military 
aircraft. The maximum heating rate experienced was about 1°C per 
second, with a maximum skin temperature of 85°C being recorded on 
the forward point of the nose. Internal heat “sinks” and sources apprecia- 
bly affected skin temperatures. While the skin next to the liquid oxygen 
tank had a temperature of only 1O”C, that just ahead of the tank was 
50°C. The flight results generally agreed with estimated temperatures 
derived by calculation. This X- 1B study was the first major aerodynamic 
heating flight research study undertaken in the United States, and, alas, 
was a good example of the kind of work the High-speed Flight Station 
had expected from the X-2.24 
Iven Kincheloe’s high-altitude flight in the X-2 demonstrated the 
inadequacies of conventional aerodynamic controls for flight in regions 
of low dynamic pressure. One solution was the installation of small 
reaction-control thrustei jets for maintaining proper vehicle attitude in 
regions of low “q”. In 1956 the High-speed Flight Station began 
researching reaction controls in support of the X- 15 program. Writing 
nearly a decade later, engineer Wendell Stillwell of the HSFS stated: “The 
transition from aerodynamic control to jet control loomed as the most 
difficult problem for this vast, unexplored flight regime.”25 The X- 1B 
offered an ideal testbed for a trial reaction control installation. In 
preparation, HSFS technicians built an iron-frame simulator, dubbed the 
“Iron Cross,” which matched the dimensions and inertial characteristics 
of the X-lB, installing small reaction control thrusters on it and then 
mounting it on a universal joint so that a test pilot could maneuver it in 
pitch, roll, and yaw. NACA’s test pilots “flew” this simulator extensively. 
In November 1957, NACA finished installing reaction controls on the 
X-1B itself, and test pilot Neil A. Armstrong made three flights in the 
plane before it was grounded in the summer of 1958 because of fatigue 
cracks in its fuel tank. NACA subsequently transferred the reaction 
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control research program to a Lockheed F- 104 Starfighter; this aircraft 
played a major role in training pilots for the X- 15.26 
The X-1E was the last of the hardy X-1 breed to retire. An 
extensive modification of the NACA’s original X- 1 aircraft, the X- 1E 
had been rebuilt with a low-pressure fuel system and a special low-aspect 
ratio wing having a thicknesskhord ratio of only 4%. Much of the design 
work was undertaken by the High-speed Flight Station staff, which saw 
the craft as an opportunity to get information at speeds above mach 2 on 
this wing configuration-similar to that of the X-3-that the X-3 had 
been unable to obtain because of its inadequate propulsion system. The 
wind had no less than 200 pressure distribution measurement orifices cut 
into it, as well as 343 strain gauges baked into the wing surface for 
structural load and heating research. At one point, after the loss of the 
X-2, NACA engineers Hubert Drake and Donald Bellman proposed 
boosting the X- 1E’s engine performance to enable the plane to reach 
mach 3, but NACA opted to wait for the X-15 instead. The X-1E 
suffered a hard-luck flight research program, experiencing two landing 
accidents, one of which severely damaged the airplane. It did comple- 
ment the heating research undertaken by the x- lB, but by the time of 
its flight trials, the Lockheed F-104 with a generally similar wing 
configuration was already flying and could more easily acquire data at 
mach 2. The rocket aircraft required time-consuming preparations; as 
research engineer Gene Matranga recalled, “We could probably fly the 
X- 1E two or three times a month, whereas Kelly Uohnson] was flying his 
F- 104s two or three times a day into the same flight regimes, so it really 
didn’t make sense for us to be applying those kind of resources to [obtain] 
that kind of inf~rmation.”~’ The X- 1E completed its last NACA flight in 
November 1958. It is now permanently exhibited in front of the Dryden 
center, perched at a jaunty angle. 
“ROUND ONE” IN RETROSPECT 
The conclusion of “Round One” in 1958-1959 brought the era of 
the supersonic breakthrough to a close. Figure 1 illustrates the compari- 
son between rocket research aircraft, military fighter prototypes, and 
military fighters in service. As can be seen, the X-series never led the 
prototypes by less than 0.6 mach; by 1956, this had increased by a whole 
mach number. The differences between X-series performance and 
aircraft in service at the time is even more pronounced (for example, the 
X- 1A vs. F-86F Sabre of 1953). 
Figure 2 places the rocket research aircraft program within the 
context of speed trends throughout aviation history. The figure illus- 
trates the interesting relationships among different growth curves. 
Notice that as piston-engine technology approached its limits a new 
technology revolutionized the field-the jet engine. The rocket research 
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Figure 1 .  Leader-follower relationship between research aircrafi, military fighter protoqpes, 
and military fighters in service. 
aircraft curve exhibits rapid growth over a short period of time. The jet 
fighter curve is a classic example of the “S” or biological curve: slow 
progress initially (“infant problems”), a period of very rapid growth 
(from mach 1 to mach 2), and then, beginning just beyond mach 2, the 
rate of development slows because of a variety of factors, including 
propulsion efficiency, aerodynamic and heating constraints, cost of such 
complex systems, and questionable mission utility above mach 2. Several 
leader-follower relationships are illustrated: piston military fighters led 
piston transports, jet fighters led jet transports (a continuance of the 
earlier trend), and the rocket research aircraft led the development of jet 
fighters.28 Significantly, the growth curve for the rocket research aircraft 
is “open-ended’; beyond these Round One vehicles was the mach 6 
X-15; beyond it the logical successor system was some form of lifting- 
reentry spacecraft such as the present-day Space Shuttle. The Round 
One rocket aircraft, besides contributing markedly to the acquisition of 
informafion on supersonic flight, were thus pointing toward manned 
suborbital and orbital spaceflight as well. 
Figure 3 indicates the life-cycle histories of the Round One aircraft, 
including development time along with active flight status. The relatively 
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Figure 2 .  Aircraft peformance by aircraft category. 
short development cycles for such successful aircraft as the original X- 1 
series forms an interesting comparison to such disappointing programs 
as the X-2 and X-3. 
The Round One aircraft, including both the rocket research 
aircraft and the configuration explorers, investigated a variety of topics 
and problems. Walter Williams and Hubert M. Drake of the High-speed 
Flight Station tabulated these into four broad areas: aerodynamics, flight 
loads, stability and control, and operations: 
Aerodynamics 
Validation of transonic tunnel design 
Interpretation of tunnel testing data 
Aerodynamic heating at supersonic speeds 
Lift and drag studies 
Inlet and duct studies 
Load distribution 
Effect of wing sweep upon gust loads 
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Fagure 3. Comparative l fe  cycles for “Round One” aircraft. 
Aeroelastic effects 
Effect of stability reduction upon flight loads 
Longitudinal control 
Blunt trailing edge control surfaces 
Alleviation of pitch-up by wing devices 
Effect of principal inertial axis upon lateral stability 




High-speed flight exploration 
Speed loss in maneuvers 
High-altitude problems 
Pressure suit research and use 
Airspeed measurement 
Variable wing-sweep operation2’ 
Stability and control 
Operations 
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The diverse range of research areas offers yet another example of 
the serendipitous character of the Round One aircraft. Conceived largely 
for aerodynamic and loads research at the speed of sound, they contrib- 
uted markedly in other areas as well, influencing subsequent aircraft 
design practice-use of vortex generators, all-moving horizontal stabilizers, 
placing the horizontal tail low, increasing the size of vertical fin surfaces 
for high-speed flight, alleviating pitch-up by a variety of wing leading 
edge devices, to name just a few. Their development acted as a “forcing” 
function, encouraging the development of improved ground research 
methods, notably the transonic slotted throat tunnel.30 And, of course, 
there was the very real psychological benefit accruing from removing the 
“sound barrier” as a fixation from the minds of engineers. 
In some respects the Round One aircraft were disappointing. Main- 
tenance demands limited most rocket research aircraft to an average of 
one or two flights per month. Then there is the sad chapter of the ex- 
”.., -:? *, .. ,.“.*..I 
These personnel members and this equipment were used by the NACA High-speed Flight 
Station to support oneflight of the NACA 0-558-2 Skyrocket. Note the two Sabre chase 
planes, the modified B -29 launch aircrafi, and the profusion of ground support equipment, 
including communications, tracking, maintenance, and rescue vehicles. Research pilot A. 
Scott Crossfield stands in front of the Skyrocket. 
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plosions, which robbed the NACA, at critical moments, of the X- 1-3 
and the X-1A. The X-2 story of delay and misuse, and the sad tale of 
the X-3 and its propulsion problems are classic examples of programs 
that got out of hand. They pointed to the need for greater coordination 
and cooperation between the NACA, industry, and the military services. 
The complexities of X- 15 development provided an opportunity to 
exercise this tighter control, and the rising costs of aeronautical research 
and development implicitly dictated that the days where a program like 
the X-2 would be allowed to continue were at an end. 
Round One was a flight research program; as such, it was almost 
exclusively the accomplishment of the NACA High-speed Flight Station 
under the direction of Walter Williams, with the support of Hartley Soul6 
as research airplane projects leader and Hugh Dryden as NACA director 
of research. The High-speed Flight Station had used the Round One 
airplanes to undertake and consolidate the supersonic breakthrough. By 
1959, as the early X-series passed into eclipse, all eyes at Edwards turned 
to the sleek, black X-15. Round One had been a success, and the 
production aircraft then aloft, from passenger-carrying jet transports to 




Testing Service Aircraft: 1953- 1959 
The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics had a long 
history of assisting the military services and other government agencies 
on research to new aircraft development projects. As early as the 1920s, it 
was not at all uncommon for NACA to participate in flight tests of 
military aircraft. Indeed, on occasion, NACA pilots flew test flights for 
the contractor (a good example being Langley’s Bill McAvoy, who flew 
some of the hazardous spin and dive tests on the XF3F for Grumman 
and the Navy). During World War 11, NACA had joined in many flight 
research investigations related to improving the combat potential of 
American military aircraft such as the Republic P-47 fighter, the Curtiss 
SBZC dive bomber, and the North American P-51 Mustang. Of course, 
these aircraft, and many others as well, were also studied extensively in 
NACA wind tunnels, a traditional form of agency support to the military 
and industry. 
This cooperative role continued after World War I1 as well, encour- 
aged by several factors including an official Air Force policy of “concurrency” 
testing whereby a large number of initial production-model aircraft were 
tested at laboratories and field sites around the country, including 
NACA, to accelerate the testing process, reducing the chances of en- 
countering problems that might arise should an experimental design be 
committed to production on the basis of only a few tests on prototypes. 
Further, with the new generation of transonic and supersonic fighter and 
bomber aircraft drawing on more new technology than ever before, there 
was greater need to deliver pre-production or early production models to 
NACA for evaluation and uncovering of possible defects. After com- 
pleting the requested projects for the services or manufacturers, NACA 
either returned the aircraft or kept them in NACA-NASA service, 
flying on a variety of “research opportunity” tasks, often for many years. 
Though service aircraft appeared at various NACA laboratories during 
the 1 9 5 0 ~ ~  the major focus of such research was, not unnaturally, the 
High-speed Flight Station at Edwards, since Edwards constituted the Air 
Force’s center for flight research. 
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EARLY WORK 
As early as 1950, the NACA-Edwards station had participated in an 
Air Force development program when station engineers provided 
assistance to the service and the Republic aircraft company on the 
XF-91 experimental interceptor. But the XF-91 was a radical depar- 
ture from conventional aircraft design for the day; thus NACA research 
on the craft could be regarded as motivated as much by the desire to 
conduct pure research as by the need to assist the military service. In 
1952, however, the NACA station at Edwards made a major contribution 
to saving a military fighter program in serious trouble, the Northrop 
F-89 interceptor. 
The F-89 was a high-priority air defense program. In the early 
months of 1952, six F-89s lost their wings in flight, With more than 
a thousand built or on order, the Air Force faced a serious crisis, for the 
F-89 was considered a major element in the North American air defense 
structure. At the request of both the contractor and the Wright Air De- 
velopment Center, the NACA-Edwards station entered the investigation. 
Since the aircraft had obviously suffered structural failures, Walt Wil- 
liams loaned a NACA team to Northrop to determine the F-89’s inflight 
loads. The NACA team installed strain gauges on an experimental F-89 
and then studied the data acquired from test flights. As a result, North- 
rop discovered a serious weakness in the wing structure and redesigned 
the structure to strengthen it. The F-89 subsequently went on to a long 
and useful service career, and the NACA’s assistance on the program 
enhanced the agency’s reputation among the military and industry flight 
testing community. 
NACA-Edwards followed the F-89 experience with a major investi- 
gation of another Air Force aircraft, the B-47 jet bomber. Unlike the 
earlier case, however, the B-47 was not in difficulty. Rather, the NACA 
had asked for the loan of one of the planes to study aeroelastic wing 
flexing. The B-47, a shoulder-wing monoplane, had six podded jet 
engines and a very thin sweptwing. An airplane with a large, thin, flexible 
wing could have peculiar aerodynamic and structural load responses as a 
result of interactions between wing and tail deflections and transonic 
airflow changes. The field of aeroelasticity, while not new, took on added 
importance with the large sweptwing aircraft then under development or 
in production, especially the B-52, an urgent defense program, and a 
Boeing tanker-transport design that eventually spawned the KC- 135 
tanker and the 707 airliner. Two NACA laboratories had an interest in 
the B-47; Langley wished to study the impact of aeroelasticity upon 
structural loads and Ames the impact of aeroelasticity upon dynamic 
stability. Operation of the aircraft from either center was dubious 
because of runway length. Accordingly, the RAPP sent it to the NACA 
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station at Edwards, where it flew from May 1953 to 1957. NACA’s B-47 
testing revealed some serious design deficiencies; buffeting problems 
limited the plane to speeds no greater than mach 0.8 and certain lift 
values. In late 1953, NACA requested that the Air Force provide a B-52 
as soon as possible, so that the research gathered with the B-47 could be 
extended through mach 0.9 + and up to 15 000 meters in altitude. NACA 
never got the B-52, but did secure permission to instrument a B-52 
being flown by Boeing; a company-sponsored loads investigation, includ- 
ing the special maneuvers called for by NACA, then gathered much of 
the data NACA wanted. The B-47 testing resulted in reports prepared 
jointly by the HSFS, Ames, and Langley laboratories that gave engineers 
and design teams around the country access to reliable information on 
the dynamic behavior and response characteristics that could be expected 
of large, flexible sweptwing airplanes2 
The High-speed Flight Station later continued its large jet aircraft 
studies using a Boeing KC- 135 tanker, starting with one aircraft loaned 
by the Air Force in 1957. But flight tests were suspended after a 
near-disastrous midair collision between the plane and a jet trainer from 
the Air Force Test Pilot School. The KC- 135, piloted by Stan Butchart, 
staggered down to a safe landing on Rogers Lake but the trainer, whose 
civilian pilot apparently never saw the transport, crashed, killing the 
student. The Air Force delivered a second KC- 135 on ninety-day loan; 
it completed a number of flights before being returned to the service in 
1958. The KC- 135 flights had been requested by the NACA Subcommit- 
tee on Flight Safety, in response to a plea from the Civil Aeronautics 
Administration (CAA). The CAA needed information that might be 
useful in writing regulations on cloud ceiling and minimum landing 
approach visibility for the new generation of jet transports then under 
development. NACA research on the plane evaluated high-altitude 
cruise performance, landing approaches including “instrument only” 
conditions, and how the jet’s wing spoilers affected its glide path during 
landing approaches. 
NACA AND THE “CENTURY SERIES” 
The High-speed Flight Station’s major service testing activities 
supported the Air Force’s “Century Series” of fighter and interceptor 
aircraft. Table 2 lists those evaluated at the HSFS from 1954 onward. 
The F- 100, F- 102, and F- 1.04 initially were sent to HSFS in support of 
the military development of those aircraft. The F-101 and F-105 
appeared at the lake only briefly, so that pilots could familiarize them- 
selves with the characteristics of those aircraft. The F- 107 program was 
an abortive attempt by a contractor to develop a mach 2 fighter-bomber- 
the F- 105 won the production order; NACA acquired the F- 107s to 
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Table 2 




North American F- lOOA 
North American F- lOOC (#1) 
North American F- lOOC (#2) 
McDonnell F- lOlA 
Convair YF- 102 
Convair F- 102A 
Lockheed YF- 104A” 
Lockheed F- 104A (#1) 
Lockheed F- 104A (#2)b 
Lockheed F- 104B‘ 
Republic F- 105B 
North American YF- 107A (#1) 




























“Completed 1439 research missions in a 19-year career. 
bLost in accident; pilot safe. 
CTransfer from NASA Ames. 
dLost in accident; pilot safe. 
study some of their design features in support of the XB-70 and X- 15 
efforts. 
During the early 1950s, the Air Force’s procurement policy stressed 
“concurrency” testing. This concept was formalized into the so-called 
Cook-Craigie Plan, after Generals Laurence 6. Craigie and Orval R. 
Cook, the deputy chiefs of staff for development and materiel. Cook- 
Craigie assumed that if a design appeared to warrant production, then a 
relatively large number of prototype aircraft should be built-say , 30 to 
40-tested extensively, and the changes incorporated on newly emerging 
production aircraft. This avoided the time delays that might be expected 
if a few prototypes were refined extensively and then the design was 
committed to production. In actual practice, Cook-Craigie proved expensive, 
prone to cause problems in “configuration control” of production 
models, left large numbers of early production aircraft having little 
relationship in systems or combat capabilities to later production models, 
and was as time-consuming as the older method of prototype evaluation 
followed by production. One of Cook-Craigie’s strengths, however, was 
its endorsement of concurrency testing. Typically, various models of a 
new design were assigned to weapon testing, engine testing, systems 
testing, flight (aerodynamic) testing, and the like. As a result, NACA 
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received prototypes of new service aircraft for its own evaluations in 
support of the Air Force development effort. 
In 1954 the first two of the Century Series aircraft arrived at the 
High-speed Flight Station, the F- lOOA and the YF- 102. The F- 100 
was a supersonic aircraft having a low tail and a sharply swept wing 
mounted on a long, rakish fuselage. The YF-102 was basically an 
enlarged XF-92A delta. Whereas the F- lOOA was an early production 
airplane, the YF-102 was a pre-production model of a proposed Air 
Force interceptor. NACA, the Air Force, and the manufacturer already 
knew from wind tunnel tests that the YF- 102’s configuration rendered it 
incapable of meeting the interceptor performance specification, which 
called for supersonic speed. Even as the High-speed Flight Station 
acquired the YF- 102, Convair was busily redesigning the airplane on the 
basis of the area-rule principle developed by Langley’s Richard Whitcomb 
to give it supersonic performance. While HSFS personnel were inter- 
ested in using the YF-102 to extend the data on delta performance 
already derived by the XF-92A, they eagerly awaited the area-ruled 
version of the plane (the F-l02A), which eventually arrived at the 
station in 1956. In any case, the YF-102 soon took a back-seat to the 
F- lOOA at Edwards, because the F- lOOA program suddenly encoun- 
tered serious difficultie~.~ 
A series of mysterious crashes of F- lOOA fighters in 1954 claimed 
the lives of several airmen, including George Welch, North American’s 
chief test pilot. His F-100A had suddenly yawed more than 15” and 
broke up while making a rolling pullout from a dive at supersonic speeds. 
The Air Force had evidently placed the F-lOOA in production too 
quickly; Pete Everest, the service’s project pilot on the F-100, had 
recommended that it be modified to overcome supersonic directional 
stability problems. He was overruled at Air Force Headquarters, follow- 
ing a series of evaluation flights by fighter pilots of the Tactical Air 
Command. The fighter “jocks” were not trained test pilots and only saw 
the F- 100 as a big improvement in performance over the older F-86s 
they had been flying. Now his report came back to haunt those who had 
committed the new fighter to ~erv ice .~  The Air Force, with hundreds of 
the new planes on order, had no choice but to ground the aircraft until 
investigators could find out what had happened and modify the design. 
Gen. Albert Boyd, commander of the Air Force Air Research and 
Development Command, detailed a senior officer on his staff to meet 
with Walt Williams of the HSFS to get the NACA’s ideas on the crisis.6 
Williams and several NACA engineers, including Joseph Weil and 
Gene Matranga, met with Air Force and North American representatives 
and mapped out a research program. Up to this time, NACA had been 
primarily concerned with evaluating the F- 100’s general stability and 
control; but now, in light of the station’s concurrent experience of 
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violent inertial coupling with the X-3, the engineers decided to study 
not only the F- 1OOA’s directional stability problems but roll coupling 
tendencies as well, since the latter had been identified as the cause of one 
of the crashes. North American already had an idea for a fix: enlarge the 
area of the craft’s vertical fin and add more area to the plane’s wing tips. 
Under NACA and Air Force pressure, the cbmpany cut its planned 
delivery schedule for the larger tail from over 90 days to just 9 days, a 
measure of how urgently correcting the F- 100’s problems was viewed. 
Williams’s engineers went to Langley laboratory to run a computer 
simulation of the F- 100’s behavior-the first such simulation done by 
the HSFS-in conjunction with William Phillips, NACA’s acknowledged 
expert on coupled motion instability. The simulation confirmed the 
F- 100’s dangerous directional stability and roll coupling problems; one 
NACA engineer termed its directional stability characteristics as “damn 
poor.” From October 1954 through December, HSFS pilot Scott Crossfield 
flew NACA’s F-100A on a series of flights defining the coupling 
boundaries of the airplane. Williams reported to the RAPP on the results 
of one flight with the plane in its original (small fin) configuration: “a 
violent divergence in pitch and yaw occurred on the F-100A airplane 
during an abrupt aileron roll at a Mach number of 0.70 and an altitude of 
[4800 meters] in which a negative load factor of 4.4 g and a sideslip angle 
of 26” were reached.”’ Had a sideslip of that magnitude occurred at 
supersonic speed, the negative load factor would have multiplied and the 
aircraft probably would have disintegrated. 
At the suggestion of both Williams and North American, NACA 
added a larger vertical fin to the plane in December 1954, adding 10% 
more surface area. Eventually -North American installed an even larger 
fin, having 27% greater area, as well as wingtip extensions, and the F- 100 
series went on to a long and distinguished service life. The F-100 data 
were incorporated in the same research memorandum (RM-H55A 13, 
February 1955) that covered the X-3’s experience, a warning not to 
underestimate the difficulties that could be expected with airplanes having 
insufficient tail area combined with long fuselages and narrow wing plan- 
forms. NACA later used the F-100A for a variety of center research 
projects. The center evaluated the behavior of a pitching motion damper 
system on the first F- lOOC received in 1956. As expected, the damper 
further increased the plane’s resistance to coupling. The other F- lOQC 
arrived at the center in 1957, and was used for general research support, 
including chase flights and pilot proficiency flights.8 
In contrast to the F- lOOA experience, the High-speed Flight 
Station’s research on the YF- 102 was more prosaic. Williams’s engineers 
had more interest in the definitive F- 102A just around the corner, and 
thus used the YF-102 primarily to extend the data acquired on the 
basically similar XF-92A. Station engineers did a complete drag survey of 
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NACA’s workhorse North American F-IOOA Super Sabre engages in inertial coupling 
studies. 
the airplane, especially under various conditions of lift, this information 
greatly assisting researchers interested in correlating results taken from 
flight testing with results from wind tunnel tests of the configuration. 
The results constituted an effective measure of the accuracy of the wind 
tunnel findings for aircraft design prediction. The YF- 102 did experi- 
ence some inertial coupling tendencies, the first encountered on a delta 
airplane, but not as serious as with the F-100. NACA tested the 
production F-102A the agency received in 1956 so that researchers 
could compare differences in drag between two generally similar 
configurations, one having area rule (the F- 102A) and the other lacking 
it. As the 1950s drew to a close, NACA sought information on the 
low-speed approach and landing characteristics of unpowered delta wing 
aircraft, information applicable to the design of future winged spacecraft 
such as the “Round Three” Dyna-Soar. Deltas have peculiar low-speed 
and approach characteristics, including high induced drag, and their 
combined ailerons and elevators (elevons) work under a disadvantage: 
deltas require so much elevon deflection during landing approaches that 
they have very little available elevon “travel” left for good lateral control. 
This limitation could seriously compromise safety during the landing 
approach of a delta-wing spacecraft, especially one having the inherent 
performance limitations imposed by reentry design constraints (i.e., 
sinking like a rock). Before NASA retired the F-102A in 1959, test 
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pilots Jack McKay and Neil Armstrong flew a series of landing ap- 
proaches under various lift-to-drag and power conditions, in preparation 
for the ill-fated Dyna-Soar p r ~ g r a m . ~  
The third Century Series program to get under way at the High- 
Speed Flight Station involved the Lockheed F- 104, an airplane having a 
configuration generally similar to the Douglas X- 3. The program began 
in 1956, the start of an association with this hot fighter that continues 
nearly three decades later. An alluring mach 2 design, the F- 104, with 
its high T-tail, long fuselage, narrow wingspan, and troublesome J79 jet 
engine, posed numerous challenges. The long, pointy configuration- 
public relations flacks dubbed the F-104 the “Missle with a Man”- 
promised to give roll coupling problems, and the tail hinted ominously 
at pitch-up, though Lockheed designed a stick shaker and “stick kicker” 
into the controls to prevent an unwary pilot from getting into pitch-up 
difficulties. Both these areas, of course, were ones in which the NACA 
had a vital interest. The Research Aircraft Projects Panel had sought an 
F-104 for the Edwards station since 1954; in late summer of 1956, the 
station received a pre-production YF- 104A.” 
The company and service flight-test program on the F- 104 did 
not go at all smoothly, largely because of powerplant problems and 
equipment failures; it eventually took twice as long as expected, with a 
number of accidents and incidents, some causing fatalities. At one point, 
Lockheed had lost all its instrumented test airplanes; NACA’s YF- 104A 
was the only instrumented airplane left. The Air Force asked for its 
return, but NACA countered with the proposal that NACA run the 
Lockheed test program on the YF airplane, using NACA pilots. Lockheed 
and the Air Force agreed, and the roll coupling study began in May 1957. 
NACA engineer Thomas Finch was detailed to work with the Lockheed test 
team and the company’s aerodynamicists on analog studies of the F- 104‘s 
expected rolling characteristics to predict what might happen in flight, 
while NACA test pilot Joe Walker flew the trials. Over the next nine 
months, the station’s YF- 104A completed more than 60 roll investigations, 
which showed the aircraft to be generally acceptable. Flight test results 
and Finch’s analog studies indicated that transonic and supersonic rolls 
near zero g “entry” conditions could lead to autorotation, a tendency for 
the plane to continue rolling despite the pilot’s applying corrective 
aileron, with accompanying pitching and yawing motions. Finch recom- 
mended that if this occurred the pilot use the stabilizer to damp out any 
tendency of the plane to couple. NACA further recommended that 
Lockheed limit the aileron’s “travel” (displacement) at transonic and 
supersonic speeds, only permitting “full” aileron “authority” with the 
plane in the low-speed landing gear-and-flaps-down configuration. This 
confirmed impressions at Lockheed, and the company built mechanical 
limits into the plane, added a yaw damper, and put cautioning notes in 
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NACA’sfirst Lockheed Staqighter, the YF-l04A, flies for NASA with an experimental 
test installation to measure base drag. 
the plane’s operational handbook.” Wary pilots still treat the F- 104 with 
caution. * 
The NACA and NASA later flew the YF-104A on a variety of 
research tasks. Equipped with reaction controls, it flew as a trainer for 
X- 15 pilots. It performed other special aerodynamic investigations, such 
as a boundary-layer-noise research program for Ames Research 
Center, before being retired in 1975. While NACA’s program with the 
YF- 104A constituted the station’s major early involvement with the 
F-104, the station also flew three other F-104s acquired later-two 
F- 104As and a two-seat F- 104B from Ames-on a variety of research 
tasks including tests of the Mercury spacecraft’s drogue parachute and 
studies of boundary layer formation transition from laminar (smooth) to 
turbulent flow. The center acquired a number of F-104s in the 1960s 
and 1970s for flight research. 
In contrast to the F-100, F-102, and F-104 programs, NACA’s 
involvement with the F- 107 did not involve support of a major defense 
production program. Rather, the F- 107 was what Williams was fond of 
referring to as a “target of opportunity,” an aircraft possessing some 
interesting features that NACA wished to examine in detail. 
The F- 107 started out as a “growth” version of the F- 100, with an 
estimated mach 2 f speed and some radical design elements. It featured a 
large inlet located above the fuselage, a very sophisticated stability 
*There is a popular tale around Dryden of a local well known former naval aviator up in one of 
the two-seat F- 104s who exuberantly initiated a rapid roll far above mach 1, only to have the NASA 
pilot wrench the stick away with an oath, exclaiming “Not in this airplane you don’t!’’ 
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augmentation system, and an all-moving vertical fin. The inlet and the 
fin designs were what interested NACA. After the F- 107 lost out to the 
F-105 for a major Air Force production contract, the NACA acquired 
the first and third YF- 107s built. The first proved mechanically unrelia- 
ble and completed only 4 flights before NASA grounded it. The third 
completed 40 flights during 1958 and 1959 before being destroyed in a 
takeoff accident, fortunately without injury to the pilot, Scott Crossfield. 
During this time, the engineers at the High-speed Flight Station modi- 
fied it with a so-called sidestick flight control system, to gain experience 
using such a system, which was planned for the upcoming X-15 
program. On the basis of F- 107 flight testing, North American refined 
the design of the sidestick planned for the X-15, and the designated 
X- 15 test pilots gained experience with such a system before having to 
try it out in the actual X-15 itself. The sidestick program was NACA’s 
major accomplishment with the craft. The proposed inlet and fin studies 
went by the wayside after the retirement of the first F-107, in part 
because the complex inlet, with its movable inlet ramps and variable inlet 
control, caused so many problems that technicians were eventually forced 
to fix the inlet into a position that limited the plane to a maximum speed 
of mach 1.2.’* 
AN ASSESSMENT 
NACA’s assistance to the Air Force and industry on the F- 100 and 
F-104 contributed significantly to ensuring that both were safe and 
effective combat aircraft. The agency’s program on the YF- 102 and 
F-102A was less important in this regard, but offered an excellent 
opportunity to evaluate the accuracy of wind tunnel predictions against 
full-scale data taken from flight testing, and also to compare the direct 
benefits of Whitcomb area-ruling on an aircraft’s configuration. The 
wind tunnel predictions and expected benefits of area-ruling were 
confirmed during tests. The F- 107 helped X- 15 development move 
smoothly along, giving confidence in the sidestick flight control system. 
For the most part, HSFS research on service aircraft took a definite 
second place to research on the X series; the only exception came during 
the F- 100 crisis. Also, toward the end of Round One, research on service 
craft picked up, in part because after 1955 the HSFS had more time to 
invest in them. Though this could smack of “make-work,” in fact many of 
these new craft had features of interest that did not appear on the 
X series. They included innovations such as the all-moving vertical fin on 
the F- 10’7 and complex stability augmentation systems. Generally, as 
soon as the High-speed Flight Station had finished with the service- 
related testing of the craft, the engineering staff would set to work on a 
program related more to NACA interests, such as reaction control stud- 
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ies with the YF-104A. Williams and his engineers, in pursuit of their 
larger mission of advancing supersonic and hypersonic research, con- 
sistently sought to place the testing of service aircraft within not only the 
framework of military and industry needs, but also within NACA’s 
interests in high-speed research, for example the low-speed ground 
approach studies of the F-102A in support of the “Round Three” 
Dyna-Soar. This often led to novel proposals and research trips far from 
the desert. Williams once advocated installing ramjets on the wingtips of 
a Lockheed F- 104A to acquire information that could benefit the design 
of supersonic ramjets; despite interest from the Lewis engine laboratory 
and the Air Force’s Air Research and Development Command, the 
project died for lack of other support. Because the X- 15 had a so-called 
“rolling tail”-the tail surfaces functioned both for pitch and roll control, 
as well as for directional control-Williams and a test team journeyed to 
France to study a French airplane having such a feature, the Sud-Ouest 
Trident experimental interceptor. Test pilots Joe Walker and hen  Kincheloe 
flew the craft (both were designated pilots for the X-15) to become 
familiar with the performance and effectiveness of such a configuration. 
The experience gave NACA added confidence in the capabilities of such 
a design feature for controlling the X- 15.13 
Flying these service aircraft was often as potentially hazardous as the 
regular X series. On the first flight of the NACA F-100A, Scott 
Crossfield had to make a powerless “deadstick” landing following an 
engine fire warning, something North American’s own test pilots doubted 
could be done, for the early F- 100 lacked flaps and landed “hot as hell.” 
Crossfield followed up the flawless approach and landing by coasting off 
the lakebed, up the ramp, and then through the front door of the NACA 
hangar, frantically trying to stop the plane which had used up its 
emergency brake power. Crossfield missed the NACA X fleet, but 
crunched the nose of the aircraft through the hangar’s side wall. Chuck 
Yeager then proclaimed that while the sonic wall had been his, the 
hangar wall was Crossfield’s. ’* Test pilot Milt Thompson had a close call 
in one of the F- 104As when one of its flap actuators failed, causing only 
one flap to lower. The F-104A began rolling crazily, but Thompson 
fortunately was at high altitude. He stayed with the plane through four 
rolls of increasing rapidity and coupling tendencies, then ejected. On the 
ground, observers heard Thompson radio “It’s going!” Edwards tower 
reported smoke in sight on the bombing range, but no parachute. “The 
gloom was so thick,” one engineer recalled, “you could cut it with a 
knife.” Meantime Thompson landed in the desert, gathered up his 
’chute, and flagged down a pick-up truck for a ride back to the center 
before lunchtime.’5 
After 1958, NASA’s involvement with service aircraft testing at the 
agency’s Edwards center was greatly reduced. This stemmed from 
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various causes. The NASA Flight Research Center, as the High-speed 
Flight Station had been renamed in 1959, was heavily committed to the 
X- 15 program, so the engineering staff lacked the manpower, resources, 
and time to become involved with other projects.* Changes in the 
military’s procurement of aircraft also played a role. Military aircraft 
acquisition and development declined; by 1960, the aircraft that America 
would rely upon for its defense and with which it would go to war in 
Southeast Asia were in service or under development; there was less for 
NASA to do in service-related testing,just as there was less for the Air 
Force as well. In effect, the services simply stopped building new 
airplanes for a while. 
There were also changes in the procurement policy as well. The idea 
of building a number of prototypes and pre-production machines and 
testing them widely was replaced by heavy reliance upon paper studies 
and proposal analysis-“read before buy” rather than “fly before buy.” 
This questionable practice also came to an end at the close of the 1960s, 
when the pace of acquisition stepped up. Then FRC again actively 
supported military aircraft projects with flight testing. 
Symbolically, the High-speed Flight Station’s activities on service 
testing completed the cycle of NACA involvement in the early era of 
supersonic flight. In the 1930s and early 1940s, engineers on the ground 
had generated the concept of a transonic and supersonic research aircraft 
program. In the late 1940s, a specialized NACA facility had been created 
and the research was successfully undertaken. In the 1950s, the frontiers 
beyond mach 1 were explored with a variety of instrumented, piloted 
research tools. And then, using much of the information derived by 
NACA ground and flight testing, manufacturers and the military services 
created a new generation of turbojet-driven combat aircraft and placed 
them in service, with the NACA Edwards station (and other NACA 
laboratories around the country) offering the military the traditional 
NACA support. Supersonic flight had gone from the theoretical, to the 
experimental, to the practical. The next frontier was space. 
*The FRC‘s heavy emphasis on the X-15 was perceived in some quarters as evidence that the 
“single-mission” center could be closed down following the X- 15 program. This perception actually 










The X-15 Era: 1959-1968 
On 1 October 1958, High-speed Flight Station employees Doll 
Matay and John Hedgepeth put up a ladder in front of the station 
building at the foot of Lilly Avenue and took down the NACA emblem, a 
winged shield, from over the entrance door. NASA had arrived in the 
desert, bringing with it a new era of space-consciousness, soaring 
budgets, and publicity. The old NACA days of concentration on aeronautics, 
and especially aerodynamics, were gone forever, as was the agency itself. 
The changes had been long in coming, and the post-Sputnik furor 
only accelerated the process. For the past five years, advanced planners at 
the High-speed Flight Station had devoted increasingly greater amounts 
of time to studying the possibility of hypersonic (mach 5 +) aircraft and 
winged spacecraft. Within the station’s Research Division, winged space- 
craft problems and conceptions clearly dominated the staff s thinking, 
not unexpected in light of the increasingly heavy commitment to the 
upcoming X- 15. The orientation at the HSFS dovetailed nicely with the 
new emphasis on unmanned and manned spaceflight implicit in the 
charter of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
The change in the station’s research emphasis during the 1950s can 
be seen by comparing the activities of the three branches of the station’s 
Research Division-the Stability and Control Branch, Aero-Structures 
Branch, and Airplane Performance Branch-in the three years between 
1955 and 1958.’ 
Branch Research Emphasis (1 955) 
Stability Inertial coupling 
& Control Roll-rate requirements 
for mach 2 fighters 
Aero-Structures Transonic airload 




Research Emphasis (1 958) 
Hypersonic boost-gliders 
Reaction control studies 
Winged spacecraft 
& satellites 
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The change is even more evident in records of how the professional 
research staff spent its time in 1955, 1957, and 1959.2 
Research Area 1955 1957 1959 
Satellite studies 




Advanced fighter aircraft 
Supersonic bombers & transports 
Subsonic bombers & transports 




























Figures may not add to 100% because of rounding. 
This indication of professional interests mirrored trends within the NACA- 
NASA as a whole. By the late 1950s, the Ames and Langley laboratories 
were devoting more effort to studying the problems of hypersonic flight 
and reentry from space than they were on aeronautics per se. By 1965, 
over 80% of NASA’s research went to space-related re~earch .~  
THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH 
On 1 October 1958, the day the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration officially came into being, the High-speed Flight Station 
had a personnel complement of 292. The new agency employed 8000 
civil servants, 3368 of whom were at Langley. In contrast to the tiny 
NASA station at Edwards, the Air Force contingent there numbered over 
8000. But like the rest of the newly created NASA, the High-speed Flight 
Station was on the verge of rapid growth. The station’s increasingly heavy 
emphasis upon the .problems of winged spaceflight was an unusual, but 
certainly understandable, legacy from its pioneering days of trying to 
“break the sound barrier.” Walter Williams identified a dozen problems 
affecting design and piloting of future high-speed hypersonic craft, 
problems that logically grew out of the Round One experience and would 
be encountered on both “Round Two” (the X- 15) and any “Round Three” 
orbital vehicle: 
Design Problems 
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Structural design 
Crew survival 
Poor landing configuration 
Large accelerations 
Reaction control operation 
Large changes in control effectiveness 
Large changes in stability 
Inertial coupling 
Presentation of piloting information 
Piloting Problems 
These were all problem areas that the Edwards NASA station could be 
expected to work on in the years ahead.4 
Williams and the professional staff at the HSFS had recognized for 
several years that their activities had broadened considerably beyond 
those envisioned for the “Muroc Flight Test Unit” back in the 1940s. The 
station had a major new role to play with the X- 15 which, together with 
the upcoming Project Mercury program, represented essentially a two- 
pronged approach to studying the problems of manned spaceflight. 
Williams had always sought laboratory status for the station, making it 
equal organizationally with the other NACA laboratories. Of course the 
scope of its work and the size of the station were smaller than those of 
Langley or even Ames. Nevertheless, after independence had been 
achieved from Langley in 1954, laboratory status had been the next 
logical step. To Williams, it was important for reasons of morale, making 
the station’s employees feel equal in prestige and value with the laboratories, 
even though it would not actually affect administration. When NASA 
came into existence , the traditional laboratories, Langley, Ames, and 
Lewis, were redesignated as research centers, to reflect their primary role 
in NASA’s coming activities. Williams’s continued pressing for a re- 
designation of the High-speed Flight Station now paid off, for the 
scope of the X- 15 program and NASA’s heavy priority on it argued for 
a name change. On 27 September 1959 NASA Headquarters redesig- 
nated the High-speed Flight Station the NASA Flight Research Center 
(FRC). That name continued into the 1970s, until it was renamed the 
Dryden Flight Research Center in 1976 in honor of Hugh L. Drydene5 
By the time the station became a center, Walter Williams was gone. 
At the behest of Hugh Dryden, in September he had joined Project 
Mercury, America’s first man-in-space venture, as its operations director. 
His appointment was indicative of the agency’s emphasis upon placing 
individuals with flight-test experience in positions of managerial and 
administrative responsibility for America’s growing manned spacecraft 
program. Williams would be missed, and not simply because he had been 
a superlative station director. He had influenced the local community as 
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well; he had worked for high-quality elementary and secondary educa- 
tion in the Antelope Valley school systems and had encouraged station 
employees to take an active part in civic affairs. 
In Williams’s place came Paul F. Bikle, a Pennsylvanian with long 
experience in flight-test projects. Bikle had been Williams’s choice for the 
job, for the two men were close in temperament and outlook. After 
graduation from the University of Detroit with a B.A. in aeronautical 
engineering in 1940, Bikle had joined the staff at Wright Field as a civilian 
flight-test engineer. Well known in military flight testing circles, he was 
serving as technical director of the Air Force Flight Test Center when he 
joined NASA. Like Williams, Bikle had little use for unnecessary paper- 
work; he often remarked that he would stay with NASA as long as the 
paperwork level remained below what he had experienced in the Air 
Force. 
Bikle replaced Williams at the HSFS on 15 September 1959, oversaw 
its transition to the NASA Flight Research Center, and remained for the 
next 12 years. The center was fortunate in having two such excellent 
administrators sequentially presiding over its activities. Bikle was a short, 
stocky individual who loved poker and cigars, one who had a natural 
affinity for flying and flight testing. A sailplane pilot of unusual ability, in 
February 196 1 he set a world’s altitude record for sailplanes by soaring to 
14 103 meters, a record still standing more than two decades later. Bikle 
believed in doing things quietly and with a minimum of fuss and outside 
attention. “Under Paul Bikle,” one FRC engineer recalled, “we were well 
aware that headquarters was 3000 miles away.” He was at home with the 
engineers, the test pilots, the crew chiefs, and the mechanics. Every day 
he would walk through the building and hangars, asking questions, 
expecting answers, and constantly checking. ‘The careless and unpre- 
pared could wind up in the “Bikle barrel” very quickly. Like Williams 
before him, Bikle impressed those who came in contact with him with his 
bluntness, drive, and canny engineering sense. “He’d sit in a meeting, 
listen to us, and say ‘Do this,’ ” one FRC veteran remembered. “We’d all 
think ‘Why the hell didn’t I think of that?’ ” Genuinely liked around the 
center, Bikle was known (but not to his face) as “the ole Man,” and his 
retirement party at the Antelope Valley Country Club still triggers warm 
memories in the minds of Dryden staffers. 
Bikle’s immediate challenge involved shifting the center from plan- 
ning for the X- 15 program to operating it. He needed people and began 
wiping out manpower-consuming projects to get the force necessary to 
run the new program efficiently. As one of his first moves, Bikle asked 
NASA’s Ira Abbott for 80 new positions and added them to the rapidly 
growing X- 15 team. In accordance with NASA’s center management 
policy, he elevated De E. Beeler from chief of research (and de facto 
deputy) to deputy director of FRC, a position Beeler held until his 
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Paul F. Bikle. 
retirement. FRC’s budget, personnel, and facilities expanded throughout 
the 1960s, as did NASA’s as a whole, and these expanded resources added 
to Bikle’s administrative tasks. The center’s budget went from $3.28 million 
in 1959 to $20.85 million in 1963 and to $32.97 million in 1968. Staff went 
from 292 to a peak of 669 in 1965. Its facilities expanded as well. The 
center had built a special high-speed flight test corridor for the X- 15 (to 
be discussed later) and added a communications building in 1963, a run- 
way noise measurement system in 1964, and a high-temperature loads 
calibration laboratory in 1966, which proved very useful during the 
YF- 12 Blackbird program.6 
The center’s organization remained largely unchanged from that of 
the 1950s. There were four main divisions, later designated as directorates: 
administration, research, data systems, and flight operation. In Novem- 
ber 1965, Bikle added a Biomedical Program Office of equal stature with 
the divisions,* and in 1969 he added a safety director. Bikle also added a 
Projects and Program Management Office that evolved, after he left 
FRC, into a directorate of its own. The four main directorates-research, 
data systems, flight operations, and administration-continued to pre- 
dominate under center director Lee Scherer until 1976, when, his 
*After Bikle’s departure, biomedical dropped from directorate level, becoming a branch of the 
center director’s office. See app. A for FRC organization during the Bikle and post-Bikle era. 
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successor David Scott added a Directorate for Shuttle Operations and 
shifted the projects office into the Directorate for Aeronautical Projects. 
In 1978, center director Isaac Gillam combined projects and research into 
a combined Directorate for Aeronautics. 
Prior to 1963, the various NASA centers reported to the NASA 
associate administrator and had a great deal of leeway in choosing 
projects within the areas of their expertise. In 1963, NASA authorized 
the Office of Advanced Research and Technology (OART) to supervise 
the five original laboratories and stations of the old NACA-Langley, 
Ames, Lewis, Flight, and Wallops Island-and to act as their managerial 
liaison with NASA Headquarters. FRC thus now reported to the NASA 
associate administrator in charge of OART. During the 1960s, OART 
itself was locked into competition for resources and support with the 
Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) and the Office of Space Science 
and Applications (OSSA), often causing OART’s engineers to mutter 
among colleagues that senior management had to remember NASA’s 
“first A stood for Aeronautics.” OART itself was expected to act within 
the agency much as the old NACA had acted for the military services and 
industry. OART “would have to anticipate problems, do preliminary 
studies, and carry its investigations to the point where the research could 
be usefully applied-in this case by NASA itself.”’ On this model, FRC’s 
relationship with OART was much like the earlier NACA-HSFS relationship, 
so that major upheavals in NASA itself only rocked FRC when they 
affected OART. OART was always heavily oriented toward winged 
vehicles; in 1972 NASA changed the name to the Office of Aeronautics 
and Space Technology (OAST) “to give adequate recognition to NASA’s 
responsibilities in aeronautics.”’ 
Above all, the decade of the 1960s was the decade of “Round TWO” 
(the X- 15) and, to a certain extent, “Round Three” (the Dyna-Soar and 
its follow-ons) as well. When Bikle assumed leadership of the NASA 
station, Round One was at an end. All eyes and NASA’s attention shifted 
to the rakish black rocketplane called X- 15, which would take the 
center’s research pilots to the fringes of space. 
THE BEGINNING OF ROUND Two 
The X-15’s origins were complex, for its development was stimu- 
lated by both foreign and domestic research. A major initial influence 
was the prewar and wartime work of German scientists Eugen Sanger 
and Irene Bredt (later Irene Sanger-Bredt), who in 1944 had set forth a 
concept of a hypersonic rocket-powered aircraft that could be boosted 
into orbit and then glide back to Earth (hence the term boost-glider). 
NACA’s John Becker later wrote: 
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Professor Sanger’s pioneering studies of long-range rocket-propelled air- 
craft had a strong influence on the thinking which led to initiation on the 
X-15 program. Until the Sanger and Bredt paper became available to us 
after the war we had thought of hypersonic flight only as a domain for 
missiles . . . . From this stimulus there appeared shortly in the United States a 
number of studies of rocket aircraft investigating various extensions and 
modifications of the Sanger and Bredt concept. These studies provided the 
background from which the X- 15 proposal emerged.g 
The Sanger-Bredt study directly influenced the birth of the X- 15. 
It also generated a climate from which sprang “Round Three,” the 
abortive Dyna-Soar effort. This occurred because Walter Dornberger, 
the wartime director of Germany’s Peenemunde proving grounds, had 
joined the Bell Aircraft Corporation after the World War I1 and used his 
position to propose various types of Sanger-Bredt-inspired boost-gliders 
for military missions, including orbital strike and reconnaissance. The 
Air Force, generally receptive, sponsored a number of studies that 
coalesced in 1957 as the Dyna-Soar program, later designated X-20A, 
the “Round Three” of Hartley SouK’s research aircraft classification 
scheme. All parties recognized the advisability of first acquiring basic 
hypersonic flight data, especially on hypersonic aerodynamics and heating, 
from a special high-speed research airplane-and thus was born the 
X- 15. 
Within NACA, the first call for such a vehicle came from Robert 
Woods of Bell Aircraft, a member of the prestigious NACA Committee 
on Aerodynamics and the man most responsible for getting Bell involved 
with the X-1 program nearly a decade before. In two committee 
meetings in October 1951 and January 1952, Woods urged that NACA 
study requirements for piloted mach 5 + research aircraft. NACA took no 
action on this proposal at the time, but individual engineers at the Ames, 
Langley, and Edwards facilities undertook their own studies of suitable 
configurations. At Edwards, two of Williams’s advanced planners, Hu- 
bert “Jake” Drake and L. Robert Carman, began a series of configuration 
studies. Langley engineers proposed salvaging the X-2 for a hypersonic 
test program, using two jettisonable rockets for additional boost and 
adding reaction controls. NACA headquarters moved slowly and 
deliberately. In mid- 1952, the Aerodynamics Committee endorsed a 
proposal for NACA to “devote a modest effort” to hypersonic studies, 
but Dryden, recognizing that a “modest effort” would stand little chance 
of accomplishing much and that NACA was already overcommitted to 
various projects, reduced it to a study to identify the problems of 
hypersonic flight, rather than research on the problems themselves. In 
August 1953 Drake and Carman submitted a proposal from Edwards to 
Headquarters for a five-phase hypersonic research program leading to 
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an orbital winged vehicle. Dryden and Crowley shelved the proposal as 
too futuristic, which indeed it was. Nevertheless, in its bold advocacy of a 
“piggy back” two-stage-to-orbit research craft, the Drake-Carman study 
constituted one of the earliest predecessors of Shuttle. By the end of 
1953, the notion of a hypersonic research aircraft had spawned two 
military study efforts, one by the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, the 
other by the Office of Naval Research. The next year was the critical year 
of decision for the future X-15.’’ 
At its annual meeting for 1954, the RAPP concluded that NACA 
should procure a new hypersonic research aircraft. Just over a month 
later, on 9 March 1954, NACA headquarters directed the laboratories to 
submit their views to Washington for evaluation. Ames, Langley, and 
Edwards supported the concept. Lewis favored an unmanned rocket that 
could be launched from Wallops. Only Langley and Edwards submitted 
proposed configurations; Langley’s was in the greater detail and hence 
more useful for planning. Langley had created a five-man configuration 
study panel under the direction of John Becker, and this team had 
produced a configuration that closely resembled the later X- 15. When 
soliciting bids for what became the X- 15, NACA sent Becker’s study to 
interested companies. “We didn’t say ‘Here’s what we want,’ ” Becker 
One of the Drake-Carman proposals for advanced hypersonic research aircraft that injlu- 
enced later work on the X- 1 5  and Dyna-Soar. 
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later recalled, “but we said, ‘Here’s one configuration that we think might 
solve the problems and be what we’re looking for.’ . . . the proposals that 
we got back looked pretty much like the one we had put in.”” 
A Dryden-arranged briefing of the military services on the Becker 
study in July 1954 met with enthusiastic endorsement. By October 1954, 
the Air Force and NACA had realized that such a program would be so 
large and expensive that a joint agency approach was desirable. On 18 
October the NACA, Air Force, and Navy created a three-man hypersonic 
aircraft committee to derive the precise specifications for the proposed 
airplane; Hartley SoulC represented NACA interests on the panel. 
Walter Williams’s staff at the High-speed Flight Station furnished the 
committee with a detailed study of the instrumentation requirements. On 
23 December 1954 Dryden and representatives from the Air Force and 
Navy signed a Memorandum of Understanding. NACA would have 
technical control of the project, the Air Force and Navy would fund the 
design and construction phases, and the Air Force would administer 
those phases. Upon completion of contractor testing, the aircraft would 
be turned over to NACA (NASA, as it turned out), which would conduct 
the flight testing and report results. The memo concluded that 
“accomplishment of this project is a matter of national urgency.”l2 
The three parties created a Research Airplane Committee, an 
interagency body of senior-level executives-Dryden represented NACA 
on the body-to supervise the project. Program participants recall that 
the committee, popularly known as the X- 15 Committee, did not exert 
much influence or control. It served primarily a psychological and 
political function and was largely honorary. The committee did not 
dabble in the design of the airplane; this was left up to the laboratories- 
especially Langley and the High-speed Flight Station-the contractor, 
and the earlier RAPP headed by Soul& Rather it offered high-level 
sanction of lower-level initiatives. As one senior engineer recalled, it “met 
once in a while, but usually provided only a rubber stamp. And it was 
useful [to get a budget approved] to say ‘And here’s what the X-15 
Committee wants to do.’ ”13  The committee continued in existence until 
26 October 1967, when OART closed it down. Its last significant action 
had been on 18 February 1964, when committee members amroved the 
Langley-developed Hypersonic Ramjet Experiment (HRk) for the 
X- 15A-2. 
The NACA- Air Force- Navy specification panel by mid-December 
1954 had stipulated that the craft should be capable of attaining an 
altitude of 76 000 meters and an airspeed of 2000 meters per second 
(mach 6 +). On 30 December 1954 invitations to bid on the contract were 
sent to 12 prospective contractors. Only 4 eventually submitted competitive 
designs: Bell, Douglas, North American, and Republic. For various 
technical reasons, Bell and Republic were quickly eliminated from 
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serious consideration, and the competition became a neck-and-neck race 
between North American Aviation and Douglas. Douglas proposed a 
magnesium structure for the craft, but North American preferred 
Inconel, a nickel alloy, and this coincided with the dominant view at 
Langley. A final NASA- Air Force-Navy listing ranked the proposals in 
order: 
1. North American (81.5 points out of a possible 100) 
2. Douglas (80.1 points) 
3. Bell (75.5 points) 
4. Republic (72.2 points) 
On 30 September 1955 the Air Force informed North American that it 
had won the X-15 competition. The X-15 now had a manufacturer. 
Round Two was under way.14 
NECESSARY PREPARATIONS 
The X- 15 program involved building three research airplanes; 
modifying two B -52 bombers to air-launch them; developing a powerful, 
fully reusable “man-rated” rocket engine for the craft; constructing a 
special aerodynamic test range running from Utah to Edwards, across 
the Nevada and California deserts; devising a special full-pressure flight 
suit; and building a special motion simulator connected to analog 
computing equipment-eventually X-15 pilots spent 8 to 10 hours in 
the simulator practicing each 10-12 minute flight. All these develop- 
ments proceeded relatively smoothly, with the exception of development 
of the craft’s 250 000-newton (57 000-lb-thrust) rocket engine, the 
Thiokol XLR-99, which encountered various delays and difficulties that 
forced North American to substitute two of the older XLR- 1 1 engines 
first used in the X-1 series, until the larger powerplant was ready for 
flight in late 1960. The X-15 airplane itself was ready in mid-1959. 
One of the most important aspects of the X- 15 effort, and one that 
the High-speed Flight Station was intimately involved with, was creation 
of the X- 15’s tracking range, the so-called “High-Range,” short for High 
Altitude Continuous Tracking Radar Range. The NACA and Air Force 
cooperated in planning the range, with the High-speed Flight Station’s 
instrumentation staff under Gerald Truszynski determining its layout. 
Truszynski’s staff informed the RAPP in November 1955 that the range 
should be at least 640 kilometers long, with three radar tracking stations 
able to furnish precise data on aircraft position, reentry prediction, 
geometric altitude, and ground speed. It required an air-launch site 
located over an emergency dirt landing area, intermediate dirt landing 
sites, intermediate launch (drop) sites, nearby airfields that could be used 




THE X-15 ERA 
A cutaway drawing shows internal details of the North American X- 1 5  rocket-propelled 
research aircrajl. 
and his staff concluded that the best course lay on a line from Wendover, 
Utah, to Edwards, with tracking stations at Ely and Beatty, Nevada, and 
at Edwards. The range would take the X-15 over some of the most 
beautiful, rugged, and desolate terrain in the Western Hemisphere. It 
would fly high over Death Valley before swooping down over the Searles 
basin to a landing at Rogers Lake. In 1956, construction started on the 
High Range, and it was ready for operation in July 1958. It measured 
780 kilometers long, with a corridor width of 80 kilometers. The Ely, 
Beatty, and Edwards tracking stations had radar and telemetry tracking 
with oscillograph recording, magnetic tape data collection, and console 
monitoring services. Each maintained a “local plot” of the X-15 as it 
passed on its way, much as national Air Route Traffic Control Centers 
process airliners on transcontinental flights. Edwards also had a master 
plot, and in the technical jargon of electronics engineers, the three sites 
had “interstation communication” via radio and telephone; real-time data 
passed to and fro from one to the other as the X- 15 sped along. On 
every flight, 87 channels, sampled 10 times per second, relayed informa- 
tion from the plane to the ground. The range would also prove beneficial 
to later NASA research involving vastly different aircraft. The three 
tracking stations did not come cheap: the Edwards station cost NASA 
$4 244 000; the other two together cost about the same. The Air Force 
spent another $3.3 million on High Range construction.15 
Aside from its involvement in the High Range, the High-speed 
Flight Station in the years prior to the arrival of the X- 15 supported the 
design and development stages of the program with such activities as the 
1 1 1  
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reaction control studies on the X-1B and later YF-104AY and the 
sidestick evaluation on the F- 107. Station representatives reviewed 
development progress on the aircraft, attended meetings with the 
contractor, participated in mock-up inspection, and generally supported 
NACA’s-and later NASA’s-involvement in the program with informed 
criticism and suggestions. When the first X-15 arrived at the High- 
Speed Flight Station in the early months of 1959, the station’s technical 
staff was more than ready to begin work on it. 
The first of the three X-15s arrived at the High-speed Flight 
Station in mid-October 1958, trucked over the hills from the plant in Los 
Angeles. It was joined by the second airplane the following April. In 
contrast to the relative secrecy that had attended flight tests with the X- 1 
a decade before, the X- 15 was pure theater. 
The program inspired a great deal of public attention, coming, as it 
did, after Sputnik and during the race between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to 
orbit a man, a race won by the Soviet Union. North American erected a 
huge neon sign over its plant reading “Home of the X- 15.” Journalists 
flocked to Edwards for the first contractor test flights; international 
rivalry with the Soviet Union received less attention from the press than 
did the idea of the X- 15’s being a tool in America’s “War against Space,” as 
one journalist tagged it. Implicit with this were literary “How do they do 
it?’’ looks at the test pilots, writers waxing eloquent over the airmen going 
out and confronting the X- 15 mano a mano. The project even gave rise to 
a ghastly Hollywood film, incorporating all the hackneyed stereotypes of 
celluloid test flying. And then, as Project Mercury moved from drawing 
board to launch pad, the camera crews and journalists left Edwards for 
Cape Canaveral; stayed there through Gemini, Apollo, and Skylab; and 
ventured back to the hinterlands of the high desert only when the squat 
Shuttle arrived on the scene. 
The X-15’s contractor program lasted two years, from mid-1959 
through mid-1960. North American had to demonstrate the craft’s 
general airworthiness during flights above mach 2 , and successful 
operation of its new XLR-99 engine before delivering the craft to 
NASA. Anything beyond mach 3 was considered a part of the government’s 
research obligation. The task of flying the X-15 during the contractor 
program rested in the capable hands of Scott Crossfield, who had left 
NACA to join North American and help shepherd the craft through its 
long development. Crossfield completed the first captive flight on 10 
March 1959 and first glide flight on 8June. Just prior to landing, the 
plane began a series of increasingly wild pitching motions; thanks to 
Crossfield’s instinctive corrective action, the plane landed safely. North 
American’s engineers subsequently modified its boosted control system 
to increase the control rate response. The X- 15 never again experienced 
the porpoising motions that had threatened it on its first flight. On 17 
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The X-15 launches from its B-52 mothership on one of the early contractor demonstra- 
tion Jzights. 
The X-15 begins its climb after launch. 
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Followed b~ a Lockheed F-104A Staqighter chase plane, thefirst North American X- 1 5  
sinks toward touchdown on Rogers Dry Lake following a research flight. Official USAF 
photo. 
September the X- 15 completed its first owered flight, when Crossfield 
A series of ground and in-flight accidents marred the X-15’s 
contractor program, fortunately without injuries or even greatly delaying 
the program. On 5 November 1959 a small engine fire-always ex- 
tremely hazardous in a volatile rocket airplane-forced Crossfield to 
make an emergency landing on Rosamond Dry Lake; the X- 15 landed 
with a heavy load of propellants and broke its back, grounding this 
particular X- 15 for three months. During a ground engine test with the 
third X-15 (the first one equipped with the large Thiokol engine), a 
stuck pressure regulator caused the craft to explode, necessitating virtual 
rebuilding. The second X- 15 was actually the first of the series to test-fly 
the large XLR-99 engine, and after adding the engine to the other two 
craft, North American delivered the last of the X- 15s to NASA in June 
1961. By that time, NASA, Air Force, and Navy test pilots had been 
operating the X-15 on government research flights for just over a 
year. l7 
flew the second airplane to mach 2.1 1. l? 
RESEARCHING THE FRINGES OF SPACE 
The government phase of the X- 15’s research program involved 
four broad objectives: verification of predicted hypersonic aerodynamic 
behavior and hypersonic heating rates, study of the X- 15’s structural 
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characteristics in an environment of high heating and high flight loads, 
investigation of hypersonic stability and control problems during atmo- 
spheric exit and reentry, and investigation of piloting tasks and pilot 
performance. By late 1961, these four areas had been generally examined, 
though detailed research continued to about 1964 on the first and third 
aircraft, and to 1967 with the second (the X- 15A-2). Before the end of 
1961, the X- 15 had attained its mach 6 design goal and had flown well 
above 60 000 meters; by the end of the next year the X- 15 was routinely 
flying above 90 000 meters. Within a single year, the X- 15 had extended 
the range of winged aircraft flight speeds from mach 3.2 to mach 6.04, 
the latter achieved by Air Force test pilot Bob White on 9 November 
1961. 
The intensive flight program on the X-15 revealed a number of 
interesting things. Physiological researchers discovered that the heart 
rates of X-15 pilots varied between 145 and 180 beats per minute on a 
flight, as compared to a normal of 70 to 80 beats per minute for test 
missions in other aircraft. Aeromedical researchers eventually concluded 
that prelaunch anticipatory stress, rather than actual postlaunch physical 
stress, influenced the heart rate. They believed, correctly, that these rates 
could be considered as probable baselines for predicting the physiological 
behavior of future pilot-astronauts. Aerodynamic researchers found 
remarkable agreement between the tunnel tests of exceedingly small 
X- 15 models and actual results, with the exception of drag measurements. 
Drag produced by the blunt aft end of the aircraft proved 15% higher on 
the actual aircraft than wind-tunnel tests had predicted.* At mach 6, the 
X-15 absorbed eight times the heating load it experienced at mach 3, 
with the highest heating rates occurring in the frontal and lower surfaces 
of the aircraft, which received the brunt of airflow impact. During the 
first mach 5 + excursion, four expansion slots in the leading edge of the 
wing generated turbulent vortices that increased heating rates to the 
point that the external skin behind the joints buckled. As a solution, 
NASA technicians added small Inconel alloy strips over the slots, and the 
X-15 flew without further evidence of buckling. It was “a classical 
example of the interaction among aerodynamic flow, thermodynamic 
properties of air, and elastic characteristics of structure.”’* 
Heating and turbulent flow generated by the protruding cockpit 
posed other serious problems; on two occasions, the outer panels of the 
X- 15’s heavy glass cockpit windshields fractured because heating loads 
in the frame overstressed the soda-lime glass. NASA solved the difficulty 
*Correlating full-scale flight-test measurements of base drag with predicted drag values from 
tunnel tests continues to pose serious challenges for engineers, as evidenced by continuing NASA 
research on this subject. Many aircraft continue to exhibit much higher base drag in actual flight 
than has been indicated by tunnels. 
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by changing the cockpit frame from Inconel to titanium, modifying its 
configuration, and replacing the outer glass panels with high-temperature 
alumina-silica glass. Another problem concerned an old aerodynamics 
and structures bugaboo, panel flutter. Panels along the flanks of the 
X-15 fluttered at airspeeds above mach 2.4, forcing engineers to add 
longitudinal metal stiffners to the panels. All this warned aerospace 
designers to proceed cautiously. John Becker, writing in 1968, noted of 
the X- 15 experience, 
The really important lesson here is that what are minor and unimportant 
features of a subsonic or supersonic aircraft must be dealt with as prime design 
problems in a hypersonic airplane. This lesson was applied effectively in the 
precise design of a host of important details on the manned space  vehicle^.'^ 
A serious roll instability predicted for the airplane under certain 
reentry conditions posed a serious challenge to flight researchers. To 
simulate accurately the reentry profile of a returning winged spacecraft, 
the X- 15 had to fly at angles of attack of at least 17”. Yet the cruciform 
“wedge” tail, so necessary for stability and control in other portions of the 
plane’s flight regime, actually prevented it from being flown safely at 
angles of attack greater than 20” because of potential rolling problems. 
By this time, FRC researchers had gained enough experience with the 
XLR-99 engine to realize that fears of thrust misalignment-a major 
reason for the large vertical fin-were unwarranted. The obvious solu- 
tion was simply to remove the lower half of the ventral fin, a portion of 
the fin that X- 15 pilots had to jettison prior to landing anyway so that 
the craft could touch down on its landing skids. Removing the ventral 
produced an acceptable tradeoff. While it reduced stability by about 50% 
at high angles of attack, it greatly improved the pilot’s ability to control 
the airplane. With the ventral off, the X-15 could now fly into the 
previously “uncontrollable” region above 20” angle of attack with 
complete safety. Eventually the X- 15 went on to reentry trajectories of 
up to 26”, often with flight path angles of - 38” at speeds up to mach 6, 
a much more demanding piloting task than the shallow entries flown by 
manned vehicles returning from orbital or lunar missions. Its reentry 
characteristics were remarkably similar to those of the later NASA Space 
Shuttle orbiter.** 
When Project Mercury took to the air, it rapidly eclipsed the X- 15 
in glamour. FRC’s researchers and NASA Headquarters viewed the two 
programs as complementary, however. Mercury dominated some of the 
research areas that had first interested X- 15 planners, such as “zero g” 
weightlessness studies. The use of reaction controls to maintain a 
vehicle’s attitude in space proved academic after Mercury flew, but the 
X- 15 had already proved them and would also furnish valuable design 
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information on the use of blending reaction controls with conventional 
aerodynamic controls during an exit and reentry, a matter of concern to 
subsequent Shuttle development. The X- 15 experience clearly demon- 
strated the ability of pilots to fly rocket-propelled aircraft out of the 
atmosphere and back in to precision landings. Flight Research Center 
director Bikle saw the X- 15 and Mercury as a 
parallel, two-pronged approach to solving some of the problems of manned 
space flight. While Mercury was demonstrating man’s capability to function 
effectively in space, the X- 15 was demonstrating man’s ability to control a 
high-performance vehicle in a near-space environment. . . . considerable new 
knowledge was obtained on the techniques and problems associated with lifting 
reentry. 21 
Operationally, the X-15 gave the Flight Research Center staff a 
number of headaches. Because of the complexity of its systems, the plane 
experienced a number of operational glitches that delayed flights, 
aborted them before launch, or forced abandonment of a mission after 
launch. Early in the program, the X- 15’s stability augmentation and 
inertial guidance systems were two major problem areas. NASA eventu- 
ally replaced the Sperry inertial unit with a Honeywell unit first designed 
for the Dyna-Soar. The plane’s propellant system had its own weaknesses. 
Pneumatic vent and relief valves and pressure regulators gave the 
greatest difficulties, followed by spring pressure switches in the auxiliary 
power units, the turbopump, and the gas generation system. NASA’s 
mechanics routinely had to reject 24 to 30% of spare parts as unusable, a 
clear indication of the difficulties of devising industrial manufacturing 
and acceptance test procedures when building for use in an environment 
at the frontier of science.22 Weather posed a critical factor. Many times 
Edwards enjoyed fine weather, the lakebed bone-dry, while upcountry 
the High Range was covered with clouds, alternate landing sites were 
flooded, or some other meterological condition postponed a mission. In 
one case, weather and minor maintenance kept one X- 15 grounded 
from mid-October 1961 to early January 1962. When it finally flew, the 
pilot had to make an emergency landing up range. Weather and 
maintenance then grounded the plane until m i d - A ~ r i l . ~ ~  
The X- 15 had its share of accidents, one of which killed an Air 
Force test pilot; another seriously injured a NASA research pilot. As 
previously mentioned, Scott Crossfield once made an emergency landing 
on Rosamond Lake with an X- 15 damaged by an engine fire; the plane 
broke its back on landing, necessitating lengthy repairs. The third X- 15 
blew up during ground testing of its XLR-99 engine, but it too was 
rebuilt. In November 1962, an engine failure forced Jack McKay, a 
NASA veteran of Round One, to make an emergency landing at Mud 
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Lake, Nevada, in the second X-15; its landing gear collapsed and the 
X- 15 flipped over on its back. McKay was promptly rescued by an Air 
Force medical team standing by near the launch site, and eventually 
recovered to fly the X-15 again. But his injuries, more serious than at 
first thought, eventually forced his retirement from NASA. In November 
1967, Mike Adams was killed in a strange accident in the third X- 15 that 
will be discussed later in great detail. One of the most remarkable 
close calls in the X- 15 program involved Air Force test pilot William J. 
“Pete” Knight. In June 1967 he experienced a complete electrical 
failure while climbing through 30 000 meters at mach 4+.  With no 
computed information and guidance, Knight continued to climb, sud- 
denly reduced to “seat of the pants” flying technique. During reentry he 
managed to restart one of the auxiliary power units, restoring some 
instruments, and made an emergency landing at Mud Lake, for which he 
received the Distinguished Flying Cross. 
THE X- 15 FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM, 1963- 1967 
Within NACA and later NASA, developing the X- 15 had been left 
largely in the hands of Langley, the center most closely involved in 
determining its mission and configuration, with important inputs from 
the other centers, especially the High-speed Flight Station. The flight 
research program was the province of the Flight Research Center with 
liaison and support from the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards. In 
the summer of 1961, as the X-15 approached its maximum perfor- 
mance during test flights, a new initiative began, one that sprang jointly 
from the Air Force’s Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright-Patterson 
AFB and from NASA Headquarters: using the X-15 as a “testbed” or 
carrier aircraft for a wide range of scientific experiments unforeseen in 
its original conception. 
Pressures had existed even before the X- 15 first flew to extend the 
scope of the program beyond aerodynamics and structural research. 
Researchers at the Flight Research Center had proposed using the 
airplane to carry to high altitude some experiments related to the 
proposed Orbiting Astronomical Observatory; others suggested modify- 
ing one of the planes to carry a mach 5 + ramjet for advanced air-breathing 
propulsion studies. Over 40 experiments were suggested by the scientific 
community as suitable candidates for the X- 15 to carry. In August 1961, 
after consulting with Bikle at FRC, NASA Headquarters, and the Air 
Force Aeronautical Systems Division, NASA and the Air Force formed 
an X- 15 Joint Program Coordinating Committee to prepare a plan for a 
follow-on experiments program. Most of the suggested experiments were 
in space science, such as ultraviolet stellar photography. Others sup- 
ported the Apollo program and hypersonic ramjet studies. A series of 
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meetings held at NASA Headquarters over the fall of 1961 between the 
joint committee, Hartley SoulC, and John Stack, then NASA’s director of 
aeronautical research, culminated in approval of the proposed follow-on 
research program and the classification of two groups of experiments. 
Category A experiments consisted of well-advanced and funded experi- 
ments having great importance; category B included worthwhile projects 
of less urgency or i m p ~ r t a n c e . ~ ~  
In March 1962 the X- 15 committee approved the “X- 15 Follow-on 
Program,’’ which NASA announced 13 April in a Headquarters news 
conference presided over by Stack and FRC planner Hubert Drake. 
Drake announced that the first task would be to fly an ultraviolet stellar 
photography experiment from the University of Wisconsin’s Washburn 
Observatory. NASA had investigated the possibility of the X- 15 carrying 
a Scout booster that could fire small satellites into orbit, the entire 
B -52/X- 15/Scout becoming in effect a multistage satellite booster, but 
that the agency finally rejected the idea for reasons of safety, utility, and 
economy. The X- 15’s space science program eventually included 28 
experiments running from astronomy to micrometeorite collection, 
using wingtip pods that opened at 45 000 meters, and high-altitude 
mapping. T w o  of the follow-on programs, a horizon definition experi- 
ment from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and tests of 
proposed insulation for the Saturn laiinch vehicle, directly affected 
navigation equipment and the thermal protection used on Apollo- 
Saturn. FRC quickly implemented the follow-on program. In 1964, fully 
65% of all data returned from the three X- 15 aircraft involved follow-on 
projects; this percentage increased yearly through conclusion of the 
program.25 
NASA’s major X- 15 follow-on project involved a Langley-developed 
Hypersonic Ramjet Experiment (HRE). FRC advanced planners had 
long wanted to extend the X- 15’s speed capabilities, perhaps even to 
mach 8, by adding extra fuel in jettisonable drop tanks and some sort of 
thermal protection system. Langley researchers had developed a design 
configuration for a proposed hypersonic ramjet engine. The two groups 
now came together to advocate modifying one of the X- 15’s as a mach 8 
research craft that could be tested with a ramjet fueled by liquid 
hydrogen. The proposal became more attractive when the landing 
accident to the second X- 15 in November 1962 forced the rebuilding of 
the aircraft. The opportunity to make the modifications was too good to 
pass up. In March 1963 the Air Force and NASA authorized North 
American to rebuild the airplane with a longer fuselage. Changes were to 
be made in the propellant system; two huge drop tanks (1 X 7 meters) 
and a small tank for liquid hydrogen within the plane were to be added. 
Forty weeks and $9 million later, North American delivered the modified 
plane, designated the X- 15A-2, to NASA in February 1964.26 
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The X- 15A-2 first flew in June 1964, piloted by Air Force test pilot 
Bob Rushworth. Early proving flights demonstrated that the plane 
retained satisfactory flying qualities at mach 5 + speeds, though on one 
flight thermal stresses caused the nose landing gear to extend at mach 
4.3, generating “an awful bang and a yaw,” but Rushworth landed safely 
despite blow-out of the heat-weakened tires upon touchdown. In Novem- 
ber 1966, Air Force pilot Pete Knight set an unofficial world’s airspeed 
record of mach 6.33 in the plane. NASA then grounded it for application 
of an ablative coating to enable it to exceed mach 7.*’ 
Flight Research Center’s technical staff had evaluated several possi- 
ble coatings that could be applied over the X- 15’s Inconel structure to 
enable it to withstand the added thermal loads experienced above mach 
6. NASA hoped that such coatings might point the way toward materials 
that could be readily and cheaply applied to reusable spacecraft, minimiz- 
ing refurbishment costs and turn-around time between flights. Such a 
coating would have to be relatively light; have good insulating properties; 
be easy to apply, cure, and then remove; and be easy to reapply before 
another flight. On FRC’s advice, a joint NASA-Air Force committee 
selected an ablator developed by the Martin Company, MA-25S7 in 
connection with some corporate studies on reusable spacecraft concepts. 
Consisting of a resin base, a catalyst, and a glass bead powder, it would 
protect the X- 15’s structure from the expected 1100°C heating as the 
craft sped through the upper atmosphere. Martin estimated that the 
coating, ranging from 1.5 centimeters thick on the canopy, wings, vertical, 
and horizontal tail down to 0.38 millimeters on the trailing edges of the 
wings and tail, would keep the skin temperature down to a comfortable 
3 15°C. The first unpleasant surprise came, however, with the applica- 
tion of the coating to the X-15A-2: it took six weeks. Because the 
ablator would char and emit a residue in flight, North American had 
installed an “eyelid” over the left cockpit window. It would remain closed 
until just before approach and landing. During launch and climbout, the 
pilot would use the right window, but residue from the ablator would 
render it opaque above mach 6.28 
Late in the summer of 1967, the X- 15A-2 was ready for flight with 
the ablative coating. It had already flown with a dummy ramjet affixed to 
its stub ventral fin; the ramjet, while providing a pronounced nose-down 
trim change, actually added to the plane’s directional stability. The 
weight of the ablative coating-57 kilograms higher than planned- 
together with expected increased drag reduced the theoretical maximum 
performance of the airplane to mach 7.4, still a significant advance over 
the mach 6.3 previously attained with the plane. The appearance of the 
X- 15A-2 was striking, an overall flat off-white finish, the huge external 
tanks a mix of silver and orange-red with broad striping. NASA hoped 
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rather than the dummy now attached to the plane. On 21 August 1967 
Knight completed the first flight in the ablative-coated plane, reaching 
mach 4.94 and familiarizing himself with its handling qualities. His next 
flight, on 3 October 1967, was destined to be the X- 15’s fastest flight and 
the most surprising as well.*’ 
That day, high over Nevada, Knight dropped away from the B-52, 
the heavy X- 15A-2 brimming with fuel. Knight climbed under the full 
thrust of the rocket engine. When the external tanks were emptied, he 
jettisoned them and continued on the craft’s internal supply, leveling off 
at slightly over 30 000 meters. It was a flight in the grand Edwards 
tradition of Yeager and Crossfield. The X- 15A-2’s engine burned 
more than 141 seconds and reached mach 6.72, 7269 kilometers per 
hour-a mark that would stand as a record for winged vehicles until the 
return of the Space Shuttle Columbia from orbit in 1981. Unknown to 
Knight, however, all was not well with the plane. Preflight studies did not 
adequately predict the complex local heating conditions the aircraft 
would experience. Temperatures later determined to have been above 
1650°C (3000°F) burned the ramjet off its pylon and seared a hole 
measuring 18 by 8 centimeters into the ventral fin’s leading edge. An 
airscoop effect channeled hot air into the lower fuselage and damaged 
the propellant jettison system-Knight eventually had to land the plane 
680 kilograms heavier than planned because he could not jettison 
residual fuel. If the heat had damaged the craft’s hydraulics, Knight 
Pete Knight pilots the X- 15A- 2 on its mach 6.7flight. 
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might have had to abandon the plane. Fortunately, that did not happen. 
Knight landed at Edwards, the plane resembling burnt firewood. It had 
been an eventful flight; now the engineers sat down and took a long look 
at what it all meant.30 
What it really meant was the end of the refurbishable spray-on 
ablator concept. It was the closest any X-15 came to structural failure 
induced by heating. The plane was charred on its leading edges and 
nosecap. The ablator had actually prevented cooling of some hot spots by 
keeping the heat away from the craft’s metal heat-sink structure. On 
earlier flights without the ablator, some of those areas remained rela- 
tively cool because of heat transfer through the heavy Inconel structure. 
Some heating effects, such as at the tail and body juncture and where 
shockwaves intersected the structure, had been the subject of theoretical 
studies, but had never before been seen on an actual aircraft in flight. To 
John Becker at Langley, the flight underscored “the need for maximum 
attention to aerothermodynamic detail in design and preflight te~ting.”~’ 
To Jack Kolf, an X- 15 project engineer at the FRC, the X- 15A-2’s 
condition “was a surprise to all of us. If there had been any question that 
the airplane was going to come back in that shape, we never would have 
flown it.”32 The ablator had done its job, but refurbishing for another flight 
near mach 7 would have taken five weeks. Technicians would have had 
great difficulty in ensuring adequate depth of the ablator over the structure. 
Obviously, a much larger orbital vehicle would have had even greater prob- 
lems. The sprayed-on ablator concept thus died a natural death. The un- 
expected airflow problems with the ramjet ended any idea of using that 
configuration on the X- 15. After the flight, NASA sent the X- 15A-2 to 
its manufacturer for general maintenance and repair. Though the plane 
returned to Edwards in June 1968, it never flew again. 
THE END OF AN ERA 
The third X- 15 featured specialized flight instrumentation and 
displays that rendered it particularly suitable for high-altitude flight 
research. A key element of its control system was a so-called “adaptive” 
flight control system developed by Honeywell; it automatically compen- 
sated for the airplane’s behavior in various flight regimes, combining the 
aerodynamic control surfaces and the reaction controls into a single 
control “package.” This offered much potential for future high-performance 
aircraft such as the Dyna-Soar and supersonic transports. 
By the end of 1963, this X-15 had flown above 80 kilometers, the 
altitude that the Air Force recognized as the minimum boundary of 
spaceflight. FRC pilot Joe Walker set an X-15 record for winged 
spaceflight by reaching 107 900 meters, a record that stood until the 
orbital flight of Columbia nearly a decade later. These flights, and others 
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later, acquired reentry data considered applicable to the design of future 
“lifting reentry” spacecraft such as the present-day Space Shuttle. By 
mid-1967, the X- 15-3 had completed 64 research flights, 21 at altitudes 
above 60 000 meters. It became the prime testbed for carrying experi- 
ments to high altitude, especially micrometeorite collection and solar- 
spectrum analysis experiments. 
As had happened in some other research aircraft programs, a fatal 
accident signaled the end of the X- 15 program. On 15 November 1967 
at 10:30 a.m., the X- 15-3 dropped away from its B-52 mothership at 
13 700 meters near Delamar Dry Lake. At the controls was veteran Air 
Force test pilot Maj. Michael J. Adams. Starting his climb under full 
power, he was soon passing through 27 000 meters. Then an electrical 
disturbance distracted him and slightly degraded the control of the 
aircraft. Having adequate backup controls, Adams continued on. At 
10:33 he reached a peak altitude of 80 000 meters. In the FRC flight 
control room, fellow pilot and mission controller Pete Knight monitored 
the mission with a team of engineers. Something was amiss. As the X- 15 
climbed, Adams started a planned wing-rocking maneuver so an on- 
board camera could scan the horizon. The wing rocking quickly became 
excessive, by a factor of two or three. When he concluded the wing- 
rocking portion of the climb, the X-15 began a slow, gradual drift in 
heading; 40 seconds later, when the craft reached its maximum altitude, 
it was off heading by 15”. As the plane came over the top, the drift 
briefly halted, with the plane yawed 15” to the right. Then the drift 
began again; within 30 seconds, the plane was descending at right angles 
to the flight path. At 70 000 meters, encountering rapidly increasing 
dynamic pressures, the X- 15 entered a mach 5 spin.33 
In the flight control room there was no way to monitor heading, so 
nobody suspected the true situation that Adams now faced. The control- 
lers did not know that the plane was yawing, eventually turning com- 
pletely around. In fact, control advised the pilot that he was “a little bit 
high,” but in “real good shape.” Just 15 seconds later, Adams radioed 
that the plane “seems squirrelly.” At 10:34 came a shattering call: “I’m in 
a spin, Pete.” A mission monitor called out that Adams had, indeed, lost 
control of the plane. A NASA test pilot said quietly, “That boy’s in 
trouble.” Plagued by lack of heading information, the control room staff 
saw only large and very slow pitching and rolling motions. One reaction 
was “disbelief; the feeling that possibly he was overstating the case.” But 
Adams again called out, “I’m in a spin.” As best they could, the ground 
controllers sought to get the X- 15 straightened out. They knew they had 
only seconds left. There was no recommended spin recovery technique 
for the plane, and engineers knew nothing about the X- 15’s supersonic 
spin tendencies. The chase pilots, realizing that the X-15 would never 
make Rogers Lake, went into afterburner and raced for the emergency 
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lakes, for Ballarat, for Cuddeback. Adams held the X-15’s controls 
against the spin, using both the aerodynamic control surfaces and the 
reaction controls. Through some combination of pilot technique and 
basic aerodynamic stability, the plane recovered from the spin at 36 000 
meters and went into a mach 4.7 dive, inverted, at a dive angle between 
40 and 45°.34 
Adams was in a relatively high altitude dive and had a good chance 
of rolling upright, pulling out, and setting up a landing. But now came a 
technical problem that spelled the end. The Honeywell adaptive flight 
control system began a limit-cycle oscillation just as the plane came out of 
the spin, preventing the system’s gain changer from reducing pitch as 
dynamic pressure increased. The X- 15 began a rapid pitching motion of 
increasing severity. All the while, the plane shot downward at 49 000 
meters per minute, dynamic pressure increasing intolerably. High over 
the desert, it passed abeam of Cuddeback Lake, over the Searles Valley, 
over the Pinnacles, arrowing on toward Johannesburg. As the X-15 
neared 20000 meters it was speeding downward at mach 3.93 and 
experiencing over 15 g vertically, both positive and negative, and 8 g 
laterally. It broke up into many pieces amid loud sonic rumblings, 
striking northeast of Johannesburg. Two hunters heard the noise and 
saw the forward fuselage, the largest section, tumbling over a hill. On the 
ground, NASA control lost all telemetry at the moment of breakup, but 
still called to Adams. A chase pilot spotted dust on Cuddeback, but it was 
not the X-15. Then an Air Force pilot, who had been up on a delayed 
chase mission and had tagged along on the X- 15 flight to see if he could 
fill in for an errant chase plane, spotted the main wreckage northwest of 
Cuddeback. Mike Adams was dead, the X- 15 destroyed. NASA and the 
Air Force convened an accident board.35 
Chaired by NASA’s Donald R. Bellman, the board took two months 
to prepare and write its report. Ground parties scoured the countryside 
looking for wreckage, any bits that might furnish clues. Critical to the 
investigation was the cockpit camera and its film. The weekend after the 
accident, a voluntary and unofficial FRC search party found the camera; 
disappointingly, the film cartridge was nowhere in sight. Engineers 
theorized that the film cassette, being lighter than the camera, might be 
further away, to the north, blown there by winds at altitude. FRC 
engineer Victor Horton organized a search and on 29 November, during 
the first pass over the area, W. E. Dives found the cassette, in good 
condition. Investigators meanwhile concentrated on analyzing all teleme- 
tered data, interviewing participants and witnesses, and studying the 
aircraft systems. Most puzzling was Adams’ complete lack of awareness of 
major heading deviations in spite of accurately functioning cockpit 
instrumentation. The accident board concluded that he had allowed the 
aircraft to deviate as the result of a combination of distraction, misinter- 
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preting his instrumentation display-and possible vertigo.* The electrical 
disturbance early in the flight degraded the overall effectiveness of the 
aircraft’s control system and further added to pilot workload. The 
X-15’s adaptive control system then broke up the airplane on reentry. 
The board made two major recommendations: install a telemetered 
headin indicator in the control room, visible to the flight controller, and 
medica P ly screen X- 15 pilot candidates for labyrinth (vertigo) sensitivity. 
As a result of the X-15 crash, FRC added a ground-based “8 ball” 
attitude indicator, displayed on a TV monitor in the control room, which 
furnished mission controllers with “real time” pitch, roll, heading, angle 
of attack, and sideslip information available to the pilot, using this for the 
remainder of the X- 15 program.36 
So passed the third X- 15. The program itself did not long survive. 
NASA had grounded the X- 15A-2 for major repairs by North Ameri- 
can Rockwell, a grounding that became permanent. Only the first X- 15 
remained and it soldiered on. Opinion within NASA had long been split 
as to whether the X-15 program should continue. The ramjet and 
proposed X- 15 delta conversion offered hope to zealots that the progam 
might last until 19’72 or 19’73, but the loss of two of the three aircraft 
ended that. As early as March 1964, after consultation with NASA, Brig. 
Gen. James T. Stewart, director of science and technology for the Air 
Force, had determined that the program would end in December 1968.37 
The X-15-1 had just about exhausted its research ability, and it cost 
roughly $600 000 per flight. Even FRC director Paul Bikle believed that 
the program had continued beyond its point of useful return. “X-15” 
and “FRC” had become such synonymous terms that uninformed specula- 
tion held that when the X-15 stopped flying, FRC would cease to exist. 
In fact, many other FRC programs could benefit from the resources 
needed to fly the X-15-programs such as the lifting bodies and the 
YF- 12A advanced supersonic mach 3 airplanes. NASA’s OART recognized 
this, so support for continued X-15 operations was not strong. NASA 
did not request funding for operations after December 1968.38 
During 1968, Bill Dana of NASA and Pete Knight of the Air Force 
took turns flying the first X- 15. A variety of weather, maintenance, and 
operational problems caused rescheduling and cancellation of a number 
of flights. On 24 October 1968 Bill Dana completed the first X- 15’s 81st 
flight, the 199th flight of the series. The plane attained mach 5.38 at 
7’7 700 meters carrying a variety of follow-on experiments. Two months 
remained before funding would end, and FRC engineers hoped to get 
the 200th flight before the program closed down. In spite of every effort 
*During testing for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program, Adams had shown an 
unusual susceptibility to vertigo and had experienced vertigo throughout boost to reentry on earlier 
X- 15 flights. Other X- 15 pilots often experienced vertiginous tendencies during boost. 
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to ensure that this would become a reality, maintenance and weather 
problems intervened. After several abortive attempts and repeated 
changes in the flight plan, FRC had the X- 15 and B-52 ready for flight 
on 20 December-and Edwards had snow. The support helicopters 
didn’t have the visibility to get airborne and go up range. Technicians 
demated the pair for the last time, then left with the rest of the center’s 
personnel for a wake at Juanita’s saloon in Rosamond. Betty Love, 
assembling the log of the X- 15 trio for the FRC Pilots’ Office, closed the 
entries with a final notation: “This ends an era in flight research history.” 
And indeed it did. 
THE x- 15 I N  RETROSPECT 
It was unfortunate that Hugh Latimer Dryden did not witness the 
conclusion of the X-15 program at the center soon to bear his name. 
Dryden had seen so much aviation history, from the early days of 
transonic research in the 1920s when he studied airflow around moving 
propeller tips, through the heyday of the X- 1, X- 15, and into Apollo. 
His voice had been an important one in design of several major systems 
in the X- 15. “It is fair to state,” Jerome Hunsaker and Robert Seamans 
have written, “that Dryden’s 1920 work on supersonic aerodynamics led 
consistently to operational supersonic airplanes, the famous rocket- 
propelled X- 15, and successful manned space flight.”3g But he was dead. 
Exploratory surgery in 196 1 revealed a serious malignancy. Dryden 
continued working almost to the end, living to see the X-15 hailed as 
the most successful research airplane of all time. His death on 2 December 
1965, at the age of 67, was a great loss to the nation and to NASA. He left 
a rich legacy and an outstanding reputation. Nothing could have satisfied 
him more than the three X- 15s flying in desert skies. 
Tabulating the X- 15’s statistics is easy. Assessing its significance to 
postwar aerospace research and development is more difficult. In 199 
flights, the X- 15 spent 18 hours above mach 1, 12 hours above mach 2, 
nearly 9 hours above mach 3, nearly 6 hours above mach 4, 1 hour above 
mach 5, and scant minutes above mach 6. It flew to a speed of mach 6.72 
and reached an altitude of 108 kilometers. Twelve pilots flew it. Starting 
as a hypersonic aerodynamics research tool, the X- 15 became much 
more than that. What, then, did it accomplish? 
In October 1968 John Becker enumerated 22 accomplishments from 
the research and development work that produced the X-15, 28 
accomplishments from its actual flight research, and 16 from testbed 
investigations. As of May 1968, the X-15 had generated 766 technical 
reports on research stimulated by its development, flight testing, and test 
results, equivalent to the output of a typical 4000-man federal research 
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center working for two years. As the X-1 had provided a focus and 
stimulus for supersonic research, the X- 15 furnished a focus and 
stimulus for hypersonic studies. A sampling of its accomplishments 
indicates their scope: 
0 Development of the first large restartable “man-rated throttleable 
0 First application of hypersonic theory and wind-tunnel work to an 
0 Development of the wedge tail as a solution to hypersonic 
First use of reaction controls for attitude control in space. 
e First reusable superalloy structure capable of withstanding the 
0 Development of new techniques for the machining, forming, 
0 Development of improved high-temperature seals and lubricants. 
0 Development of the NACA “Q’ ball “hot nose” flow-direction 
sensor for operation over an extreme range of dynamic pressures 
and a stagnation air temperature of 1900°C. 
0 Development of the first practical full-pressure suit for pilot 
protection in space. 
Development of nitrogen cabin conditioning. 
Development of inertial flight data systems capable of functioning 
0 Discovery that hypersonic boundary layer flow is turbulent and 
0 Discovery that turbulent heating rates are significantly lower than 
0 First direct measurement of hypersonic skin friction, and discov- 
0 Discovery of “hot spots” generated by surface irregularities. 
Discovery of methods to correlate base drag measurements with 
tunnel test results so as to correct wind tunnel data. 
0 Development of practical boost-guidance pilot displays. 
0 Demonstration of a pilot’s ability to control a rocket-boosted 
aerospace vehicle through atmospheric exit. 
0 Development of large supersonic drop tanks. 
Successful transition from aerodynamic controls to reaction controls, 
0 Demonstration of a pilot’s ability to function in a weightless 
0 First demonstration of piloted, lifting atmospheric reentry. 
First application of energy-management techniques. 
rocket engine, the XLR-99. 
actual flight vehicle. 
directional stability problems. 
temperatures and thermal gradients of hypersonic reentry. 
welding, and heat-treating of Inconel X and titanium. 
in a high-dynamic pressure and space environment. 
not laminar. 
had been predicted by theory. 
ery that skin friction is lower than had been predicted. 
and back again. 
environment. 
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Studies of hypersonic acoustic measurements used to define 
insulation and structural design requirements for the Mercury 
spacecraft. 
Use of the three X- 15 aircraft as testbeds carrying a wide variety 
of experimental packages4’ 
The X-15 also made its mark in many other ways. When NACA 
began its development, the science of hypersonic aerodynamics was in its 
infancy; the few existing hypersonic tunnels were used largely for studies 
in fluid mechanics. Aerodynamicists feared that there might be a 
hypersonic “facility barrier,” much like the earlier transonic tunnel 
trouble that led to the Bell X- 1 and Douglas D-558, so that hypersonic 
tunnel tests might prove of little value in predicting actual flight 
conditions. The X-15 disproved this; predicted wind tunnel data and 
data flight testing of the airplane generally showed remarkable agree- 
ment. Proving that hypersonic laminar flow conditions did not develop 
led to the disappearance of this “technical superstition,” and recognition 
that the small surface irregularities that prevent laminar flow at low 
speed also prevent its formation at hypersonic speeds. Like the earlier 
X- 1, the X- 15 encouraged a great deal of ground research and simu- 
lation techniques. So successful were these methods and so great was 
the engineers’ confidence in these methods and the X- 15’s flight results 
that the X-15 wound up actually decreasing the likelihood of NASA’s 
developing any future hypersonic research aircraft with the prime 
justification being the generation of unique and otherwise unobtainable 
data. Any future research aircraft would be built more for “proof of 
concept” purposes than for acquiring information unobtainable by other 
means. At the conclusion of the X- 15 program, the German Society of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics presented the NASA X- 15 team with the 
Eugen Sanger Medal-. fitting and appropriate honor. In his accep- 
tance address on behalf of the team, John Becker stated that “no new 
exploratory research airplane can ever again be successfully promoted 
primarily on the grounds that it will produce unique flight data without 
which a successful technology cannot be achieved.”41 
The X- 15 story had another side: its effect upon the people of the 
team. Their intense and devoted work was recognized in numerous 
honors: the Sanger Medal, the Collier Trophy, the Harmon Trophy, the 
Octave Chanute Award, the NASA Medal for Exceptional Bravery, the 
Thomas D. White Space Trophy, the NASA Exceptional Service Medal, 
the NASA Distinguished Service Medal, the NASA Medal for Outstand- 
ing Leadership, the Iven C. Kincheloe Memorial Award, the FA1 Gold 
Air Medal, the Lawrence B. Sperry Award, the Sylvanus Albert Reed 
Award, the Haley Astronautics Award, the Flight Achievement Award, 
the David C. Schilling Trophy, the NASA Group Achievement Award. All 
these, at one time or another, went to the X-15 team or its members. 
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The public had little understanding of the X- 15 and, after the early 
fanfare, saw only the occasional items in newspaper back pages on new 
speed and altitude marks-as if that was all the X- 15 did. Laymen could 
not understand what went into a flight: the mission planning; the hours 
of simulator time; the flight practice; the endless maintenance; the 
annoying delays for weather; the excitement as the B-52 took off; the 
long wait to drop or, disappointingly, to an abort; the moment of launch, 
with ignition and boost, or an abort and emergency landing; the 
tenseness of the control room; the hypersonic glide back; the chase and 
X- 15 coming in like a flock of ducks; the resounding smack as its skids 
thumped into the lake; and, once again, the maintenance, debriefing, 
data analysis, and planning for the next mission. They could not know 
the strong bonds the program forged, nor the collective worry produced 
by an errant flight or an emergency condition, nor the heartache 
generated by the death of Mike Adams. They could not fathom the 
emotional and psychological release of the parties at Juanita’s. For a 
decade, the Flight Research Center sustained this effort, and its person- 
nel found new kinship and dedication. When the X- 15s left the lake for 
the last time, a little bit of the center and its personnel went with them. 




Serving Gemini and Apollo: 1962 - 196’7 
NASA’s major priority in the 1960s was, of course, space. The 
agency’s activities were related to three major manned spacecraft 
projects, Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. Beyond Apollo, the agency had 
at best vague plans for some sort of semipermanent orbital space station 
supplied by an Earth-to-station “shuttle.” In truth, however, NASA had 
not formulated long-range plans beyond the lunar landing. Because of 
the intensity of the space program, particularly during the early 1960s, 
NASA channeled the activities of all the field centers and stations toward 
some aspect of it. The Flight Research Center during this time concen- 
trated its efforts on various means of returning men from space-means 
such as the Paresev and lifting body, which will be discussed later-and 
analyzing how to land on the moon. This work was directly related to Gemini 
and Apollo, and to the later Space Shuttle as well. However, Flight 
Research Center labored under one serious handicap during the 1960s, a 
handicap that almost cost the center its existence. In an agency domi- 
nated by spaceflight, FRC appeared to be anachronistically obsessed with 
aeronautics. 
WHITHER FRC? 
In point of fact, FRC‘s research during the 1960s was oriented 
primarily toward spaceflight, though with a heavy aeronautical flavor: 
hypersonic flight within the upper atmosphere and into and back from 
space; the low-speed handling qualities of spacecraft; lifting reentry 
schemes; and support of space research at other NASA centers, such as 
high-altitude drop tests of Mercury spacecraft’s drogue parachute. Since 
FRC relied heavily upon research aircraft-vehicles having wings-the 
center seemed to be concentrating its activity on the airplane in the era of 
the spacecraft. But these aircraft were actually being used as tools for 
studying problems that were basically space technology. Research on the 
X- 15, for example, clearly benefited spaceflight studies more than, say, 
supersonic aerodynamic research. This tended to be missed among 
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individuals who were not familiar with the true scope of the center’s 
research. FRC suffered simply because no spacecraft were being man- 
aged from the center, no boosters were being developed by its engineers, 
no rockets were being launched there. 
As early as 195’7, the percentage of FRC’s research staff involved 
with space studies had begun to grow. This, too, was missed, possibly 
because most of these internal studies went no further than FRC’s “front 
office,” in part because many of them were speculative and not directly 
involved with mainstream NASA budget items. Even in the 1960s, the 
actual percentage of FRC’s personnel involved in space-related research 
appears from available internal evidence to have been higher than shown 
in published NASA statements. Table 3 shows the distribution of 
permanent personnel at FRC by fiscal year and budget activity, as set 
forth in NASA’s budget estimates, at two year intervals from 1960 
through 1968. A closer examination of these data, however, raises serious 
questions as to their accuracy and possibly indicates a source of misinfor- 
mation that might well have convinced many within NASA and outside 
the agency-including Congress-that FRC was far less in step with the 
times than it actually was. 
The NASA budget estimate for 1960 states that approximately 90% 
of FRC’s staff was engaged in “aircraft technology.” Yet by 1959 the 
personnel breakdown in HSFS internal planning documentation indi- 
cates that no more than 40% were working on aircraft studies. Fully 35% 
were studying boost-glide (i.e., orbital) aircraft, another 16% were 
examining satellites (both manned and unmanned), 5% were engaged in 
ICBM and anti-ICBM research, and 4% were studying antiaircraft 
missiles.’ These figures certainly could not have changed in favor of 
aeronautics in one year. Clearly budget request statistics from 1960 to 
1968 are misleading because they lump together such major activities as 
the X- 15 and lifting body programs as “aircraft technology” when, in 
fact, these programs were space related. In 1962, fully 84.5% of FRC’s 
staff was officially listed under “aircraft technology,” but it is doubtful if 
more than 20% was engaged on purely aeronautical (i.e., flight within 
the atmosphere) projects at that time, and no more than 40% in 1968. 
Since so many of the X-15 and lifting body programs were related to 
manned spaceflight, it is inconceivable that FRC, in 1964, had only 8.3% 
of its staff investigating manned spaceflight activities. This figure should 
have been in the author’s calculations, about 40% as well, based on the 
flight research activities surrounding these projects, the number of 
employees engaged with them, and the amount of paperwork (an in- 
dication of administrative “prioritizing” of projects) generated by them. 
These statistics from NASA’s budget requests are misleading in 
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Table 3 
Distribution of FRC Permanent Personnel by Program, 
1960- 1968 
(Number Assigned and Percentage of Total) 
Program 1960” 1962 1964 1966 1968 
Manned Space Flight 0 6 50 34 0 
Space Applications 0 0 0 0 0 
Unmanned Space Investigations 0 1 3 1 0 
0.0% 1.2% 8.3% 5.6% 0.0% 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.0 
Space Research & Technology 0 45 51 1 04 92 
0.0 8.6 8.4 17.2 16.2 
Aircraft Technology --- 443 344 308 325 
90.0 84.5 56.8 51.1 57.4 
Supporting Activitiesb --- 29 157 156 1 49 
10.0 5.5 26.0 25.9 26.3 
”Actual positions unavailable for FY 1959-60; percentages from NASA Office of Programming, 
Budget Operations Div., Histg, of Budget Plans, Actual Obligations, and Actual Expenditures for FY I959 
through 1963 (NASA, 1965), sect. 8. 
bIncludes tracking and data acquisition, data analysis, and technology utilization staff. 
SOURCE: Nimmen, Bruno, and Rosholt, NASA Historical Data Book, 1958-1968, vol. 1 ,  NASA 
Resources, NASA SP-4012 (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1976), Table 6-31, p. 277. 
words) that has always characterized FRC’s administrative style. Its small 
staff has never been divided by rigid administrative lines and networks 
separating programs, authorities, and administrative units; instead, spe- 
cialized small work forces have been formed to accomplish certain 
projects or goals-such as the Paresev, lifting body, and lunar landing 
simulator.* Workers ostensibly “assigned’ to aeronautics projects might 
suddenly be called upon to participate in a space-related project. They 
might still show up on organizational charts as “aeronautics” personnel, 
when, in fact, they often flitted back and forth from “aero” to “space” as 
the research need arose. 
Doubtless the failure to portray adequately the wide-ranging air 
and space interests of FRC lay equally between FRC and NASA Head- 
quarters. FRC’s casual though highly effective administration showed 
little inclination to set up a sharply structured bureaucracy that would 
clearly divide the activities of the center between aeronautics and astro- 
nautics, or spaceflight. Because of the small size of the center and the 
need to shift people to meet constantly changing project structures, such 
a bureaucracy would have made little sense anyway. Unfortunately, 
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the persons in NASA Headquarters charged with preparing and submit- 
ting budget requests to Congress type-cast the FRC as an “aeronautics” 
center. Communication between FRC and Headquarters was inadequate, 
although Paul Bikle recognized the danger of being perceived as an 
aeronautics-only facility and worked hard to move FRC into the main- 
stream of space-related programs. Paresev, lifting bodies, and the lunar 
lander were Bikle initiatives. FRC’s staff may well have failed to grasp just 
how single-minded the non-NASA governmental community, especially 
Congress, was when it came to “emphasizing” aeronautics or astronautics 
in the early 1960s. 
All this would constitute little more than a curious footnote to FRC’s 
managerial style and visibility during the 1960s were it not for a critical 
event: an attempt by some congressional elements to close down the 
center at the conclusion of the X- 15 program. 
As has been mentioned, the X- 15 so dominated FRC’s activities in 
the early 1960s that some saw FRC and X- 15 as so intertwined that the 
end of the latter would spell the demise of the former. This feeling had 
reached the halls of Congress, and in the summer of 1963, during 
consideration of NASA’s 1964 budget, the influential House Committee 
on Science and Astronautics (later the House Committee on Science and 
Technology) recommended closing the Flight Research Center since, in 
members’ judgment, “no known future aircraft projects will specifically 
require the continued existence of the Flight Research Center beyond the 
date when the X- 15 project will be ~ompleted.”~ Dr. Raymond Bisplinghoff, 
OART director, worked hard over the next few weeks to save FRC, 
pointing out that NASA envisioned its participation in a range of 
programs in both aeronautics and space activities. Fortunately, the 
Senate Committee on Aeronuatical and Space Sciences restored funding 
for the FRC, on grounds that it would be vital to the upcoming American 
supersonic transport testing program. By the end of the summer, FRC 
was safe, having survived a serious attempt to legislate its d e m i ~ e . ~  
With hindsight, it is ironic that FRC was saved at a critical juncture of 
its existence by an anticipated need to support the American SST-which 
program itself fell to the congressional axe of 1971. By that date the 
center was again well established with a variety of research projects, 
primarily in aeronautics, that necessitated its continued existence. Further, 
its major role in flight testing the upcoming Space Shuttle was already 
mapped out. 
That FRC was so well established again by 1971 stemmed from a 
variety of factors but chiefly from the aggressive policies and initiatives of 
center director Paul Bikle. In 1963, at his urging, De Beeler and senior 
FRC staffers prepared a comprehensive five-year plan for the future 
direction of the   enter.^ This document served as a general guide for 
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Table 4 
FRC Five-Year Research Plan, 1963: 
Continuing Activities 
Aeronautics Technology 
Studies of SST operational problems using modified service aircraft. 
Space Technology 
X- 15 flight operations (X- 15 follow-on program). 
Paresev studies." 
Active support and research on Dyna-Soar.b 
New Initiatives 
Aeronautics Technology 
Renewed military service testing, starting with F- 11 1.  
Development of a mulitpurpose airborne simulator using a modified Lockheed 
JetStar transport to simulate a wide range of aircraft, from hypersonic reentry 
vehicles to SSTs. 
Investigation of the handling qualities of light airplanes to improve general aviation 
safety. 
Space Technology 
Flight testing of M2-FI lifting body and development of supersonic lifting bodies to 
assess the low-speed handling qualities and approach and landing characteristics of 
lifting body spacecraft. 
Development of a lunar lander simulator to serve as a training device for the Apollo 
program. 
Studies of an advanced hypersonic research vehicle successor to the X- 15. 
"A kite-like landing system for spacecraft, to be discussed subsequently. 
bDyna-Soar was terminated at the end of 1963. 
emphasized continuing four on-going air and space activities while 
developing six new initiatives. Some of these, such as lifting bodies, 
continued into the 1970s. By the mid-l960s, then, the Flight Research 
Center clearly knew where it was going in the future, even if others 
elsewhere were not so certain. 
EARLY SPACE RESEARCH AT FRC 
FRC's research in support of NASA's space program began in 1959 
when, at the request of the Space Task Group, the center flew a series of 
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F- 104 flights to drop test versions of the Project Mercury spacecraft’s 
drogue parachute from altitudes above 15 000 meters. As a result of 
these tests, critical design problems were discovered and corrected before 
the spacecraft first flew.6 The center’s greatest early space effort, however, 
was on the planned Dyna-Soar program, the X-20A. 
Dyna-Soar, the “Round Three” after the X- 15, was a Sanger-like 
boost-glider designed to be lofted into orbit by a Titan I11 booster. 
Dyna-Soar had three major objectives: to demonstrate controlled lifting 
reentry from space and acquire data useful for the development of other 
lifting reentry spacecraft; to investigate a pilot’s ability to perform useful 
tasks in space; and to explore piloted, maneuverable reentry including 
landing at conventional airfields.’ Its general configuration was that of a 
hypersonic slender delta, a flat-bottom glider using radiative cooling. 
Under development for the Air Force by Boeing, Dyna-Soar was pushing 
technology in many areas, including high-speed aerodynamics, high- 
temperature structural materials, and reentry protection concepts. 
Eventually, questions over its utility, research potential, and safety forced 
cancellation of the craft in December 1963. Nevertheless, Dyna-Soar was 
a generally useful design exercise; much of the research encouraged by 
this program significantly influenced subsequent Shuttle studies. Like 
others of the X series before it, the X-20A thus acted as an important 
research focal point.’ 
The Dyna-Soar project office, in conjunction with NASA, had 
selected an FRC pilot, Milt Thompson, as the only NASA pilot to fly the 
craft. Further, FRC had complete responsibility for stipulating the 
X- 20A’s instrumentation requirements. Center engineers had already 
prepared papers on Dyna-Soar’s expected operational problems and the 
possibility of air-launching it from B-52 and B-70 mothers hip^.^ In 
early 1961, the FRC had received two “castaways,” prototypes of the 
Douglas F5D-1 Skylancer, an experimental Navy fighter that had not 
been placed in production. The F5D-1 had a wing planform very 
similar to that projected for Dyna-Soar; FRC pilot Neil A. Armstrong 
recognized that the Skylancer could be used to study Dyna-Soar abort 
procedures. How to save the pilot and spacecraft in the event of a 
launch-pad booster explosion was a problem of great concern to the 
Dyna-Soar team. The X-20A Dyna-Soar had a small escape rocket to 
kick it away from its booster, but no one really knew what kind of 
separation flight path and landing approach would best bring Dyna-Soar 
safely to earth. Armstrong developed a suitable maneuver using the 
F5D-1; it consisted of a vertical climb to 2100 meters, pulling on the 
control column until the “X-20A” was on its back, rolling the craft 
upright, and then setting up a low lift-to-drag-ratio approach, touching 
down on a part of Rogers Lake that was marked like the 3200-meter 
landing strip at Cape Canaveral. Following Dyna-Soar’s cancellation, 
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Neil A. Armstrong prepares to fly a Dyna-Soar abort simulation in one of the Flight 
Research Center’s Douglas F5D - 1 Sky lancer aircraft. 
FRC continued to fly the F5Ds in sup ort of lifting body and SST studies, 
before retiring the aircraft in 1970. 1B 
PARESEV: A SPACE-AGE KITE 
The center’s major space research support activities concerned the 
Paresev and the Lunar Landing Research Vehicle (LLRV), developed 
and flown at the FRC in support of the Gemini and Apollo programs. 
Paresev was an indirect outgrowth of kite-parachute studies by NACA 
Langley engineer Francis M. Rogallo. The “Rogallo wing” was a diamond 
profile with a flexible covering attached to a V-shaped (point fore- 
most) leading edge and a longitudinal keel. As with a parachute, the 
air filled out the sail-type surface, giving it its shape. In the early 1960s, 
this shape seemed an excellent means of returning a spacecraft to Earth. 
A spacecraft could streak in through the atmosphere and then, at much 
lower altitudes and subsonic speeds, deploy a stowed Rogallo wing, 
enabling the astronauts on board to fly it down to an airplane-like 
landing, obviating the need for a water landing and recovery flotilla. 
NASA engineers had begun studying how the agency could apply the 
Rogallo wing to current spacecraft projects, especially one tentatively 
designated Mercury Mark 11. 
In January 1962, Mercury Mark I1 became the Gemini program, 
America’s second major man-in-space venture, involving a two-man crew 
and encompassing extravehicular “spacewalks,” rendezvous, and docking. 
In May 1961, when Mercury Mark I1 was slowly evolving, Robert R. 
Gilruth, director of NASA’s Space Task Group, requested studies of an 
inflatable Rogallo-type “Parawing” for spacecraft. Several companies 
responded; North American Aviation produced the most acceptable 
concept and development was contracted to that company. At a 28-29 
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November 196 1 meeting, NASA Headquarters launched a paraglider 
development program, with Langley doing wind tunnel studies and 
Flight Research Center supporting the North American test program. 
NASA grafted the parawing scheme onto the Mercury Mark I1 program.12 
Paraglider development involved solving major design difficulties of 
stowing and deploying the wing, ensuring that the crew would have' 
adequate control over the parawing-equipped craft, and providing 
satisfactory stability, control, and handling qualities. The Flight Research 
Center's technical staff was never convinced that the scheme was workable. 
Eventually, because of poor test results and rising costs and time delays, 
the idea was dropped from Gemini in mid-1964. FRC engineers and 
pilots had believed that any vehicle so equipped might present a pilot 
with a greater flying challenge than contemporary advanced airplanes. 
They thought that NASA should acquire some sort of baseline experi- 
ence before attempting development and flight of Parawing on a 
returning spacecraft. After returning to Edwards, they continued their 
discussions among themselves. 
The best way to acquire such experience, of course, was by building 
and flying a Parawing. Two who actively favored such an approach were 
center research pilots Neil Armstrong and Milt Thompson. They ap- 
proached Paul Bikle, who liked the idea, but recognized that both pilots 
had heavy Dyna-Soar commitments; FRC could not spare their services 
elsewhere, even to a project as interesting as the proposed Parawing. 
Instead, Bikle called in a group of center engineers under the direction 
of Charles Richards, a team composed of Richard Klein, Vic Horton, 
The Paresev I-A Rogallo research vehicle and one of its towplanes, a Stearman sport 
biplane. 
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Gary Layton, and Joe Wilson. Bikle’s instructions were characteristically 
short and to the point: build a single-seat Paraglider and “do it quick and 
cheap.” All this took place just before Christmas 1961. The team, now 
totaling nine engineers and technicians, set to work on this “Paraglider 
Research Vehicle,” conveniently abbreviated Paresev. Seven weeks later, 
after expending $4280 on construction and materials, the team rolled 
out the Paresev I. It resembled a grown-up tricycle, with a rudimentary 
seat, an angled tripod mast, and, perched on top of the mast, a 
14-square-meter Rogallo-type parawing. The vehicle weighed 272 kilograms, 
had a height of over 3.4 meters, and a length of 4.5 meters. The pilot sat 
out in the open, strapped in the seat, with no enclosure of any kind. He 
controlled the descent rate by tilting the wing fore and aft, and turned by 
tilting the wing from side to side. NASA registered the Paresev, the first 
NASA research airplane to be constructed totally “in-house,” with the 
Federal Aviation Administration on 12 February 1962. Flight testing 
started immediately. l3 
At first, with ingrained caution, engineers tested the Paresev by 
towing it behind a utility vehicle. Technicians drove a tow vehicle up to 95 
kilometers per hour on the lakebed; the Paresev lifted into the air at 
about 65 kilometers per hour, followed by a dusty gaggle of “chase” cars 
and motorcycles. Milt Thompson, one of the two project pilots (the other 
being NASA’s Bruce Peterson), would let the plane float along a few feet 
off the ground as he gained familiarity with the vehicle. The original 
configuration had several faults. The control system had built-in lag; 
pilots used to the sensitivity of modern ‘et aircraft found that the Paresev 
flew as if “controlled by a wet n~odle.”‘~ Because cloth-covered airplanes 
often used Irish linen, the Paresev design team decided to use it for the 
wing surface. Dick Klein and Gary Layton visited a sailmaker in Newport 
Beach; he cast a quizzical eye at the material and suggested Dacron 
instead. The team stuck with linen, found it did indeed have a number of 
problems including flutter at the trailing edge, and changed to Dacron at 
a later date.15 The Paresev was difficult to fly-Thompson considered it 
more demanding than the later lifting bodies. He made several hundred 
ground tows and 60 air tows, recollecting later that “it was a lot of fun.”I6 
But it had its moments of danger, too. During one ground tow, Bruce 
Peterson got out of phase with the lagging control system and developed 
a rocking motion that got worse and worse; just as the tow truck started to 
slow, the Paresev did a wing-over into the lakebed, virtually demolishing 
the Paresev and injuring Peterson, though not seriously. 
The accident ended the days of the Paresev I; FRC technicians 
salvaged only the tripod from the wreck. They totally rebuilt the vehicle, 
this time with a much more sophisticated control system using a conven- 
tional stick and rudder system. They took the sailmaker’s advice and used 
a Dacron wing. This became the Paresev I-A. Ground tows quickly 
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indicated this paraglider handled better than its predecessor, and NASA 
moved to flight tests. To tow the I-A, FRC rented a Stearman biplane 
from a Tehachapi sailplane operator. Later a Cessna L- 19 Bird Dog was 
acquired on loan from the U.S. Army Reserve. The Paresev project team 
also flew a smaller wing on the I-A. During Paresev I-A tests, tow 
planes dragged it to 3000 meters before release. For a test pilot used to 
the confined but comforting environment of a supersonic jet, it was an 
eery sensation to sit out in the open, like a pre-World War I aeronaut, 
strapped in the seat. In addition to Milt Thompson and Bruce Peterson, 
Neil Armstrong, Emil “Jack” Kleuver (an Army pilot detailed to FRC), 
astronaut Gus Grissom, and Langley research pilot Bob Champine-a 
Muroc old-timer-flew the little craft. It underwent one further 
modification, as the Paresev I-B, equipped with an inflatable Gemini- 
type wing as well. NASA ended flight tests on the Paresev in 1964, having 
completed over 100 flights.” 
The Paresev program is a good example of the Bikle low-cost 
do-it-quick approach. Originally scheduled as a two-month flight test 
project, the program became interesting enough to warrant running for 
two years. Eventually engineers evolved a useful vehicle having accept- 
able handling characteristics. Nevertheless, it was a big step from this 
simple technology demonstrator with a rigid and fixed wing framework 
to a stowable, inflatable parawing on an actual spacecraft that could be 
relied on to return a crew safely to Earth. At the same time that NASA’s 
Paresev was concluding so agreeably, North American’s complex Gemini 
Paraglider program had already forced a test pilot to abandon one of the 
vehicles in flight-hardly encouraging. The long process involved in 
making the relatively unsophisticated Paresev an acceptable craft indi- 
cated the magnitude of the task awaiting those developing such devices 
for spacecraft. 
NASA’s FLYING BEDSTEADS 
NASA’s major undertaking in the 1960s was the Apollo program, an 
ambitious and breakneck-pace effort to place astronauts on the moon by 
the end of the decade. It is difficult now to relive those hectic days, to 
imagine the level of activity at NASA centers around the country, the 
frantic pace of meetings, the sense of mission that pervaded the agency 
and its workers. Virtually every worker felt privileged to work for the 
agency, and even the wing-oriented NACA old-timers did their best to 
contribute to the national space effort. 
One of the many critical questions in the Apollo program was the 
descent to the lunar surface. The descent vehicle would only be operating 
in a gravity 1/6 that of Earth’s, but the airless moon dictated a strictly 
propulsion-borne descent, not an aerodynamic descent. Grumman was 
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the subcontractor for the landing vehicle, the LEM, later shortened to 
LM.* Nobody wanted the first lunar landing, with its attendant high pilot 
workload and psychological stress, to be also the first time an astronaut 
team flew a lunar landing descent profile. Some sort of exotic simulator 
was needed to give the crew some useful experience before they tackled 
the task of setting down on the moon. There were several possible ways 
of doing this. One would be an electronic simulator. Another would be a 
free-flight test vehicle. Yet a third would be a tethered device, suspended 
beneath some sort of framework. NASA decided to be conservative and 
followed all three routes. The most ambitious of the three was the 
free-flight vehicle. As might be expected, this was the Flight Research 
Center’s contribution to Apollo. 
The FRC staff conceived the idea for a free-flight lunar landing 
simulator. In early 1961, Hubert Drake had convened a group of FRC 
engineers to investigate simulating a lunar landing. Drake contacted Walt 
Williams, then associate director of the Manned Spacecraft Center; 
Williams offered his enthusiastic support, recommending that FRC 
propose such a vehicle to NASA Headquarters. At the same time, 
unknown to the FRC group, Bell Aerosystems Company (heir of Bell 
Aircraft Corporation, which had built so many of the early X-series 
aircraft) was also examining ways of building a free-flight simulator. 
When Drake and FRC engineers Gene Matranga and Donald Bellman 
learned from NASA Headquarters that Bell was interested, they invited 
company representatives to FRC for consultation; this culminated in a 
$50 000 study contract to Bell, which FRC awarded in December 1961. 
At the time, FRC was thinking of the vehicle primarily for research, 
rather than as a training aid. 
At the same time, Langley Research Center was supporting a much 
less ambitious concept involving a tethered rig. When constructed, the 
large gantry (120 meters long, 75 meters high) supported 5/6 of the test 
vehicle’s weight. Rockets supported the remaining 116. The Langley 
Lunar Landing Research Facility cost $3.5 million and started operations 
in June 1965. By that time, FRC had already amassed considerable flight 
experience with its own lunar landing simulator, the remarkable Lunar 
Landing Research Vehicle, LLRV.” 
Ajet engine supported 5/6 of the LLRV’s weight; rockets lifted the 
remainder, simulating the descent propulsion system of an actual lunar 
lander. Attitude control thrusters allowed the pilot to control the vehicle; 
aerodynamics played no part. It was not a new idea, but an old idea 
serving a new purpose. Aircraft companies had built and flown similar 
vehicles, dubbed “flying bedsteads,” to acquire information needed for 
*Lunar Excursion Module, later just Lunar Module. 
14 1 
e 
ON THE FRONTIER 
designing vertical-takeoff-and-landing (VTOL) aircraft. Dr. A. A. Griffith, 
a pioneer in British VTOL technology, had built the first such rig, 
powering it with a pair of Rolls Royce Nene turbojets. Such rigs 
invariably had an open framework supporting the pilot, his instrumentation, 
the fuel system, the engines, and a variety of “puff pipes” running hither 
and yon to control the attitude of the vehicle. Griffith‘s “Flying Bedstead” 
first flew in August 1954, gaining a great deal of attention in the aviation 
and popular press. FRC’s engineers naturally considered this vehicle 
when conceiving the LLRV.” 
Bell was the only firm in the United States that had a great deal of 
experience in the design and construction of VTOL aircraft using jet lift 
for takeoff and landing. FRC’s engineers consulted with Bell personnel 
before drawing up the specifications for their vehicle. In early 1962, 
following award of the Bell study contract, Donald Bellman (head of the 
project), Gene Matranga, and Lloyd Walsh (FRC’s contracting officer) 
ventured to Bell to interest the company in fabricating such a vehicle for 
NASA. While at Buffalo, they rode company helicopters on simulated 
lunar descents; stopwatch and notepads in hand, they quickly learned 
that a helicopter could not match the expected descent rates and paths of 
a jet-lift lander. The tests quickly silenced those who thought NASA 
could simulate the lunar landing mission aerodynamically by using 
helicopters. Following the Buffalo visit, Bellman passed along their 
tentative findings to Walt Williams at Houston. Williams endorsed the 
concept. Out of this came support from the Manned Spacecraft Center 
and NASA Headquarters. On 1 February 1963 NASA awarded Bell a 
$3 610 632 contract for the design and fabrication of two lunar landing 
research vehicles capable of taking off and landing under their own 
power, attaining an altitude of 1200 meters, hovering, and horizontal 
flight. Bell had 14 months in which to build and deliver the first vehicle, 
with the second to follow 2 months later. NASA intended using them for 
studies of piloting and operational problems during the final phase of a 
lunar landing and the initial phase of a lunar takeoff. The tests would 
permit study of controls, pilot displays, visibility, propulsion control, and 
flight dynamics. Each ‘LLRV would carry 70 kilograms of research 
equipment.20 
Bell unveiled the first of the two LLRVs during ceremonies at its 
Wheatfield, New York, plant on 8 April 1964. Bell’s Kenneth L. Levin 
oversaw the development. FRC’s C. Wayne Ottinger served as NASA 
resident representative. The completed LLRV weighed 1680 kilograms, 
stood slightly more than 3 meters high, and had four aluminum truss legs 
spread 4 meters. A General Electric CF-700-2V turbofan engine 
provided 18 700 newtons (4200 lb) thrust, enough to boost the LLRV to 
altitude. Then the engine would automatically adjust to support 5/6 of 
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the vehicle’s weight, and the pilot would use two lift rockets capable of 
modulation from 440 to 2200 newtons (100 to 500 lb) thrust for 
controlling the “lunar descent.” The lift rockets burned hydrogen 
peroxide. Sixteen smaller rockets, arranged in eight pairs, controlled 
pitch, yaw, and roll. To permit the turbofan engine to maintain vertical 
thrust when the vehicle assumed other than a horizontal attitude, Bell 
gimballed the engine at the apex of the vehicle’s legs. The LLRV had 
six backup rockets capable of 2200 newtons (500 lb) thrust for emer- 
gency use if the turbofan engine quit. The pilot sat out in the open, 
behind a Plexiglas shield, on an emergency “zero-zero” ejection seat- 
a wise precaution, as things turned out. The LLRV could remain aloft 
14 minutes at full thrust, though safety considerations dictated a more 
prudent limitation of 10 minutes. It used an electronic “fly-by-wire” 
(FBW) control system connected to a conventional aircraft-type center 
stick for pitch and roll control and “rudder” pedals for yaw control. 
There were no aerodynamic control surfaces. The system provided 
direct electronic control-with no mechanical linkages, even as a backup 
safety system-of the attitude rockets. FBW also simulated the actual 
vehicle motions and control system response that an astronaut could 
expect to encounter while piloting a descending lunar module. 
After unveiling the surprising craft to the press, Bell sent both 
LLRVs to Edwards in partially disassembled and incomplete condition to 
expedite NASA’s installation of instruments, for FRC technicians be- 
lieved they could complete the craft more quickly than could Bell. The 
two LLRVs arrived at the Flight Research Center on 16 April 1964, and 
center personnel immediately set to work preparing the first for flight.*l 
By September 1964, the FRC had LLRV # 1  ready for its first trials, 
mounted on a fixed “tilt table” constructed by the center’s Aircraft 
Modification and Repair group. Joe Walker first tested out the craft in 
this manner. It had complete freedom of movement, being restricted 
only from flight. The tilt table tests proceeded smoothly; by the fall of 
1964, the LLRV research team was ready for free-flight trials. Test 
operations were set up at Edwards’ South Base, scene of the old 
High-speed Flight Station. On 30 October 1964 center test pilot Joe 
Walker took the craft on its first flight, making three separate liftoffs and 
landings, reaching a peak altitude of three meters, and remaining aloft 
for a total free flight time ofjust under one minute. The craft took off, as 
Walker subsequently described it, “just like going up in an elevator,’’ At 
liftoff, with the CF- 700 wailing, the pilot maintained proper attitude by 
firing short bursts of reaction controls; they hissed loudly, swathing the 
craft in peroxide steam and enhancing the Rube Goldberg appearance. 
By the end of the year, Walker was joined by Donald Mallick, a new FRC 
pilot who had transferred from Langley. Mallick completed his checkout 
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on 9 December. Over the next year, LLRV # 1  continued its flight 
program. By the end of August 1966, it had completed 175 flights, flown 
by WaIker, Mallick, and the Army’s Jack Kleuver. 
In preparation for an LLRV training program for the Apollo 
astronauts at Houston, Manned Spacecraft Center research pilots Joseph 
Algranti and H. E. “Bud” Ream checked out in the strange vehicle. On 1 1  
March 1966, piloted by Don Mallick, LLRV #1 flew with a three-axis side 
arm controller, making it comparable to the actual Grumman LM control 
system. NASA also moved the LLRV’s control panel from the center of 
the cockpit to the right side, again matching the LM configuration, and 
planned to reduce the amount of pilot visibility to give the craft the same 
visual characteristics as the lunar lander. In January 196’7 Jack Kleuver 
completed FRC’s first flight in LLRV #2, which had an’enclosed cockpit 
like the LM. LLRV #2 completed 5 more flights and #1 ran its total up to 
198 before the FRC concluded its program on the two vehicles in the 
winter of 1966. By this time, the LLRVs had flown as long as 9% minutes 
and attained altitudes nearing 240 meters.22 
Joseph Walker pilots the first lunar landing research vehicle (LLRV) during tests at 
Edwards’ South Base. 
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FRC shipped LLRV #1 to Houston on 12 December 1966 and 
followed with #2 on 17 January 1967. Kleuver flew LLRV #1 at Houston’s 
Ellington AFB in March 1967. Afterward, Joe Algranti and Bud Ream, 
who would act as instructor pilots for the astronauts, also flew the craft. 
A month later Robert R. Gilruth, director of the Manned Spacecraft 
Center, in an official commendation of the LLRV Flight Research Center 
project team, said the flights at Edwards had “yielded important infor- 
mation on vehicle handling qualities and piloting techniques and pro- 
cedures necessary for a successful lunar landing. . . . The LLRV program 
has and will continue to contribute much to the United States’ efforts for 
a manned lunar landing.”23 
Gilruth’s concluding remarks referred to an extension of the two- 
vehicle LLRV program. In mid-1966, the Manned Spacecraft Center had 
ordered three more lunar landing simulators from Bell, these being 
designated LLTVs: Lunar Landing Training Vehicles. Each cost about 
$2.5 million. Incorporating modifications that resulted from experience 
with the LLRVs, the LLTV weighed 1860 kilograms and could attain an 
altitude of 120 meters. The cockpit display and control system was mod- 
eled on the lunar module, and the pilot’s visibility was restricted to 
match what the LM would offer. The first LLTV arrived at Houston in 
December 1967 and first flew 8 October 1968. The Manned Spacecraft 
Center modified the two original LLRVs as LLTV aircraft as well; they 
became LLTV-A1 and A2. The new vehicles ordered straight from Bell 
became the LLTV-B1, B2, and B3. Houston’s pilots made the initial 
LLTV flights at Houston and acted as instructor pilots to the astronauts. 
Manned Spacecraft Center quickly evolved an astronaut training program. 
Potential LM crewmen first went to helicopter school for three weeks, 
then to Langley’s Lunar Landing Facility, then on to 15 hours in a 
ground simulator, and finally to the LLTVs, which they flew from nearby 
Ellington AFB.24 
The LLTVs proved extremely useful. Indeed, as astronaut chief 
Donald “Deke” Slayton noted, there was “no other way to simulate moon 
landings except by flying the LLTV.”25 All prime and backup command- 
ers of lunar landing missions practiced on the LLTV-A and B vehicles, 
and a number of other astronauts flew them. Gene Cernan completed 
the last LLTV flight on 13 November 1972. Commenting to newsmen 
following an LLTV training flight on 16 June 1969, a month before 
liftoff of ApoZZo 11, mission commander Neil Armstrong remarked: “We 
are very pleased with the way it flies. . . . I think it does an excellent job of 
actually capturing the handling characteristics of the lunar module in the 
landing maneuver. . . . we’re getting a very high level of confidence in 
the overall landing rnane~ver . ’ ’~~ 
Houston’s LLTV operations were not without difficulty. In fact, 
three of the five vehicles crashed. On 6 May 1968 Neil Armstrong took 
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off in LLTV- A1 , the former LLRV # 1. While hovering 10 meters above 
the ground, the vehicle suffered a loss of helium pressure in the 
propellant tanks, causing shutdown of its attitude control rockets. It 
started nosing up and rolling over, and Armstrong immediately ejected. 
His zero-zero seat kicked him away from the stricken craft, which tumbled 
into the ground and exploded as the astronaut safely descended by 
parachute. It was a sad fate for a pioneering flight craft. On 8 December 
1968 gusty winds forced LLTV-Bl out of control; MSC pilot Joe 
Algranti safely ejected just one second before the wobbling simulator 
crashed. Finally, on 29 January 1971, LLTV-€32 suffered an electrical 
failure that caused loss of attitude control. MSC pilot Stu Present 
abandoned this sick bird safely.27 
The LLRV-LLTV program is a remarkable example of how the 
Flight Research Center’s bias toward free-flight testing helped NASA 
achieve a spectacular success: the first manned lunar landing. Naturally, 
when discussions turned to putting astronauts on the moon, this bias had 
triggered a desire on the part of Flight Research Center engineers to 
build a specialized flight research testbed. Other centers, dominated by 
ground-based laboratory thinking, had favored less radical, more tradi- 
tional and less satisfactory methods, such as fixed simulators and semimobile 
rigs. Combination of these methods produced the successful lunar 
landings, which went off flawlessly. Two of these craft still exist: the 
LLTV-A2 and the LLTV-BS. It is difficult now to conceive of such 
strange and grotesque hardware making a worthwhile contribution to 
any development effort; but that the LLTVs did contribute, and 
handsomely, is beyond dispute. 
By the time Neil Armstrong set foot on the moon, however, the 
Paresev and LLRV programs were rapidly fading memories at Edwards. 
FRC was busy on other space-related projects in an area of traditional 
FRC interest: hypersonic lifting reentry from space. At the heart of this 
effort was a strange group of test vehicles, the lifting badies. They come 
as a t to the early days of “Round TWO” and “Round Three” and 
as a to the Space Shuttle. 
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During the late 1950s and early 1960s, two camps emerged among 
those studying reentry from space. One group favored so-called “ballistic” 
reentry, literally dropping out of orbit and transiting the atmosphere 
like a plunging stone. The other camp favored “lifting” reentry, a longer 
passage from space to Earth that would enable a crew to fly a spacecraft 
to a conventional landing at an airfield. A lifting reentry spacecraft was a 
far more demanding-but potentially far more useful-technology than 
a ballistic “capsule.” Designers would have to develop a configuration 
with adequate structural strength to withstand the rigors of a missile-like 
launch, with a reusable or refurbishable thermal protection system for 
reentry, and with adequate hypersonic, supersonic, transonic, and sub- 
sonic flying qualities-no mean feat. The X-20A Dyna-Soar project was 
a premature attempt to develop such a craft. 
Dyna-Soar was not the only lifting reentry approach to orbital flight; 
there were also weird, wingless shapes known, for want of a better title, as 
“lifting bodies.” The lifting body concept dated back to the blunt-body 
studies of H. Julian “Harvey” Allen, an imaginative engineer at Ames 
Aeronautical Laboratory. Allen conceived the blunt body theory in 1951. 
Together with Alfred Eggers, Allen concluded that a ballistic missile 
warhead having a blunt, rounded nose (as opposed to a pointed shape) 
would better survive the intense heat generated as it entered the atmos- 
phere from space at near-orbital velocities. The blunt shape produced 
a strong, detached bow shock wave that, in effect, gave the following 
warhead excellent thermal protection. Allen’s work remained highly 
classified, but the fruits of it appeared on the Atlas missile’s deadly nose. 
Necessarily the blunt body had a very low lift-to-drag ratio, far less 
than 1. It flew a ballistic descent path having a minimal “cross-range 
footprint.” Allen and Eggers, together with Clarence Syvertson, George 
Edwards, and George Kenyon, recognized that designers might be able 
to combine the blunt body with a manned orbital vehicle in such a way 
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that it had an acceptable lift-to-drag ratio, on the order of 1.5. This could 
reduce reentry g loadings from the 8 g experienced by a blunt body to 1 g 
and give a cross-range footprint in excess of 2400 kilometers from the 
initial point of atmospheric entry. Eggers deduced that one desirable 
shape for such a vehicle would be a modified half-cone (flat on top) witha 
rounded nose to reduce heating. Working at Ames, Eggers, Syvertson, 
Edwards, and Kenyon refined the concept in 1958, deriving the M2 
configuration, a 13” half-cone with a rounded nose having a lift-to-drag 
ratio of 1.4 at hypersonic speeds. At subsonic speeds, however, its 
woefully inadequate stability characteristics made it prone to tumble end 
over end. Eventually the Ames engineers “boat-tailed’ the top and bottom 
of the shape, giving it an airfoil cross-section and curing most of the 
stability difficulties. This final M2 version had a protruding canopy and 
twin vertical fins-the fins earning it the sobriquet “M2 Cadillac.” By 
1960 the lifting body work at Ames was far from fruition, but engineers 
had chosen a basic shape. (See lifting bodies in the color photo section at 
the end of this chapter.) 
Ames was not the only NASA center engaged in lifting-body studies. 
The High-speed Flight Station did not have the hypervelocity tunnels, 
guns, and shock tubes needed for such research, but the staff kept in 
touch with colleagues at the larger centers and were aware of what was 
going on. One night over drinks at the Antelope Valley Inn, Walt 
Williams prophetically suggested to Eggers that the HSFS could build a 
piloted M2 shape for low-speed stability and control tests, launching it 
from a B-52. The HSFS engineers would make their own contributions 
soon enough, originating the flight-test programs for the lifting bodies. 
At Langley, engineers favored a more traditional approach over sawing a 
cone in half. They opted for modified delta configurations. Eventually, 
as a result of the work of Eugene S. Love, Langley devolved the shape for 
the HL-10-HL standing for horizontal lander. It first appeared on 
Langley drawing boards in 1962 as a manned lifting reentry vehicle. 
Though still working on Dyna-Soar, the Air Force considered other 
lifting reentry schemes and in the early 1960s, commissioned a series of 
studies that eventually spawned the Martin SV-5D shape, a configura- 
tion between the cone-like M2 and the modified delta HL-10. In sum, 
then, the Ames M2, Langley HL-10, and Air Force-Martin SV-5D 
shapes were all outgrowths of the same climate of research that had 
created the Dyna-Soar program; their roots were in “Round Three” 
thinking. 
THE FIRST LIFTING BODY 
Robert D. Reed, an FRC Research Division engineer, was fond of 
building flying models. While recognizing that models are limited in the 
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range of information they can return, he knew they could validate basic 
stability and control characteristics of a new configuration. Reed had 
followed with interest the Ames work on the M2, noting that while it had. 
potentially excellent hypersonic characteristics, doubts existed that the 
M2 could successfully fly to a landing because of difficulties in handling 
at transonic and subsonic speeds. Other NACA engineers had suggested 
in the 1958 HSFS research assessment that NACA develop low-speed 
testbeds of proposed hypersonic shapes to determine their landing 
behavior. In February 1962, Reed built a 60-centimeter model of the M2, 
which he launched from a larger radio-controlled “mothership” having a 
150-centimeter wingspread-a typical FRC approach scaled down in size. 
Reeds wife filmed some of the flights to show center director Paul Bikle, 
De Beeler, and Alfred Eggers. Reed also flew small lifting body models 
down the corridors at FRC, causing raised eyebrows among skeptics. But 
Eggers promised the use of wind tunnels at Ames, and Bikle authorized a 
six-month feasibility study of a cheap, manned, lightweight M2 glider, 
the “next step” suggested by Reed-who also flew sailplanes as a hobby.’ 
In September 1962 Bikle authorized design and construction of a 
manned M2 glider. Victor Horton headed the effort, assisted by Dick 
Eldredge and Dick Klein. FRC engineers built the tubular steel structure, 
and Gus Briegleb of the Sailplane Corporation of America built the 
plywood outer shell. At first, Reed, Horton, Eldredge, and Klein wished 
to test various lifting body shapes, including M1, M2, and a lenticular 
“flying saucer” concept. The M2 seemed the most practicable, however, 
and was the only one the FRC proceeded with. Technicians set aside floor 
space in a hangar, walled it off with canvas, and put up a sign reading 
“Wright’s Bicycle Shop.” The project team drew on many other FRC 
staffers for assistance, especially the large local NASA community of 
aircraft “homebuilders,” mostly members of the Experimental Aircraft 
Association. Bikle ran the project out of local funds on a nickel-and-dime 
basis, because he feared he could not secure Headquarters support 
rapidly enough to permit a quick development program. Bikle’s concern 
over complicating the project by working through the system was well 
founded: one major aircraft company informed the FRC M2 team that it 
would have cost $150 000 for the firm to build such a vehicle. By using 
in-house funding and exacting cost control, FRC engineers kept expendi- 
tures on the design and fabrication of the M2 glider, including support, 
beneath $30 000. Briegleb‘s own construction team, consisting of three 
mechanics and a draftsman working at El Mirage Dry Lake, built the 
mahogany plywood body shell (23 millimeters thick) in 120 days. The 
FRC team had stipulated that the body shell weigh less than 135 
kilograms; Briegleb‘s team managed to complete it at 124 kilograms.* 
The FRC-Briegleb team finished the M2 glider, which the FRC 
designated the M2-F1, early in 1963. A tubby vehicle, it measured 6 
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meters long and 3 meters high, with a width of 4 meters. It had two 
vertical fins, just like the earlier Ames “M2 Cadillac” study, and stubby 
elevons were mounted on the fins. The body had trailing edge flaps for 
trimming purposes and landing gear wheels from a Cessna 150 airplane. 
With its pilot, the M2-F1 weighed 516 kilograms. The pilot sat under a 
large bubble cockpit; though at first the craft had no provisions for 
emergency ejection, the FRC later added a lightweight Weber rocket- 
propelled zero-zero seat. Later the craft also had a 10’70-newton (24-lb- 
thrust) solid-fuel rocket developed by the Naval Ordnance Test Center 
at nearby China Lake to assist in the prelanding “flare” maneuver if this 
became necessary. The craft was trucked to Ames for low-speed tunnel 
testing in the 40 x 80 ft tunnel. The tunnel tests, completed in March 
1963, were very encouraging. NASA project pilot Milt Thompson often 
sat in the cockpit of the M2-F1 during the studies, “flying” the 
rigidly mounted craft in the cavernous maw of the full-scale tunnel. 
Satisfied, Ames gave the shape its blessing, and FRC took it back to 
Edwards in preparation for its first flights, a series of Paresev-like ground 
tows. 
Strange enough already, the M2-F1 program now took a real turn 
toward the bizarre. Obviously, the shape had a lot of drag, requiring a 
tow vehicle with great power and speed. NASA’s general-purpose trucks 
and vans just could not do the job; a specialized, high-performance tow 
car was needed. The solution did not take long. Out in the desert lived a 
number of racing aficionados, many of whom worked at FRC. After 
consulting with them, the FRC M2 team bought a stripped-down Pontiac 
convertible with the largest engine available, a 4-barrel carb, and a 
4-speed stick shift, capable of towing the M2 to 1’7’7 kilometers per hour 
in 30 seconds. Then the team turned it over to “funny car” expert Mickey 
Thompson’s shop in Long Beach, where technicians fine-tuned the 
engine, added rollbars, installed radio equipment, turned around the 
right passenger bucket seat to face aft, and removed the rear seats, 
installing another bucket seat for a second observer facing sideways. 
. Fearful lest a critic hastily conclude that this was somebody’s private 
toy paid for with government funds, the team quickly painted “National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration” on the sides and sprayed the 
hood and trunk high-visibility yellow, like any other flight-line vehicle.* 
The NASA engineers added a tow rig and some airspeed measuring 
equipment, and then took it to the Nevada desert, with its (then) 
anything-goes speed limit to calibrate the speedometer-just like any 
*Toward the end of 1963, NASA shipped the Pontiac to Langley for tests at Wallops Island. “No 
longer,” mourned the X-Press, “can we drive along the lakebed and pass the airplanes in flight.” 
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other research airplane. Team members fondly recollect the strange 
head-shaking stares of California and Nevada highway patrolmen as the 
exotic auto rumbled along, driven by Walter Whiteside, engine exhausts 
roaring. Its gasoline mileage wasn’t good-just six kilometers per gallon. 
Finally, by the spring of 1963, all was ready. Milt Thompson ventured out 
on the lake, the M2-Fl rigged behind the Pontiac on a tow line for its 
first excursion into .the air.3 
The M2-F1 completed its first ground tows on 5 April 1963 and 
made 45 others by the month’s end. From then until the first air tows, the 
little lifting body made over 100 tows, an accumulated air time of nearly 
four hours. Generally speaking, the M2-F1 had acceptable flying 
qualities, warranting its being air-towed to altitude and released; but 
Thomas Toll, FRC’s chief of research and one of the men responsible for 
the X-15 concept, had serious misgivings. He became especially con- 
cerned after Thompson’s first flight, when the pilot encountered a 
dangerous lateral oscillation. Nevertheless, Bikle went ahead and ap- 
proved air tows. FRC had a Douglas C-47 “Gooney Bird” assigned for 
general duties. The C-47, the military version of the legendary DC-3, 
had been an excellent glider tug during World War I1 in such campaigns 
as Sicily and Normandy. Vic Horton of the FRC’s M2 team scrounged up 
a C-47 tow mechanism from a junkyard. The team installed it on the plane, 
and on 16 August 1963 Milt Thompson piloted the little lifting body as 
the center’s C-47 towed it off the lake. On this and other flights, the 
C-47 generally climbed at about 190 kilometers per hour to over 3000 
meters, the M2-F1 trailing on a 300-meter towline. The towplane would 
release the glider above its intended landing spot on Rogers Lake, and 
Thompson would guide the rapidly sinking craft to a touchdown about 
two minutes after release, landing at 137- 145 kilometers per hour. On 3 
September FRC unveiled the craft to aviation news reporters. The lift- 
ing body concept at once became a hot journalistic item.* 
The first flights of the M2-F1 had proved that the lifting body 
shape could fly. As early as mid-April 1963, Bikle was convinced enough 
to bring NASA Headquarters into his confidence. He told Milton Ames, 
NASA’s director of space vehicles: “The lifting-body concept looks even 
better to us as we get more into it. We also recognize a rising level of 
interest in the concept at Ames and at Langley.”’ There was a rising level 
of interest on Capitol Hill as well, as word got back to Washington. By 
mid-April 1963, many congressmen were quizzing NASA Headquarters 
officials on the M2 flight program, and causing consternation among 
some Department of Defense officials who apparently had no idea that 
the M2 was flying. Some congressmen feared the low-budget M2 might 
soar overnight to a major multi-billion-dollar post-Apollo development 
program; others later suspected that the program was a way for NASA to 
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circumvent the decision to cancel Dyna-Soar. Hugh Dryden and OART’s 
Raymond L. Bisplinghoff defended the FRC effort, and the M2 program 
continued.6 
At Edwards, seven other pilots checked out in the airplane; NASA 
test pilots Bruce Peterson, Donald Mallick, and Bill Dana; and the Air 
Force’s Chuck Yeager, Capt. Jerauld Gentry, and Lt. Col. Donald Sorlie. 
Colonel Yeager clambered out of the craft after his first flight exclaiming 
“She handles great!” He hoped to use similar vehicles, powered by small 
jet engines, as lifting body simulation trainers at the Aerospace Research 
Pilots School, which he commanded. 
Eventually the little M2 - F 1 completed approximately 100 flights 
and 400 ground tows before retirement to the Smithsonian’s National Air 
and Space Museum (it is now held in storage at Dryden for the museum). 
FRC did have to make some modifications to the craft. On one flight, 
NASA’s Bruce Peterson landed with sufficient force to shear off the 
landing wheels, and the M2 - F 1 sustained minor damage; during the tow 
to altitude, the automobile-type shock absorbers had become chilled, and 
the cold hydraulic fluid simply failed to function properly on touchdown. 
NASA replaced the Cessna 150 landing gear with more rugged gear 
from a Cessna 180. On two other flights, Jerauld Gentry became involved 
in some extremely hazardous rolling maneuvers. On one occasion, Vic 
Horton glanced out of the C-47 in time to see Gentry and the M2-Fl 
rolling inverted on the towline; for several seconds, the launch crew in 
the C-47 did not know if the errant lifting body had ploughed in. When 
they next saw it, however, it rested safely on the lake: Gentry had cast off, 
stabilized the M2-F1, flared, and landed-just another close call. Not 
wishing to take further chances, Bikle shut down the M2-Fl program. It 
had served its purpose: it proved that the lifting body shape could fly 
and encouraged further research with supersonic, rocket-powered lifting 
bodies, to determine if the shapes so desirable for hypersonic flight could 
safely fly from supersonic speeds down to landing, through the still tricky 
area of transonic trim changes. When the tubby M2-F1 completed its 
last air-tows in August 1964, work was already well along on two 
“heavyweight” aluminum follow-ons-the M2-F2 and the HL- 10, both 
Northrop products.’ 
ESTABLISHING A JOINT LIFTING BODY PROGRAM 
With the encouragement afforded by the M2-F1, FRC pressed 
forward on its lifting body studies, which eventually led to the Northrop 
M2-FZ (and later the M2-F3) and the Northrop HL-10. Air Force 
interest resulted in formation of a joint NASA-Air Force lifting body 
program. The Air Force Flight Test Center and the NASA Flight 
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Research Center issued a Memorandum of Understanding on the 
program in April 1965. 
Early in 1963, as the M2-F1 took shape at Edwards and El Mirage, 
Dale Reed’s M2 team had preliminary studies under way on an air- 
launched, “mission weight,” rocket-propelled, mach 2 lifting body using 
off-the-shelf systems and equipment. This research vehicle, informally 
dubbed “Configuration 11,” could return useful information on the 
supersonic and transonic behavior of such craft, piloting problems and 
workloads, and approach and landing characteristics of a “mission 
weight” lifting body. The earlier lightweight M2-F1 had a “wing 
loading” only 115 of that expected with a fully developed and operational 
space-rated lifting body. Oddly, NASA recognized from the outset that 
the lightweight lifting body would be considerably more difficult to land 
than the heavyweights. Even though both had the same lift-to-drag 
ration, the lightweight M2 had an inherently shorter time between the 
pilot’s landing flare and touchdown than the heavyweight would have. 
This increase in time available before touchdown was desirable from a 
piloting standpoint, but the heavyweight vehicles also landed much 
faster. The FRC M2 team had decided to proceed with the lightweight 
M2 tests, even though the vehicle would be difficult to fly, because its low 
touchdown speed (around 137 kilometers per hour) reduced the risk of 
pilot injury.’ 
Bikle’s almost-covert M2 operation at Edwards proved a big success 
in boosting the lifting body concept. The flight test results encouraged 
greater participation by other NASA centers and Headquarters through 
the Office of Advanced Research and Technology under NASA Associ- 
ate Administrator Raymond Bisplinghoff. On 15 and 16 September 
1964, just after the end of the M2-F1 program, Bisplinghoff and some 
of his staff met with Paul Bikle and the M2 team at Edwards. What came 
out of this meeting was a directive to the NASA center directors asking 
that they document “existing research effort on entry vehicles of the 
lifting-body class,” with a view toward possible construction of a hypersonic 
lifting body. OART now strongly supported the lifting body research 
program at Edwards; Bisplinghoff wrote, “I believe it is essential that we 
have a strong in-house research effort covering all the technical problem 
areas of importance to lifting-body vehicle design and ~perat ion.”~ 
By this time the “heavyweight” program was under way. In February 
1964 FRC solicited proposals from 26 firms for two heavyweight, low- 
speed, lifting body gliders. NASA would test them in the full-scale Ames 
wind tunnel and also air-launch them from a B-52 flying at 13 700 
meters. The firms had five weeks to submit proposals. OART would super- 
vise the program, with Ames, Langley, and FRC participating. One glider 
would be an M2, and the other would be Langley’s own proposed 
HL- 10 modified delta shape. Only five companies submitted proposals; 
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FRC selected the Norair Division of the Northrop Corporation to build 
the vehicles. On 2 June 1964 the FRC awarded a fixed-price contract to 
Northrop for the fabrication of the M2 and HL- 10 heavyweight gliders 
for $1.2 million apiece. Northrop would deliver the MZ-FZ in the late 
spring of 1965, with the HL- 10 following six months later.” The lifting 
body program had moved into its next phase. FRC and Headquarters still 
favored going beyond gliders to powered supersonic lifting body trials; in 
early August 1964 Bikle, Bisplinghoff, and Bisplinghoff s deputy Alfred 
Eggers agreed on incorporating provision for XLR- 1 1 rocket engines in 
the two new gliders.” 
What most influenced Bikle and the FRC project team in their 
selection of Northrop were the elements of simplicity and costs. Northrop, 
a company in the midst of a highly successful “private” fighter venture 
(the F-5 program), assured FRC that it could build the two gliders 
cheaply. Richard Horner, who had worked with Bikle first at Edwards, 
then from NASA Headquarters, was now executive vice president of 
Northrop. The two men dispensed with all unnecessary paperwork and 
red tape. The result of this simplification was that the vehicles, which one 
industry spokesman had predicted could cost $15 million apiece, wound 
up costing just $1.2 million apiece, unheard of for complex research 
airplanes. Bikle assigned FRC engineer John McTigue as NASA pro- 
gram manager, while Northrop assigned Ralph Hakes as Norair’s pro- 
gram manager. The two men devised a Joint Action Management Plan to 
minimize paperwork, to minimize the number of employees working on 
the project, to make decisions by individuals and not by committees, to 
locate the project in one area where all necessary resources could be 
easily and quickly directed to it, and to fabricate the vehicle using a 
conservative design approach. As Hakes recalled, 
We never had more than a handful of engineers.. . . They were all 
twenty-year men who had worked to government specifications all their lives 
and knew which ones to design to and which to skip. McTigue’s people and 
ours would talk things over and decide jointly what was reasonable compli- 
ance with the specifications. Decisions were made on the spot. It didn’t 
require proposals and counter-proposals. l2 
Because of his long Air Force association, Paul Bikle always worked 
closely and effectively with his Air Force Flight Test Center counterparts, 
much as Walt Williams had before him. He recognized that, like the 
X- 15, the lifting body program required some sort of joint operations 
agreement because the program was getting too large for NASA to 
manage and operate alone. He knew that the NASA-Air Force-contractor 
flight testing relationship was a close one; as with the NACA in the late 
1940s at Muroc, there were few if any disagreements among the 
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working-level personnel. Such disagreements as existed were imposed 
from above. Bikle saw that the Air Force and NASA had similar interests 
in the lifting body concept; over the early spring of 1965, he met with 
Maj. Gen. Irving Branch, commander of the Air Force Flight Test Center 
at Edwards. Out of these meetings came a Memorandum of Understand- 
ing on 19 April 1965. The memo drew on previous X- 15 program 
experience, alluding to the similarities between the programs and the 
excellent working relationships that had existed between Air Force and 
NASA personnel assigned to the X- 15 program. The memo created the 
Joint FRC/AFFTC Lifting Body Flight Test Committee composed of 10 
members: director of FRC (chairman), commander of the AFFTC 
(vice-chairman), NASA and Air Force pilots, NASA and Air Force 
engineers, NASA and Air Force project officers, NASA instrumentation 
representative, and medical officer from the Air Force. 
The joint flight test committee had overall responsibility for the test 
program; it also assumed responsibility for all outside relations and 
contacts. FRC had responsibility for maintenance, instrumentation, and 
ground support of the craft, while the AFFTC assumed responsibility for 
the launch aircraft, support aircraft, medical support, the rocket power plant, 
and the pilot’s personal equipment. AFFTC and FRC assumed joint 
responsibility for planning research flights, analyzing flight data, test 
piloting, range support, and overall flight operations.’ Bikle and Branch 
issued the memo two months before Northrop rolled out the M2-F2. 
But the M2-F2 and the HL- 10 were no longer the only “heavyweights” 
under construction. A year and a half later, on 1 1  October 1966, the 
AFFTC and FRC amended the memo to cover NASA participation in an 
Air Force-sponsored lifting body program, the Martin SV-5P. l4 
The Martin SV-5P had a complex genesis. In 1960 the Air Force 
had begun examining manned, maneuverable, lifting body spacecraft as 
alternatives to the ballistic-type orbital reentry concepts then in favor. 
This investigation became Project START (Spacecraft Technology and 
Advanced Reentry Tests), though this name emerged only much later. 
START involved a three-phase program, with ASSET (Aerothermody- 
namidElastic Structural Systems Environmental Tests), PRIME (Precision 
Recovery Including Maneuvering Entry), and PILOT (Piloted Lowspeed 
Tests) as its eventual constituents. 
In May 1961, the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory awarded the 
McDonnell Aircraft Corporation a contract for a suborbital lifting body 
reentry vehicle called ASSET. The craft measured over 1.5 meters long 
and generally resembled the canceled X-20A. McDonnell built six of 
these, launching them down the Eastern Test Range from Thor-Delta 
and Thor boosters between September 1963 and March 1965. These 
shapes reached speeds between 16 000 and 21 700 kilometers per hour 
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while making lifting reentries from 60 000 meters over the South 
Atlantic. All the vehicles survived reentry, though some were lost at sea 
before recovery crews could pick them up. 
The next step, PRIME, began in November 1964 when the Space 
Systems Division of the Air Force Systems Command gave the Martin 
Company a contract to design, fabricate, and test a maneuvering reentry 
vehicle to demonstrate whether a lifting body could, in fact, be guided 
from a straight course and returned back to that course. Martin already 
had been studying lifting reentry vehicles for some time-the company 
had, after all, been in the Dyna-Soar competition-and had put more 
than 2 million man-hours into lifting entry studies. The outcome had 
been the SV-5 body shape, which resembled a finned potato. Company 
engineers built a 1.5-meter radio-controlled model and flew it at Martin’s 
Middle River, Maryland, plant. They raised it to altitude under two 
balloons, then dropped it and guided it to a landing. These quick-and- 
dirty trials proved the shape could fly; eventually Martin refined the 
design into the SV-5D, a 400-kilogram aluminum vehicle with an 
ablative heat shield. The Air Force ordered four of the SV-5D PRIME 
vehicles, designating them X-23A and launching three of them between 
December 1966 and mid-April 196’7 over the Western Test Range using 
Atlas boosters that blasted them at 24 000 kilometers per hour toward 
Kwajalein. The three vehicles performed so well that the Air Force 
canceled the last launch to save money. The PRIME project demon- 
strated that a maneuvering lifting body could indeed successfully alter its 
flight path upon reentry. 
The Air Force and Martin had further expanded upon the company’s 
PRIME work and had derived PILOT-a proposed mach 2 “low-speed” 
research vehicle that the service could test to determine its supersonic, 
transonic, and subsonic-to-landing behavior. This vehicle the company 
designated SV-5P.15 
Martin also proposed a low-speed lifting body trainer, the SV-5J, to 
be powered by a small turbojet, for use at the Air Force test pilot school. 
Nothing came of this, though the company built the shells of two such 
vehicles and tried to entice a NASA pilot-one of FRC’s best-to fly it if 
and when it was completed.* On the other hand, the SV-5P develop- 
ment program went smoothly. The Air Force awarded Martin a contract 
*The pilot in question would have had to make three landings to earn a very lucrative payoff. 
The SV-5J would be very underpowered-perhaps too underpowered to gain enough altitude to 
execute the critical flare before landing. During consultations, colleagues waggishly proposed 
putting three logs across the Edwards runway. The SV-5J would hit the first, bounce, and the pilot 
would key his mike, calling “That’s one.” Bouncing over log 2: “That’s two,” followed by log 3: 
“That’s three,” followed by “Where’s my money?” Fortunately, for the sake of FRC‘s reputation and 
the health of the pilot, the SV-5J program died. 
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for one SV-5P vehicle in May 1966, and the company began develop- 
ment under the direction of engineers Buz Hello and Lyman Josephs. 
Martin completed it a little over a year later, rolling it out of the 
Baltimore plant on 11 July 1967. The Air Force designated the craft 
X-%€A. It soon journeyed to Ames for comprehensive wind tunnel 
testing, and from there to Edwards, where the other lifting bodies, the 
M2-F2 and HL- 10, had already flown.16 
THE “HEAVYWEIGHTS” FLY 
Without a doubt, the lifting bodies were the ugliest of the postwar 
research aircraft. Only two were passingly handsome: the HL- 10 was 
pleasingly plump and the X-24B, with its laundry-iron shape, had 
rakish lines that hid the tubby bulge of its X-24A ancestry. Despite their 
lines, they generally flew satisfactorily. “Lifting bodies,” one test pilot 
remarked at the unveiling of the X-24A, “fly a lot better than they look.” 
For convenience, the aircraft will be discussed in the following order: the 
M2-F2 and M2-F3, the HL-10, and the X-24A and X-24B. 
The M2-FZ rolled out of Northrop’s Hawthorne, California, plant 
on 15 June 1965 and was trucked over the hills to Edwards the next day. 
It resembled the earlier M2-F1. At its unveiling, it still lacked the 
planned XLR- 1 1 rocket engine; NASA would fly it first as a glider and 
then modify it for powered flight. Fabricated from aluminum, the 
M2 - F2 weighed 2 100 kilograms and measured 6.76 meters in length, 
with a span of 2.92 meters. Like the earlier M2-F1, it had two vertical 
fins, but lacked the earlier craft’s horizontal control surfaces. Unlike the 
M2-F1, it had a retractable landing gear, assembled from off-the-shelf 
components, including the main landing gear of a Northrop T-38 
trainer and the nose gear of a North American T-39 Sabreliner. 
High-pressure nitrogen would blow down the gear just prior to touchdown. 
It had a complex series of body flaps: a full-span ventral flap controlled 
pitch, while split dorsal flaps controlled roll (lateral) motion through 
differential operation and pitch and trim through symmetrical operation. 
The twin vertical fins provided directional (yaw) control and also acted as 
speed brakes. The M2-F2 had a stability augmentation system to assist 
the boosted control system in damping out undesirable vehicle motions. The 
pilot could use four throttleable hydrogen peroxide rockets rated at 1780 
newtons (400 lb) apiece for “instant lift’’ during the prelanding flare; 
if the craft proved unmanageable or some other calamity struck, the 
M2-F2 had a modified zero-zero ejection seat from an F- 106 Delta Dart. 
At FRC, technicians checked out the aircraft, added research 
instrumentation, and then trucked it to Ames for two weeks of tests in the 
full-scale wind tunnel. Ames completed 100 hours of testing in August 
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1965; apart from a correctable high-frequency oscillation of the upper 
surface flaps, the M2-F2 received a clean bill of health. It returned to 
Edwards for its initial flight trials. Northrop furnished a special 6.7-meter 
adapter so that the M2-F2 could launch from the B-52 mothership’s 
existing X- 15 launch pylon. On 23 March 1966 the M2-F2 completed 
its maiden captive flight. Following a series of similar checkouts, NASA 
readied the craft for free flight.” 
In preparation for the MZ-FZ’s first flights, FRC launched a 
cooperative pilot training and aircraft simulation program with the 
Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory of Buffalo, New Ymk. Earlier, FRC had 
flown Cornell’s highly modified variable-stability Lockheed T-33A jet 
trainer to simulate the low lift-to-drag reentry characteristics of the 
X-15. Now, in the spring and summer of 1965, the FRC again flew 
Cornell’s T-33AY this time on lifting body studies, using the M2-F2 as 
the reference type. The variable-stability T-33A-in its own right, one 
of America’s most successful postwar research aircraft-had “drag petals” 
installed on its wingtip tanks. These petal-shaped surfaces, extended in 
flight, varied the lift-to-drag ratio of the aircraft from the T-33A’s 
normal 12 - 14 to as low as 2, the approximate ratio of an M2 lifting body. 
Typical lifting body approaches were executed by Cornel1 test pilot 
Robert Harper and by FRC pilots Milt Thompson, Bruce Peterson, Bill 
Dana, and Fred Haise. The T-33A tests indicated that the M2-F2 
aircraft would have undesirable lateral control characteristics under 
certain conditions-a fact that later assumed critical importance. In 
addition, NASA’s pilots simulated lifting body approaches and landings 
using the center’s F- 104s and the amenable Douglas F5D.18 
The M2-F2 completed its maiden flight on 12 July 1966. NASA 
pilot Milt Thompson dropped away from the B-52 mothership at 
13 700 meters, flying at ’725 kilometers per hour. During the brief 
flight-not quite four minutes-Thompson made a 90” turning descent, 
performed a practice landing flare maneuver at 7500 meters, made 
another 90” turn onto final approach, increased his gliding speed to 560 
kilometers per hour, initiated the landing flare at 365 meters reducing 
his rate of descent from 75 metedsecond to 3 meterdsecond, lowered 
the landing gear, and touched down exactly at the planned aiming point 
on Rogers Lake at 320 kilometers per hour, coasting 2.4 kilometers 
across the lakebed. The MZ-FZ’s first flight had been an unqualified 
success. By mid-November 1966 the craft had completed an additional 
13 flights, piloted by Thompson, Bruce Peterson, and the Air Force’s 
Capt. Jerauld Gentry and Lt. Col. Donald Sorlie. Following flight 14 on 
2 1 November, NASA grounded the M2 - F2 for installation of its XLR- 1 1 
rocket engine. On 2 May 196’7 the M2-F2 made its first flight carrying, 
but not using, the rocket engine, another glide flight piloted by Jerauld 
Gentry. Along with all other pilots who had flown the craft, Gentry did 
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not like the M2 - F2’s poor lateral-directional stability characteristics. At 
low angles of attack at high speeds, it often developed a rolling motion 
that increased in severity. If the pilot increased the angle of attack, this 
motion damped out. On the very next flight this behavior contributed to 
a major accident that set back the entire lifting body program and 
seriously injured NASA’s Bruce Peter~on.’~ 
On 10 May 1967 Peterson launched away from the B-52 at 13 560 
meters, heading to the north and flying east of Rogers Dry Lake. All went 
well as the M2-F2 sank like a stone, until the wingless craft reached 2 135 
meters. Then, flying with a “very low” angle of attack, the M2-FZ began 
a “dutch roll” motion, rolling from side to side at over 200” per second. 
Peterson, who earlier had turned a nearly uncontrollable first flight in 
the HL- 10 into a brilliantly successful landing, was an excellent pilot; he 
quickly and instinctively raised the nose, damping out the lateral motions. 
The recovery had carried the craft away from its intended flight path. 
The pilot realized he was too low to reach the planned landing site near 
lakebed Runway 18 and was rapidly sinking toward a section of lakebed 
that lacked visual runway reference markings, which were needed to 
estimate height above the lake with accuracy. 
At this point, a rescue helicopter appeared in front of the M2-F2. 
Peterson, overburdened, disoriented from the rolling motions, now had 
an additional worry. He called, “Get that chopper out of the way,” 
following this seconds later with “That chopper’s going to get me, I’m 
afraid.” FRC chase pilot John Manke, flying an F5D, assured Peterson 
the helicopter was clear, and it did chug off, out of Peterson’s path. 
Realizing he was very low, Peterson fired the landing rockets, and the 
M2-F2 flared nicely. He lowered the landing gear, which needed only 1 ‘/2 
seconds to deploy from up-and-locked to down-and-locked. But time had 
run out. Before the gear locked, the M2-F2 hit the lake, shearing off its 
telemetry antennas. In the control room, engineers saw the needles on 
their instrumentation meters flick to their null points. Startled, they 
looked up to the video monitor-in time to see the M2-F2, as if in a 
horrible nightmare, rolling over and over across the lakebed at more 
than 400 kilometers per hour. It turned over six times before coming to 
rest on its flat back, minus its canopy, main gear, and right vertical fin. 
Peterson, who by all expectations should have died in the accident, was 
badly injured. Rescue crews pulled him from the wreckage, rushed him 
to the Edwards hospital for emergency surgery, then to the hospital at 
March Air Force Base, and several days later to UCLA’s University 
Hospital. He pulled through, though losing the sight of one eye. The 
plucky airman remained at the FRC as the center’s director of safety and 
continued to fly as a Marine reservist.“ 
Instead of simply trucking the M2-F2’s remains to a scrapyard, 
NASA returned them to Northrop’s Hawthorne plant. Technicians 
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placed the battered lifting body in a jig to check alignment, removing the 
external skin and portions of the secondary structure. The inspection 
took 60 days. In March 1968 NASA’s Office of Advanced Research and 
Technology authorized Northrop to restore the primary structure and 
return the vehicle to FRC. There it sat, while lifting body advocates from 
Ames and FRC determined its future. In light of its poor handling 
characteristics, the craft obviously needed modification. By this time the 
rival HL- 10 was already demonstrating superior handling qualities. 
Nevertheless the M2 shape still appeared worth studying; on 28 January 
1969 NASA Headquarters announced that the agency would repair, 
modify, and return the MZ-FZ to service as the M2-F3.21 
The rebuilt aircraft, which returned to Edwards and first flew in 
1970, looked much like its predecessor, except for a short stubby vertical 
fin located midway between the two large vertical fins. This center fin 
acted as a large “flow fence” to improve lateral control. The craft had a 
new jet-reaction roll-control system, which NASA hoped might be used 
on future lifting body spacecraft so that the pilot could rely on a single 
control system all the way from orbit to landing, rather than the 
multiplicity of systems used on such craft as the X-15. NASA planned to 
employ the M2-F3 as a testbed for research on the lateral control 
problems encountered by lifting body vehicles. 
On 2 June 1970 Bill Dana completed the craft’s first flight, a glide 
flight to evaluate how the modifications changed the plane’s perfor- 
mance from that of the earlier M2-F2. A planned powered flight on 25 
November went awry when the engine shut down prematurely. Air Force 
test pilot Jerauld Gentry, the only pilot at Edwards to fly the MZ-FZ, 
HL- 10, and M2-F3, flew the plane on 9 February 1971 and said it flew 
as well as the HL-10; this was praise, for the HL-10 flew much better 
than the unmodified M2-F2. NASA and the Air Force then embarked on 
a joint program of incrementally increasing its speed and altitude 
performance, with the last two flights setting the fastest and highest 
MZ-FZ marks. On 25 August 1971 Bill Dana had made the craft’s first 
supersonic flight, attaining mach 1.1. Over a year later, on 13 December 
1972, Dana attained mach 1.613, 1712 kilometers per hour, the fastest 
M2-F3 flight. On the last flight of the craft, on 20 December FRC test 
pilot John Manke attained 21 790 meters, an M2 record. On only one 
occasion did trouble occur; on its tenth flight, 24 September 1971, the 
M2-F3 experienced an engine ignition malfunction; Dana shut down 
the XLR-11 engine, but a small amount of propellant flared briefly in 
the engine bay before extinguishing itself. Dana made “a hard but 
otherwise uneventful landing” on Rosamond Dry Lake, the alternate 
emergency landing site to Rogers. Toward the end of the craft’s flying 
career, FRC technicians installed and evaluated a rate command augmenta- 
tion control system, a kind of fly-by-wire system that used an analog 
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computer and a side-arm control stick in addition to the regular control 
stick. Altogether, the M2 completed 43 flights. 16 as the F2 and 27 as the 
F3. Retired at the end of December 1972, the lane subsequently joined 
NASA complemented the M2 - F2 and M2 - F3 trials with an extensive 
evaluation of the Northrop HL- 10. In contrast to the accident-marred 
M2 flight test program, HL-10 testing moved along quite smoothly- 
once the aircraft had been modified after a very frightening first flight. 
The HL-10, product of Eugene Love’s work at Langley Research 
Center, was among the most successful of the lifting bodies; indeed, 
when the Space Shuttle began to take shape, the consensus among NASA 
engineers at the Flight Research Center was that it should look like the 
HL-IO. Unlike the M2, which had a cone-shaped underside, the HL-10 
had a flat bottom and a rounded top; it was, in effect, an inverted airfoil 
in cross-section, with a delta planform. It had three vertical fins, two of 
them angling outwards from the body, and a tall center fin. The flush 
canopy did not protrude above the body lines of the vehicle. Like the 
M2-F2, it measured 6.7 meters in length, but it was wider (4.6 meters) 
and higher (3.5 meters). It used many off-the-shelf components from the 
T-38, T-39, and F- 106, among others. The control system consisted of 
upper body surface and outer fin flaps for transonic and supersonic trim, 
blunt trailing edge elevons, and a split rudder on the center vertical fin. It 
had a three-axis stability augmentation system, landing rockets, and 
provisions for an XLR- 11 engine, though the engine was not installed at 
roll-out from Northrop’s Hawthorne plant 18 January 1966.23 
Northrop shipped the vehicle to Ames for testing in the 40 X 80 ft 
full-scale tunnel. The tunnel tests proceeded uneventfully, though some 
tests hinted at flow separation over the outer vertical fins, a condition 
engineers did not consider serious. At the Flight Research Center on 22 
December 1966 NASA pilot Bruce Peterson completed the craft’s first 
glide flight. It was anything but routine. During the 3-minute descent to 
landing, Peterson discovered that he had minimal lateral control over the 
lifting body; flow separation was much worse than anticipated. Peterson 
managed to set the HL- 10 down safely on Rogers Dry Lake, no small 
tribute to his piloting skills. NASA immediately grounded it for study, 
also taking the opportunity to install its rocket engine. The first flight, in 
the words of Langley engineers, “once again demonstrated the value of 
flight tests as proof-of-~oncept.”~~ Langley undertook a series of tunnel 
tests. As a fix, NASA engineers modified the leading edge of the outer 
vertical fins so as to direct more air over the control surfaces. Technicians 
added the new leading edges, constructed of fiberglass, late in 1967, 
smoothing over the installation with epoxy paint. The HL- 10 experi- 
ence reemphasized to engineers that aerodynamically shaping lifting 
body designs for good subsonic performance could lead to potentially 
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disastrous flow separation problems in the absence of thorough design 
analysis. “This experience,” Langley engineers concluded, “. . . pointed 
up the significance of seemingly minor shape changes. . . .’’25 
When the HL-10 took to the air again on 23 October 1968, it 
handled very nicely. What was to have been the first HL-10 powered 
flight had to be aborted after launch when only one of the XLR-11’s 
chambers fired; Jerauld Gentry made an emergency landing on Rosamond 
Dry Lake. On 13 November everything clicked; NASA pilot John Manke 
reached mach 0.84 (843 kilometers per hour) using two of the engine’s 
four thrust chambers. NASA now began incrementally working toward 
the craft’s maximum performance. The HL- 10 went supersonic for the 
first time on 9 May 1969; this was the first supersonic flight of any 
manned lifting body and a major milestone in the entire lifting body 
program. The craft exhibited acceptable transonic and supersonic han- 
dling characteristics. On 18 February 1970 Air Force test pilot Maj. Peter 
C. Hoag reached mach 1.86 (2072 kilometers per hour), the fastest lifting 
body flight ever made; nine days later, on 27 February 1970, Bill Dana 
reached an.altitude of 27 524 meters, another record for the lifting body 
program. The HL- 10 thus became the fastest and highest-flying piloted 
lifting body ever built.26 
Toward the end of the HL-10 flight test program, NASA em- 
barked on a series of powered landing trials. By 1970, the Space Shuttle 
was being discussed. One critical question was whether it should make 
unpowered landing approaches or, like a conventional transport aircraft, 
fly a powered approach and landing. Engineers had several schemes for 
the powered landing, the most popular being “pop-out” retractable 
turbojet “landing engines” that the Shuttle crew could deploy at subsonic 
speeds while approaching the earth. Advocates thought the landing 
engines would give Shuttle a shallower descent angle, reducing pilot 
workload and enhancing overall mission safety. While popular with many 
industry and government engineers who had little background in the 
“Round One,” “Round TWO,” and lifting body programs, this scheme was 
not at all popular at Edwards. Test pilots and engineers alike recognized 
the complexity that landing engines would add to any Shuttle design, as 
well as the danger to a Shuttle crew if one of the engines failed during the 
final and most critical portions of flight. Because of the popularity of this 
idea elsewhere, FRC engineers embarked on a powered-landing pro- 
gram using the HL-10. 
In February 1970, following the record altitude and speed flights, 
NASA grounded the HL- 10 and replaced its XLR- 11 rocket engine 
with three 2200-newton (500-lb-thrust) Bell Aerosystems hydrogen- 
peroxide rocket engines. NASA planned launching from the B-52 in 
the vicinity of Palmdale; the pilot of the HL- 10 would ignite the rocket 
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engines as the lifting body passed through an altitude of 2000 meters. 
The rockets would reduce the approach angle of the aircraft from its 
customary 18” to 6” and give the HL-10 an airspeed in excess of 560 
kilometers per hour. At 60 meters above the lakebed, the pilot would 
shut down the rockets and extended the landing gear, executin a 
routine landing. The HL-10 completed two of these flights pilotedgby 
Pete Hoag on 11 June and 17 July 1970, the latter flight being the craft’s 
final mission. The flights gave much more encouragement to the Edwards 
viewpoint than to those in favor of landing engines. The shallow descent 
angle had in fact increased pilot workload and degraded mission safety. 
Hoag found he had more trouble in determining the landing aiming 
point, and the higher approach speed aggravated control-sensitivity 
problems. 
The HL-10 tests carried the day for advocates of a “deadstick” 
Shuttle reentry, approach, and landing. As Milton Thompson, a test pilot 
with experience in numerous low WD research aircraft, subsequently 
stated, 
the shuttle, whether it has landing engines or not, must be maneuvered, 
unpowered, to a point near the destination because the engines cannot be 
started until the vehicle is subsonic and only limited fuel will be available. To 
us it seems ridiculous to maneuver to a position where power must be relied 
upon to reach the runway. 
The HL- 10, in large measure, contributed to the decision to design the 
Space Shuttle without landing engines.*’ 
During its brief flying career, the HL-10 completed 3’7 flights. In 
storage at the Dryden Flight Research Center, it awaits restoration and 
exhibition at the center, like its earlier compatriot, the X-1E. It was a 
fine flying vehicle, and its flight test program encouraged Eugene Love 
of Langley to advocate the HL- 10 design concept for any future NASA 
shuttle. For a variety of reasons, this did not come to pass. Pilots who flew 
the craft uniformly praised its handling ChaTacteristics, reserving criti- 
cism only for its bubble Plexiglas nose. The lenticular-shaped nose acted as 
a giant “demagnifying” lens at low altitude, causing severe visual 
distortion and misleading pilots into thinking that they were much higher 
over the lakebed than they really were. Consequently they sometimes 
waited too long before extending the landing gear. With experience, 
however, they learned to compensate for this distortion, and the problem 
disappeared. 
At first, NASA had no role to play in the Air Force’s X-24A 
(SV-5P) program. In mid-1965, before the Air Force had issued Martin 
a development contract for the vehicle (then designated SV-5P), NASA’s 
Ray Bisplinghoff and his opposite number in the Air Force, Alexander 
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Flax, had agreed in principle that the SV-5P should be added to the Air 
Force-NASAjoint M2-F2 and HL- 10 programs. OART was receptive 
to testing the SV- 5P, but the then-uncertain state of the program 
prevented inclusion of the SV-5P into the joint program until October 
1967, when NASA and the Air Force concluded a memo of understand- 
ing on use of the vehicle, now designated the X-24A. The memo also 
confirmed the earlier joint lifting body program agreements established 
by Paul Bikle and Maj, Gen. Irving Branch. Branch subsequently died in 
the crash of a T-38 trainer, but his successors at AFFTC had also 
approved participation in the NASA M2 and HL- 10 programs.28 
Martin had completed the X-24A at its Middle River, Maryland, 
plant in the summer of 1967. The craft had little aesthetic appeal; 
indeed, it could lay claim to being the most unattractive of these odd 
designs. Its ultimate maturation into the sleek X-24B shape thus has 
elements of the story of the ugly duckling that one day turned into a 
swan. The body shape differed greatly from the M2 and HL-10. 
Whereas M2 was basically a modified, boat-tailed half cone, and the 
HL- 10 a delta derivative with negative camber (Le., an inverted airfoil) 
and boat-tailing, the plump X-24A had positive camber. It had a 
landing weight of 2850 kilograms, a span of 4.1 meters, and a length of 
7.5 meters. After rollout on 11 July 1967, Martin shipped the craft to 
Ames for full-scale tunnel testing. That completed, NASA shipped the 
craft to Edwards in early 1969 for flight trials. Jerauld Gentry completed . 
the maiden glide flight on 17 April, the craft making nine more such 
flights before its first powered mission. Gentry flew the X-24A’s first 
powered flight on 19 March 1970, reaching mach 0.87, well into the 
transonic region. Following this flight, Gentry, NASA pilot John Manke, 
and Air Force test pilot Maj. Cecil Powell steadily opened the X-24A’s 
performance envelope. On 14 October 1970, 23 years to the day since 
Chuck Yeager’s first supersonic flight, Manke piloted the X-24A on its 
own initial excursion past mach 1, reaching mach 1.19 (1261 kilometers 
per hour) at 20 700 meters. Not quite two weeks later, Manke flew the 
X-24A to 21 765 meters, simulating a Space Shuttle approach and 
landing from that altitude. On 29 March 197 1 Manke reached mach 1.60 
(1667 kilometers per hour), the X-24A’s fastest research flight. On 4 
June 1971 the 28th and final research mission was a disappointment 
because only two of the XLR-11 engine’s four chambers ignited, 
limiting the craft to subsonic speeds2’ 
The little X-24A had no vices, though it once gave researchers a 
bad moment. The rocket engine shut down prematurely and a small fire 
erupted in the engine bay, but Gentry made an emergency landing. 
Damage to the four maneuvering flaps, wiring, and flap instrumentation 
kept the ugly duckling grounded for nearly two months. The X-24A did 
have one bothersome quirk: during boost, it exhibited a pronounced 
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nose-up trim change that prohibited low angles of attack during powered 
flight. FRC engineers concluded that the aerodynamic effects of the 
rocket exhaust plume impinging on the craft caused the nose-up condition, 
and warned the designers of the Shuttle to beware similar problems in 
that ambitious project. Though such trim changes sound innocuous, they 
could impose unacceptable aerodynamic loads on the Shuttle during its 
boost to orbit. Aside from this quirk, the X-24A flew very well and the 
pilots liked it. Like the M2-F3 and HL-10, the X-24A demonstrated 
that shuttle-type hypersonic vehicles could make precise landings without 
power. The X-24A pilots found they could land the vehicle on lakebed 
Runway 18 with an average 76-meter longitudinal “miss” distance from 
the intended touchdown spot. Indeed, NASA lifting body team members 
had no qualms about attempting landings on a confined concrete 
runway, such as the 4600-meter runway at Edwards. This had not been 
attempted with earlier lifting bodies only because they lacked nosewheel 
steering. All the lifting body trials gave great confidence to advocates of 
landing an unpowered Space Shuttle on a conventional runway after its 
return from space. This was the plan ultimately followed for the Space 
Shuttle and demonstrated at Edwards with the Orbiter Enterprise in 
1977.30 Had this been all that the X-24A contributed, the program 
would have been satisfactory. Instead, however, the ugly duckling turned 
into the sleek and significant X-24B. 
THE END OF AN ERA 
The Martin X-24B was America’s last postwar rocket research 
aircraft; its story began in the late 1960s when engineers at the Air 
Force’s Flight Dynamics Laboratory evolved a family of reentry shapes, 
the FDL-5,6, and 7, having a reasonable lift-to-drag ratio (approximately 
2.5) at hypersonic speeds and large internal volume. These configura- 
tions were all suited to hypersonic aircraft capable of flight from mach 4 
to orbital velocities, but tailored primarily for aircraft in the mach 8- 12 
performance regime. The Air Force hoped that these shapes could be 
used for two applications: sustained hypersonic-cruise aircraft powered 
by advanced airbreathing engines, and unpowered orbital reentry vehi- 
cles capable of landing at virtually any convenient airfield. At first, of 
course, the Flight Dynamics Laboratorywished to verify the performance 
of the shapes on low-speed lifting body vehicles. (See the color photo 
section at the end of this chapter.) 
In a bid to reduce costs, Air Force engineers thought of modifying 
one of the abortive Martin SV-5J shells into an FDL-7 body shape, 
gloving the FDL-7 around the SV-5J, retaining the three vertical fins, 
and redesignating this composite shape the FDL-8. In January 1969 the 
Flight Dynamics Laboratory issued a proposed development plan for the 
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project, the jet-powered craft to be air-launched from a B-52 mothership. 
As studies matured, however, the advantages of rocket propulsion 
became obvious. This led the Air Force to scrap the SV-5J plan and, 
instead, build the FDL-7 shape around the X-24A then flying at 
Edwards. Because of the joint lifting body agreements, Air Force engi- 
neers had consulted their NASA counterparts, including Paul Bikle at 
the FRC and Fred J. DeMeritte, NASA OART’s chief of the lifting body 
program, to secure tentative NASA support. In August 1970, the 
laboratory sent a memorandum describing the proposed program to all 
interested parties. By the end of the month, the directors of both the Air 
Force Flight Test Center and NASA’s FRC had concurred, but Air Force 
Systems Command delayed approval pending arrangements for joint 
NASA-Air Force funding. On 11 March 1971 NASA transferred $550 000 
to the Air Force to initiate acquisition of the aircraft. The Air Force 
pledged a similar amount, and on 2 1 April 197 1 the AFSC’s director of lab- 
oratories gave the program its go-ahead, five months later than supporters 
had desired. On 4 June 1971 the X-24A completed its last flight. On 1 
January 19’72 the Air Force awarded the Martin Marietta Corporation 
the modification contract. The X-24B program was now officially under 
way, and modifying the existing craft secured for $1.1 million a research 
vehicle that could have cost $5 million if built from scratch. Hypersonic 
tests at the Air Force’s Arnold Engineering Development Center indi- 
cated that the FDL-8 shape performed well at those speeds. However, as 
always, the big question was what happened when the vehicle decelerated 
to much lower velocities. As Fred DeMeritte stated at the beginning of 
the program, “We are looking for surprises as we go through t ran~onic .”~~ 
Martin Marietta Corporation’s Denver plant delivered the X-24B in 
the fall of 19’72. It had grown 3 meters in span and 4.4 meters in length 
and weighed 6250 kilograms at launch. It had a ’78” “double delta” 
planform for good center-of-gravity control, a boat-tail for favorable 
subsonic lift-to-drag characteristics, a flat bottom, and a sloping 3” nose 
ramp for hypersonic trim. Like the earlier lifting bodies, the X-24B 
used several off-the-shelf components; portions of its landing gear, 
control system, and ejection system came from the Northrop T-38, 
Lockheed F- 104, Martin B-57, Grumman F1 lF, Convair F- 106, and 
the North American X- 15. It had an XLR- 11 rocket engine and Bell 
Aerosystem landing rockets. Once the aircraft was back at Edwayds, 
technicians installed a research instrumentation package. Program man- 
agers Johnn Armstrong and Jack Kolf supervised preparations for the 
John Manke completed the X-24B’s first glide flight on 1 August 
1973, launching from the B-52 carrier aircraft at 12 200 meters, coasting 
earthward at 740 kilometers per hour, and performing a series of 
handling-qualities maneuvers and a practice landing approach before 
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making a 320-kilometers-per-hour landing on the lakebed. The flight 
initiated the usual sort of programs and investigations that accompany all 
new research aircraft. On succeeding missions, Manke and the Air Force 
project pilot, Maj. Michael V. Love, checked the vehicle’s behavior in a 
variety of configurations. Following this series of glide flights the X-24B 
made its first powered flight piloted by John Manke, on 15 November 
1973. As always, the pilots practiced for their brief seven-minute sojourns 
in the X-24B with numerous lifting body simulation approaches in 
T-38 and F- 104 aircraft. By the end of the X-24B program, pilots had 
flown more than 8000 such approaches in support of the entire lifting 
body program. On the X-24B’s sixteenth flight, on 24 October 19’74, 
Mike Love reached mach 1.76 (1873 kilometers per hour), the craft’s 
fastest flight. Manke followed this on 22 May 1975 by making the craft’s 
highest approach and landing, coming down to the lake from a height of 
29 500 meters. Both Love and Manke were pleasantly surprised by the 
handling qualities at all speed ranges, and with and without engaging the 
control dampers in the stability augmentation system. Even in turbulence 
the aircraft flew surprisingly well; its handling qualities, including the 
landing approach, reminded pilots of the F- 104. Its subsonic handling 
qualities in general earned the X-24B a rating of 2.5 on the NACA- 
developed Cooper-Har er ilot rating scale, a very high mark. In short, 
By mid-1975 the Space Shuttle was well into its design phase; mission 
planners were still interested in whether such unpowered low WD 
reentry shapes could demonstrate successful landings on the relatively 
confined geographical and heading constraints of a fixed runway. John 
Manke was convinced that the X-24B could execute such an approach 
and landing. He recommended that the lifting body-which, in contrast 
to its fellows, did have nosewheel steering-make a series of landings on 
the main 4500-meter concrete runway at Edwards, Runway 04/22. 
Manke, Love, and others considered such a demonstration important to 
developing the confidence to proceed with similar landings of the Space 
Shuttle itself. In January 1974 the X-24B Research Subcommittee 
approved the proposal. Manke and Love began a three-week farniliariza- 
tion program flying F- 104 and T-38 approaches that simulated the 
X-24B’s characteristics. Manke alone shot over 100 such approaches. 
The payoff came on 5 August 1975, when Manke launched from the 
mothership B-52, ignited the XLR-11 engine, climbed to 18 300 
meters, and began his descent. Seven minutes after launch, Manke 
touched down precisely at the planned target mark 1500 meters along 
the Edwards runway. Afterward he said: “We now know that concrete 
runway landings are operationally feasible and that touchdown accuracies 
of 2500 feet can be expected. We learned that the concrete runway, with 
its distance markers and unique geographical features, provides addi- 
it was a fine airplane. 2 
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tional ‘how goes it’ information not available on our current lakebed 
runways.” Two weeks after Manke’s first runway landing, Mike Love 
duplicated the feat. The runway landing program, a major accomplishment, 
brought the X-24B research program to a conclusion. The Air Force 
and NASA embarked on a series of pilot checkout flights.34 
On 9 September 1975 Bill Dana completed the X-24B’s last 
powered flight, a flight that also brought to an end the postwar American 
rocket research program. No  more would the rumble of an igniting 
rocket engine echo along the lakebed. No more would the XLR-11 
power some exotic airframe. Old-timers who had worked in the early 
days with Chuck Yeager and Walt Williams on the XS- 1 recognized that 
a unique period had at last come to a close. Following Dana’s flight, as the 
X-24B sat inert on the ground, the four chase planes, two T-38s and 
two F- 104s, closed up in a tight diamond formation and dipped low in a 
noisy salute over the Flight Research Center. That night, center person- 
nel reminisced until the wee hours at an “End of an Era’’ party at the 
Longhorn, outside Lancaster. Following Dana’s flight, the X- 24B com- 
pleted a series of six pilot familiarization glide flights, by Air Force Capt. 
Francis R. Scobee and NASA’s Einar Enevoldson and Tom McMurtry. 
On 26 November 1975 the X-24B dropped from the sky for the last 
time, piloted on its 36th flight by McMurtry. The NASA flight report 
concluded laconically that “all objectives for this flight were attained.” 
Through the dedication ceremony the following spring renaming FRC as 
the Hugh L. Dryden Flight Research Center, the X-24B remained at 
Edwards, resplendent in blue and white. Then it departed for the Air 
Force Museum, where it is currently exhibited. The lifting body flight 
test program gave way to the next phase: Space Shuttle’s approach and 
landing tests. 
BEYOND THE X-24B? 
Of Flight Research Center’s space-related activities in the 1960s, 
among the most important and influential were the lifting body studies. 
Evidence exists that the Soviet Union has followed a similar course, 
air-launching a lifting body shape reminiscent of the X- 20 Dyna-Soar 
from a Tupolev Tu-95 mothership. The Flight Research Center’s work 
on the other space-related projects-such as the Project Mercury drogue 
chute, the Paresev, and the LLRV-LLTV-was important, but the lifting 
bodies received the center’s greatest attention. The fact that the lifting 
body per se did not dictate the Space Shuttle shape is no reflection on 
NASA’s work with these shapes; indeed, the FDL-8 shape used on the 
X- 24B is considered ideal for a hypersonic sustained-cruise aircraft. 
Other considerations dictated the Shuttle’s shape; these, together with 
new thermal protection systems, lessened the once-urgent need for pure 
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blunt-body lifting reentry vehicles. Writing in 1968, lifting body advocate 
Clarence Syvertson stated: 
A technology so new and challenging cannot be rushed. . . . But I believe that 
later in this century we will come to regard today’s purely ballistic manned 
capsules, splashing down in an ocean, as a relatively crude and inefficient way 
of returning from a space mission. The lifting body offers an alternative that 
is already proved in prin~iple.’~ 
NASA’s lifting body program led to two abortive research efforts, a 
“mini-Shuttle” and an air-breathing hypersonic follow-on to the X- 24B. 
In the former case, center engineers proposed construction of manned, 
flying, 11-meter versions of the Space Shuttle to study the most critical 
area of its flight, the deceleration from mach 5 through the landing. 
Mach 1, 2, and 3 models were to be powered (respectively) by one, two, 
and three XLR- 11 engines, or a mach 5 model could be powered by an 
XLR-99. Such research aircraft, air-launched from a B-52, could fly ‘in 
direct support of Space Shuttle development, especially by validating 
wind-tunnel predictions of stability, controllability, and performance at 
hypersonic, supersonic, transonic, and subsonic velocities. They could be 
used for astronaut training and for investigating launch abort maneuvers. 
As with the earlier lifting bodies, FRC advocates of the subscale shuttle 
planned on using components from a variety of existing aircraft, includ- 
ing the M2-F3, F-4, YF- 12, F- 15, and X- 15, as well as some Apollo 
hardware. It was hoped that, using this approach, costs could be kept 
down. An XLR-99-equipped mach 5 subscale shuttle was estimated to cost 
$19.7 million. If NASA’s Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology- 
the successor to OART-and the Office of Manned Space Flight had 
authorized immediate go-ahead, the mini-Shuttle could have been flying 
toward the end of 1975.36 
This was a typical Flight Research Center proposal: do something 
that no other center could do, and do it in support of a broader research 
program. Unfortunately, the proposal came to grief. The major push for 
a subscale shuttle came in August 1972, with preparation of a well 
defined and detailed proposal. Following this, Milton Thompson, Joe 
Weil, and other mini-Shuttle proponents traveled to the Manned Space- 
craft Center and NASA Headquarters to make presentations for the 
vehicle. It had some high-level support-Robert Gilruth of MSC was a 
strong advocate-but critics argued that the projected costs were far too 
low, that a realistic cost estimate would be more like $150 million. FRC 
supporters pointed to costs in the earlier FRC-managed lifting body 
program. They conceded that if the program went through conventional 
management procedures at Headquarters, its costs would indeed rise. 
Other critics believed FRC could not go it alone on the project and that it 
would ultimately involve people who were at work on the Shuttle. But the 
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overriding difficulty seems to have been a matter of pride: FRC justified 
the subscale shuttle on the basis of its validating and verifying the results 
of wind tunnel testing-an old sorespot to tunnel devotees who passion- 
ately believed in their facilities. Despite strong industry support from 
Northrop and Martin (both with lifting body experience) and Rockwell, 
the Shuttle contractor, the subscale shuttle succumbed to the cost 
argument. The actual Shuttle’s hypersonic, supersonic, and transonic 
performance remained unchecked by actual results until the first all-out 
mach 25 reentry from space.” No one seems to have proposed a subscale, 
unmanned shuttle reentry vehicle to be flown like the earlier ASSET and 
PRIME shapes. There is no reason to believe that such a proposal would 
have won a~ceptance.~’ 
The other proposal derived from the lifting body effort, as well as 
desires for an X-15 follow-on, was the “X-24C,” a strange aircraft 
subsequently awkwardly redesignated as the NHFRF: National Hypersonic 
Flight Research Facility, pronounced “Nerf.” The Flight Research Center 
had high hopes for development of this vehicle, a B-52 air-launched 
mach 8 research aircraft equipped with rocket boost and designed for 40 
seconds of sustained mach 6 + cruise. FRC, in conjunction with Langley’s 
hypersonic ramjet research program, could use the aircraft to test 
“Scramjet” (supersonic combustion ramjet) air-breathing engines. As early 
as the mid-l960s, De Beeler of the Flight Research Center had pressed 
hard for development of such a craft. With the conclusion of the X- 15 
program in 1968, calls from enthusiasts for an advanced hypersonic air- 
breathing research aircraft became clamorous. Langley Research Center 
launched two programs: HYFAC, the Hypersonic Research Facilities 
study, a mach 12 design; and the less ambitious HSRA, a mach 8 High- 
Speed Research Aircraft. The Air Force originated two proposals, one 
for a mach 3-5 test vehicle, and the other for the Incremental Growth 
Vehicle, a test airplane initially designed for mach 4.5, but which could be 
modified for flight at mach 6, and later for mach 9. Starting in July 1974, 
after recognizing the probable high costs of the program, NASA and the Air 
Force jointly conducted a series of design studies for an air-breathing 
hypersonic vehicle. The Flight Dynamics Laboratory FDL- 8 body shape 
appeared ideal; studies pursued this approach, encouraged by Air Force 
research on two proposed follow-on X-24 configurations, one with 
“cheek” air inlets, and the other with an XLR-99 rocket engine. In 
December 1975 NASA Headquarters and the Air Force established an 
“X-246” Joint Steering Committee, composed of the commanders of 
the Air Force’s Flight Dynamics Laboratory and Flight Test Center, and 
*For the record, its behavior was highly satisfactory. 
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the directors of NASA‘s Langley and Flight Research Centers. In July 
1976, out of this joint committee came the NHFRF.38 
The NHFRF came close to winning approval. It was strongly 
supported at Dryden at all levels. Langley’s hypersonic aerodynamicists 
and propulsion team saw in it the fruition of all their work. They also saw 
it as a good opportunity to “cover the whole hypersonics waterfront and 
do it before we’ve lost all the hypersonic talent we developed from the 
X- 15 program.” There were certainly psychological overtones as well, 
primarily a desire to reassert and revitalize the role of aeronautics within 
the agency. NASA forecast a $200-million program involving construc- 
tion of two aircraft, with 200 flights over a 10-year period. The agency 
and the Air Force would start funding the program in 1980, with the first 
airplane flying in 1983. To Dryden management, uneasily eyeing the 
future of the center after the Space Shuttle left the lake for the last time, 
the NHFRF seemed especially important for the 1980s. It would be the 
logical conclusion of two decades of X- 15-X-20A-X-24B 
What happened was a sad anticlimax. Discussions between the Air 
Force and NASA continued into 1977. As plans grew, so did the expected 
cost of the vehicles. The 40-second cruise requirement added complexity 
that translated directly into higher costs. Finally, despite the wishes of 
NHFRF supporters at Edwards and Langley, NASA Headquarters 
canceled the program in September 1977. James J. Kramer, NASA’s 
acting associate administrator for aeronautics and space technology, 
stated that “the combination of a tight budget and the inability to identify 
a pressing near-term need for the flight facility had led to a decision by 
NASA not to proceed to a flight test vehicle at this time.”40 The Air Force 
was in no financial or political position to go it alone on such an ambitious 
venture. The result hit Dryden hard. Center morale dropped precipitously. 
Some blamed over-management. Some blamed the cruise requirement. 
Others felt the FRC should have pressed harder for a no-frills off-the- 
shelf shape. It was all to no avail: NHFRF was gone. 
It is ironic that the center’s work with lifting bodies for reentry from 
space eventually spawned an abortive interest in hypersonic atmospheric 
flight. It was a joining together of two streams of research: the stream 
running from the X- 15 through the X-20 and on to the HSRA; and the 
stream running from the Allen blunt body to the Eggers M2, the Love 
HL-10, the Martin SV-5, the FDL-8/X-24B, and the NASA HYFAC. 
Both streams pooled together in the NHFRF. The subscale shuttle was 
certainly spawned by the lifting body program, and constitutes a little 
puddle of its own to the side. It did not influence the work on what 
became NHFRF, though some of its technology was very close. Following 
the cancellation of the NHFRF, there was a general feeling among 
subscale-shuttle proponents that it might have evolved into a research 
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tool, like the NHFRF, had NASA proceeded with development. That is 
indeed likely. 
With cancellation of the NHFRF, the national program on transonic, 
supersonic, and hypersonic flight research using specialized rocket- 
propelled research vehicles was over. The actual Space Shuttle, of course, 
does not fit in any of these research areas. As its enthusiasts claim, it is a 
space-age DC- 3, a vehicle to revolutionize manned and unmanned 
orbital spaceflight. The cancellation of NHFRF came in the midst of the 
center’s program on the Space Shuttle. The Shuttle was, for a very brief 
time, a major center program. While Johnson Space Center (formerly 
MSC) had overall control of the program, Dryden furnished the techni- 
cal expertise on flight-testing to validate the craft’s approach and landing 
characteristics. The Shuttle program ultimately involved a great number 
of center personnel, plus others from Johnson, and brought Dryden its 
greatest public exposure. The odd sight of a 747 carrying and then 
launching a delta monstrosity the size of a DC-9 airliner could not help 
but draw attention. The Shuttle program involved a lot of preparation, 
including a special “mate-demate” facility, a microwave landing system, 
and work on the 747 mothership. Yet this transitory program was over 
almost as soon as begun and did not reappear until four years later, when 
the first Space Shuttle dropped out of the Mojave skies to land on the 
Edwards lakebed. 
The center’s involvement with space came as a prelude to the Space 
Shuttle. But the same years that witnessed the X-15, the Paresev, the 
LLRV, and the lifting bodies also saw a return to conventional aeronautics: 
flight at transonic and supersonic speeds. Though the Flight Research 
Center did not run an extensive number of service-type test programs in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, several aeronautical research projects were 
under way. Some of these, such as the Blackbird, XB-7OA, Supercritical 
Wing, and the TACT program, became quite visible and were very 
important, both in terms of their technology contributions and in how 
they promoted the reputation of the center. Though they played second 
fiddle during the heydey of space, it has been these programs-and 
others like them-that have since emerged as Dryden’s life blood. 
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In the foreground, lifting body configurations that were launched from “Mother,” the large 
twin-engine radio-controlled model airplane in the background. 
The plywood M2- Fl lifting body in towed flight over Rogers Dry Lake. 
The “heavyweight” Northrop M 2  -F2 lifting body. 
Three lifting body vehicles line up on Rogers D ~ J  Lake (left to right): the Martin X-24A, 
the Northrop M2-F3 (rebuilt from the M2-F2), and the Northrop HL-10. The M 2  
and HL- 10 were both NASA concepts. 
NASA’s A-SA, wed for simulation studies of the supersonic transport in 1963. 
The Martin X-24B, whose laundry-iron shape was added to the existing Martin X-24A, 
giving it a new lease on life. 
Seconds from touchdown, the Martin X-24B flares above Runway 18 on Rogers Dry 
Lake. The craft's shadow on the lake bed clearly delineates its slender delta configuration. 
The Flight Research Center's variable-stability North American F-1 OOC Super Sabre was 
used for  a range of airborne simulation studies, including some in support of the X- 15 
and SST programs. 
a 
A low sun angle highlights the blended wing-body configuration of NASA’s mach 3 4- 
YF -1 2C Blackbird. 
North American’s awesome XB - 70A Valkyrie thunders off the lake on a research mission. 
NASA flew this large supersonic aircraft in support of the national SST program. 
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Mach 3 Again: 1966- 1979 
As long as NASA had not yet fulfilled its mandate of landing men on 
the moon before the end of the 1960s, aeronautics had to take a second 
place to space within the agency. Yet even before Neil Armstrong’s “one 
small step” at Tranquillity Base, a ground swell of renewed interest and 
support for aeronautics was building. Within the agency, engineers- 
especially those at the old NACA centers, Langley, Ames, Lewis, and 
Flight-decried the imbalance. In May 1966, a congressional report 
bluntly stated that “any new or expanded aeronautical activity within 
NASA immediately has to compete for attention, money, resources, and 
manpower with an urgent, presidentially declared, national space goal. 
Under these circumstances it is perhaps surprising that NASA’s aero- 
nautical efforts have not suffered any more than they have.”’ And the 
Flight Research Center, so recently out of favor with some congressional 
staffers, now came back into the good graces of the legislative branch. 
Indeed, the same report credited the FRC with “a spectacular series of 
technological ‘firsts.’ ” 
Several major developments suggested the need for greater aeronauti- 
cal research and development. First, a protracted war in Southeast Asia 
was revealing surprising problems with American aircraft and airpower 
doctrine. In one measure, the overwhelmingly favorable air-combat 
victory-loss ratios of earlier wars--8 to 1 against the Luflwufe and about 
12 to 1 against North Korea-were missing; indeed, at times the 
victory-loss ratio slightly favored the North Vietnamese. Advancing 
aircraft technology offered the hope that clear military air supremacy 
might be regained. Foreign military aircraft technology was moving 
rapidly, especially in the Soviet Union. NASA’s OART, in an in-house 
19’7 1 study, concluded that “the U.S. traditional preeminence in military 
airpower has been lost in recent years. While progress in foreign 
airpower during the last decade has been rapid, few truly advanced 
aircraft have been developed in this ~ountry.”~ Second, new generations 
of jet transports-particularly supersonic jet transports-were being 
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developed in the US., Europe, and the Soviet Union. NASA’s aeronauti- 
cal partisans and congressional supporters recognized a need to strengthen 
America’s traditional position of leadership in civil air transportation. For 
the 1960s, this meant supporting the national SST effort. Further, 
vertical-takeoff-and-landing (VTOL) and short-takeoff-and-landing (STOL) 
aircraft, new advanced wing designs for more efficient transonic and 
supersonic flight, and new concepts for flight-control systems-all these 
would require sustained NASA research. 
NASA’s Langley Research Center remained, as it had always been, 
the agency’s principal aeronautical research resource. Langley was the 
agency’s “team leader” for advanced supersonic aircraft design, particu- 
larly in relation to the national SST program, then a joint effort between 
NASA, the Federal Aviation Administration, and American industry. 
When NASA began devoting more time and resources to aeronautics 
from the mid-1960s onward, Langley intensified its own research. The 
Flight Research Center followed these activities as much as possible, 
offering opinions and judgments as to what technical policies and 
programs NASA should support. The center remained heavily commit- 
ted to the space-related efforts of the X- 15, LLRV, and lifting bodies, so 
the amount of engineering talent available to work on non-hypersonic 
non-space-oriented programs was relatively small. Nevertheless, the 
center applied some resources to comprehensive supersonic research in 
support of the national SST effort and, later, to research on improving 
the efficiency and performance of transonic aircraft. This involved the 
center in four major aeronautical research programs: the XB -70A, 
YF- 12, F-8 Supercritical Wing, and F- 11  1 Transonic Aircraft Tech- 
nology effort. The first two involved research in sustained mach 2.5-3 + 
flight. The latter two were concerned with transonic aircraft design. 
Figure 4 places these four programs within the context of selected FRC 
activities from 1959 through 1980. The gradual deemphasis on space 
research in favor of more traditional aeronautical research is obvious, 
and FRC’s experience mirrors that of Langley, Ames, and Lewis over 
the same p e r i ~ d . ~  
EARLY SUPPORT OF THE SST 
FRC’s supersonic research during the 1960s emphasized support of 
the national SST program, a logical outgrowth of the center’s research on 
“Round One” and Century Series aircraft in the 1950s. The American 
SST program had begun in 1963, but dated to a Kennedy Administration 
initiative in 1961 that called for development of a mach 3 supersonic 
transport. With hindsight, the goal was obviously ill-chosen; the complex- 
ity of such a craft and its enormous costs made it at best luxury and at 
worst a severe burden on the airline community expected to buy it. 
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Grounded following first flight for additional R&D 
Ongoing program 
Figure 4 .  Selected Dryden Flight Research Center research programs, 1959-1 980, 
Proponents argued for an SST largely from a “pure” technology standpoint, 
with overtones of nationalism. The requisite technology base exists for 
such a craft, the argument went, as a result of the nation’s supersonic 
research program in the 1950s and the development of such supersonic 
bombers as the B-58 and the XB-70; therefore, the country should do 
it. Often added to this was the thought that if the United States did not 
develop an SST, Europe or the Soviet Union would sweep past American 
technology with their own SSTs. Thoughtful arguments questioning a 
mach 3 SST’s cost, utility, and desirability were ignored, especially after 
1963, when the Federal government had committed itself to supporting 
development of such a craft as a major American aeronautical research 
and development initiative. 
In 1963, the Flight Research Center was flying three military aircraft 
on SST studies. Because the Douglas F5D-1 Skylancer had a modified 
delta-wing planform similar to wing configurations suggested for a 
mach 3 SST, center pilots flew the F5D-1 on SST landing studies, 
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accumulating data on sink rates and approach characteristics. A North 
American F- 1 OOC Super Sabre, modified to have the variable-stability 
characteristics that would simulate the handling qualities of an SST, was 
acquired from Ames and flown to generate information on predicted 
SST handling qualities. FRC also acquired a North American A-5A 
Vigilante attack bomber from the Naval Air Test Center at Patuxent 
River, Maryland, and flew it to determine the let-down and approach 
conditions of a SST flying into a dense air traffic network. During 1963, 
center pilots Milt Thompson and Bill Dana flew the Vigilante over 
remote areas around Edwards on expected supersonic transport flight 
profiles and even flew supersonic approaches into the terminal approach 
control zone to Los Angeles International A i r p ~ r t . ~  The A-5A was 
returned to the Navy at the end of the year. 
lanned to 
provide funds-and eventually did contribute approximately P 2 million- 
to instrument the experimental North American XB -70A Valkyrie 
mach 3 + bomber so that it could return supersonic-cruise research data. 
In February 1963, the center purchased a Lockheed Jetstar four-engine 
business jet; suitably instrumented with an analog computer, it could 
simulate the handling characteristics of a wide range of aircraft, includ- 
ing SSTs. FRC purchased the Jetstar for $1 325 000 and sent it to the 
Cornel1 Aeronautical Laboratory at Buffalo, New York, for installation of 
the simulation equipment at a cost of an additional $1.3 million. Back at 
Edwards for test duty in November 1965, it was known as the GPAS: 
general purpose airborne simulator. Many engineers believed that any 
SST would require a movable “droop” nose (such as later employed on 
Concorde) for adequate pilot visibility in the high angle of attack 
assumed by such an aircraft on takeoff and landing. Others believed 
visibility could be provided by an extendable, periscope-like, binocular 
system. FRC engineers installed binocular optics in the center’s two-seat 
F-l04B, and center pilot Bill Dana evaluated it in flight. The press of 
concurrent X- 15 work terminated the program; eventually, the ad- 
vocates of the “droop nose” carried the day.5 By the middle 1960s, then, 
the FRC was definitely SST-minded in its aeronautical research. Its principal 
involvement with the,SST program came with the XB - 70A test program. 
(See the color photo section preceding this chapter.) 
FRC went beyond these efforts. The research staff 
THE XB-70A ACCIDENT 
North American’s XB -70A Valkyrie was a six-engine experimental 
bomber designed for mach 3 + speeds. Generally, the two prototypes of the 
XB - 70A closely resembled the aerodynamic configuration that could be 
expected of a large supersonic jet transport. At the time of its maiden 
flight on 21 September 1964, the Valkyrie was the world’s largest 
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experimental airplane, with a length of 58 meters, a wingspan of 32 
meters, and a height of 10 meters. It had two large vertical fins, a canard 
(“tail-first”) horizontal control surface mounted on the fuselage, and a 
sharply swept delta wing, the tips of which could be lowered to furnish 
greater supersonic lateral (roll) and directional (yaw) stability. Con- 
structed of titanium and brazed stainless steel “honeycomb” materials, it 
could withstand sustained temperatures on the order of 332°C as it 
cruised at high altitude and mach 3. It was designed as an intercontinen- 
tal bomber, but production in quantity was canceled before its first flight 
because of changes in Defense Department offensive doctrine. Instead, 
the government decided to complete the two prototypes and use them 
for mach 3 research in support of the SST program. The first XB-70A 
had an FRC-funded package of test instrumentation capable of telemeter- 
ing 36 separate measurements of aircraft performance and condition to 
ground stations. A further 900 measurements were recorded by digital 
pulse-code-modulation and analog frequency-modulation recording sys- 
tems on magnetic tape at the rate of 20 000 samples per second-a far cry 
from the scratchy oscillograph film used on the old X- 1. 
During the first phase of its flight-test program, the XB-70A and its 
later sister ship were flown by North American and Air Force test pilots. 
The planes were routinely flying above mach 3 by early June 1966. Turns 
required flight corridors hundreds of kilometers wide; obviously an SST 
could not use conventional airway routes, a vital discovery. The first 
airplane proved to have poor stability characteristics above mach 2.5; on 
the basis of wind-tunnel studies at Ames, North American had added 5” 
dihedral to the wing of the second XB-70A. This airplane had much 
better stability characteristics above mach 2.5, so researchers designated 
it the prime mach 3 research airplane. The complex systems of the 
airplanes posed maintenance headaches. Also poor bonding of the 
stainless steel skin on the wing sometimes allowed whole sections of it to 
peel off in flight. Landing gear retraction problems plagued the craft; 
in one case, because of partial gear failure, the plane veered almost a 
kilometer off a lakebed runway’s centerline, causing the test pilot to 
scribble in his report, “This landing could not have been accomplished on 
any runway in this country. Thank God for Rogers Dry Lake. . . .,, 
Despite all these difficulties, the XB-70As were returning a great deal 
of useful information for SST designers-on noise, operational problems, 
control system requirements, validation of tunnel test techniques by 
comparison with actual flight-test data, and high-altitude clear-air 
turbulence.6 
NASA’s OART had already allocated $10 million for support of the 
XB-70A program, primarily for flight-test instrumentation on the first 
and second aircraft. Then in the spring of 1966, the Air Force and NASA 
announced a joint $50-million program to be run by FRC and the Air 
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Force Aeronautical Systems Division. To begin in mid-June 1966, at the 
conclusion of the North American airworthiness demonstration program, 
the joint NASA- Air Force program would study the problems of sonic 
booms and evaluate the aircraft during typical SST flight profiles. FRC's 
Joe Walker was designated project pilot for the civilian agency. 
On 8 June 1966, the second XB-70A took off from Edwards, 
piloted by North American test pilot A1 White and a new copilot, Maj. 
Carl Cross, making his first flight in the plane. The XB-70A was to 
make a series of tower passes at various airspeeds to calibrate its onboard 
airspeed system, then make a single pass at mach 1.4 and 9450 meters to 
acquire sonic boom information during an overflight of a specially 
instrumented test range. There was another item on the flight plan, not a 
critical one: the Air Force had approved a request by General Electric for 
the XB-70A to lead a formation of aircraft equipped with General 
Electric engines. The XB-70A used GE J93s. Participating would be a 
Navy F-4B Phantom, an Air Force T-38A Talon and YF-5A, and a 
NASA F-104N Starfighter piloted by Joe Walker. A Lear Jet would 
photograph the formation for publicity purposes. At the preflight 
briefing the day before, John Fritz, a GE test pilot who would be flying 
the YF-5A, advised the other pilots to fly a loose formation, with about 
one wingspan clearance between airplanes.' 
The XB-70A took off from Edwards at 7:15 a.m. on 8 June, 
followed by a T-38A piloted by Pete Hoag and Joe Cotton. White and 
Cross made three tower flybys, aborted a fourth because they were not 
properly aligned with the course, and canceled the remaining eight 
because of low altitude turbulence. At 7:59 White and Cross climbed for 
altitude while Hoag and Cotton landed and refueled their T-38. White 
and Cross completed the sonic boom pass by 8:30 and headed for the 
formation flight rendezvous point, Lake Isabella. By 8:43 the F-4B from 
Point Mugu, the YF-5A, the NASA F-l04N, the photo Lear Jet, and 
the now-refueled T-38 had all joined up with the big white delta. The 
plan for the formation flight called for the XB-70A to lead the other 
aircraft on a racetrack pattern between Mojave and Mt. Whitney at 6 100 
meters. White and Cross soon discovered that clouds precluded this 
original plan and changed to a racetrack pattern northeast of Rogers. 
The new track was much shorter: the formation covered the straight 
portion of the track in a little over a minute and then made a 3-minute 
turn through 180". The Air Force T-38 and Navy Phantom rode off 
the XB-70A's left wing, with Walker's Starfighter and the YF-5A on 
the right. A two-seat Air Force F-104D returning from a test mission 
briefly joined the group while the rear-seat cameraman took high-speed 
motion pictures, using up his film. The visiting pilot noticed that the two 
right-hand aircraft, the F- 104N and YF-5A, were flying a much tighter 
formation than the Navy F-4B and Air Force T-38. He suggested the 
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T-38 tighten its position relative to the F-4B to improve the looks of the 
formation.* 
The F- 104D left for Edwards while the. XB-70A flew along, 
followed by its flock. Joe Walker in the F- 104N edged closer and closer 
to the mammoth research airplane. A B-58 on a test flight passed high 
overhead. Then, for reasons that will forever remain unknown, Walker’s 
plane closed with the XB-70A7 its horizontal stabilizer touching the 
downturned tip of the Valkyrie’s wing. 
Why? There were a lot of possible factors. For one thing, Walker was 12 
meters ahead of the tail of his plane, a plane with an unusual protruding 
tail configuration, a T-tail that had its maximum width high above 
Walker’s cockpit. Then there was the long, sharply swept leading edge of 
the XB-70A’s wing: deltas are notoriously difficult to maintain forma- 
tion on, and the chances for misjudging distance are high. Checking wing 
and tail clearances would have required Walker to resort to extreme neck 
craning. There was the possibility of pilot distraction: the group had held 
formation for 43 minutes, not unsafe or unusual for a loose formation, 
but dangerous for a tight one. Then there was the darting Lear Jet and 
the oncoming B-58. That initial F-104N motion was slight; even the 
YF-5A pilot, off Walker’s right wing, failed to detect a significant change 
in the Starfighter’s position. 
In any case, the F- 104N touched the XB-70A and then, passing 
through the leading edge vortex of the XB-70A’s wing, the Starfighter 
rapidly rolled over the top of the XB-70A7 hooking its left wing tank on 
the Valkyrie’s wing. The tip tank broke up, initiating a built-in sequence 
so that the F- 104N’s right tank immediately jettisoned. The Starfighter, 
still rolling over the XB-YOA, smashed into the right a‘nd left vertical 
fins, exploded in flames, and impacted the top of the XB-70A’s left 
wing. Walker was killed instantly. The F-104N fell away in bits of 
wreckage and flame; the XB-70A continued on, minus its vertical fins 
and with major damage to both wings, a doomed a i r~ ra f t .~  
The other aircraft reacted immediately. Hoag and Cotton radioed 
“Mid-air, mid-air!” followed by “You got the verticals, this is Cotton, you 
got the verticals-came off left and right. We’re stayin’ with ya, no sweat, 
now you’re holdin’ goodAl.. . .”The F-4B and YF-5A broke formation. 
The Lear Jet stayed away. The XB-70A continued to fly straight and 
level for 16 seconds. In the cockpit, White and Cross were unaware that 
they had been involved in a collision; White thought it might be two of 
the chase planes, and he missed the “s” on Cotton’s “verticals,” Then the 
XB-70A abruptly yawed right and rolled right, tumbling over and over 
so violently that White thought the plane’s nose would break off. Hoag 
and Cotton still called “Bailout, bailout, bailout” over and over. Finally a 
parachute appeared; one pilot was out. In fact, the chute belonged to White, 
who had just waged a successful struggle to stay alive. After he initiated 
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the escape sequence, the capsule’s closing clamshell doors trapped his 
right elbow; he worked it free, but then the doors would not close, and he 
ejected in that condition. The doors had inflicted painful shoulder 
injuries, but White faced a more serious problem: the open doors 
prevented the capsule’s built-in “shock attenuation bag” from deploying. 
The capsule struck the ground with a 45-g force, causing White severe 
internal injuries. Carl Cross died in the wreckage of the Valkyrie. The 
copilot’s ejection capsule never even left the airplane.” 
One minute and 1 1  seconds after the collision, the XB-70A spun 
into the ground and exploded, six kilometers northwest of Barstow. 
Walker’s F- 104, in several pieces, was already burning in the desert, 16 
kilometers away. White’s capsule floated downward. Woag and Cotton 
circled around and around, looking for another chute. Back at Edwards, 
ground monitors received the first word of the accident. It spread like 
wildfire through the center, a numbing shock. A casual observer of flight 
testing might wonder why the participants are not hardened to death, but 
it is not so. One mathematician reflected: “You just feel so defeated. You 
know what I mean? The life you can’t replace. The loss of the aircraft was 
secondary. You can get another airplane, but you can’t get another pilot 
like that.” The word first came from Operations: an accident had 
occurred, an accident involving the XB-70A. Little knots of people came 
by. All Operations knew was that an F- 104 had hit the XB-7OA. Then 
came confirmation. NASA F- 104N 8 13 had collided with the XB - 70A. 
Both aircraft were down. Joe Walker was presumed dead, as was one of 
the XB-70A crewmen. Then came the final word: Walker and Cross 
dead, White badly injured, two airplanes destroyed. l 1  
Of course, there was an accident investigation. The Air Force 
Directorate of Air Safety established a team of more than 60 people, and 
a smaller accident board as well. The board was under Air Force control, 
and NASA’s official representative, FRC engineer Donald Bellman, was 
a non-voting member. Wreckage analysis clearly indicated what had 
happened, and the XB-70A’s telemetry system had transmitted data all 
the way down to impact. The XB-70A program had great national 
visibility, and the deaths of Walker and Cross called forth tributes from 
many quarters. NASA Deputy Administrator Robert Seamins cited Joe 
Walker for his many contributions to flight research, and President 
Lyndon Johnson issued a statement of tribute from the White House.12 
Charges over the wisdom of risking the XB-70A and the lives of test 
pilots merely to provide corporate publicity photographs flew back and 
forth. But none of this could change the unhappy situation: two test 
pilots had died and two aircraft had been lost. NASA’s Flight Research 
Center had lost a valued colleague, and the XB-70A program had re- 
ceived a serious setback. 
. 
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FRC’s XB-70A PROGRAM 
The accident to the second XB-70A drastically altered plans for 
NASA’s joint SST research program with the Air Force. After the first 
numbing shock, the FRC went back to work, assessing where the 
program now stood. The first XB-70A was down for maintenance, 
including modifications to its landing gear, instrumentation, and inlet 
system. It did not resume flying until November 1966. Meanwhile, the 
Air Force reassessed its own plans for the aircraft. The second XB-70A 
had been the better suited for the Phase Two flight tests planned by 
AFSC and NASA. It had a better wing configuration, better inlet ramp 
control system, and much better instrumentation. It was gone. AFSC 
doubted that the first XB - 70A could meet the same goals and, indeed, 
when testing resumed, it never ventured beyond mach 2.57. On 3 
November 1966 Joe Cotton and NASA pilot Fitz Fulton” took the 
remaining XB-70A over an instrumented test range for boom assess- 
ment at mach 2.1. The plane made 10 more flights by the end of January 
1967.13 
That same month the Air Force, after comparing cost with research 
utility, decided to transfer total program and funding responsibility for 
flight, the big aircraft remained down for maintenance for 2% months. 
During that time, Air Force and NASA officials worked out the details of 
the transfer. On 15 March NASA and Air Force representatives signed 
an agreement under which the Air Force would continue to run some 
XB - 70A research projects and provide aircraft support and pilot 
participation. A week later, FRC Director Paul Bikle and AFFTC 
commandant Maj. Gen. Hugh Manson created a joint FRC-AFFTC 
XB - 70A operating committee patterned on the very successful X- 15 
and lifting body agreements. Expenditures up to this point had amounted 
to approximately $2 million per month; to stay within its available 1967 
and 1968 spending rates, NASA limited its planned XB-70A monthly 
program expenses to $800 000 per month, which automatically cut back 
the planned flight program. The agency had requested $10 million in 
FY 1968 funding, sufficient to continue the program through 1968. Also, 
FRC awarded an $8.9 million contract to North American for maintenance 
and support of the XB-70A while it was flown by NASA and a 
$l.g-million contract to General Electric for engine maintenance.’* 
the XB-70A to NASA “as soon as possible.” Following its last Air Force u 
*Fulton, a former senior Air Force test pilot on the XB-’IOA, had retired from the Air Force. 
He had launched most of the early “Round One” rocket airplanes from B-29 and B-50 
motherships while flying for the Air Force. Fulton was a welcome addition to the FRC pilots’ office, 
for he was the world’s finest test pilot of large multiengine supersonic airplanes. 
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During its 11 flights from November 1966 through January 1967, 
the XB-70A supported the National Sonic Boom Program. This program, 
begun in June 1966, had involved a number of military aircraft inflights 
over selected American cities. The XB-70A made these flights at 
different weights, altitudes, and mach numbers over a test range at 
Edwards instrumented to record the “boom carpet” of the aircraft and its 
“overpressure” (pressure rise) on two specially constructed test houses. 
Such studies were critical; while the boom of a supersonic fighter 
might do little more than annoy citizens, the possibility existed that a 
large heavy SST would lay down a boom of such magnitude that it might 
do serious damage. During the XB-70A’s tests, the craft made one 
overflight at mach 1.22, 192 000 kilograms weight, and an altitude of 
8200 meters, generating an overpressure of 150.8 newtons per square 
meter (3.15 lb/sq ft). Higher, at 21 300 meters, the XB-70A once 
generated a boom having 11 1.6 newtons per square meter (2.33 lb/sq ft) 
overpressure directly underneath the aircraft, and an overpressure of 
77.8 newtons per square meter (1.71 lb/sq ft) up to 13 kilometers to 
one side of the plane. An overpressure of 3 18 newtons per square meter 
(7.5 lb/sq ft) is sufficient to damage some structures. During turns, the 
XB -70A’s shock waves converged, often doubling the overpressure felt 
on the ground. The tests clearly indicated that much work remained on 
tailoring aircraft design to minimize shock wave magnitude; even though 
the booms were not materially damaging, they were annoying. Indeed, 
the XB - 70A tests went far toward providing quantitative evidence that 
overland commercial SST operations at supersonic speeds would gener- 
ate boom phenomena that simply would not be t01erated.l~ 
When the XB-70A returned to the air in April 1967 on its first 
NASA flights, the agency had mapped out another program for the 
airplane: acquiring flight data that could be used to correlate and validate 
the data from two SST simulators, a ground-based simulator at Ames 
Research Center and FRC’s Lockheed Jetstar general-purpose airborne 
simulator (GPAS). NASA also had the XB-70A aircraft instrumented to 
record information on aeroelastic response of the structure to gusts; 
handling qualities, especially during landing approach; and boundary 
layer noise. NASA engineers believed that the combination of XB-70A 
tests and tests of the GPAS aircraft could benefit the development of 
Boeing’s proposed SST in four key areas, including control in the event of 
engine failure at supersonic speeds, development of an SST stability 
augmentation system, derivation of longitudinal stability requirements, 
and the influence of “ground effect” upon the landing characteristics of 
an SST. Later FRC added other programs to investigate inlet perfor- 
mance and structural dynamics, including fuselage bending and canard 
flight loads.16 
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Fitz Fulton and Joe Cotton completed the XB-70A’s first NASA 
flight on 25 April 1967. By the end of March 1968, the plane had 
completed a further 12 flights by Fulton, Cotton, Van Shepard, Lt. Col. 
Emil “Ted” Sturmthal, and NASA pilot Donald Mallick. Following the 
73d flight on 2 1 March, NASA grounded the airplane for installation of a 
structural dynamics research package dubbed ILAF-meaning identi- 
cally located acceleration and force. Two small, thin exciter vanes 
extended 60 centimeters outward from just in front of the crew 
compartment. They could rotate 12” at a frequency up to 8 cycles per 
second. The vanes induced structural vibrations having a known fre- 
quency and amplitude; accelerometers sensed the disturbances and 
signaled the aircraft’s stability augmentation system to move the aircraft’s 
controls and suppress the disturbance. NASA hoped the ILAF program 
would serve as a prototype for advanced systems that could be installed 
on SSTs, enabling them to fly with increased smoothness, reducing the 
fatigue experienced by both passengers and airframe. Previously XB - 70A 
crews had frequently experienced annoying trim changes and buffeting 
from clear air turbulence and rapidly fluctuating atmospheric temperature. 
Test results indicated’ that the ILAF system reduced the buffeting 
associated with such conditions. The XB-70A made its first ILAF- 
equipped flight on 11 June 1968; from then until the end of the program 
in 1969, the aircraft acquired a great deal of information applicable to 
the design of future SST or large supersonic military aircraft. ’’ 
By the end of 1968, operating expenses and maintenance problems 
had caught up with the XB-70A. The research data gained from the 
plane no longerjustified the resources needed to maintain and operate it. 
The Flight Research Center could look forward to operating another 
mach 3 + airplane, the Lockheed YF- 12A Blackbird, which represented a 
more advanced technology than that of the already dated XB-70A. On 
13 January 1969, NASA Headquarters announced termination of the 
joint NASA-DoD XB - 70A flight research program. The announcement 
rightly hailed the XB-70A as “a productive flight research vehicle for 
studying sonic boom, flight dynamics, and handling problems associated 
with the development of advanced supersonic air~raft .”’~ On 4 February 
1969, the Valkyrie made its last flight, to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 
where it is now on exhibit at the Air Force Museum.lg Together the two 
XB-70A aircraft had completed 129 flights. The first XB-70A had 
completed 83 of these. The total flying time for both airplanes had been 
252 hours, 38 minutes. Of this, 22 hours were spent above mach 2.5. 
Today visitors at the Air Force Museum can compare the XB-70A to 
other dinosaurs of flight. The Valkyrie is still an impressive sight.*’ 
Thus ended the XB-70A program. Without a doubt, the loss of the 
second aircraft hurt whatever results NASA and the Air Force could have 
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expected to reap out of this long time- and budget-consuming project. 
Critics of the aircraft often fail to realize, however, just how ambitious the 
XB-70A was. It was the world’s first large transport-size aircraft 
capable of sustained, long-range supersonic flight. So intoxicating were 
its performance figures that in 1959, the FAA administrator, Gen. 
Elwood Quesada, recommended to President Eisenhower that the United 
States develop a commercial version of the aircraft. While this proposal 
went nowhere, North American naturally drew quite heavily on its 
XB-70A work when developing its own abortive SST plans. Critics also 
fail to recognize that the aircraft did return a great deal of information 
on sustained supersonic cruise. The data predicted SST behavior, which 
could be incorporated in simulators, and the structural and control 
requirements of such airplanes. The flight requirements for a mach 3 
SST are far more complicated than the requirements for a mach 2 SST. 
The magnitude of the problems is easily determined by noting that the 
Anglo-French Concorde, a modest mach 2 airplane, is the product of one 
of the greatest international cooperative industrial efforts conceived to 
this time. The problems of mach 3 present an even greater engineering 
challenge. Designers of mach 3 aircraft cannot use a conventional 
aluminum airframe. Rather, because of aerodynamic heating, they must 
use sophisticated and challenging material such as titanium. Controlling 
an aircraft moving at mach 3 and integrating it into an air transport 
network with aircraft moving much slower than it does also presents 
problems. It is remarkable that the XB-70A achieved the performance it 
did though it was the first U.S. venture into large supersonic aircraft 
design. 
NASA’s Flight Research Center engineers had always hoped that the 
center could play some role in the development and testing of Boeing’s 
SST, seeing such activity as the logical conclusion of the center’s work 
with the XB-70A and GPAS programs. In September 1967, center 
engineers prepared a rough proposal for the FAA and NASA Headquar- 
ters enumerating a variety of areas where the FRC could assist the FAA 
and Boeing on development of the airplane. In some of the areas-such 
as studies on pressure drag, skin friction, surface roughness, shock wave- 
boundary layer interaction, and boundary layer noise-Boeing and the 
FAA had no research efforts under way, while FRC’s experience and 
background were unique.*l 
The American SST fell further and further behind its European 
competitors as cost and complexity rose. Even before the XB-70A 
concluded its flying program, the first supersonic transport, the Soviet 
Tu- 144, had completed its maiden flight. One month after the XB-70A 
retired, the Anglo-French Concorde took to the air. In contrast, the 
Boeing design was in serious difficulty, including numerous major design 
changes, such as going from a variable sweep wing to a fixed modified 
delta-a bad sign. Though the American SST had the full support of 
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three successive presidents-Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon-it had 
numerous critics, ranging from thoughtful spokesmen who questioned its 
economic utility to neo-Luddites operating simply from an antitechnological 
bias. To save the foundering program, the FAA created, at the behest of 
President Nixon, an Office of the Supersonic Transport. This office, 
directed by William M. Magruder, a distinguished test pilot and, ironically, 
former technical director of Lockheed’s own SST design, did its best to 
keep the Boeing SST alive, but to no avail. On 24 March 1971, the Senate 
declined to appropriate $289 million for prototype fabrication, abandon- 
ing the field to Concorde and the Tu- 144. 
Since that time, industry had continued work on developing the 
technology necessary for an American SST. Dryden Flight Research 
Center engineers have kept in touch with these efforts. Nevertheless, the 
driving impetus that characterized the earlier SST effort is missing. The 
Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the subsequent high cost of jet fuel have 
increasingly made a petroleum-fueled SST look like a money-losing 
liability. Should an SST-or  even a hypersonic transport-be developed 
in the future, it might well be fueled by liquid hydrogen. Such an aircraft 
could enter commercial service around the turn of the century, but it 
would require a major national investment and the greatest possible 
cooperation between private industry and the Federal government.22 
When the XB-70A program concluded, hopes were still high that 
the United States might produce an SST for the 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  and the 
program’s end did not end FRC’s work on advanced supersonic cruise 
aircraft. Indeed, the center terminated the XB-70A to make way for an 
even more advanced vehicle: the Lockheed YF- 12A Blackbird. The first 
NASA FRC research flight on the YF-12A took place in 1969, but by 
that time center engineers had already been supporting the Air Force on 
the Blackbird program for two years. That program quickly took up 
where the XB-70A program had left off. 
NASA AND THE BLACKBIRDS 
Even though two decades have passed since the first flight of the 
Blackbird series, this program is shrouded in secrecy. Conceived by the 
Lockheed company to fulfill a requirement for a mach 3+ strategic 
reconnaissance aircraft, the program spawned two similar configurations, 
the YF- 12A, an abortive interceptor, and the SR-71A, a long-range 
reconnaissance aircraft. Exact performance figures are still highly classified; 
official sources still only refer to the planes as mach 3 vehicles capable of 
flying at 24 400 meters. Their true performance may be quite a bit higher 
than these conservative statistics. 
The Blackbirds came out of the Lockheed Advanced Development 
Projects Group, the famed “Skunk Works” headed by Clarence “Kelly” 
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Johnson. Considering the scope of the technical challenges, the Black- 
birds offered unparalleled design difficulties that Johnsan and his team 
of fewer than 200 engineers overcame. Because of the sustained high 
temperatures that the planes would encounter during mach 3 cruise, 
Johnson chose a largely titanium airframe. All supporting systems and 
fluids, including lubricants and fuels, had to be developed from scratch. 
During mach 3 + cruise, the afterburning turbojet engines functioned 
more as ramjets than as gas turbines. The first Blackbird flew at a remote 
airstrip in 1962, and flight tests generally went smoothly. Though flown 
in single- and two-place versions, Lockheed standardized on a two-place 
configuration, with a pilot and navigator-systems operator. The plane 
featured a distinctive, blended wing-body shape, with long chines run- 
ning along the fuselage sides from the wing roots. Each engine was 
located at mid-span, and each nacelle was surmounted by a large, 
inwardly canted, vertical fin. For additional stability, the YF- 12A had a 
folding ventral fin and two smaller, fixed ventral fins as well. In February 
1964 President Lyndon Johnson announced the existence of the plane. 
The first of the definitive reconnaissance variants, the SR-71AY flew 
later that same year.23 
The Flight Research Center’s involvement with the Blackbird pro- 
gram began in 1967. Ames Research Center had opened negotiations 
with the Air Force for access to the early YF-12 wind-tunnel data that 
had been generated at Ames under extreme secrecy. The service agreed, 
in return for NASA assistance on the flight test program then under way 
at Edwards. This arrangement closely dovetailed with the plans of 
OART, which saw the Blackbird as a means to advance high-speed 
technology, especially that necessary to build SSTs. In the summer of 
1967, the Air Force and NASA agreed to Flight Research Center 
participation. Paul Bikle and FRC research chief Joseph Wed asked 
engineer Gene Matranga to represent NASA on the Blackbird test force. 
Matranga, then busily involved in general aviation studies, thought about 
it over a weekend and agreed to go. Bikle, Weil, and Matranga assumed 
the center would work with the Air Force on the project for about six 
months. The exposure would give FRC engineers data to compare with 
the flight results coming from the XB-70A program. Matranga began 
working on Blackbird stability and control and soon brought a small team 
of experienced FRC engineers to labor along with him. Much good will 
between the Air Force, Lockheed, and NASA test force team members 
ensued. 
The service team needed assistance in several technical areas. The 
Air Force wanted to get the SR-71A fully operational with the Strategic 
Air Command as quickly as possible. NASA wanted an instrumented 
SR-71A for the agency to use for its own research; failing that, NASA 
was willing to install an instrument package on the Air Force SR-71A 
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stability and control test aircraft. The Air Force declined, but offered 
NASA use of two YF-12A aircraft then in storage at Edwards. NASA 
quickly assented, even taking the unusual step of paying the operational 
expenses of the airplanes, using funds made available by termination of 
the X-15 and XB-70 programs. The service would also furnish a test 
team from the Air Defense Command for maintenance and logistics sup- 
port. A memorandum of understanding was signed 5 June 1969; public 
announcement came on 18 July. Matranga and the FRC team immedi- 
ately set to work instrumenting the two YF-12A aircraft and mapping 
out a joint program with the Air Force.24 
At FRC and Ames, interest was high in Kelly Johnson’s Blackbird. Its 
airframe, propulsion system, and related equipment most engineers 
expected to see on future mach 3 airplanes. It was an ideal vehicle for 
assessing the state of the art of wind-tunnel prediction, aerodynamics, 
propulsion, and structural design. The plane could also carry experimen- 
tal research packages, but FRC considered this a secondary objective, at 
least at first. Langley engineers had interest in running fundamental 
aerodynamics experiments and tests of advanced structures. Lewis was 
interested in propulsion research. Ames, a vital partner to FRC, was 
interested in inlet internal aerodynamics and the correlation of wind- 
tunnel and flight data. Flight Research Center thus had the challenging 
task of organizing these interests into a single unified research program. 
At first, FRC concentrated on aerodynamic loads and structural effects 
because instrumentation was available for those investigations. Much 
time-consuming work remained to be done before one of the Blackbirds 
could be instrumented for propulsion tests. So when the Air Force brought 
the two YF- 12As out of storage, FRC technicians installed strain gauges 
and thermocouples. They instrumented the wing and fuselage for aerody- 
namic loads and the left side of the aircraft for temperature measure- 
ments to better define the craft’s thermal e n ~ i r o n m e n t . ~ ~  
NASA and Air Force technicians spent three months readying the 
first of them for flight. On 10 December 1969, the joint flight research 
program got under way with a successful maiden flight. The first 
YF- 12A ready quickly became the program’s workhorse, while techni- 
cians readied its stablemate.* With the first flight out of the way, the 
NASA-Air Force team got down to the serious business of acquiring 
data points. While the Air Force concentrated on military applications, 
such as studying bomber penetration tactics against an interceptor having 
YF- 12A capabilities, NASA pursued a loads-research program. FRC 
*These two aircraft were the second and third YF-12As actually built; the second, serial 
number 60-6935 became NASA’s long-lived YF- 12A. The third, 60-6936 crashed and was 
replaced by the YF-l2C, 60-6937. 
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and Langley engineers were interested in measuring the flight loads, 
which depended on both the actual load conditions and the effects of 
structural heating. At some future date, FRC engineers planned to move 
the airplane into FRC’s High Temperature Loads Laboratory, heat it, 
and determine how much of the load stemmed from thermal heating of 
the structure. This is not an innocuous as it sounds. When an airplane’s 
structure is heated, the induced thermal stresses change the shape of the 
structure even without loads being applied. The changed airframe shape 
then has a much different load distribution pattern. When actual flight 
loads are added, the importance of knowing how the structure reacts to 
temperature and load is self-evident. To predict loads and structural 
response, NASA had developed two computer modeling programs using 
a technique known as finite element analysis. Both programs, FLEXSTAB 
and NASTRAN, were applied to the YF-12A. One of the major 
objectives of the flight tests on the Blackbirds was to compare the actual 
flight test results with the predicted data. Technicians also installed a 
Hasselblad camera within the fuselage of the YF- 12A to photograph the 
structure during high-g maneuvers, recording the deformation of the 
aircraft. Under certain conditions, the camera revealed that the plane 
experienced as much as 15 centimeters of deflection at the aft end of the 
fuselage.26 
While the program on aircraft 935 went smoothly, the program on 
936, the other YF- 12A, ended badly. The aircraft had just embarked on 
its joint NASA-Air Force research program when it crashed. During a 
flight 24 June. 197 1 to acquire operationally useful information, this 
Blackbird experienced fatigue failure of a fuel line and fire in the right 
engine. Lt. Col. Ronald J. Laytdn and systems operator Maj. Billy A. 
Curtis debated whether they could land the burning Blackbird. They 
wisely elected to eject, and the YF-12A smoked down to an explosive 
finale.27 The loss of the YF-12A did not seriously affect the NASA 
structures program, which was almost finished; it did delay plans for the 
propulsion research program. NASA had wanted to add a third aircraft 
to the YF- 12A joint test program, solely for propulsion tests. A month 
after the loss of the YF-l2A, the Air Force made available 937. This 
aircraft, which was designated YF- 12C, had SR-7 1A features; because 
the SR-71 program was shrouded in the highest security classification, 
the Air Force restricted NASA to using the aircraft solely for propulsion 
testing with YF- 12A-model inlets and engines in place of the presuma- 
bly more sophisticated inlets and engines on the SR-71A. The YF- 12C, 
which looked like the SR-71A, was thus an oddball. For the NASA 
programs on both the YF-12A and YF-126, the Flight Research 
Center had designated pilots Fitz Fulton and Don Mallick and flight-test 
engineers Vic Horton and Ray Young. As the program developed, 
generally Fulton and Horton flew together as one team, Mallick and 
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Young as the other. At Beale AFB, the pilots received familiarization 
flights in a humpback SR-71B having a second pilot cockpit in place of 
the navigator-systems operator’s cubicle.28 
On 24 May 1972 Fulton and Horton crewed the YF- 12C on its first 
NASA flight. By this time, NASA had already accumulated 53 flights in 
the YF- 12A and had grounded the airplane for testing in FRC’s High, 
Temperature Loads Laboratory. It remained in the lab for over a year, 
not flying again until July 1973. As a result of the correlation between 
flight tests and tests in the heat laboratory, FRC engineers were confident 
that they had developed instrumentation and test procedures that would 
allow the aircraft industry to proceed with assurance on the development 
of other high-temperature aircraft. 
NASA engineers approached the propulsion program on the YF- 12C 
with a similar purpose in mind: “provide a baseline of information that 
can be used in future times as well as the present time to assess the 
validity of current prediction and wind tunnel test  technique^."^' To- 
gether with Pratt & Whitney (the engine manufacturers) and Lockheed, 
FRC engineers assembled a computer model of the engine and inlet 
system. In conjunction with Ames, Langley, and Lewis research centers, 
the flight data of the aircraft were compared with data taken from tests of 
scale-model inlets; also a full-scale inlet was tested in the Lewis 10 x 10- 
foot tunnel in early 1972. One surprise was the discovery that a strong 
vortex, coming from the fuselage chines, streamed into the middle of the 
inlet. These studies were very detailed, examining such questions as what 
percentage of airflow through the inlet left through bypass doors in the 
inlet and what percentage actually passed through the engine. The FRC 
team also examined inlet “unstart”-if the airflow was not properly 
matched to the engine, internal pressure would force the standing shock 
wave from inside to outside the inlet. This action lost the thrust provided 
by inlet pressure recovery; the thrust imbalance generated a large yawing 
motion, as well as residual pitching and rolling tendencies. The first time 
one NASA crewman encountered unstart, the aircraft motions and 
accelerations were so violent that he expected the YF-12 might break 
up. Obviously this condition could not be tolerated on an SST aircraft. 
NASA devoted a great deal of attention to unstart in an attempt to learn 
how to control it, deliberately inducing unstarts on test flights. Automatic 
inlet sensing and control was one method of combatting it; the produc- 
tion SR-71A’s system worked so well that the Air Force had to induce 
the phenomenon to familiarize pilots with it during training. NASA’s 
YF- 12 crews became so familiar with unstarts that they could sense when 
one was imminent even before the instrumentation showed it.30 
The FRC YF- 12 program was ambitious; the aircraft flew an average 
of once a week unless down for extended maintenance or modification. 
Program expenses averaged $3.1 million per year just to run the flight 
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tests, and Ames, Lewis, and Langley were heavily involved in the program 
as well. The YF- 12A program dominated the annual FRC Basic Research 
Review reports that the center prepared for OAST’s Research Council 
during the 1970~ .~ ’  The scope of what was involved in a YF-12 flight 
was enormous. Technical preparation and briefings aside, the flights. 
required coordination of the highest order between NASA, FAA, and 
Air Force. The crew would suit up 1% hours before takeoff, using a 
special Air Force aeromedical van, drive out to the flightline, and enter 
the aircraft. For what seemed an interminable time they would run up 
the engines and check out systems. The Blackbirds-and sometimes both 
would fly together-would sit on the ramp, engines oddly muted, ex- 
haust waves shimmering over the lake. Other FRC personnel would 
ready an F- 104, and maybe a slower T-38 as well, to follow the craft on 
takeoff and acceleration to mach 2. Further north, at Beale AFB, the Air 
Force would send aloft a KC- 135Q tanker with a load of the Blackbird’s 
special JP-7 fuel. Finally all would be ready; one after another, the 
aircraft would taxi from the Flight Research Center to the 4600-meter 
runway. After final safety checks, the Blackbirds would scoot down the 
runway and rumble into the air with a shattering roar reminiscent of a 
Saturn V booster. The chase planes would follow. The YF-12A would 
accelerate to about mach 0.9, dive (the most efficient way to exceed mach 
l), nose upward, and accelerate to the maximum speed selected for the 
flight, outrunning and outranging the chase. After one gigantic circuit 
over the western U.S. (with the Air Force and FAA keeping a watchful 
eye to make certain that the craft did not wander around other SR-71As 
or U-2s tooling about in the sky), the Blackbird would decelerate and 
descend, take on a load of fuel from the KC- 135Q, again go supersonic, 
make another circuit, then return and land. 
NASA’s Blackbird program had its exciting moments, routine unstarts 
aside. On one YF- 12C flight, Don Mallick and Ray Young experienced a 
stuck inlet spike, which caused the airplane to burn prodigious amounts 
of fuel, necessitating an emergency landing at Fallon Naval Air Station, 
Nevada. Another time, during a stability test at mach 0.9 with the craft’s 
roll and yaw stability augmentation system deliberately off, they lost the 
folding ventral fin from NASA’s YF- 12A. Fortunately this fin is needed 
only at high supersonic speeds; at mach 3 the effect would have been 
much more serious, probably loss of the airplane. Mallick and Young 
skillfully brought the ailing airplane back to Edwards. The departing fin 
had damaged the wing, aft fuselage, and stability augmentation system; it 
also ruptured a fuel tank, causing it to dump its contents overboard in a 
long silver trail. 
Tests of a proposed “coldwall” experiment package gave bad mo- 
ments as well. The coldwall, a Langley-supported heat-transfer experiment, 
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consisted of a stainless steel tube equipped with thermocouples and 
pressure-sensing equipment. A special insulation coating covered the 
tube, which was chilled with liquid nitrogen. At mach 3,  so planners 
hoped, the insulation could be pyrotechnically blown away from the tube, 
instantly exposing it to the thermal environment. Its data could be 
compared with results taken from testing a similar tube using ground- 
based wind-tunnel facilities and would validate ground research methods. 
Eventually researchers did get a successful test, but the experiment 
caused numerous in-flight difficulties. On the last coldwall flight, for 
example, the YF- 12A experienced a simultaneous unstart followed by 
rough engine operation after firing the coldwall. As it descended, 
anxiously followed by the YF- 126 photo chase plane, the latter aircraft 
also experienced multiple unstarts; for a brief while, test monitors at 
Dryden worried for the safety of both crews. Both aircraft limped back to 
Edwards at reduced power. NASA grounded them for extended 
in~pec t ion .~~  
Flight tests of the YF- 12 aircraft furnished some interesting data. 
For example, at mach 3 fully 50% of the aircraft's total drag came from 
NASA3 YF-12A Blackbird cruises over the desert carrying a '%oldwall" heat-transfer 
experiment under the fuselage. 
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simply venting air overboard through the inlet bypass doors. Also, a gray 
area was discovered between stability and control, on the one hand, and 
propulsion, on the other. Inlet components were almost as effective as 
ailerons and rudders in influencing aircraft motion at high speeds; inlet 
spike motion and bypass door operation could alter the aircraft’s flight 
path under some conditions. The airflow dumped overboard through 
the inlet louvers entered a “stagnation area” just ahead of the louvers and 
actually flowed forward along the outside of the nacelle for a brief 
distance before mixing with the mach 3 airstream and moving aft-a 
weird effect. Most serious, however, was a problem that had earlier 
cropped up on the XB-70A: unwanted altitude changes, while cruising 
at high altitude and high speed. 
In fact, the main stability and control area of interest to NASA 
researchers was the ability to hold a desired cruise altitude. At high 
speeds and altitudes, without stability augmentation, the plane could 
change attitude slightly; since it was moving at mach 3, any nose-up or 
nose-down change immediately produced major changes in altitude. The 
plane entered porpoising motions for up to three minutes, during which 
altitudes changed by as much as plus or minus 1000 meters. Such 
operation would certainly be prohibitive from an air traffic control 
standpoint with a commercial SST aircraft. At the altitudes the YF- 12s 
and SR-71As operated, there was no other traffic aside from an 
occasional U-2 or fellow SR-71A; but that situation could change with 
time. The thought of fleets of SST aircraft all wobbling about their flight 
paths is not comforting. The YF- 12’s very ability to attain high speeds 
and altitudes contributed to the problem. At mach 3, it covered distance 
quickly, passing through local pressure and temperature changes that 
would affect a slower aircraft much more gradually. Since mach number 
is a function of pressure and temperature, the rapid variations caused 
velocity changes; correcting for these changes by adjusting inlet controls 
or aerodynamic controls produced large altitude deviations. In future 
supersonic transports, such a situation would pose problems for air 
traffic controllers and in some circumstances could cause the aircraft to 
exceed its operating limits.33 
As one potential solution to the altitude-holding problem, FRC 
engineers developed a new autopilot and flight-tested it on the YF- 12s. 
Traditional autopilots moved aerodynamic control surfaces to maintain 
speed or altitude. The experimental YF- 12 system compensated for 
various pressure-sensitive instrumentation that influenced altitude 
deviations; after further modifications, it linked the aircraft’s central 
air-data computer to the autopilot, the inlet control system, and the 
engine throttle system. The combination of aerodynamic surface controls 
and throttle control, together with more advanced data sensing equipment, 
worked well on actual flight tests, even during extended high-mach 
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cruise.34 Such integrated systems would almost certainly be used on 
future SSTs. 
NASA performed a variety of research on the Blackbirds. For 
example, technicians installed a special computerized checkout system in 
the aircraft, the central airborne performance analyzer. CAPA moni- 
tored a number of parameters dealing with aircraft maintenance, includ- 
ing the craft’s electrical system, inlet control system, and hydraulic 
system. Though just a research project itself, CAPA offered great 
promise for such future projects as the Space Shuttle and commercial and 
military aircraft. During flight, the system could actually diagnose a 
problem, informing the pilot whether he should abort. At the end of the 
flight, technicians could check the CAPA readout to determine the 
maintenance required before the next flight. 
Another program investigated the temperature, pressure, and other 
physical characteristics of the upper atmosphere, because such factors 
would have great impact on the performance and operation of future 
aircraft. FRC examined high-altitude turbulence, which the YF- 12s 
encountered at virtually all altitudes, and researchers supported the work 
with statistical studies at the National Climate Center and the University 
of California at Los Angeles. Biomedical researchers took physiological 
and biomedical measurements of the flight crews on most YF- 12 flights 
to derive a better understanding of physiological stress. Researchers used 
the airplane as a flying wind tunnel carrying experiments and instrumen- 
tation for studying boundary layer flow and noise, heat transfer, skin 
friction, and base pressure measurements. Under Langley Research 
Center’s supersonic cruise aircraft research program, FRC evaluated a 
number of advanced structural techniques on the YF- 12. Engineers 
replaced a panel on the airplane with a series of Langley-designed 
experimental panels of advanced design. The flight testing comple- 
mented laboratory work on small test specimens. Technicians chose a test 
panel, sized 71 by 41 centimeters, on the inboard upper surface of the 
wings between the nacelle and the fuselage. Between 1974 and 1976 they 
evaluated three lightweight structures there: a weldbrazed titanium skin 
stringer panel, a titanium honeycomb-core sandwich panel, and a 
sandwich panel faced with boron-aluminum and having a titanium 
honeycomb core. All exceeded required strengths. In all these ways and 
more the Blackbirds contributed to flight technology. Because of the 
tight security restrictions on the program, engineers could get informa- 
tion only on a “need-to-know” basis. Nevertheless, in June 1974 the 
Flight Research Center hosted a major conference attended by 150 
representatives from government and the aviation industry to report on 
the YF-12 loads research. Though it had been over a decade since the 
first flight of the Blackbirds, they still represented advanced state-of-the- 
art t e~hnology .~~  
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BLACKBIRDS, BYE-BYE I 
By the beginning of 1977, the YF-12 aircraft had completed over 
175 flights, much of the time above mach 3. Though still the pride of 
Dryden’s hangars, the two Blackbirds were becoming increasingly expen- 
sive to maintain and more difficult to justify. Other programs-notably 
the center’s McDonnell F- 15 Eagle research aircraft-could lay greater 
claim to funding. The axe fell during an OART center directors’ 
management council meeting in the spring of 1977. Residual funding 
enabled the YF- 12C to fly through October 1978, continuing tests of an 
integrated aerodynamic and propulsion control system. The oldest 
YF-12 still flying, 935, would end its research program a year later.* 
Dryden’s most visible program thus ended far sooner than most YF- 12 
partisans had assumed-previously, the center had planned to operate the 
Blackbirds into the 1 9 8 0 ~ ~ ~  
The decision was not popular with the YF-12A team; they saw 
themselves as the center’s elite program, and tended to view the cancella- 
tion as more evidence that Dryden’s “Golden Years” were in its past and 
not its present. Many decried what they felt to be a growing tendency 
within the agency to homogenize the centers, reducing center control 
over research. The fiercely independent NACA veterans shook their 
heads in frustration. Partisans grumbled that the decision was simply the 
latest in a long line afflicting a technological hiatus on American aviation, 
and as evidence pointed to the SST cancellation. When the B- 1 and 
NHFRF joined the ranks of the p a d ,  the YF- 12 decision became just 
one more name in the litany of martyred projects. The decision, 
however, was final. For the time being, Dryden was through with mach 3. 
NASA’s Blackbird program proved one of the most useful programs 
ever flown at the center. It was the major airbreathing propulsion work 
done at Dryden and helped change the center’s image away from a rocket 
bias toward a more balanced mix of research. The Blackbird program 
was certainly much more productive than the XB-70A; the two YF- 12s 
proved surprisingly free of chronic maintenance problems, aside from 
some difficulties with fuel tank leaks. The program generated a great 
deal of information that will prove useful to future mach 3 sustained- 
cruise designs. To those unacquainted with the flight testing process, it 
often seems odd that so much effort should be spent testing modified 
versions of production designs. Surely, the criticism goes, the contractor 
and the user have already obtained all the information of value from the 
aircraft by the time another agency or group acquires it. The YF-12 
program is a good example of how incorrect this supposition is. The 
contractor and the user were naturally much more interested in assuring 
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that the aircraft was safe to operate and met its performance specifications. 
When the SR-71A entered full service with the Strategic Air Command, 
Air Force interest in the craft's research utility quickly cooled. A 
contractor is never in a financial position to run an extended flight 
research program, no matter how beneficial it might be later on. And so 
it fell to NASA to use the Blackbirds as research instruments. The 
Blackbird teams derived an important data base for subsequent aircraft 
design. Interest in supersonic flight was already ebbing at Dryden by 
1979, but the engineering staff was busily working on a variety of other 
problems from transonic research to remotely piloted research vehicles, 




A Center with Diversity: 1962- 1981 
In the last two decades, the Flight Research Center undertook 
aeronautical studies covering a wide range of research areas. This work 
continued FRC’s tradition of simultaneously running diverse research 
programs, supporting civil and military aircraft testing and development, 
and supporting research in progress at other NASA centers, the latter 
usually by “proof of concept” flight testing. During these years, engineers 
and technicians evaluated the Whitcomb supercritical wing and winglet; 
developed a new flight research tool, the remotely piloted research 
vehicle; developed and evaluated a radical new method of flight control 
using electronics; studied wake vortex formation and clear air turbulence, 
two areas of importance to aviation safety; supported development of 
new military aircraft systems; and entered a number of other fields as 
well, including design configurations for long-distance trailer trucks and 
flight testing of advanced rotorcraft. Though much of the center’s 
research was applied, more of it was basic, exploring and deriving new 
data on the often mysterious and perplexing conditions and phenomena 
that influence how flight vehicles perform.’ The full spectrum of 
FRC’s research in aeronautics is shown in figure 5. 
FRC AND THE SUPERCRITICAL WING 
In 1978, over three decades since Chuck Yeager exceeded mach 1, 
John Anderson, a noted aerospace engineering educator, wrote: 
The analysis of transonic flows had been one of the major 
challenges in modern aerodynamics. Only in recent years, since about 
1970, have computer solutions for transonic flows over airfoils come 
into practical use; these numerical solutions are still in a state of 
development and improvement. Transonic flow has been a “hard nut 
to crack.”2 
Though the transonic regime had long disappeared as a “barrier” in the 
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Figure 5. D?yden Flight Research Center aeronautical research programs, 1962 - 1980. 
transonic regime, an airplane experiences mixed subsonic and super- 
sonic flow patterns. At some point, which varies with the design of the 
plane, the flow over the wings goes supersonic; a little faster and standing 
shock waves dance across the wing; then the drag of the plane rises 
sharply with concomitant losses in efficiency. It is also in the transonic 
regime that most commercial jet airliners fly, so the intricacies of 
transonic aerodynamics are part of the real world for aircraft designers. 
One individual who devoted the major portion of his NACA-NASA 
career to transonic research was Langley’s Richard T. Whitcomb, an 
engineer fond of remarking, “We’ve done all the easy things-let’s do the 
hard ones.” In the 1950s, Whitcomb had derived the concept of transonic 
area rule, which gave an entire generation of aircraft a “wasp waist” or 
pinched look. An engineer equally at home with a slide rule at his desk or 
shaping a wind-tunnel model for testing, Whitcomb demonstrated an 
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uncanny ability for visualizing configuration changes to enable airplanes 
to fly more efficiently at transonic speeds. He ultimately conceived two 
other means of improving that efficiency: the supercritical wing (SC W) 
and the wingtip “winglet.” All three advances went to the High-speed 
Flight Station (later the Flight Research Center, later still Dryden) .for 
“proof of concept” flight testing. 
During the early 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  Whitcomb investigated a technique for 
tailoring airfoil designs to raise the drag-divergence mach number as 
close to the speed of sound as possible. Such airfoils would have a 
“supercritical” mach number, the point at which the airflow over the 
airfoil exceeds the speed of sound. They would have less drag, because 
the design would discourage shock-wave formation. In other words, if 
two transports of similar design cruised at the same speed, differing only 
in that one had a conventional airfoil and the other a supercritical airfoil, 
the transport with the supercritical airfoil should have less drag, and 
hence should use less fuel. It should also have higher speed potential 
and, because of its fuel efficiency, greater range. Whitcomb estimated 
that such airfoils could raise the cruising speed of long-range jetliners by 
as much as 160 kilometers per hour. He embarked on a four-year 
wind-tunnel study program at Langley. The shape he finally selected had 
a flattened top surface, with a downward curve at the trailing edge; it 
looked somewhat like a tadpole. The flattened top reduced any tendency 
of the wing to generate shock waves, and the downward curve at the 
trailing edge restored the lift lost by flattening the top. Whitcomb spent 
many hours in the tunnel, hunched over development models, refining 
his concept. By 1967 he was convinced that he had a major breakthrough. 
Wind-tunnel tests indicated that the new shape would greatly improve 
the transonic performance of transport aircraft. Would the wing per- 
form in flight as advantageously as those tests indicated? Flight validation 
was obviously required. Whitcomb and other Langley researchers started 
looking for a suitable aircraft to serve as a testbed for a supercritical wing. 
The airplane chosen was the Vought F-SA Crusader, a single-seat, 
single-engine, obsolescent Navy jet fighter. The Crusader had been an 
excellent aircraft. Capable of mach 1.7 speed and equipped with both 
cannon and missiles, it had formed the backbone of naval aviation during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. Indeed, at the very time that NASA 
contemplated modifying an F-8A to serve as a supercritical wing test- 
bed, advanced F-8D and F-8E Crusaders were in combat over North 
Vietnam. 
NASA selected the F-8A because it had an easily removable wing, 
which technicians could replace with a supercritical wing test installation, 
and had landing gear that retracted into the fuselage. This last meant 
that the experimental wing would not need to house the retracted 
landing gear. The F-8A was readily available from the Navy, could be 
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maintained with relatively little effort, and had genuine transonic 
performance. NASA acquired three of them. Whitcomb and SCW team 
members Thomas C. Kelly and Lawrence K. Loftin had decided to use 
the F-8A at a meeting on 21 March 1967. By mid-May 1968, Langley 
research director Thomas A. Toll was chairing meetings between Lang- 
ley and Flight Research Center personnel to define the broad responsibili- 
ties of each center in running an F-8A SCW proof-of-concept 
dem~nstration.~ 
In February 1969, NASA announced that Whitcomb‘s supercritical 
wing concept would be tested on a modified F-8 at the Flight Research 
Center. NASA Administrator Thomas 0. Paine testified before a congres- 
sional committee that the tests would probably begin in late 1970. 
“Because of its potential for enhancing both the cruise performance and 
the operations economics of subsonic jet aircraft, this new NASA concept 
has generated widespread interest within the aircraft indu~try.”~ Whitcomb‘s 
team designed a shapely transport-type wing for the F-8 and ran tests in 
Langley’s 8-foot tunnel on a model F-8 having such a planform. Military 
applications of supercritical wing technology took a different path, that 
of the TACT program, which will be described shortly. The F-8 SCW 
program was oriented entirely toward civil aviation. Indeed, some 
observers saw the program as NASA attempting to sell the American 
aircraft industry on a concept, whereas NACA-NASA’s traditional role 
had been to conduct research, present the results at meetings and 
symposia, and let industry decide what to do. 
The Vought F-8A arrived at the Flight Research Center on 25 May 
1969. Center pilots Thomas C. McMurtry and Gary Krier began flying it 
to gain operational experience in the plane before it was modified. FRC 
contracted with North American- Rockwell’s Los Angeles Division to 
fabricate the supercritical wing, at a cost of $1.8 million. Meantime, 
North American- Rockwell “gloved” a supercritical airfoil on the wing of 
a Navy T-2C Buckeye jet trainer at the company’s Columbus, Ohio, 
plant, to gain some preliminary experience with such wings. The 
Buckeye made its first SCW flight at Columbus on 24 November 1969 
without any unusual results. Three weeks earlier, North American had 
delivered the F-8’s supercritical wing to Edwards. NASA planned the 
first trials of the aircraft in early 1971. By this time, Krier and McMurtry 
had completed 32 flights in the unmodified Crusader, which received the 
designation TF-8A.* NASA engineers set to work installing the new 
wing on the plane.5 
*Not to be confused with Vought’s abortive two-seat TF-8A Crusader (the F8U- lT), only one 
of which was completed. 
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Whitcomb and his Langley team had desired as pure a wing as 
possible, so that the full spectrum of SCW performance could be 
explored without interference from gaps, flaps, or ailerons. Instead of 
ailerons on the wings for roll control, he had preferred that the F-8 be 
modified with a “rolling” tail such as was used on the X- 15, This proved 
unworkable; the rolling tail gave inadequate control at low speeds. 
Whitcomb had to accept an aileron on the supercritical wing. The 
standard Crusader had a two-position, variable-incidence wing to reduce 
its landing speed; the test wing was fixed and required a fast landing 
approach. This made the plane totally unsuited for operation from a 
conventional runway. Otherwise, Langley could have run the program 
entirely at Hampton. In fact, because the plane touched down at about 
315 kilometers per hour and lacked antiskid provisions, it could not even 
land on Edwards’ 4600-meter runway without coasting onto the overrun. 
Takeoffs were from the main runway toward the lakebed; the craft 
landed on the lake itself.6 
By early 197 1, FRC technicians had installed the shapely wing on the 
TF-8A. Tom McMurtry was the lead project pilot; engineer John 
McTigue, who had earlier shepherded the lifting bodies, was the first 
program manager. At Langley, Thomas Kelly acted as that center’s 
project engineer and Whitcomb took a personal interest in the tests. 
McMurtry and pilot Gary Krier practiced in an SCW simulator that FRC 
technicians built, and NASA modified the aircraft to incorporate artifi- 
cial stability devices. On 9 March 1971, McMurtry took off on the 
TF-8A’s first supercritical wing flight. During the 50-minute excursion, 
he evaluated the plane’s low-speed handling qualities and stability 
augmentation system attaining an altitude of 3000 meters and a maxi- 
mum speed of 555 kilometers per hour.’ 
The supercritical wing TF- 8A was perhaps the most graceful 
aircraft flown by NACA-NASA at Edwards. Testing went smoothly as 
NASA gradually expanded the flight envelope to higher altitudes and 
higher speeds. On its fourth flight 13 April 1971, McMurtry took the 
plane to mach 0.9 at 11 000 meters. On 26 May he reached mach 1.1 at 
11 000 meters. The first data-gathering flight came on 18 August, 
following installation of special instrumentation, including a network of 
250 pressure sensors on the wing’s upper surface to locate and measure 
shock-wave formation. Though the supercritical wing promised great 
performance improvement at about mach 0.9, engineers wanted it flown 
beyond mach 1 to see if any undesirable trim problems developed there. 
The early exploratory flights had turned up no surprises, always a 
pleasant occurrence; and tentative data indicated that the wing’s flight 
performance was close to that expected from tunnel tests at Langley. In 
fact, the program had already given sufficient encouragement for NASA 
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and Air Force’s Flight Dynamics Laboratory to begin another SCW 
research program, the military-oriented TACT effort.’ 
Whitcomb envisioned the ideal transonic transport as having both a 
supercritical wing and transonic area ruling-and, at a later date, wing- 
lets-so in May 1972, NASA reworked the F-8’s instrumentation and in- 
stalled new fuselage fairings that gave it pronounced area ruling. It first 
flew with the fairings on 28 July 1972. By the end of the year, the re- 
search utility of the aircraft was nearing an end. Other programs de- 
manded funding, such as the Blackbirds. Whitcomb was certainly not one 
to let a program conclude hastily; he too recognized that the F-8 effort 
had reached the point of diminishing returns. Starting in January 1973, 
FRC began flying the aircraft on pilot familiarization flights. Ron Gerdes 
had the honor of making the last flight, on 23 May 1973. As if sensing the 
end, the plane chose this flight to develop a serious problem; its prime 
hydraulic system failed, but Gerdes landed the aircraft safely on the lake. 
The plane, as attractive as ever, remains at Dryden to this day.g 
NASA wasted no time in presenting the results of the SCW F-8 
program to the rest of the government and industry in a major 
symposium at Edwards on 29 February 1972. Richard Whitcomb com- 
mented on the good correlation of flight test and ground test data. The 
SCW concept had increased the transonic efficiency of the F-8 by as 
much as 15%, and the tests showed that passenger transports with 
supercritical wings would increase profits by 2.5% over those of conven- 
tional aircraft, a total of $78 million per year (in 1974 dollars) for a 
280-plane fleet of 200-passenger airliners. Such savings in a fuel-crisis 
economy were too important to pass by. 
Industry rapidly applied the results of supercritical wing technology 
to new designs such as the Boeing and Douglas YC- 14 and YC- 15, the 
The NASA F- 8  supercritical wing (SCW) testbed. 
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Rockwell Sabreliner 65, and the Canadair Challenger. France exploited 
the concept with an advanced model of the Dassault Falcon business jet. 
Indeed, foreign interest in employing SCW concepts caused NASA to 
look closely to determine if NASA-derived data was being used without 
due consideration of patent law. At NASA Headquarters on 4 June 1974, 
Administrator James C. Fletcher conferred on Whitcomb the maximum 
$25 000 prize for invention of the supercritical wing. The National 
Aeronautic Association awarded him the 1974 Wright Brothers Memo- 
rial Trophy. '' 
Before the F-8 had completed its flight program, NASA and Air 
Force interest in supercritical wing technology had spawned the TACT 
program. TACT-for Transonic Aircraft Technology-involved modify- 
ing a General Dynamics-Convair F- 11 1A to explore how SCW technol- 
ogy could benefit new military aircraft designs. During the 1960s, as a 
result of trying to save the lagging F-111 program, Langley Research 
Center had undertaken a great deal of wind-tunnel work on that aircraft. 
In addition to the transport-type wing tested on the F-8, Whitcomb had 
devised a supercritical wing for a transonic maneuvering military aircraft. 
The F- 11 1 was chosen as the testbed because of its variable-sweep wings. 
The new wings could be installed easily on the aircraft, with a minimum 
of other modifications. Indeed, when word of the apparent advantages 
of supercritical wing technology reached beyond Hampton, the Air Force 
Flight Dynamics Laboratory began examining the concept. General 
Dynamics engineers conceived a retrofit program for the entire F- 11 1 
fleet. The company dubbed this program F- 11 1 TIP: Transonic Im- 
provement Program. By mid- 1970 General Dynamics had broached this 
to the Air Force. The Air Force wanted the F- 11 1 tests as a valuable 
proof-of-concept evaluation, but would not retrofit the entire fleet. By 
mid-1971 NASA and General Dynamics had expended over 1600 hours 
of wind-tunnel test time on a suitable wing for the F- 11 1. Whitcomb 
determined its shape, twist, and airfoil coordinates. General Dynamics 
built the wing, and the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory furnished 
the money. On 16 June 1971 NASA and the Air Force signed a joint 
Transonic Aircraft Technology (TACT) agreement to explore the appli- 
cation of supercritical wing technology to maneuverable military aircraft. 
The F- 11 1 would be flown at NASA's Flight Research Center, and de- 
velopment of the advanced configuration of the wing would be under- 
taken by NASA's Ames Research Center. The TACT program, then, af- 
fected much of NASA as well as industry and the Air Force. Like the 
contemporaneous F-8 effort, TACT was far more than just a flight pro- 
gram. Eventually almost as much funding went to support numerous wind- 
tunnel studies as toward the actual flight program. TACT became pri- 
marily a wind-tunnel correlation program, in spite of General Dynamics' 
earlier hopes that it might spawn an SCW retrofit program for the 
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F- 11 1 fleet. Charles J. Cosenza of the Flight Dynamics Laboratory ran 
the Air Force TACT effort. At the Flight Research Center, NASA 
engineer Weneth D. Painter took over as NASA TACT project engineer.' ' 
The F- 11 1A was an ideal carrier for a supercritical wing. Capable of 
supersonic speeds above mach 2, the aircraft had a large volume for fuel. 
and instrumentation. The wings were easily removable. The variable- 
sweep provision enabled SCW testing over a wide range of wing sweep 
angles and aspect ratios. Also the Air Force planned to install pylons 
under the wings to carry external stores (such as bombs and drop tanks) 
to evaluate how these shapes interfered with the supercritical flow field. 
Fortunately, an F- 11 1A was readily available: the 13th of that first 
undistinguished and unlucky bunch of F- 11 1A research and develop- 
ment aircraft. NASA signed a loan agreement for the airplane with the 
Air Force on 3 February 1972, and on 18 February NASA pilot Einar 
Enevoldson and Air Force pilot Maj. Stu Boyd checked out in the plane. 
The modified aircraft was ready by the fall of 1973, and on 1 November 
Enevoldson and Boyd made the first TACT flight, reaching mach 0.85 at 
8600 meters. On the 6th flight, 20 March 1974, they exceeded mach 1; 
and on the 12th flight, they reached mach 2." 
Thereafter the TACT aircraft flew frequently, with a mixed Air 
Force- NASA crew. The wing definitely improved the performance of 
the F- 1 1 l.13 At transonic speeds, the wing delayed drag rise and pro- 
duced twice as much lift as the conventional F- 11 1 wing. The supercriti- 
cal wing did not impair high-mach performance, either. In fact, the plane 
spent a great deal of time above mach 1.3. The external stores tests, with 
the F- 11 1 carrying drag-inducing multiple bomb shapes on the pylons, 
came off without a hitch. Fears that the external stores might wipe out 
any benefits from the supercritical planform proved without foundation. 
As with the F-8 effort, the correlation between tunnel and flight tests 
proved close. In November 1975 NASA and the Air Force sent TACT 
program personnel from Edwards, the Flight Research Center, the Flight 
Dynamics Laboratory, Ames Research Center, and Langley Research 
Center around the country to brief industry and government representatives. 
The message was simple: TACT, like the earlier SCW F-8 program, had 
been an unqualified success. Test results were readily available for the 
use of industry in developing new and advanced military aircraft.14 
The F- 11 1 TACT aircraft soon became a workhorse, flying with a 
variety of aerodynamic experiments, including special shapes to evaluate 
base drag around the tail, experimental test instrumentation, and equip- 
ment destined for use with other airplanes. It was still flying in 1980, 
seven years after its first SCW exploration, the most productive of all the 
early F-11lA test aircraft. The TACT experience encouraged the Air 
Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory to proceed with another research 
effort: Advanced Fighter Technology Integration (AFTI). Another joint 
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NASA3 modified F - l l l A  transonic aircraft technology (TACT) testbed, equipped with a 
Whitcomb supercritical wing, descends for a landing at Rogers Dry Lake. 
Air Force-NASA effort, it consisted of various “Technology Sets.” AFTI 
Tech Set I1 was a direct extension of the TACT program. Like TACT, 
the AFTI program involved the F- 1 1 l-in fact, the Flight Dynamics 
Laboratory examined no less than six different F- 11 1 testbed con- 
figurations. This TACT “second phase,” subsequently called AFTI- 1 1 1, 
went a step further, with conceptualization of a “mission adaptive wing.” 
This wing would not have the surface irregularities produced by conven- 
tional high-lift devices such as flaps and leading edge slats. Instead, an 
internal mechanism would flex the outer wing skin to produce a high- 
camber airfoil section for subsonic speeds, a supercritical section for tran- 
sonic speeds, and a symmetrical section for supersonic speeds- hence 
the name “mission adaptive.” The TACT F- 11 1 modified as this AFTI 
demonstrator was scheduled to fly at Edwards in 1984. An F- 1 1 1 testbed 
with this wing might eventually have other novelties as well, such as an 
advanced composite wing structure, a two-dimensional exhaust nozzle, 
coupled propulsion and flight controls, and “active” flight controls. Such 
a technology demonstrator can be expected to fly in the mid-1980s. When 
it does, it will be the heir to the earlier work undertaken at Edwards with 
the F-8 and the TACT F-lll.15 
By the beginning of the 1980s, a growing number of transonic and 
high-subsonic aircraft were flying with supercritical wing planforms. There 
could be no greater tribute to NASA research, and particularly the work 
of Richard Whitcomb. A similar situation had happened in the 1950s, 
when his area rule concept quickly became de rigueur for advanced aircraft; 
it may happen yet again, when the full benefits of the Whitcomb winglet 
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are realized, following flight testing at Dryden of the winglet concept on a 
modified Air Force KC- 135. During the 1950s, the High-speed Flight 
Station had played an important role in validating the area rule. During 
the 1970s, the center played an equally important role in validating the 
supercritical wing. Through the efforts of the center, the new, exciting 
shape of the supercritical wing took its place in the sky. 
RADIO-CONTROLLED RESEARCH 
Remotely controlled aircraft appeared as early as World War I; by 
the end of World War 11, the major powers had made extensive use of 
remotely controlled guided weapons. The technology obviously had 
great potential; during the 1950s, remotely controlled Regulus and 
X-10 missile testbeds were landed on the lake at Edwards. At the same 
time, flying radio-controlled model airplanes became a widespread (if 
expensive) hobby. Electronic advances in the mid- 1960s greatly increased 
the reliability of control systems as tubes gave way to solid-state components. 
It took the insight of FRC engineer Dale Reed to blend this weekend 
hobby with a professional interest in aeronautical development; the 
result was a new method of flight testing, using remotely piloted research 
vehicles (RPRVs) . 
The RPRV concept differed appreciably from previous “drone” or 
remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). A limited autopilot had controlled 
those craft through a restricted number of maneuvers. Some RPVs could 
be used for military purposes, such as reconnaissance or remotely 
controlled strike missions. Drones were used extensively in the Vietnam 
War and during the 1973 Middle East war. The RPRV, on the other 
hand, eventually emerged as a study tool capable of versatile applications 
and of operating in “unexplored engineering territory.”16 
In support of the M2 lifting body program in the early 1960s, Dale 
Reed built a number of little lifting body shapes and launched them from a 
twin-engine radio-controlled model called Mother that spanned 3.2 meters. 
By late 1968, Mother had made over 120 launch drops. The move to more 
sophisticated equipment came in late 1968. Following the loss of the 
X-15 and Mike Adams, FRC installed an X-15-type “8-ball” attitude 
indicator on a T V  monitor in the control room. One day, while test pilot 
Milt Thompson and engineer Reed were monitoring a flight, Reed asked 
the pilot if he could control an actual research airplane by using the 8-ball 
as a reference. Thompson averred that he could. Within a month, at a 
cost of $500, Thompson was flying Mother from the ground by reference 
to the instrument. Next, Reed wanted to see if a pilot could get the same 
results flying a full-scale research airplane. Because of his interest in 
lifting body reentry vehicles, Reed selected the Langley Hyper 111 
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configuration, a very slender reentry shape having a flat bottom and flat 
sides. The Hyper I11 shape had a lift-to-drag ratio of about 3, and Reed 
designed it with a fixed wing simulating a “pop-out” wing such as could 
be used to improve the low-speed glide ratio of an actual reentry vehicle. 
Shop personnel built the vehicle at a cost of $6500. The RPRV weighed 
220 kilograms, measured 9.7 meters in length, and spanned 5.6 meters. 
By December 1969 the center was ready for the initial trials. Hyper 111 
was launched from a helicopter at 3000 meters, glided five kilometers, 
reversed course, and glided five kilometers to touchdown. As the Hyper 
I11 came in for a landing, Thompson transferred control to an experi- 
enced model-flyer who used standard controls to flare the lifting body 
and fly it to touchdown. The craft rolled along the lake, just like any 
of the other exotic research aircraft at Edwards.” 
Thompson exhibited some surprising reactions during the Hyper 
I11 flight; he behaved as if he were in the cockpit of an actual research 
aircraft. “I was really stimulated emotionally and physically in exactly the 
same manner that I have been during actual first flights,” Thompson 
recalled afterwards. 
Flying the Hyper I11 from a ground cockpit was just as dramatic as an 
actual flight in any of the other [full-scale manned] vehicles. , . . I, and 
only I, had to fly the vehicle down to a preselected location for 
landing. . . . responsibility rather than fear of personal safety is the 
real emotion driver. I have never come out of a simulator emotionally 
and physically tired as is often the case after a test flight in a research 
aircraft. I was emotionally and physically tired after a 3-minute flight 
of the Hyper 111.” 
Although encouraged by the Hyper 111 experience, FRC did not test I 
that shape further since it had a much lower lift-to-drag ratio than 
predicted. Many other programs-other lifting bodies, the YF- 12 
Blackbirds, and the SCW F-8-had a more urgent call on the center’s 
time and manpower. Reed and his RPRV team decided to try to control 
an actual manned aircraft by means of a ground pilot, with a back-up 
pilot in the plane. The center selected a Piper PA-30 Twin Comanche, a 
light, twin-engine airplane already configured as a testbed for general- 
aviation flight controls. As flown by FRC, the Twin Comanche had dual 
controls, one side an electronic fly-by-wire system, the other a conven- 
tional system, permitting controls research. That arrangement made the 
aircraft particularly well suited for RPRV research. FRC already had 
“downlink” electronics-such as pulsecode modulation telemetering- 
supported by the center’s radar tracking and digital computing equipment. 
The “uplink” electronics carrying the radio commands to the RPRV came 
from military research with drones. A forward-pointing television system 
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The Hyper III remotely piloted research vehicle (RPRV)Jlew at the Flight Research Center 
in December 1969. 
in the RPRV transmitted images from the aircraft to a ground cockpit, 
where the operating pilot flew the aircraft by reference to the visual cues. 
To provide physical cues as well, technicians connected small electronic 
motors to straps around the pilot’s body. During sideslips and stalls, the 
straps exerted forces on the pilot in proportion to the lateral accelera- 
tions being telemetered from the RPRV. The forces on the pilot made it 
feel natural for him to push rudder pedals to control sideslip. 
In October 1971, FRC began flight trials, with center pilot Einar 
Enevoldson flying the PA-30 from the ground as FRC pilot Tom 
McMurtry rode as safety pilot. Eventually, Enevoldson flew the airplane 
unassisted from takeoff through landing, making precise instrument- 
landing-system approaches, stalls, and stall recoveries. ’’ 
The next step was applying the RPRV to some meaningful research 
project. In April 1971 Grant Hansen, assistant secretary of the Air Force 
for research and development, issued a memorandum calling for a 
national program to investigate stall and spin phenomena. This area had 
become critical; many fighter aircraft were being lost in spinning 
accidents. The Air Force’s Aeronautical Systems Division formed a 
steering committee that included NASA representatives; it recommended 
expanding existing programs using radio-controlled free-flight models 
to evaluate spin entry and post-stall gyrations. Langley Research Center 
had made stall-s pin studies using small-scale models dropped from 
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The Flight Research Center’s Piper Twin Comanche, which helped validate the RPRV 
concept, descends to a remotely controlled landing on Rogers Dly Lake, unassisted by the 
mboard pilot. 
helicopters, but the committee recommended using larger models. Scale 
effects, always significant in model testing, were especially important in 
stall-spin tests; it was important to verify or refute the Langley tests by 
examining the results of tests with larger models. 
Over the spring and summer of 1971, Reed and other FRC engi- 
neers studied the feasibility of stall-spin testing an RPRV model. One 
advanced Air Force fighter project then under way could benefit from 
such work-the McDonnell F- 15A Eagle, a mach 2 highly maneuverable 
dogfighter designed using lessons from air combat over North Vietnam. 
Maj. Gen. Benjamin Bellis, chief of the F-15 System Project Office at 
Wright-Patterson, wanted the Flight Research Center to test an RPRV 
modeled after the proposed Eagle. In November 1971 the Flight 
Research Center transmitted a proposal to NASA Headquarters for stall- 
and spin-testing a 318 scale model of the F-15 configuration; OAST’s 
Military Programs Office quickly assented. In April 1972 NASA awarded 
the McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation a $762 000 contract for the 
construction of three 3/8 scale F- 15 models. NASA placed a variety of 
contracts with other firms for supporting equipment including electronic 
components and parachute recovery equipment.20 
The first F-15 RPRV arrived at the Flight Research Center on 4 
December 1972. The 1100-kilogram vehicle, 7.3 meters long, was fab- 
ricated from aluminum, hard and soft woods, and fiber glass. It cost a 
little over $250 000, compared to $6.8 million for full-scale, piloted F- 15 
aircraft. McDonnell Douglas built the vehicles, and the Flight Research 
Center added the avionics, hydraulics, and other subsystems. 
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The F-15 RPRV was launched from a B-52 mothership at about 
15 000 meters, after which an FRC pilot put the aircraft through its 
planned research program. Upon reaching 5000 meters, the RPRV 
streamed a spin recovery parachute having a diameter of 4 meters; that 
chute then extracted two other parachutes, an 8-meter “engagement 
chute” and a 24-meter-diameter main chute. As the F-15 RPRV 
descended, a helicopter snagged the engagement chute with grappling 
hooks. After a complex series of events, the main chute separated from 
the F- 15, and the helicopter reeled in the RPRV with a winch, until the 
research vehicle was suspended about 5 meters below the helicopter. The 
helicopter then returned to the Flight Research Center. Should it be 
impossible to recover the F-15 from a spin or stall, the pilot on the 
ground could deploy the spin recovery chute early, initiating the recov- 
ery sequence. Similar airborne snatch recoveries were already standard 
operating procedure for drone aircraft such as the Ryan Firebee. 
Eventually, NASA planned to land the F- 15 RPRV on the lakebed using 
skids, like any other research airplane.21 
On 12 October 1973 the first F- 15 RPRV went aloft under its B-52 
mothership for a flawless nine-minute flight, remotely piloted by Einar 
Enevoldson. He found the task challenging; researchers monitoring his 
heart rate found it went from a normal 70-80 beats per minute for a 
manned flight test to 130- 140 for the first RPRV flight.22 
Subsequent testing confirmed the ability of the RPRV to return 
useful information. McDonnell Douglas and the Air Force were encour- 
aged to proceed with manned spinning trials in the actual F- 15 Eagle. 
The only serious incident in the F-15 RPRV program occurred after 
pilot Tom McMurtry had flown the aircraft down to parachute deployment, 
and the helicopter had snagged the parachute. About 1000 meters above 
the ground, the lines separated, and the F- 15 model was once again in 
free flight. McMurtry quickly assumed control and guided the plane to 
an emergency landing in the desert. The plane hit a Joshua tree and a 
raised roadbank, inflicting some damage-but McMurtry’s skill had 
saved it to fly another day. The incident encouraged those who wished to 
land the RPRVs using skids. Soon after, NASA did indeed begin landing 
the F-15 RPRV on the lake, like any other unpowered research 
airplane.23 
Controversy still surrounds the RPRV concept. Ground researchers 
have sometimes tended to see the method as a way of relegating manned 
flight testing to a position of unimportance. More dispassionate champi- 
ons of the concept recognize that the RPRV complements-but cannot 
replace-manned flight testing. RPRVs are ideal for use when manned 
testing is impossible or unduly dangerous. In some situations, they can be 
considerably cheaper than testing a manned aircraft. But they cannot 
match the flexibility of a manned research airplane; in the words of one 
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An F- 15  RPRV is carried to launch altitude by a B-52 mothership. 
Dryden airman, they are “damn limited.” They cannot fly independently 
of a large, complex ground support system, so support costs for RPRV 
vehicles closely approximate those of manned aircraft. Nevertheless, the 
Flight Research Center had proved that the RPRV could make a 
meaningful contribution to flight research. 24 
Dryden has continued its work with RPRVs since the F- 15 RPRV 
program. In cooperation with Robert Jones and the Ames Research 
Center, Dryden engineers flew a propeller-driven RPRV having a Jones 
oblique swingwing. Center engineers have also flown an air-launched 
Ryan Firebee I1 in support of advanced RPRV projects. The most 
ambitious of Dryden’s RPRV efforts is the Rockwell-NASA HiMAT. 
HiMAT-for Highly Maneuverable Aircraft Technology-is a powered 
RPRV using an afterburning General Electric 585-2 1 turbojet engine. It 
has a wingspan of over 5 meters and a length of over 7 meters. Designed 
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as a technology demonstrator, the HiMAT aircraft is a sharply sweptwing 
canard configuration that should provide the technology base necessary 
for an advanced 1990 fighter system. HiMAT features a composite 
structure of glass fibers, graphite composites, and various metals. Follow- 
ing two preliminary study phases, in August 1975 NASA awarded 
Rockwell International a $1 1.9-million contract for two HiMAT aircraft, 
the first of which was completed in mid-19’78. After launch from a B-52 
mothership, the HiMAT vehicle is flown through a complex series of 
maneuvers at transonic speeds by a NASA pilot at Dryden’s RPRV 
remote pilot control facility. Then he lands it on Rogers lakebed. A chase 
airplane provides emergency backup control. While HiMAT is Dryden’s 
major RPRV research effort for the first half of the 1980s, Dryden is also 
running another RPRV project, Mini-Sniffer, begun in 1975. This is an 
attempt to develop a propeller-driven RPRV operating on hydrazine 
monopropellant fuel to altitudes around 30 000 meters to gather air 
samples from the wakes of high-flying supersonic aircraft. Three Mini- 
Sniffer configurations have been built. The concept has led to interest by 
various research facilities, including the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, in 
using similar vehicles for planetary sampling missions. Such an aircraft 
could be used on Mars as part of a planetary probe. Clearly, Dryden’s 
RPRV work has been and will continue to be an important aspect of the 
center’s-and NASA’s-re~earch.~~ 
ELECTRONIC CONTROLS 
In the early days of aviation, pilots controlled their aircraft by direct 
force. They moved a stick or pushed a rudder pedal connected to cables 
that, in turn, pivoted a control surface. In those days an on-off switch 
provided full engine power or none at all. In time, sets of throttles and 
fuel mixture controls regulated engine power. As flight speeds rose, 
control loads increased, eventually reaching a point where pilots could no 
longer exert sufficient brute strength to control airplanes at high speeds. 
The next step was hydraulically boosted controls. Control systems now 
became complex indeed. By the early 1960s, jet aircraft were operating 
with boosted hydro-mechanical controls. These were very vulnerable to 
damage; loss of hydraulic pressure in the control system could spell the 
end of an airplane even if all other systems functioned smoothly. The 
necessity for redundant backup systems further complicated aircraft 
design, while design constraints often minimized the benefit of these 
backup systems. For example, the Air Force lost many Republic F- 105 
Thunderchief aircraft over North Vietnam to antiaircraft fire that 
damaged the craft’s hydraulics. “Unfortunately,” one “Thud” driver has 
written, “a hit that caused loss of one flight control hydraulic system 
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usually got them both.”26 In another case, Grumman lost the first 
prototype F-14 Tomcat on its maiden flight as a result of hydraulic 
failure, an accident that delayed the program at a critical time. 
Conventional hydraulic-mechanical control systems also imposed 
design limitations upon aircraft configuration. Designers had to incorpo- 
rate a degree of inherent stability even if the plane had stayiity 
augmentation; during some portions of the flight the pilot could not be 
continuously moving the controls. But the aircraft could not be allowed 
to go out of control during those moments. Designers therefore had to 
use tail surfaces of a certain size and in a certain location; the wing had to 
be located in a certain position; the fuselage had to be of a certain length. 
But with electronic controls, in which the pilot’s commands go to a digital 
computer, which sends a signal flashing through a wire to move the 
controls electronically, all this could be changed. Electronic “fly-by-wire” 
controls are much less vulnerable to damage than conventional hydro- 
mechanical controls; several wire bundles can be routed through an 
aircraft with greater flexibility than a maze of pushrods, pulleys, and 
cables. Electronic controls also are simpler, smaller, and lighter, advan- 
tages that translate directly into improved performance, reliability, 
payload, and fuel consumption. A fly-by-wire control system could 
revolutionize the way an airplane looks. No longer will designers have to 
tailor their configurations a certain way. The electronic controls could 
provide aircraft stability; a sensing unit could detect any tendency of the 
aircraft to diverge from its desired flight path and warn the digital 
computer to signal corrective control deflection. When the pilot made a 
control input, it would in fact be a command to the system to “relax” the 
stability briefly so that the aircraft would move in the direction the pilot 
wished to go. With the electronic control system furnishing stability, 
designers could reduce the size of some components, such as tail surfaces, 
or even relocate them. Such changes could reduce the size and weight of 
aircraft, lessen drag, and permit increases in payload and performance. 
The primary, and immediate, advantages are in simplicity and maneuver- 
ability. “Control configured vehicles” (CCV) promise to have outstanding 
maneuvering characteristics. Indeed, with fly-by-wire controls, aircraft 
could perform such maneuvers as intentional and prolonged yawed 
flight, with obvious advantages for military airplanes. 
First, however, the fly-by-wire principle had to be proved. Some 
earlier aircraft had used rudimentary fly-by-wire controls. The Concorde 
SST used a pseudo fly-by-wire system for primary flight control, but the 
secondary system was conventional hydromechanical. At the Flight 
Research Center, engineers desired a true fly-by-wire testbed having 
strictly electronic controls. They discussed radically reconfiguring a 
conventional fighter, such as the Lockheed F-104 or a Vought F-8, 
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with fly-by-wire controls and revised flight control surfaces, perhaps 
reducing tail size or incorporating a canard layout. Engineer Melvin 
Burke was especially interested in flying a digital fly-by-wire testbed. 
Considering how important the technology has subsequently become, 
NASA Headquarters expressed little interest in the idea until Neil 
Armstrong became NASA’s deputy associate administrator for aeronau-’ 
tics within the Office of Advanced Research and Technology. During the 
Apollo program, he had become acquainted with fly-by-wire technology 
at the controls of the lunar module. That vehicle had a digital computer 
and inertial measuring unit. When the astronaut moved his controls, the 
computer sent signals to reaction controls that maneuvered the vehicle. 
Armstrong believed this off-the-shelf system could be readily applied to a 
testbed airplane and supported Burke’s project. With OART’s approval, 
the Flight Research Center acquired a Navy Vought F-8C Crusader, 
disconnected its mechanical flight control system, including all cables, 
push rods, and bell cranks, and replaced it with the Apollo-derived 
digital flight computer and inertial sensing unit, routing sets of wire 
bundles from the pilot’s control stick to the computer, and thence to the 
control surfaces. This marked the beginning of FRCTJ F-8 Digital Fly- 
by-Wire (DFB W) flight research pr~gram.~’  Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology’s Charles Stark Draper Laboratory supported FRC’s effort 
by reprogramming the Raytheon computer from the lunar module. 
Sperry’s Flight Systems Division supplied a backup fly-by-wire system for 
the aircraft. 
On 25 May 1972 center research pilot Gary Krier completed the first 
flight of the F-8 DFBW testbed, the first flight of an airplane completely 
dependent upon an electronic control system. Using off-the-shelf equip- 
ment had enabled NASA to make that flight at least two years earlier 
than would have been the case starting from scratch. The agency 
awarded the DFBW project team its Group Achievement Award during 
Headquarters ceremonies in November 1972. By early 1973, after 15 
DFBW flights without incident, Kries testified before the House Commit- 
tee on Science and Astronautics on the benefits the program had already 
demonstrated. Clearly fly-by-wire equipped transport aircraft could fly 
with greater smoothness in turbulence-the near-instantaneous sensing 
of motion changes, combined with an immediate computer-signaled 
corrective control response, would rapidly damp any turbulence-induced 
aircraft motions. “A much larger improvement in performance could be 
gained by starting from scratch with FBW,” Krier testified. “We have 
been refining aircraft for years now, and the FBWICCV combination 
gives us a chance to make a quantum jump in aircraft per forman~e .”~~ 
Like all trial systems, the F-8’s DFBW installation did have some 
operational quirks. The electronic interface on the Apollo computer was 
too coarse for the precise pilot stick inputs required to fly the plane. The 
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Piloted by Gary Krier, the NASA F- 8 digitalfly-by-wire (DFBW) testbed cruises on a 
research mission from Rogers Dry Lake. 
computer changed control-surface positions in a series of steps, like the 
small but abrupt movements of a watch’s second hand. The pilot felt this 
as a mild but unpleasant series of nudges, especially when using the 
all-moving horizontal stabilizer for pitch control. At FRC‘s request, the 
Draper Laboratory changed the computer software, with beneficial 
results to the handling qualities of the plane. The F-8 flew 42 times 
without incident and it was never necessary to resort to the plane’s 
emergency back-up flight control system. Before finishing the test 
program, a prototype version of the electronic sidestick planned for the 
General Dynamics F- 16 fighter was tested on the F-8, including 
formation flight and landings. The results lent encouragement to the 
practicality of using such a stick on the F- 16 itself. 
The first phase of the F-8 program had only shown that DFBW 
control was feasible, not that it was practical. The system used much 
special purpose hardware and, although it was extremely reliable, it could 
not operate if the digital computer failed. In a joint program with the 
Langley Research Center, Dryden received funding to develop and 
flight-test an advanced redundant digital fly-by-wire system in place of 
the modified Apollo system. This “triplex” DFBW system used general- 
purpose digital computers and would be able to sustain several system 
failures and still operate. It was flown in August 1976, with a ride- 
smoothing system, maneuver-driven flaps,” and an angle-of-attack limiter. 
These are typical of the characteristics expected on future vehicles 
employing DFBW control. The F-8 system also demonstrated “fault- 
*Sensors detect vehicle maneuvers, triggering appropriate flap movement to enhance airplane 
performance during the maneuver. 
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tolerance” by continuing normal operation after certain computer failures. 
After the initial development flights, the F-8 was used to test Shuttle 
computer software and to support the development of the flight control 
system of the Shuttle orbiter.ZY 
Dryden’s Digital Fly-by-Wire flight research program is only one of 
the electronic control programs that will continue to influence the 
development of this new technology. Another is the center’s Integrated 
Propulsion Control System (IPCS) evaluated on an Air Force F-111E 
airplane. This program, run from March 1973 through February 1976, 
involved a cooperative effort by NASA’s Lewis and Flight Research 
Centers, the Air Force’s Flight Propulsion Laboratory, and the Boeing, 
Honeywell, and Pratt 8c Whitney companies. In essence, it accomplished 
for the propulsion system of an airplane what fly-by-wire controls did for 
flight control. Numerous factors affect engine performance, including 
throttle position, inlet position for variable-geometry inlets, fuel flow 
rates, and even the maneuvers that an aircraft is performing at any 
particular time. As with mechanical aerodynamic controls, the hydrome- 
chanical controls used in engine operation grew increasingly complex. 
Propulsion experts at NASA’s Lewis Research Center recognized that 
future aircraft might demand propulsion control systems capable of 
controlling a number of variables with much greater accuracy and speed. 
Digital electronic controls might well provide the answer. 
The Air Force Flight Propulsion Laboratory at Wright-Patterson 
AFB was willing to fund an experimental effort using a suitable airplane. 
A twin-engine airplane could be configured so that one engine was 
electronically controlled. The other engine could remain hydromechanically 
controlled for flight safety and to provide a comparison with the test 
engine. One aircraft immediately came to mind-the General Dynamics 
F- I 1  1. The F- 1 I 1 was a large, two-seat twin-engine aircraft with a 
complex propulsion system. It had a variable position inlet and afterburning 
fanjet engines, as well as an internal weapons bay that researchers could 
use to house the necessary electronic controls. The Air Force had an 
F- 1 11 available, the first prototype of the General Dynamics F- 11 1E 
series. Lewis and the Air Force selected Boeing as prime contractor to 
develop the system, with Honeywell and Pratt 8c Whitney as subcon- 
tractors. NASA awarded the contracts for the Integrated Propulsion 
Control System program in March 1973. 
The program could have been run at Lewis; but for various reasons, 
including flight safety, NASA and the Air Force decided to fly the 
F- 11 1E IPCS testbed from Flight Research Center at Edwards. Once 
FRC became involved, center personnel did far more than just fly and 
maintain the airplanes. Indeed, FRC engineers and pilots initially re- 
sented what they saw as an effort by various distant parties to dictate what 
was to be done, how, and when. “It took a year before we really 
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developed a good working relationship with everybody,” one Dryden 
participant recalled, “so that they trusted us, and we trusted them. And 
they realized we weren’t just being hard to get along with when we 
wanted changes or said we had a problem. They started believing us.”30 
After this initial wariness, the program moved along smoothly. 
The Flight Research Center received the F-111E in mid-1974 and 
embarked on a series of 13 flights before modification. These flights 
acquired baseline data for comparison with results of the later IPCS tests. 
Installation of IPCS began in March 1975. The system consisted of an 
instrumentation package, power supply, digital computer, and interface 
equipment installed in the fuselage weapons bay. The hydromechanical 
inlet and afterburner controls were replaced by new electronic controls. 
Two software programs supported the IPCS evaluation. One of 
these was a digital representation of a TF30-P-9 afterburning turbofan 
engine used for assessing the ability of the IPCS system to duplicate the 
hydromechanical control functions. The other, called the IPCS control 
mode, integrated the inlet and engine control functions into one operation, 
exploring the new control concept. All the software and related IPCS 
control hardware were rigorously bench-tested, installed on a Pratt & 
Whitney TF30-P-9 engine and run on a test stand, and then the 
modified engine was installed in the altitude test chamber of NASA’s 
Lewis Research Center, where engineers ran the engine under planned 
flight conditions. NASA was especially interested in operation of the 
IPCSon high-altitude, low-mach flights (typically mach0.9 at 13 700 meters 
or mach 1.4 at 15 000 meters) and flights above mach 1.9, where the 
interactions of variable inlet and engine were of critical importance. 
NASA had hoped to use the actual IPCS-modified engine tested at 
Lewis, but this did not prove possible. Instead, another TF30-P-9 was 
installed. The IPCS controlled only the F- 1 11E’s left engine. Hydrome- 
chanical control was available over the left engine for emergency use, and 
the right engine retained its own hydromechanical system. As a precaution, 
however, in the event of failure of the manually controlled engine during 
takeoff and the possibility of simultaneous problems with the experimen- 
tal IPCS, all takeoffs were made toward Rogers Dry Lake, where an 
emergency landing could be made.” 
The F- 11 1E completed its first IPCS flight on 4 September 1975 
piloted by NASA’s Gary Krier and the Air Force’s Stan Boyd.* It 
completed further 14 IPCS investigations before the program concluded, 
making its last IPCS flight on 27 February 1976. NASA returned the 
*Not to be confused with Stu Boyd, another Air Force test pilot who by this time had left 
Edwards. 
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F- 11 1E to the Air Force; restored to its original non-IPCS configuration, 
it served as a chase aircraft for the B- 1 strategic bomber. 
The IPCS flights demonstrated that the system worked well. The test 
crews used rapid throttle manipulation, abrupt aircraft maneuvers-such 
as high-angle-of-attack turns and sideslips-and various inlet positions to 
evaluate performance of the IPCS. Because it was not an ideal, best-of-all- 
possible-worlds system, the gains realized were not spectacular. But at its 
worst, the IPCS system never performed less efficiently than the hydro- 
mechanical system. This alone was significant; it indicated that, in the 
future, IPCS technology could be expected to produce major benefits. 
There were other less visible advantages. Engineers compensated for 
deficiencies in the hardware used on the IPCS by changing software 
routines. The project team noted: 
This allowed temporary corrections to be made and verified without the need 
for extensive design modifications and hardware testing that could have 
affected the flight scheduling. With this flexibility, the testing and optimiza- 
tion of propulsion systems can be completed without the major hardware 
modifications that accompany development in hydromechanical systems.3z 
The conclusion of the IPCS program was influenced as much by 
monetary considerations as by the fact that the system had proved its 
potential value. Dryden’s interest in electronic controls has continued, 
however, with the similar but more advanced digital electronic engine 
controls (DEEC) research program using a center F- 15. The advanced 
aircraft of the 1990s will fly with Dryden-pioneered developments such 
as digital fly-by-wire flight controls and some advanced form of IPCS. 
Some may have so-called “co-op” controls, whereby a digital system inte- 
grates flight controls and engine controls into a single efficient system. 
This too was pioneered by Dryden in May 1978, aboard the YF-12C 
B1ackbi1-d.~~ As with the supersonic breakthrough and the dawn of hyper- 
sonic flight, Dryden’s work on electronic controls will have continuing 
impact in the years to come. 
NEW CONCERNS I N  AVIATION SAFETY 
The old NACA did relatively little work in the field of aviation 
safety-although some of its aerodynamics research had a serendipitous 
effect on safety. The High-speed Flight Station undertook virtually no 
aviation safety projects related to air transportation, the closest being the 
KC- 135 studies supporting the introduction of the 707-generation 
jetliners into service. Lewis Laboratory had deliberately destroyed sur- 
plus military airplanes to study how crash fires propagated. But for the 
most part, NACA had left aviation safety to the Civil Aeronautics 
Administration (the forerunner of the Federal Aviation Agency, later the 
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Federal Aviation Administration), and such organizations as the Flight 
Safety Foundation and the Cornell-Guggenheim Aviation Safety Center. 
All this changed in the 1960s and early 1970s. The disconcerting 
number of general-aviation stall-spin accidents caused NASA to under- 
take special studies of the spinning characteristics of such aircraft. The 
agency complemented this work with other studies on the handling 
qualities of private aircraft. Much of this work was done at Langley, but 
the Flight Research Center ran a number of flight evaluations on 
general-aviation airplanes from 1964 through 1966, following these with 
tests of the center’s workhorse Piper PA-30 Twin Comanche. During 
one test flight of the PA-30, center research pilot Fred Hake encoun- 
tered severe flutter of the craft’s horizontal tail while well within the 
aircraft operational limits. This dangerous situation fortunately did not 
cause loss of the tail and Haise landed safely. A film taken from a chase 
plane shows the horizontal tail twisting through an alarming arc for what 
seems an incredibly long time, evidence that the unexpected dangers in 
flight testing are not limited to high-performance jets and rocket planes. 
Though general aviation was a major research concern, two other 
problems drew particular attention: wake vortex and clear air turbulence. 
In 1907, British aerodynamicist F. W. Lanchester postulated the concept 
of the tip vortex, a “horizontal tornado,” as it were, formed by the flow 
field around a wing.34 This whirling column streams around the wing tip 
and trails in a wake behind the aircraft. Sometimes, under the proper 
conditions of humidity and temperature, the vortex can be seen. It is 
easily demonstrable in a wind tunnel or water tank, using injected smoke 
The Flight Research Center? Aero-Commander, used for liaison and a variety of general- 
aviation studies. 
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or dyes. As seen from behind the aircraft, one vortex streams from the 
right wingtip, rotating counter-clockwise. The vortex from the left 
wingtip rotates clockwise. These turbulent vortices trailing behind an 
airplane can affect other aircraft that pass through them. The magnitude 
of the vortices is directly related to the size and weight of the airplane that 
generates them: the wake vortex of a light plane such as a Cessna 150 is 
negligible, while that of a 747 can exceed 240 kilometers per hour in 
rotational velocity and can persist for a distance of 30 kilometers. The 
vortex of a large transport can easily upset a much smaller aircraft, 
possibly inducing structural failure or, more likely, throwing it out of 
control. If this occurs close to the ground-during a climbout after 
takeoff or during a landing approach-the plane might crash. Indeed, 
many aircraft have been lost in such accidents. 
The problems engendered by wake vortices first became a serious 
concern following the introduction of large jetliners. When the wide- 
body jumbojets (the Boeing 747, McDonnell Douglas DC- 10, and Lockheed 
L- 101 1) entered service, wake vortices became a major hazard. These 
aircraft trailed vortices powerful enough to roll business jets and even 
other airliners. Further, their vortices could persist even at high altitudes. 
In response, the FAA increased minimum separation distances for 
airplanes from 5 kilometers for a small business jet following a wide- 
body jumbojet to 10 kilometers. Even another wide-body could not follow 
closer than six kilometers behind a wide-body aircraft. These separation 
distances automatically reduced the number of aircraft that could land at 
an airport in a given time. The FAA undertook the development of 
sensors that could detect the resence of hazardous vortices in the ap- 
Another method was to attempt to reduce the magnitude of tip 
vortices. Here is where the Flight Research Center became involved. 
NASA became interested in vortex research both from the safety aspect 
and as a matter of aerodynamics. A wingtip vortex seriously reduces 
efficiency, causing drag to rise with a consequent penalty in fuel 
consumption and performance. If the wake could be minimized, this 
could greatly increase the aerodynamic efficiency of the plane and 
improve its operating economics, always a vital concern in air transport. 
This desire for efficiency prompted Richard Whitcomb at Langley 
Research Center to develop the winglet concept: small, nearly vertical 
wing-like surfaces mounted on the wingtips of an airplane. These 
winglets reduced induced drag by 4 to 5%, offering fuel savings for a 
707-class transport of about 7%. The Dryden center subsequently tested 
a Boeing KC- 135 equipped with winglets in a proof-of-concept 
demonstration. Ames Research Center engineers experimented with 
small fins mounted above or below a wing. These fins would generate 
“good” vortices to breakup and disperse the dangerous ones. Langley 
proach corridor of an airport. !5 
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Research Center engineers experimented with a nearer-term solution, 
deploying an aircraft’s spoilers and speed brakes to minimize wake vortex 
formation. Langley tunnel-tested a 311 00-scale model of a 747. Following 
up on the Langley work, the Flight Research Center flew a 747 on wake 
vortex alleviation studies.36 
The Flight Research Center had studied wake vortices with a Boeing 
727 in November 1973, equipping the plane with smoke generators to 
trace the patterns and following it with instrumented PA-30 and F- 104 
chase aircraft to measure the force and effects.” The 727 was a small 
three-engine jetliner, not comparable even to the 707, let alone to jumbo 
wide-bodies such as the 747. Fortunately, NASA bought a Boeing 
747- 100 jetliner from American Airlines for use as the Rockwell Space 
Shuttle’s carrier aircraft during the Shuttle’s approach and landing tests. 
FRC petitioned NASA Headquarters for use of this aircraft, assigned to 
the Johnson Space Center. On 16 August 1974 Headquarters assented to 
FRC’s request, and the 747 made some 30 flights in a wake vortex 
research program. Test crews varied the positions of the spoilers and 
used various spoiler segments in an attempt to determine the optimum 
method of alleviating wake vortices. Chase aircraft, including a Gates 
Learjet and a Cessna T-37 trainer (representative of business jets and 
smaller aircraft) probed the vortices to measure their strength. The 
results were surprising.38 
During one test when the 747 crew did not attempt to alleviate the 
wake vortices by spoiler operation, the T-37 entered a vortex six kilo- 
NASA’s Boeing 747, used on wake vortex alleviation studies, is followed by a Gates Learjet 
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meters behind the 747, did two inverted snap-rolls, and developed a roll 
rate of 200 degrees per second. During another flight, the disturbed 
vortex flow caused one of the T-37’s engines to flame out. With the 747 
in landing configuration, landing gear and flaps down, the T-37 pilot 
believed that at least a 16-kilometer separation was desirable between the 
T-37 and the 747. Spoiler operation, however, markedly improved the 
situation. With two spoilers on the outer panels of each wing extended, 
the vortices were greatly reduced and the T-37 could safely fly five 
kilometers behind the larger aircraft.39 
FRC’s 747 wake vortex studies clearly indicated that use of spoiler’s 
could reduce the severity of wake vortices. After the 747 was reassigned 
to its primary mission-carrying the Space Shuttle orbiter-the vortex 
alleviation studies continued, under the direction of program manager 
Russ Barber. In July 1977, the center began a brief series of tests on a 
Lockheed L- 101 1 TriStar wide-body to determine if the spoiler fix that 
worked so well on the 747 could be applied to other wide-body aircraft as 
well. The test showed that while the spoilers on the TriStar could reduce 
wake vortices, they were not as effective in doing so as the spoilers on the 
747. NASA is continuing wake vortex studies, which can be expected to 
improve the operational safety of future air~raft.~’ 
Two other recent research areas for Dryden have been clear air 
turbulence and pollution of the upper atmosphere. While atmospheric 
pollution is strictly an environmental problem-and a most serious 
one-clear air turbulence can endanger an aircraft by exposing it to 
sudden and extreme gust loadings possibly exceeding its structural 
strength. Private researchers, the FAA, and NASA have always had a 
major interest in turbulence. One of the old NACA’s greatest accomplish- 
ments was its work on gust-induced flight loads, work that predated 
World War 11. In the late 1950s and 1960s, NASA flight researchers 
undertook projects on high-altitude clear air turbulence using Lockheed 
U-2 aircraft. As concern about pollution of the upper atmosphere 
became more widespread, NASA sponsored U -2 and Martin WB-57F 
high-altitude sampling flights, as well as the current Dryden Mini-Sniffer 
RPRV program. Gustiness at high altitudes had caused annoying difficul- 
ties during some of the Flight Research Center’s work with the XB-70A 
and YF-12 Blackbird. More seriously, clear air turbulence had given 
some commerical aircraft a rough flight, injuring some passengers not 
using their seat belts and occasionally leading to structural failure. 
In response to this interest in atmospheric conditions, Langley and 
Flight Research Center engineers mapped out joint research to provide 
“a limited amount of highly accurate measurements associated with 
mountain waves, jet streams, convective turbulence, and clear air turbu- 
lence near  thunderstorm^."^^ At the first LaRC-FRC meeting on 3-4 
June 1969, planners agreed to use a NASA-owned Martin B-57B 
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airplane, a modified medium bomber. In due course it appeared on 
FRC’s flightline. Difficulties with the data-acquisition system delayed the 
planned flights,* but in time the B-57B supported three atmospheric 
science programs: measurement of atmospheric turbulence, sponsored 
by Langley; aerosol-sampling sponsored by the University of Wyoming; 
and detection of clear air turbulence, sponsored by the Department of 
Tran~portat ion.~~ Combining data from these flights with that from 
many other sources, scientists are developing a better understanding of 
the nature-and fragility-of the upper atmosphere. 
FRC AND THE NEW GENERATIONS OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT 
Because of commitments to the X- 15 and other advanced research 
programs. FRC lacked manpower to participate in new military pro- 
grams such as the F-4 Phantom! Paul Bikle would have preferred to 
continue the practices of the 1950s, getting involved in as many serviee- 
related programs as possible. But the easy days of the Cook-Craigie 
procurement plan had long passed, and stronger institutional ties workec‘ 
to prevent close NASA-Air Force cooperation on flight testing of new 
service aircraft. Under new procurement policies, if NASA flew an 
aircraft on loan from the military services, NASA had to pay its operational 
costs. Bikle nevertheless sought cooperation between the military and 
FRC, and because of personal ties dating from his duties as technical di- 
rector of the AFFTC, he had a great deal of success. Bikle was thwarted 
in his efforts to acquire service aircraft for FRC less by the services than 
by NASA Headquarters, which refused several requests for budgetary 
reasons. 
Aside from research, Bikle needed newer aircraft at the FRC so that 
his pilots could stay current with the latest technology. FRC acquired 
three F- 104N Starfighters, specially ordered from Lockheed in 1963. 
Bikle also got the Northrop two-seat T-38 supersonic trainer. This 
useful and reliable little jet could perform a variety of mission support 
chores, as well as simulating lifting body landing approaches. Bikle’s 
managerial philosophy stressed diversity, which helped save the Flight 
Research Center from the criticisms of those who sought to shut it down 
during the 1 9 6 0 ~ . ~ ~  
Following the creation of NASA, FRC was involved in programs with 
various service aircraft: Lockheed F- 104A Starfighter, McDonnell F-4A 
*Meanwhile the B-57B was put to work in proof-of-concept testing of the deceleration 
parachute to be used by the Viking Mars landers. The tests were conducted at the Joint Parachute 
Test Facility at nearby El Centro. For example, see J. M. Groen, Flight Report, Viking Test #7, 28 
April 1972. 
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Two of NASA’s special Lockheed F- 104N StarjGghters. 
Phantom 11, General Dynamics F- 11 lA,  Lockheed T-33 Shooting Star, 
Northrop F-5A Freedom Fighter, Vought F-8C Crusader, Northrop 
YF-17 Cobra, and the McDonnell Douglas F-15A Eagle. NASA had 
other programs that were military related, such as the Blackbirds, 
XB-’70A, and the TACT F- 1 1 1. FRC also acquired airplanes from 
abandoned projects, such as the Northrop A-gA, but did not run 
programs on them. Clearly, then, if FRC’s research using modified 
service aircraft was not as extensive as that of the 1950s, such activity 
remained substantial-certainly as much as the center could support 
during a space-conscious era. 
During the 1960s and 19’70~~ NASA continued to fly the workhorse 
F- 104s as testbeds. Aside from using the Starfighters for X- 15 mission 
support and chase and in support of the lifting body effort, NASA used 
them in a number of short programs such as base drag measurements, 
sonic boom measurements in support of Langley research, and tests of 
“ballute” (balloon-parachute) deceleration devices. In the early 1960s 
FRC flew a brief military-inspired program to determine whether an 
airplane’s sonic boom could be directed; if so, it could possibly be used as 
a weapon of sorts, or at least an annoyance. In December 1965 FRC 
received an ex-Navy McDonnell F-4A Phantom I1 fighter. It flew briefly 
in this project before a wing fuel tank burst, producing a large hole in the 
wing. The pilot landed safely. 
The center received two early General Dynamics F- 11 1A airplanes. 
As a result of a poorly thought-out development specification, both the 
Navy and Air Force had become committed, much against their will, to a 
civilian-inspired “Tactical Fighter Experimental” (TFX) program. This 
called for developing a single aircraft-the F-111-to fulfill a Navy 
fleet-defense interceptor requirement and an Air Force supersonic strike 
aircraft requirement. In retrospect, this was impossible to achieve, 
especially since planners placed priority upon the Air Force requirement, 
and then tried to tailor this heavy landplane to the constraints of 
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carrier-based naval operations. The naval aircraft, the F- 1 I IB, was 
never placed in production. The Air Force aircraft, which was produced 
in a variety of models, including the F-lIIA, F-IIID, F-IIIE, and 
F-IIIF, as well as an “FB-111A” strategic bomber version, had 
numerous problems, and only the F- 1 1 1 F actually fulfilled the original 
TFX design specification. This was less the fault of General Dynamics 
than of the civilian planners in the Pentagon whose “cost effective” 
inclinations ironically produced the major aeronautical fiasco of the 
1960s-and a costly one at that.* 
The center’s F- 11 1A program was the only program of the 1960s 
that closely followed the earlier pattern of using NACA-NASA flight-test 
specialists to iron out technical problems with a major new weapon 
system. The early F- 1 1 1As had extremely bad engine problems, suffer- 
ing from compressor surge and stalls. In January 1967 the Air Force sent 
the sixth production F- 11 1A to FRC for testing. The plane did not make 
a favorable impression there. One center pilot stated: 
The early ones were rats. . . . It was like flying in a three-dimensional 
maze. You couldn’t sweep the wings beyond a certain point, you 
couldn’t exceed so much [angle of attack], you couldn’t turn too tight, 
you couldn’t have so much sideslip. . . . It was terrible.44 
NASA pilots and engineers wrung out the airplane in an attempt to solve 
its problems, studying the engine inlet dynamics of the plane to deter- 
mine the nature of inlet pressure fluctuations that led to compressor 
surge and stall. Eventually, as a result of NASA, Air Force, and General 
Dynamics studies, the engine problems were solved by a major inlet 
redesign. FRG’s work had been crucial to this effort. The center’s second 
F-IIlA, the twelfth built, arrived in April 1969 and was flown in a 
handling-qualities investigation program. Both aircraft were retired 
to the boneyard in 1971. The center’s experience with its later F-11 Is 
(the TACT and IPCS airplanes) was far more pleasant.45 
FRC flew numerous brief programs using service airplanes. A 
Lockheed T-33 Shooting Star jet trainer was flown on a human-factors 
study to evaluate the effects of visibility restrictions upon a pilot’s 
performance during landing; many advanced airplanes would have very 
restricted visibility forward and laterally during landing approach. The 
center undertook a comprehensive study of high-lift flaps as aids to trans- 
onic maneuverability with a series of tests on F-104, Northrop F-5A 
*One FRC wag, noted for his pen-and-ink skills, drew a variety of F- 1 1 1 “growth proposals, 
including a cargo C- 11 1,  a helicopter H-  1 1 1 ,  and an X- 11 1 research airplane. His cartoon was 
printed in Avzation Week €3 Space Technology, fortunately without credit. 
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In the 1960s, Flight Research Center flew an F-111A prototype in support of the 
seruice-testing of the General Dynamics F- 1 1 1 A aircraft. 
Freedom Fighter, and Vought F-8C Crusader aircraft during 1970 and 
1971. Wind tunnel results simply were not reliable for this purpose, and 
the flight-test data would be useful for developing new military aircraft. 
FRC’s work in this area led to the derivation, by the Department of Defense, 
of “agility” criteria for fighter turn rate, buffet, maximum lift, and 
handling qualities. This paid off in the development of a whole new gen- 
eration of fighter aircraft: the McDonnell Douglas F- 15A Eagle, the 
General Dynamics F- 16A, and the Northrop YF- 17 CobrdF- 18 Hornet. 
The center also used the T-33 for evaluating a self-contained liquid- 
cooled flight garment providing the pilot with heating, cooling, and 
pressure p r ~ t e c t i o n . ~ ~  
DFRC’s most recent exposure to new military aircraft came with the 
McDonnell Douglas F- 15A Eagle and the Northrop YF- 17 and F- 18. 
Involvement with the F- 15 program came out of earlier work with the 
F-15 RPRV model and a desire to have a representative of the latest 
highly maneuverable fighter aircraft. The F- 15 Eagle represented a 
turning point in Air Force doctrine, a return to an airplane designed 
primarily for agility and air-to-air combat-the first since the old F-86 
Sabre. 
The opportunity to work on the Eagle came at a time when some 
engineers and pilots within the agency were grumbling that a return to 
the service-testing policies of the 1950s was long overdue. Dryden 
secured NASA Headquarters approval to request transfer of two aircraft 
from the Air Force’s F-15 Joint Test Force. Its activities were winding 
down-soon some of its aircraft were refurbished and shipped to 
Israel-and two specialized prototypes were available: the second, which 
had been used for propulsion tests, and the eighth, which had been used 
for spin testing. NASA acquired both aircraft on indefinite loan from the 
Air Force. 
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The center has flown the two aircraft on a variety of research 
missions, two of which have been a major propulsion and performance 
flight test program and research into high angle-of-attack stall-spin 
phenomena. At the request of the Air Force, the Dryden F- 15 test team 
also investigated discrepancies between predicted and measured drag 
values. In flight, the F- 15 had greater base drag-drag around the aft 
end of the plane-than tunnel tests had predicted. This problem has 
afflicted a range of aircraft-one notable example being the X- 15-and 
remains an area of concern to aerodynamicists. Data from the F-15 
full-scale flight tests were also used to validate data taken during testing 
of the 3/8-scale F- 15 RPRV drop model. In another effort to improve 
wind-tunnel prediction techniques, a small 10” cone was installed on the 
nose boom of one of F-15s. The shape has been tested in 23 wind 
tunnels, and the data taken in flight up to mach 2 speeds were compared 
with wind tunnel data, furnishing an assessment of the airflow quality 
and turbulence levels generated in the  tunnel^.^' 
In the early 1970s the Air Force pressed for development of a new 
generation of lighweight fighters-single-seat jet aircraft “optimized” for 
agility and air combat maneuvering, with high thrust-to-weight ratios 
(above 1 to l), and good acceleration. Out of this interest came the 
so-called “Lightweight Fighter” program, which involved construction of 
two technology demonstrators, the single-engine General Dynamics 
YF- 16 and the twin-engine Northrop YF- 17 Cobra. Midway down the 
development path the stakes changed; what had been a technology 
demonstration became a Department of Defense competition for a new 
fighter for both the Air Force and Navy, and for allied nations as well. 
Eventually the YF-16 was ajudged superior; the Air Force adopted a 
derivative of it, the production F-16A. The Navy, unhappy with the 
outcome, proceeded independently with a derivative of the YF- 17 
One Of Dvden Flight Research CenterS two F-15A Eagles on an early test flight. 
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Cobra, this evolving into the Navy’s Northrop F-18 Hornet fighter 
program. After sitting briefly in storage, the two YF- 17 prototypes flew 
again, this time as development aircraft for the proposed F-18. At the 
request of the Navy, Dryden flew the first YF- 17 for base drag studies 
and to evaluate the maneuvering capability and limitations of the aircraft. 
NASA pilots-all of whom got at least one flight in the plane-and 
engineers examined the YF- 17’s buffet, stability and control, handling 
qualities, and acceleration characteristics. 
The YF- 17 shocked many of the center’s pilots, trained on earlier 
combat aircraft. “I was astounded,” one center pilot recalled. “That 
airplane really is a generation ahead of anything else. It’s got twice the 
performance of current-day airplanes like the F-4, and some of the 
others. It’ll climb twice as fast, and it’ll burn half the fuel-just 
phen~mena l . ”~~  Wistfully, the center’s personnel saw the shapely little 
YF-17 depart, on its way to help out Northrop and the Navy on the 
F- 18. The greatest shock came when many within NASA realized that 
the YF- 17 typified industry’s growing tendency to develop aircraft 
independent of NASA research. “Now the tail’s wagging the dog,” one 
engineer stated. “Industry goes out and builds an airplane like the F- 16 
and the F-17. . . . NASA says, ‘let’s take a look at it, let’s assess the 
thing.’ ”49 
This problem was succinctly summarized in a memo from a senior 
engineering administrator to Dryden Director David Scott in January 
1976, before the YF- 17 arrived. The administrator argued for NASA to 
acquire an F- 16, citing the record of the NACA in the 1950s. “We must, 
however, recognize the fact that we may not have as much to contribute 
Dryden Flight Research Center continues to study advanced military aircraft. This is one of 
the two Northrop YF- 1 7 Lightweight Fighter (L WF) prototypes that center pilots evalu- 
ated in 1976. 
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these days as we had in the past.” After discussing the center’s work on 
the Century series in the 1950s, he went on: 
NACA was in that time period an acknowledged leader in the fields of 
aerodynamics, stability and control, aerodynamic loads, buffet, flutter, 
propulsion performance, and possibly others. NASA no longer enjoys that 
esteemed position in the aeronautics world, largely due to default. NASA was 
actually unable to provide any substantial guidance or assistance to the de- 
signer of the YF-12 and SR-71. Thus, NASA is now in an extremely weak 
position to bargain for participation in any new aircraft program [however] 
NASA should be flight testing new aircraft if for no other reason than to keep 
abreast of te~hnology.~” 
Certainly NASA occasionally appears to be playing catch-up to the 
American aircraft industry. But in many fields-such as transonic and 
supersonic aerodynamics, supercritical wing technology, control system 
technology, and aero-thermal loads-NASA is well ahead. Those areas 
where NASA seems weakest relate to the early design of new military 
aircraft. At worst it is a problem that can be solved by encouraging basic 
research and involving the centers in new aircraft development programs 
at an earlier date-i.e., before the first flight of an airplane or, better yet, 
before the design is “fixed” on the drawing board. At best (and this is a 
view held by many), the problem is fading rapidly now that the space 
program makes fewer demands on the time and efforts of the old 
aeronautics centers, Langley, Ames, Lewis, and Dryden. NASA will 
continue to have much to offer other government agencies and industry.. 
One positive step, coming on the heels of Apollo, was the creation of a 
Military Aircraft Programs Office within OART in September 197 1 , 
charged with overseeing the agency’s support of Air Force and Navy 
aircraft  project^.^' 
Dryden’s flight testing of service aircraft is certain to continue. The 
center is currently involved in a major Navy-sponsored study of the 
lateral (roll) stability and control characteristics of the Grumman F- 14A 
Tomcat fighter in low speed at high angles of attack, in an attempt to 
develop a better understanding of the spin departure characteristics of 
the aircraft. This is a typical 1950s NACA-type problem-solving “helping 
hand” study aimed at alleviating problems that have cost the Navy some 
airplanes and flight crews. Center pilots have also flown such experimen- 
tal military aircraft as the YC- 14 and YC- 15 advanced STOL transports, 
and even the Rockwell B-1 strategic bomber. It is to the credit of the 
staff at Dryden that they have sought participation in demanding 
projects and programs. That spirit, so typical of Hugh Dryden himself and 
so much a part of the Dryden facility’s tradition, must be cherished in the 
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A Center at the Crossroads: 19’76- 1981 
On 26 March 19’76 the Flight Research Center opened its doors to 
hundreds of guests for the dedication of the center in honor of Hugh 
Latimer Dryden. The evening before, an Air Force Douglas C-9 
executive transport had flown into Palmdale with a group of official 
visitors, including Dryden’s widow and other relatives and prominent 
NASA officials. 
It was a beautiful day, clear and sunny, typical of the Antelope 
Valley. The dedication was very much a local event; following Center 
Director David Scott’s opening remarks, the Antelope Valley High School’s 
symphonic band played the national anthem. Then came the invocation, 
followed by recognition of the invited guests. Dryden, a man of total 
humility, received praise from all quarters. NASA Administrator James 
C. Fletcher, Senator Frank Moss, and former NASA Administrator T. 
Keith Glennan all spoke of his foresight and resourcefulness. Mrs. 
Dryden unveiled the memorial bust, and with her remarks and those of 
Scott, the formal ceremonies came to an end. After a buffet lunch, 
visitors flocked around the center’s research aircraft and the official 
guests returned to Washington. 
That night, the center’s staff held a more informal celebration in the 
Longhorn, the ever popular gathering spot on the outskirts of Lancaster. 
In contrast to the placid tributes of noon, the conversations in the 
Longhorn were more questioning. The lifting body program had ended. 
The National Hypersonic Flight Research Facility aircraft faced an 
uncertain future.* The Blackbirds were the only project that seemed to be 
continuing Dryden’s tradition of frontier-probing research. On the 
horizon loomed the Space Shuttle-but it was less a Dryden project than 
one for the NASA space centers, notably Johnson. As earlier in the 
center’s history, doubts were expressed about its future. Could Dryden 
continue as an independent center in the budget-conscious post-Apollo 
*It would be canceled 18 months later (chap. 8). 
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period? Did Headquarters fully appreciate the unique flight-research 
capabilities of the center? Were non-flight-test-oriented administrators 
going to homogenize it-turn it into a copy of the other research centers? 
Many seemed to be celebrating the dedication as an end to what had 
been, rather than as a promise of what might be.’ 
WHITHER DRYDEN? 
Dryden’s recent administrative history had certainly been unsettled. 
On 31 May 19’71 Paul Bikle had retired from NASA. Bikle had made a 
major imprint on the center, and everyone there was aware and apprecia- 
tive of his role, especially in actively seeking a broad research base. Bikle’s 
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deputy director, De E. Beeler, had taken over until October, when Lee 
R. Scherer became director. His arrival marked a major change in leader- 
ship style. Williams and Bikle had been closely attuned to flight testing 
and flight research; they were strong managers with a bias toward aero- 
nautics; they were individualists who favored a great deal of personal 
and center autonomy. Their immediate successors were more closely in 
tune with a NASA Headquarters management philosophy emphasizing 
close consultation, coordination, and dependency upon Washington for 
decisionmaking. Bikle’s successors functioned more as agents of Head- 
quarters in the same sense that project engineers acted at the bidding of a 
program manager.2 
Lee R. Scherer, the center’s third director, was a graduate of the U.S. 
Naval Academy with advanced degrees from the Naval Postgraduate 
School and the California Institute of Technology. A naval aviator, he 
had served in the 1950s as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of 
the Navy for research and development, had helped create an antisubma- 
rine warfare center for NATO, and in 1962 had joined NASA on 
!ntc *r Director Lee R.  Scherer. 
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temporary assignment as manager of the Lunar Orbiter project. After 
retiring from the Navy in 1964 with the rank of captain, he had risen 
within NASA to direct Project Apollo’s Lunar Exploration Office, where 
he was responsible for lunar science. A gregarious, athletic individual, 
Scherer brought to the center a keen awareness of current space and 
management interests at Headquarters. During his tenure, the Flight 
Research Center largely continued to run the programs established 
during the Bikle era. Appointed director of the Kennedy Space Center in 
1975 Scherer was replaced at FRC by his deputy, David R. S ~ o t t . ~  
The fourth center director, Scott had joined FRC in August 
1973 as deputy director, following the retirement of De Beeler, one of 
the last of the NACA old timers. Scott, a West Point graduate and career 
officer, came to the center as an Air Force colonel-he retired in March 
19’75. An astronaut of note, Scott had made three flights in Gemini and 
Apollo. Though a test pilot by training, Scott brought to the center the 
same orientation and interests as his predecessor Scherer, for whom Scott 
had worked for nearly two years. Both sought to bring Dryden more in 
line with a standard relationship with the other centers and Headquarters; 
gone was the sometimes paternalistic padrone-Williams or Bikle; in his 
place was a more tightly structured bureaucracy. This rankled many 
veterans who were used to a free-wheeling style. Some doubted the 
devotion of the new leaders to atmospheric flight-testing; cancellation of 
NHFRF, thwarting of the mini-Shuttle research aircraft, termination of 
the Blackbird effort were all seen as symptomatic of this supposed 
non-aeronautics ~r ientat ion.~ 
Scott retired in 1977. His deputy Isaac “Ike” Gillam had run the 
approach and landing tests of the Shuttle at Dryden (p. 239). With 
background in Air Force flight assignments and management of launch 
vehicles for NASA, a friendly disposition and obvious ability, Gillam had 
the support of many on the staff who hoped he would become the new 
director. Until he was so appointed in June 19’78, Gillam was not inclined 
to be a mere g are taker.^ As acting director and then permanent director, 
his was to be a challenging assignment. With a new administration in 
Washington pledged to economy, NASA and other agencies would be in 
a budget squeeze. Dryden would be buffeted by internal wars of 
institutional assessment, which would determine where NASA’s smaller 
budget would go. At the same time, the Shuttle test flights would bring 
Dryden massive, unaccustomed publicity. 
SHUTTLE CONES TO DRYDEN 
NASA’s thinking on reusable lifting-reentry spacecraft reached 
fruition in development of the Space Shuttle. After studying various 
proposals, NASA awarded study contracts to North American- Rockwell 
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(now Rockwell International) and McDonnell Douglas in July 1970. The 
design characteristics selected for the craft included a delta wing and a 
2000-kilometer “cross-range” during reentry. Various designs were 
submitted, including vehicles launched from the backs of other winged 
reentry vehicles, vehicles launched on top of boosters, and vehicles 
attached to large fuel tanks and solid-fuel boosters-the “parallel burn” 
configuration, in which both liquid-fuel engine and solid-fuel booster 
would burn during ascent. In March 1972 NASA selected the parallel- 
burn approach and on 16 July selected Rockwell’s proposal for development. 
Construction of the first Space Shuttle orbiter, vehicle OV- 101, 
started at Rockwell’s Downey, California, plant on 4 June 1974. Compo- 
nents were delivered to Rockwell’s Palmdale plant near Edwards, where 
final assembly began in August 1975. The OV-101 was rolled out 17 
September 1976. The hefty craft, the size of a Douglas DC-9 jet 
transport, was christened Enterprise, a name fraught with historic 
significance-and also tinged with the banalities of television science 
fiction. In January, in a scene reminiscent of building the Pyramids, the 
Shuttle was trucked overland from Palmdale to Dryden. Meanwhile, 
NASA had bought a Boeing 747 and returned it to the manufacturer for 
modification, so that the Shuttle could be mounted on the back of the 
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747. So connected, the Shuttle would be carried aloft for its first flight 
tests. Later it would be ferried from one site to another the same. way.6 
The Space Shuttle was an ambitious design. It had a body length of 
over 37 meters, a height of over 17 meters, and a wingspread in excess of 
24 meters. It combined reaction controls for spaceflight and aerody- 
namic controls for glide to earth. The reaction controls would not be 
installed for the approach and landing tests. If the craft went out of 
control or collided with the 747 after launch, the crew of two would 
eject. Planning for the approach and landing tests was as complex as for 
any other research airplane. And there was the added factor of 
publicity; everything that happened at Dryden would be headline news. 
In the fall of 1974, the Air Force and NASA executed a joint 
agreement to establish Space Shuttle facilities at Edwards. Edwards was 
already designated as the test site for the Shuttle’s approach and landing 
tests and as the prime landing site for the first orbital flights. Within 
NASA, the Shuttle would be under the overall control of Johnson, with 
FRC in a supporting role.’ 
By the time of the Dryden dedication, Shuttle test plans were 
nearing completion. The Shuttle road was almost ready. In January 
1977, Enterprise was moved to Dryden. Immediately the center, which 
had done its most spectacular work under conditions of almost total 
privacy, was the focal spot of national attention. Ralph Jackson, Dryden’s 
ebullient director of public affairs, had his hands full. Inside the 
headquarters building, Johnson engineers and technicians roamed the 
halls. Outside, Johnson astronauts and pilots zipped around in T-38s 
and a NASA Grumman Gulfstream I1 Shuttle trainer simulated Shuttle 
approaches and landings. The Boeing 747 crews readied themselves for 
the first flights. Press and television commentators wandered about, 
interviewing and photographing anything that moved. It was the Cape 
come to the Mojave, a scene more familiar to Cocoa Beach or Houston; 
indeed, the reporters who covered the Shuttle were mostly veterans of 
Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo-Soyuz. 
The flight test program had three phases: captive, captive-active, 
and free flights. The unmanned captive flights would simply demon- 
strate whether the combination-which wags dubbed the worlds largest 
biplane-could fly together safely. In the captive-active trials, an astronaut 
crew would ride in the Shuttle. Finally it would be launched from the back 
of the 747 and flown down to a landing. During the captive flights and the 
first of the free flights, the Shuttle’s blunt base would be faired over with 
a tailcone to reduce buffeting on the 747’s vertical fin; as another 
precaution, Boeing had added two more vertical fins to the 747’s 
horizontal stabilizer. Toward the end of the flight trials, NASA hoped to 
launch the Shuttle without the tailcone, which would reduce the Shuttle’s 
lift-to-drag ratio, resulting in a descent path similar to what it would have 
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upon returning from orbit. A series of high-speed taxi tests by the mated 
747 and Enterp-zse in mid-February 1977 went without a hitch.* 
On the 15th the first Shuttle flight proved to be a media event 
unparalleled in the brief history of Dryden. For the previous week, 
Johnson and Dryden public affairs officials had been on hand to meet the 
demands of the hundreds of media representatives who left plusher 
locales for the sunny but blustery desert. Those who spent the night in 
Lancaster and Palmdale had to get an early start. At 5 a.m., the sky was still 
black and clear, the stars as brilliant as always, the temperature in the low 
20s. Autos moved along the Sierra Highway, down Avenue E, then north 
on 120th Street East. Despite the urban-sounding names, the surround- 
ing country was bare, scrub desert broken only by an occasional homestead. 
As the sky began to lighten, Joshua trees and the low hills near Hi Vista 
were outlined. The revolving beacon at Edwards pulsed brightly on the 
northern horizon, and the 6 a.m. news on KNX reported that the Shuttle 
would fly today. Dryden itself was controlled pandemonium, the public 
affairs trailer a madhouse. By 6:45 the sun was spreading a warm glow 
through the thin fog covering the lakebed. Those present prepared to 
convoy out to the runway; meantime they drank coffee and watched the 
T V  monitors in the public affairs trailer.8 
By 7 a.m., the Shuttle launch crew, Fitz Fulton, Tom McMurtry, Vic 
Horton, and Skip Guidry, were in the 747, the inert Shuttle riding on 
top. No sooner had the reporters journeyed from Dryden to the press 
site along runway 04-22 than the Air Force staged an impromptu 
airshow: the YC-14 took off, followed by the B-1, some T-38s, an 
F-4, and the F-16. Finally those at the site watched the 747-Enterprise 
combination taxi slowly past the Air Force’s two large hangars, down to 
the west end of 04-22. There it held while the test crew completed final 
checks. Aloft, two NASA T-38s flew over, as if impatient to get on with 
the flight. Camera crews set up their tripods, shivering in the brisk desert 
morning. It was a beautiful day. Right down the center of 04-22 flew a 
gaggle of geese-a large V honking along, heading east, unperturbed by 
the consternation they were causing. Geese and jet engines do not mix, so 
NASA delayed the departure of the 747 a little longer. Finally, the 747 
started to roll down the runway with that peculiar whine so typical of 
large fan-jet airplanes. 
The world’s most improbable aerial combination, after a run of 1800 
meters, became airborne, climbing ponderously toward the east, above 
the lake. For 125 minutes, this strange hybrid flew along, anxiously 
attended by T- 38 chase planes, before Fulton and McMurtry returned it 
gently to earth. First flights are always cautious, and on this one, the test 
crew held the combination to a maximum altitude of 4900 meters and a 
maximum speed of 463 kilometers per hour. Everything went well; the 
747-Enter@e flew closer in performance to a standard 747 than simulations 
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had predicted. Nothing serious had happened, a tribute to the test 
planning. That afternoon and evening, the dark interior of the Long- 
horn echoed to the jubilation of Dryden, Rockwell, and Boeing personnel. 
The Shuttle had taken to the air. 
Back at Dryden, over the weekend engineers worked up the data 
from the flight. At a technical and crew briefing on Monday, the word went 
foGh: “Testing can go on to expand the envelope as planned.” The 
critical concerns of buffeting, flutter, and tail loads proved to be no 
problems. After five complete successes, NASA abandoned a planned 
sixth flight, deeming it unnecessary. While the next series of tests was 
being prepared, the 747 flight crews temporarily returned to more 
prosaic duties such as flying the YF-12 Blackbird on its coldwall tests 
(p. 195).’ 
SHUTTLE SUMMER 
NASA had already selected four astronauts for the Shuttle 
landing tests, placing Fred W. Haise and Charles G. Fullerton on one 
crew and Joe H. Engle (the former X- 15 pilot) and Richard H. Truly on 
the other. Haise, a former center pilot, had flown on the ill-fated ApoZZo 
I3 mission. They prepared for the Shuttle program by practicing in a 
ground simulator and flying a much-modified Grumman Gulfstream 11. 
Other pilots flew the center’s Jetstar to test the Shuttle’s microwave 
scanning-beam landing system. In addition, Dryden managers worked 
closely with their Johnson counterparts to prepare for a most important 
part of the Shuttle test program: arranging for the Houston center to 
control the mission while it was in progress at the desert. Dryden had 
controlled the captive inert flights, but Mission Control Center at 
The Space Shuttle Orbiter Enterprise cruises atop its Boeing 747 launch aircraft during 
the Space Shuttle approach and landing tests, 1977. 
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Johnson would have primary responsibility for running subsequent 
missions, starting when the 747 and Enterprise backed away from the 
Shuttle mate-demate facility and began taxiing to the runway. By 
mid-June all was ready, and the Shuttle flight test program moved into its 
next phase. lo 
On 18 June 1977, the 747 and Enterprise combo went aloft on the 
first “captive active” test. Inside the Shuttle, Fred Haise and Gordon 
Fullerton had a magnificent view; not being able to see any portion of the 
carrier aircraft added to the illusion that they were alone in the sky. The 
flight lasted nearly an hour and all objectives were achieved. The test 
data indicated that the Space Shuttle was buffet- and flutter-free up to 
the maximum speed attained on the flight, over 320 kilometers per hour. 
The next captive-active mission, flown by Engle and Truly on 28 June, 
involved high-speed flutter tests up to 500 kilometers per hour. It too was 
successful. NASA concluded that the four flights originally scheduled for 
the captive-active phase could be safely cut to three. On 26 July Haise and 
Fullerton completed the last of the captive-active flights. During this last 
mission, 747 pilots Fitz Fulton and Tom McMurtry flew a launch 
separation profile, pushing the 747 over into a shallow dive at 8500 
meters and lowering the 747’s landing gear to simulate the free-flight 
launch conditions. During approach of the 747-Enterprise combination to 
landing, Haise and Fullerton lowered the Shuttle’s landing gear to check 
its operation. It went smoothly. 
Indeed, the captive-active phase of the Shuttle testing had gone 
pleasingly well. Some equipment problems had been experienced; auxil- 
iary power units leaked or overheated, computers were “voted” off-line 
by other computers, and sometimes a computer tried to take the square 
root of a negative number. These were small concerns that could be 
remedied by minor fixes or software changes. The important fact was 
that the Shuttle and the 747 were a safe flying combination. Now NASA 
could move to the next phase of the approach and landing tests: the 
actual free-flight testing of the Enterprise. The flock of news personnel, 
who had left the desert in droves after the first captive flights, now 
swarmed back. 
During the week of 8 August, project officials concluded a two-day 
Shuttle readiness review and a mission readiness review; all conditions 
were “go.” Most visible-and audible-of the preparations were the Shuttle 
simulation flights that Fred Haise and Gordon Fullerton made in the 
Gulfstream I1 training aircraft; for the few days prior to the flight, the 
center echoed to the occasional rumble of the Gulfstream and its T-38 
chase planes climbing out over the lake following another approach to 
landing, or the center’s Jetstar checking the microwave landing system. 
The flight plan called for the 747-Enterprise to take off at 8 a.m., 
from runway 22 and climb to the west. The two mated craft would enter a 
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The Dryden Flight Research Center's Lockheed Jetstar, which has been used for a variety of 
general-purpose airborne simulation studies, general-aviation research, and support of the 
Space Shuttle approach and landing tests. 
racetrack pattern, flying south toward Los Angeles, turning north over 
the mountains, and coming up the east side of Rogers Dry Lake. The 
craft would nose into a shallow dive from an altitude of over 8500 meters. 
At 7300 meters and an airspeed of approximately 515 kilometers per 
hour, Fred Hake in the Shuttle would press a square white button on the 
Shuttle's instrument panel, triggering explosive bolts that would separate 
the Enterprise from the 747. If all went well, Fulton would roll the 747 into 
a descending left turn, and Haise would pitch up the 75-ton Enterprise to 
the right. At 6200 meters Hake would initiate a practice landing flare 
to evaluate the handling qualities of the Enterprise. Then, sinking like a 
rock, the astronaut crew would begin a gradual 180" turn to position the 
Enterprise for a 320-kilometer-per-hour touchdown on lakebed runway 
17, which, at over 11 kilometers, was the longest of the Rogers runways. 
The flight attracted massive public attention. Over 1000 reporters 
flocked to Dryden, many from abroad. Parking had to be prepared for 
the public viewing sites west of Dryden, and the VIP and press sites along 
runway 04-22 and the west shore of the lakebed, parallel to runway 17. 
Motels as far away as eastern Los Angeles were booked solid. A wide 
range of aviation personalities, including NASA Administrator Robert 
Frosch and such pioneers as Jimmy Doolittle, were present. 
As with most test flights, the preparations took days of hard work at 
all levels. The event came alive in the early morning of 12 August. At 3 
a.m., the first reporters left Lancaster and Palmdale for the lakebed. 
Once again, the night was perfectly clear; after driving up 120th Street 
through the base gate, the cars made their way to the FAA radar facility 
by Hospital Road on old South Base, turned right, and drove through an 
Air Police checkpoint. Those with authorizations continued on toward 
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the runway site or the lake. The lake was better, at least for those with a 
handle on the past and an awareness of the present. Eerily quiet and still, 
the lake seemed unconnected with civilization. Further away could be 
seen the night lights of the mines at Boron and the bustle of activity at 
Dryden. The Air Force side of the field was still and dark, except for 
watchlights and the tower and runway lights. 
For those interested in omens, the Shuttle’s day began with a meteor 
shower. Looking up toward the Milky Way, clearly visible as a faint 
patchy white in the crisp desert sky, observers saw a rain of fire, with 
meteors coming down by the minute. There were fireballs breaking apart 
in greenish-white trails, streaks of russet, streaks of yellow. Then came 
the desert dawn, the familiar yellow glow lighting up the eastern sky, 
shining through high clouds, and bathing the rocky outcroppings of 
Leuhman Ridge in orange, and finally reaching down to illuminate the 
broad baked expanse of Rogers. The lights on buildings dimmed, and 
soon an Air Force helicopter clattered noisily over the lakebed, joined by 
another from Dryden. Far from the lake, between 60 000 and 70 000 
visitors streamed along the Sierra Highway and Rosamond Boule- 
vard into Edwards; at one point, the trafficjam stretched 16 kilometers. 
As journalists whiled away the time setting up equipment and sipping 
coffee from a Rockwell courtesy van, the technicians, engineers, and 
flight crews at Dryden readied themselves for the flight. 
Finally all was ready, and the 747-Enterprise backed out of the 
mate-demate gantry at Dryden, ran up its engines, and began the long 
taxi. The Air Force Huey still clattered above. The first of the T-38 
chase planes whistled aloft. The 747-Shuttle reached the east end of 
runway 22, turned, and held for the last checks. At 8 a.m., right on 
schedule, Fulton called up full power; the combination, with surprisingly 
little noise, began to roll and nosed aloft, followed by two T-38s. The 
aircraft climbed into the prescribed racetrack pattern, joined by the other 
three chase T-38s. On the ground, the reporters waited for the big 
moment. 
The air launch had been scheduled for 8:45. In fact, higher-than- 
normal temperatures at altitude caused the climb to take longer than 
planned. The 74’7-Shuttle moved majestically around the racetrack, 
plainly visible most of the time from the lakebed. The low sun obscured 
the view of its approach to launch, but video coverage from one of the 
T-38s outfitted with a portable camera was stunning. The formation 
continued over Saddleback Butte to the Edwards bombing range. Roughly 
48 minutes into the flight, the 747-Shuttle was due east of Rogers lake, at 
an altitude of 8654 meters. Fitz Fulton nosed into a shallow dive. Fred 
Hake radioed Fulton, “The Enterprise is set; thanks for the lift.” Then he 
punched the separation button. Seven explosive bolts detonated and the 
Shuttle was flying on its own at 7346 meters. The 747 pitched down 
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slightly and rolled into a diving left turn, and Haise briefly pitched up to 
the right. He initiated a practice landing flare at about 460 kilometers per 
hour and made moderate lateral control inputs to evaluate the Shuttle’s 
response. The big delta handled well. Because of the Shuttle’s low 
lift-to-drag ratio, it would remain aloft only for about five minutes. Later, 
after removing the drag-reducing tailcone, the Shuttle would sink to 
earth in about two minutes, a descent rate similar to the X- 15’s. 
On the ground, the separation had been seen by some with binocu- 
lars and sun shields. Soon, it became visible to all. The 747 flew alone, 
trailed by a single T-38, while to the northeast a white speck could be 
seen growing in size at what seemed a remarkable rate, attended by four 
T- 38s. The cameramen started clicking furiously, and exclamations 
sounded on all sides. The Shuttle descended over Leuhman Ridge, 
passed across Highway 58 at Boron, turned west toward Peerless Valley, 
swung around over North Edwards, and lined up on runway 17. 
Houston’s Mission Control radioed Haise that the Enterprise had a lower 
lift-to-drag ratio than predicted by tunnel tests. In fact, however, the 
ratio was just as predicted; Houston had miscalculated. The error caused 
Haise to fly the final approach at a higher speed, conserving energy to 
prolong the glide. As a result, the Shuttle was “high and hot” on its final 
approach. Realizing that the Enterprise would land long, Haise deployed 
the craft’s speed brakes from 30 up to 50 percent. At 275 meters altitude, 
Haise began the landing flare. As the Enterprise leveled out, he deployed 
the landing gear. The Shuttle landed long by about 900 meters at 340 
kilometers per hour, nearly 5% minutes after launch. The Shuttle coasted 
The Rockwell Space Shuttle Orbiter Enterprise glides to a landing after itsfirst freeflight 
during approach and landing tests at Dryden Flight Research Center, 1977. 
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for over 3 kilometers before stopping on the south lakebed; as it slowed, 
its T-38 chase planes streaked by. Soon the 747 and its lone chase 
plane swept majestically over the landing site. The first Shuttle free 
flight had been a success. Now all that was left for most at the lake was the 
long trip around the base to Dryden, a quick lunch, and the afternoon 
press briefing. For the engineers, however, the task of data reduction had 
just begun. l2 
After the press conference, many called it a day and went to one of 
the many parties being hosted by mission personnel in and around 
Lancaster. Most wound up at the main blow-out, held at Lancaster’s Delta 
Lady saloon. Others settled for the more tranquil but no less joyous 
environment of the Desert Inn or Mr. B’s Twin Lakes Inn outside 
Palmdale. Shuttle obviously flew well-better than the Gulfstream simulator. 
The major remaining question was how the Shuttle would behave 
without its tailcone. This actually involved two considerations. One was 
whether the buffet from disturbed air caused by removal of the cone 
would cause structural problems for the 747’s vertical fin during the 
climb. The other was whether the Shuttle’s low lift-to-drag ratio-made 
even lower by removal of the tailcone-would present serious piloting 
problems. After all, the descent rate of the craft would just about double, 
reducing flight time from over five to just over two minutes. Pending a 
decision to fly “tailcone off,” Shuttle testing continued with the Enterprise’s 
blunt end still sporting the pointed tailcone. 
Rain on the lakebed and other delays deferred the next free flight to 
13 September, when former X-15 pilot Joe Engle and copilot Dick 
Truly dropped down to the lake, all the while taking data on the craft’s 
longitudinal, lateral, and directional response and lift-to-drag and flutter 
characteristics during approach and landing. Nothing unusual aloft had 
occurred, but on the ground a power surge at Dryden had briefly caused 
a loss of all radar data. Fortunately, after a few minutes everything had 
come back on line and the flight had continued. Ten days later, Fred 
Hake and Gordon Fullerton completed the third Shuttle free flight, and 
events progressed so smoothly that NASA determined to commence 
tailcone-off testing with the very next flight. l 3  
At first, NASA and Rockwell had thought that a series of captive 
flights with the Shuttle minus its tailcone might be necessary to evaluate 
whether the buffeting loads on the 747’s vertical fin were acceptable. 
Mission planners soon realized that there was little point in such flights. 
The 747 could take off with the Shuttle; if the buffeting seemed excessive, 
the craft could simply abort the mission and land on the lakebed. In 
preparation for the flight, Rockwell and NASA technicians removed the 
tailcone from the Enterprise and replaced it with a configuration identical 
to what the Shuttle would have during reentry from space, including the 
three main Shuttle engine nozzles and the much smaller nozzles of the 
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orbital maneuvering subsystem. By this time, the massive press atten- 
tion that had focused on the earlier Shuttle flights had abated and 
day-to-day activities at Dryden were more tranquil. 
Mission planners decided that, during the takeoff roll and liftoff, Fitz 
Fulton would report any severe buffeting in the cabin. Bill Andrews 
would monitor the loads on the 747’s tail, and if he deemed them 
excessive, he would call “data abort,” terminating the flight. If the 747 
was still on the runway, this meant chopping power and stopping. If just 
airborne, the 747 could land straight ahead on the lakebed. If airborne, 
Fulton and Tom McMurtry would gingerly return the craft to Edwards. 
The actual flight on 12 October 1977 came off without difficulty. 
Again there was the early morning procession to the south lakebed and 
the long wait until takeoff, while some Air Force Phantoms shot landing 
approaches. When the 747-Shuttle rolled down the runway this time, 
observers watched for any indication of an abort. Then it was airborne 
and climbing out to the east, with no visible problems. At Dryden and 
Johnson, engineers checked monitors. The tail loads were within accept- 
able boundaries. After about 40 minutes, the 747-Enterprise became 
visible to the north, approaching the drop. Cameramen peered through 
telephoto lenses to catch the moment of separation. Fulton pushed into a 
shallow dive at 7680 meters above the desert. Thirty-eight seconds later, 
Joe Engle triggered the explosive bolts. The separation occurred over 
Peerless Valley; Enterprise nosed down sharply, descending over North 
Edwards on final approach to runway 17. It quickly became apparent 
that Enterprise would land right in the aiming area. The steep diving 
The Enterprise on itsJirst tailcone-ofiflight, 12 October 1977. 
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descent, with the Shuttle plunging to earth followed by its T-38 chase, 
brought exclamations of surprise even from those who had witnessed the 
earlier tailcone-on flights. Removing the tailcone certainly made a 
difference. In what seemed an incredibly brief time, Engle had pulled 
out of the dive into the landing flare and deployed the gear. There was 
no excess energy to worry about this time, and Enterprise plunked down, 
streamin a roostertail of playa dust, 2 minutes and 34 seconds after 
launch .3 
During the very brief flight the Shuttle had flown well, confirming 
earlier predictions and simulations. It was, in effect, simply a big X- 15. 
The next question was whether the Shuttle could be landed with 
confidence on a confined runway. It was a critical issue since NASA 
planned landing the Shuttle on 4600-meter runways at Vandenberg and 
Kennedy. For the next tailcone-off flight, NASA planned to land the 
Enterprise on the 4600-meter runway at Edwards. So  far, aside from the 
high and hot first landing, the Shuttle had had little difficulty in landing 
at a chosen spot on the lakebed runways, even with the tailcone off. 
Encouraged, NASA scheduled the fifth Shuttle free flight for 26 0ct0ber.l~ 
In that flight Enterpme encountered control problems just at touchdown. 
The Shuttle had been launched at an altitude of 5800 meters over the 
desert for a straight-in approach. Mission commander Fred Hake flew a 
536-kilometer-per-hour approach profile down to the flare maneuver; 
the Enterprise lost speed very slowly-much slower than the Shuttle’s 
Gulfstream I1 simulator. Passing across the runway threshold, the 
Enterprise was about 40 kilometers per hour faster than planned. Haise 
used the split-rudder speed brake to slow the craft and nosed down to 
force it onto the runway at the planned impact point. Instead, the 
Enterprise entered a left roll, which Haise corrected, touched down on its 
main landing gear, and bounced back into the air. Hake had brought on 
a “PIO’: pilot-induced oscillation. Copilot Gordon Fullerton told Haise 
to relax his grip on the controls, and the Enterprise damped out its rolling 
motions. It touched down again, bounced more shallowly, then touched 
down for the final time before coasting to a stop. The flight had an 
important VIP observer: Charles, the Prince of Wales. Prince Charles, a 
Royal Air Force pilot, was in the United States as part of a goodwill tour. 
While in Houston, he had “flown” the Shuttle simulator with Haise and 
Fullerton. Interestingly enough, during one “touchdown” the craft had 
bounced and Prince Charles had encountered the same sort of lateral 
P I 0  during the ensuing skip. The rugged arrival prompted NASA 
briefly to reconsider adding an additional tailcone-off flight, but mission 
planners decided that it was unnecessary. The astronauts themselves had 
no reservations about the Shuttle’s ability to land on concrete runways at 
Kennedy and Vandenberg, and their feelings did much to influence the 
decision not to add an extra flight. Dryden did undertake a landing study 
8 
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of the Shuttle the better to understand its low-speed handling and 
control characteristics. With their usual penchant for thoroughness, 
center personnel wanted no unresolved questions or doubts when the 
Shuttle whistled in to land from a mach 25 reentry sometime in 1981.16 
The fifth Shuttle free flight concluded Enterprise’s flight testing. 
Dryden now prepared for the task of ferrying the Enterprise aboard the 
747 to NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center for a series of ground 
vibration tests. Technicians reinstalled the tailcone aerodynamic fairing. 
Fulton and the 747 crew completed a series of test flights with the Shuttle 
in ferry condition (with its front attachment strut lowered slightly to 
improve the cruise performance of the two mated vehicles) in mid- 
November. All indications were that the Shuttle could easily be ferried 
atop the 747. On 10 March 1978 the Enterprise left the runway at Dryden 
for the last time. Fulton and his crew ferried the Shuttle to Ellington Air 
Force Base at Houston where, during a weekend stay, it was seen by 
240 000 viewers, creating, in the words of Houston police, “the largest 
traffic jam in Houston’s history.” 
While at Houston, the 747 crew and two other Dryden Shuttle 
project officers received NASA’s Exceptional Service Medal. Nine other 
Johnson and Kennedy center employees also received the Exceptional 
Service Medial, and Donald K. Slayton, project director for the approach 
and landing tests, received NASA’s Outstanding Leadership Medal. On 
13 March the 747-Enterprise departed from Ellington on a short flight to 
Huntsville. Seven thousand NASA and Redstone employees witnessed 
the arrival of the strange pair. The next day, cranes removed the Shuttle 
from the 747 preparatory to installing it in a special test rig at Marshall 
for a series of ground vibration tests simulating the loads a Shuttle would 
experience in flight. l7 
Dryden’s active role in Shuttle had come to an end, until the time in 
the future when another Shuttle would reenter from space over the 
Pacific and glide in for a landing on the Edwards lakebed. 
CONSOLIDATION 
For a while, things returned to normal at Dryden, The Blackbirds 
flew, the TACT continued its investigations, the DFBW F-8 roamed the 
sky. In the few years before the Shuttle Columbia landed at Dryden in 
early 1981, the center had all the appearances of going on much as 
before. A few new programs started up. The center began flight-testing 
the AD- 1, a cooperative venture between the Ames and Dryden centers 
using a specially made twin-jet research airplane with an oblique or 
“scissors” variable sweep wing developed by Robert T. Jones, the Ameri- 
can father of the sweptwing. During tests by project pilots Tom McMurtry 
and Fitz Fulton, the little AD- 1 swept its wing up to 60°, but at the most 
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The Ames-Dryden AD-1 oblique-wing testbed, flying with its adjustable wing in the 
fully swept (60’) position. 
extreme positions the AD - 1’s unpleasant flying characteristics negated 
the potential value of this configuration for future aircraft needing low 
drag and good energy efficiency at transonic speeds.” 
HiMat entered flight testing, gradually working up to high-g re- 
motely piloted manuevering trials. The center borrowed an Air Force 
KC- 135 and outfitted the four-engine tanker-transport with Whitcomb 
winglets, validating the concept of these energy-saving wingtip devices. 
An F- 14 arrived for a joint NASA-Navy program following preliminary 
testing by center personnel at Grumman’s New York test facility. And, 
finally, Dryden began tests with the second of two Bell XV-15 winged 
tilt-rotor convertiplanes as part of a joint V/STOL program with Ames. 
The XV-15 was capable of taking off and landing vertically like a 
helicopter, or of making short takeoffs and landings. In flight the aircraft 
changed into conventional flight with the “prop rotors” functioning as 
propellers. This program marked the beginning of center research in the 
field of rotary-wing aerodynamics, a field NASA had traditionally left to 
Ames and Langley. Dryden seemed stronger than ever, with a balanced 
group of aeronautical research programs and a critical role to play in the 
upcoming orbital flights of the Space Shuttle. This appearance was 
reaffirmed by the center’s second major bout with national publicity, at 
the time of the first orbital flight of the Space Shuttle Columbia in April 
198 1 .  Columbia landed at Dryden before thousands of onlookers and 
millions on worldwide TV. It was fitting that Columbia arrived at Edwards 
amid the rumbling of its own sonic booms, for Young and Crippen’s 
flight was in the grand tradition of Yeager, Crossfield, Apt, Knight, and 
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Under this tranquil surface, however, the wars of institutional 
assessment raged unabated. And within a month of Young and Crippen’s 
historic flight the outcome was announced by Dr. Alan Lovelace, NASA’s 
acting administrator. Four centers were to be combined: Dryden with 
Ames, and Wallops with Goddard. The smaller centers would retain their 
names (though as “facilities”) while becoming operational elements of the 
larger ones. Dryden and Wallops would be under the overall manage- 
ment and administrative direction of Ames and Goddard, respectively. 
Lovelace emphasized that the consolidations would better focus the 
resources of each center to accomplish what it did best: “The close 
relationship between Ames and Dryden’s efforts in aeronautical programs 
and Wallop’s amd Goddard’s efforts in suborbital programs, as well 
as the unique facility capabilities and the physical proximity of the 
installations provides an opportunity to improve overall program effec- 
tiveness through these consolidations.”” 
The consolidations were to be effective as of 1 October 1981. NASA 
Headquarters quickly assembled task and support teams to arrange the 
details. For the California centers, the task team consisted of the Ames 
and Dryden directors (Clarence Syvertson and Ike Gillam); Dr. Walter B. 
Olstad, NASA’s acting administrator for aeronautics and space technology; 
and Jack Boyd, an associate director of Ames and former deputy director 
at Dryden. The support team consisted of the heads of the Ames and 
Dryden directorates affected by the consolidation. By early August, the 
teams had developed a plan for the consolidation, a plan that drew quick 
approval from NASA’s new administrator, James M. Beggs. Dryden would 
become a directorate of Ames. The aeronautical research activities at the 
two locations would be integrated and all staff functions for the two 
centers would be combined; there were to be nei er forced layoffs nor 
relocations as a result of the consolidation. The team estimated that though 
the plan would become effective on 1 October, it would take 30 months to 
implement fully. Selected Ames research aircraft, such as the two XV- 15s 
and the Quiet Short-Haul Research Aircraft (QSRA), would be trans- 
ferred to Dryden. Ames, in essence, would retain only those aircraft in- 
volved in the center’s extensive space sciences and earth resources- remote 
sensing programs, such as the GaZiZeo 11, C-41 Kuiper Airborne Observa- 
tory, U-2, and ER-2 aircraft.” 
It was Wellington who wrote, “Nothing except a battle lost can be half 
so melancholy as a battle won.” In the wars of institutional assessment 
that smoldered within NASA, misery afflicted both winners and losers. 
To Dryden’s staff, it seemed a poor reward for years of services 
rendered. But Ames lost an aspect of local research that center had 
always treasured-her on-site flight testing and the Crow’s Landing test 
site. Ames may have gained Dryden, but Dryden expanded its dominion 
over the agency’s flight testing activities. 
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The Hugh L. Dryden Flight Research Center shortly after its dedication in 1976. The 
Space Shuttle Enterprise atop its carrier aircraft is at the extreme top. Among other 
aircraft visible are a DC-3 at the top of the apron, a 8-52 carrier aircraft at center, and 
two YF-12s at middle right. 
But was it, in fact, a case of a heartless headquarters forcibly 
consolidating two centers having differing philosophies and orientations? 
Or, was it inevitable, a story that smacked, at least to those with a sense of 
historical cynicism, more of Carthage and Rome? 
In truth, it was an understandable trade-off, given agency history 
over the previous decade. As much as any occurrence is, it was inevitable. 
To explain the decision in other than bland terms of NASA's reorganiza- 
tion pronouncements, it is necessary to consider three questions: Why 
consolidate? Why consolidate Dryden? Why consolidate Dryden with 
Ames? 
NASA's budgetary woes in the post-Apollo era and the rising costs of 
the Space Shuttle dictated a retrenching, a pulling back. It made both 
economic and administrative sense to streamline the structure reporting 
to the NASA administrator by reducing the number of independent 
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centers, eliminating wasteful duplication if it existed, and developing 
strong cooperative bonds between organizational elements having re- 
lated if dissimilar interests in certain areas of aerospace technology. This 
is the doctrine of the hand and glove, or knife and fork. It is a managerial 
trend that has gained great support in recent years, emphasizing team- 
work in place of “go it alone” efforts. With the challenges that faced 
NASA in the 197Os, it was certain that some consolidation would take 
place. Although many partisans at Dryden and other centers had feared 
abolishment of their centers, this time that was not seriously considered. 
Both Wallops and Dryden play roles that could not economically be 
assumed by the other centers. Wallops’s long experience with sounding 
rockets make it the lead center for that vehicle. Dryden, of course, has an 
unmatched expertise in flight testing of complex, high-technology aero- 
space vehicles. In its entire history, it has never received anything but the 
greatest praise from NASA administrators. Dryden and Wallops, then, 
were not candidates for destruction. But they were prime candidates for 
reorganization and consolidation, which leads to the second question, 
Why consolidate Dryden? 
There are several possible answers, all interrelated. The answer 
really involves questions of size, budget, and research. As figure 6 and 
appendix A, B, C, and D indicate, Dryden has always been one of the 
smallest centers. The organization charts indicate a much smaller staff 
with a smaller range of administrative units. It has a much clearer 
organizational mission: “to plan, conduct, analyze, and report on flight 
In 1973 Center Director Lee Scherer announced that his 
goal was “to maintain a position of pre-eminence in the conduct of flight 
research in support of military and civil national needs.”22 The center 
could do this, he believed, by pursuing five objectives: 
1. Flight research of new design concepts and new flight regimes. 
2. Flight research directed toward improving flight safety and/or 
3. Attain recognized national pre-eminence in applied control 
4. Search for improved cost-effective methods of conducting flight 




Scherer had concluded that over the next decade, the center would find 
its “flight research programs . . . more closely tied to the discipline capabili- 
ties of the larger centers with greater consolidation of flight work here.”23 
Dryden was little larger than Wallops in size of its staff, and about as 
specialized in its own way as the east coast facility. Its budget was nowhere 
near as great as the three major OAST centers, Langley, Lewis, and 
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1960 62 E4 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 
Year 
Figure 6. Personnel growth and decline for Dryden, Ames, Langley, and Lewis research 
centers, 1 959 - 1 980. 
however, could be misleading. If the wind tunnels at Langley, Ames, and 
Lewis were the most visible symbols of aeronautical research, research 
airplanes were no less important laboratory tools. 
Related to the question of consolidating Dryden was the question of 
its research. The center has always participated in frontier-pushing and 
critically important flight research, though much of that research has 
been in conjunction with other NACA-NASA centers. This tradition goes 
back to the days of the old NACA Muroc Flight Test Unit. The following 
is a list of selected Dryden research activities through the years, together 
with the center that originated the concept. 
Research Area Originating Center 
“Round One” aircraft Langley, USAAF, USN 
“Round TWO” (X- 15) 
“Round Three” (X-20) 
Langley, primarily 
Langley, USAF 
Lifting bodies Ames, Langley, USAF 
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Reseurch Area Originating Center 
Paresev (paraglider research 
XB-70A Langley, Ames, NASA OART 
YF- 12 
F-8 SCW-F- 11 1 TACT 
AD- 1 oblique wing Ames 
HiMAT NASA OAST, USAF 
XV-15 Ames, Army 
Space Shuttle Johnson, Marshall 
In these projects DFRC has been charged with working with a con- 
cept in a particularly important way. For example, Whitcomb developed 
the supercritical wing, DFRC demonstrated it. Ames and Langley con- 
ceived the lifting bodies, DFRC validated them. DFRC has also shown 
great initiative in starting critically needed flight research-such as the 
proof-of-concept flight testing of the lifting body concept and the Rogallo 
concept-but DFRC has not been able to compete with either Ames or 
Langley in developing theoretical concepts. DFRC excels in what it was 
intended to be: a flight test center for the entire agency, with specialized 
strengths in high-speed flight. Dryden has made strong contributions in 
simulation (as in the LLRV-LLTV program) and with such developments 
as the remotely piloted research vehicles and the center’s digital fly-by- 
wire flight-control testbeds. It might be said that Dryden has been the 
diligent craftsman, testing out the ideas of others and improving on 
them. 
Dryden has always shown a strong tendency to work project-by- 
project with another NACA-NASA center, especially Langley and Ames. 
Flight research and research on the ground should be closely related, and 
there has to be a partnership between the flight-test aircraft and the wind 
tunnel. Dryden, as viewed from Headquarters, was ripe for consolidation. 
And that meant with one of the three major OAST centers, Langley, 
Ames, or Lewis. 
Which brings this discussion to the last question, Why consolidate 
Dryden with Ames? This question is perhaps the easiest to answer. Dry- 
den was spawned by Langley, as were most of the NACA-NASA centers. 
Under NACA, the Muroc-Edwards facility did not seem the small anom- 
aly that it became within the larger NASA. Even in the early years, 
however, administration of the Muroc center proved awkward, and there 
were some feelings of unease on the part of the Ames administrators as 
Space Task Group (Johnson 
vehicle) forerunner) 
Ames, USAF, NASA OART 
Langley 
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the Langley offshoot grew up in their backyard. The Muroc unit, soon to 
become the HSFS, quickly developed ties with Ames; following the sever- 
ance of its final links with Langley’s administration in 1954, rapport 
between the California centers became very close. Lewis never really 
counted; Lewis was an engine research center, so Dryden had at best 
minimal contact with it. 
Dryden worked principally with Ames and Langley, In the 1960s, 
with Ames studying lifting bodies and programs such as the SST and 
advanced supersonic aircraft, the connections between Dryden and Ames 
tightened even further. There were some differences between them: 
Dryden usually emphasized high speed, Ames usually low speed with 
V/STOL. But the differences were complementary, not mutually destruc- 
tive or exclusive. Except for Dryden, Ames was the smallest of the QAST 
centers. Their combination would tend to equalize the size of the remain- 
ing centers. Geography certainly favored the alliance. Separated by only a 
few hundred kilometers, Ames and its wind tunnels and analytical 
branches naturally could complement Dryden and its real-world flight 
testing just down the road. 
Some of the history-makers: DFRC’s research pilot stafl, including (left to right) Milt 
Thompson (later DFRC associate director), Fitz Fulton, Bruce Peterson (later chief of 
safety), Don Mallick, John Manke, Einar Enevoldson, Bill Dana, and Tom McMurtry. 
Not shown are Gary Krier, Steve Ishmael, and the late Mike Swann. 
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As popularly interpreted, Dryden “lost” to Ames. But in fact, both 
centers gained much. It was a good ground research-flight research 
mix. Gillam, in discussions at Headquarters, got the best possible deal for 
his center. Ames lost a large portion of its own flight research activities 
and aircraft to Dryden; Dryden’s staff-always happier with hands-on 
research than administration anyway-could luxuriate in having traded 
administrative burden for more aircraft and time to work on them. 
IN RETROSPECT 
It would not be fair to Dryden, Ames, or NASA to close on a 
downbeat note such as: 
HUGH L. DRYDEN FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER 
1946- 1981 
R.I.P. 
Dryden is very much alive and well. It has merely undergone a change of 
status. Indeed, elimination of Dryden as a separate independent NASA 
center equal with Langley, Ames, and Lewis merely eliminated a fiction. 
Dryden was always the smallest, always the most specialized, always the 
service center. The reorganization did not reflect on the quality or level 
of work of the center and its people. Indeed, Dryden has always enjoyed 
an excellent reputation within and outside of NASA, and the agency 
foresees a broad range of programs and tasks for DFRC in the years 
ahead. 
Hugh Latimer Dryden, a man who grew up with the airplane, was 
fond of remarking that the most important tool in aeronautical research 
is the human mind. The story of his center is not at an end. The story will 
go on as long as there are those who dream dreams and those who seek to 








Organization Charts, 1948 - 198 1 
A WORD ABOUT FRC/DFRC ORGANIZATION 
Unlike other field centers under the NASA Headquarters OAKT/OAST 
office, Flight Research Center, later Dryden Flight Research Center, has always 
been small, with a single overriding purpose: flight research using advanced 
aerospace research vehicles. Thus changes of major significance in its administra- 
tive organization have been few. T h e  1948 chart reflects the close identity of the 
Muroc Flight Test Unit with specific aircraft programs. As the unit expanded to 
station and eventually center size, gaining autonomy along the way, its adminis- 
trative organization of necessity became broader and more in line with that of 
other NACNNASA research facilities. As indicated in chapters 3 and 6, the 
center's organization remained largely unchanged in 1960 from the days of the 
station in 1954; there was strong continuity from the period of HSFS Director 
Walter C. Williams to the period of FRC Director Paul F. Bikle. Organization 
charts for 1960 through 1966 also reflect continuity. Even into the 1970s, under 
Director Lee R. Scherer (1975 chart), FRC organization remained strongly 
oriented along previous lines, mainly structured around four key directorates: 
Research, Data Systems, Flight Operations, and Administration. Under Center 
Director David Scott (1976 chart) came the first significant departure from the 
previous structural framework, with the addition of two new directorates, 
Aeronautical Projects and Shuttle Operations. 
On the eve of consolidation with Ames Research Center, DFRC's structure 
showed further changes introduced by Director Isaac Gillam. By 1979, the 
traditional directorate structure had disappeared, replaced by a more central- 
ized and integrated one built around a strong executive-staff support network 
and three major directorates: Engineering, Flight Operations and Support, and 
Administration (see chart for  1979). These changes reflected the wishes of 
NASA as a whole to consolidate the functions of the centers both within the 
contexts of the centers themselves and that of the agency as a whole. These same 
wishes were responsible for eventual decision to merge DFRC and ARC into a 
single operating administrative unit (see chapter 1 1). 
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dAs of 30 September 1980. 
SOURCE: NASA Office of Management Operations data. 
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Appendix C 
HS FS/FRC/D FRC Technical Facilities 















































NO~E: It is worth remembering that the FRC/DFRC's greatest research resources have been the 
experimental aircraft themselves, which are analogous to the wind tunnels, shock tubes, etc., at other 
centers. DFRC's need for specialized facilities on the ground for testing and research has thus 
traditionally been far less than other NACA-NASA centers. In a 1973 OAST research evaluation, 
DFRC's major facilities listed only 1 ground laboratory (for high-temperature loads calibration) and 
10 specialized flight research aircraft, an appropriate example of the importance attached to re- 
search aircraft. 
SOURCE: NASA Office of Management Operations data. 
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Major HSFSIFRCIDFRC Technical Facilities 
(Not including specialized flight research 
aircraft, for which see appendix E.) 
Facility Year cost Research 
Built (thousands) 
Air Vehicle Flight 1956 
Simulation Facility 
High Range Tracking Net 
Edwards Station 1958 
Ely Station 1958 
Beatty Station 1958 
Voice Communications 1963 
Facility 
Runway Noise Acquisition 1964 










Flight planning, pilot 
training, systems analysis, 
vehicle handling qualities, 
and flight-data analysis. 
Analog and digital trajectory 
data, telemetry reception and 
processing and voice 
communications for real-time 
and postflight analysis in support 
of X- 15 and other 
high-performance aircraft 
testing. 
Voice communications for 
real-time support of high- 
performance aircraft testing. 
Determination of aircraft 
takeoff and landing noise levels. 
Heating, loading, and 
calibration of aircraft and 
components. 
~~ 
SOURCE: NASA Technical Facilities Catalog (Washington, D.C.: NASA, March 1967), I, section 3. 
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Authorized Funding for Research 
and Program Management 
at FRC/DFRC, Other OARTIOAST Centers, and NASA 
(in millions) 





































































































































"As of 30 September 1980. 
SOURCE NASA Office of Management Operations data. 
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Appendix E 
HSFS/FRC/DFRC Research Aircraft, 194'7 - 1980 
Aircraft operated by NACA and NASA for NACA and NASA testing. Times 
refer only to period actually operated by NACA or NASA at the center. 
1. Piloted Experimental Research Aircraft 
Aircraft - Serial NACNNASA Number Code Remarks 
Bell XS-1 #2 
Bell X- 1A 
Bell X- 1B 
Bell X- 1E 
Douglas X-3 
Northrop X-4 #1 
Northrop X-4 #2 
Bell X-5 #1 
Convair XF-92A 
Douglas D-558- 1 #1 
Douglas D-558- 1 #2 
Douglas D-558- 1 #3 
Douglas D-558-2 #1 
Douglas D-558-2 #2 
Douglas D-558-2 #3 
North American X-15 #1 
North American X- 15 #2 






































Flown 1955, destroyed. 
Flown 1956- 1958. 
Rebuilt from XS-1 #2, 
flown 1955-1958. 
Flown 1954-1956. 
Acquired 1950, but used 
only for spares support. 
Flown 1950- 1954. 
Flown 1952- 1955. 
Flown 1953. 
Acquired 1949, for spares. 
Flown 1948, destroyed. 
Flown 1949-1953. 
Flown 1956 after storage. 
Flown 1949- 1956. 
Flown 1950- 1956. 
Flown 1960- 1968. 
Damaged in landing 
accident in 1962, rebuilt as 
X- 15A-2. Retired 1968. 
Destroyed in 1967. 
279 
ON THE FRONTIER 
1. Piloted Experimental Research Aircrafl, Continued 
Aircraft Serial NACAINASA Number Code Remarks 
NASA FRC Paresev N-9765Z - Flown 1962- 1964. 
NASA FRC M2-F1 N-86652 - Flown 1963-1964. 
Northrop M2 - F2, M2 - F3 - NASA 803 Flown 1966- 1967. 
Damaged in landing ac- 
cident. Rebuilt as M2-F3, 
flown, retired in 1972. 
Northrop HL- 10 - NASA 804 Flown 1966- 1970. 
Martin X-24A, X-24B 66-13551 - Flown 1969-1971. Rebuilt 




- _. Flown 1964- 1966; sent 
to JSC; crashed 1968. 
- - Flown 1967; sent to JSC, 
returned to FRC; retired. 
North American XB-70A # I  62-0001 - Flown 1967- 1969. 
Lockheed YF- 12A 60-6935 DFRC 935d Flown 1969- 1978. 
Lockheed YF- 12A 60-0936 - Flown 1970, destroyed 
Lockheed YF- 12C 60-0937 DFRC 937" Flown 1972- 1979. 
Vought TF-SA SCW 141353 NASA 8 10 Flown 197 1 - 1973. 
Vought F-8C DFBW 145546 NASA 802 Flown 1972; ongoing. 
Gen. Dynamics F- 11 1A TACT 63-9778 - Flown 1972; ongoing. 
Gen. Dynamics F- 11 1E IPCS 67-01 15 - Flown 1974- 1976. 
(Air Force flight). 
Boeing 747 N-905NA NASA 905 Flown 1974; ongoing. 
Shuttle ferry aircraft. 
Boeing NKC- 135A 55-3129 - Flown 1979- 1980, winglets. 
Lockheed Jetstar N-814NA NASA 814 GPAS, flown 1965; ongoing. 
Ames-Dryden AD- 1 N-805NA NASA 805 Flown 1979-1982. 
"Informal code; NASA 900 series assigned to Johnson Space Center. 
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2.  Remotely Piloted Research Vehicles 
- -  
Aircraft Serial Number NACAINASA Code Remarks 
“Mother” - - Radio-controlled model 
flown to launch other 
models. Flown 
1962- 1968. 
Hyper 111 - - Launched from heli- 
copter. One flight in 
1969. 
Piper PA-30 N-808NA NASA 808 Flown as RPRV in 1971. 
F- 15 RPRV#l and #2 - - Launched from B-52; 
first flown 1973, one 
flying as DFRC Spin 
Research Vehicle (SRV). 
Flown 1979; ongoing. HiMAT #I  and #2 - - 
- Flown 1975; ongoing. Mini-Sniffer I, 11, 111 - 
DAST - - Flight loads alleviation 
testbed; destroyed 1980. 
3 .  Military Models Flown on Experimental Research Flights 
Aircraft Serial NACA/NASA Number Code Remarks 





North American F- lOOA 
North American F- lOOC 
North American F- IOOC 
North American JF- lOOC 
44 -84958 
45-59488 
















Dives to 0.8 mach; also used 
for proficiency flights. 
Flown 1950- 1954, primarily 
proficiency. 
Flown 1949-1954; vortex 
generator research. 
Flown 1954- 1956; pitch-up 
research. 
Flown 1954 for AF pitch-up 
research. 
Flown 1954- 1960. 
Flown 1956- 1957. 
Flown 1957-1961. 
Flown 1960- 1964; variable- 
stability studies. Transferred 
to FRC from Ames. 
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3 .  Military Models Flown on Experimental Research Flights, Continued 
Aircraft Serial NACAINASA Number Code Remarks 
McDonnell F-1OIA 53-2432 
Convair YF- 102 53- 1785 
Convair F- 102A 54- 1374 
Lockheed YF- 104A 55-296 1 
Lockheed F- 104A 56-734 
Lockheed F- 104A 56-749 
Lockheed F- 104B 57-1303 
Lockheed F- 104N N-O11NA 
Lockheed F- 104N N-O12NA 
Lockheed F- 104N N-Ol3NA 
Lockheed F- 104A 56-790 
Lockheed TF- 104G - 
Lockheed TF- 104G - 
Lockheed F- 104G - 
Republic F- 105B 54- 102 
North American YF-lO7A 55-51 18 
North American YF-107A 55-5120 
Gen. Dynamics F- 11 1A 
Gen. Dynamics F- 11 1A 
McDonnell F-4A 145313 
63-9771 
63-9777 








NASA 01 1 















Flown 1956; for pilot 
familiarization. 
Flown 1954- 1958. 
Flown 1956- 1959. 
Flown 1956- 1975. 
Flown 1957- 1961. 
Flow: 1959- 1962, destroyed. 
Flown 1959- 1978. 2-seat. 
Flown 1963-on. Special 
F- 104 version for FRC. 
F- 104 version for FRC. 
F- 104 version for FRC. 
Destroyed in mid-air collision, 
1966. 
Replacement for 0 13. 
Ex Luftwaffe; received 
in 1975. 
Ex Luftwaffe; received in 
1975. 
Ex Luftwafle; received in 
1975. 
Flown 1959; familiarization. 
Flown 1957-1958; grounded 
for spares support. 




Flown 1966- 1967; damaged 
in flight, retired. 
Flown 1961. Transferred to 
Ames in 1963 for SST 
studies. 
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3. Military Models Flown on Experimental Research Flights, Continued 
Aircraft Serial NACAINASA Number Code Remarks 
Douglas F5D- 1 142350 NASA 213 Flown 1961-1970. 
Northrop YF- 17 70- 1569 - Flown 1976. 
McDonnell Douglas F- 15A 71 -0281 - Flown 1975; ongoing. 
McDonnell Douglas F-15A 71-0287 - Flown 1975; ongoing. 
Grumman F- 14A 157991 DFRC 991" Flown 1979; ongoing. 
North American A-5A 147858 - Flown in 1963; SST work. 
Boeing JTB - 29A 45-2 1800 - X- 1 series mothership, 
Boeing B-29A 45-21787 NACA 137 33-558-2 mothership, flown 
Boeing B-47A 49-1900 NACA 150 Flown 1953-1957. 
Boeing KC- 135A (unknown) - Flown 1957; damaged in 
mid-air collision, retired. 
Boeing KC- 135A 55 -3 124 - Replacement; flown 1958. 
Boeing NB-52B 52-008 DFRC 008" Mothership; ongoing. 
"Unofficial NASA code. 
!down 1955-1958. 
1951 - 1959. 
4. Miscellaneous Models Flown on Experimental Research Flights 
Mostly light aircraft flown as part of an FRC 
general-aviation safety survey, 1964- 1966. Piper PA-30 and 
Aero Commander were exceptions. 
Aircraft Serial Number NACAINASA Remarks 
Cessna 0- 1A (L- 19A) 51 -2220 - Flown 1962. 
Cessna TO-IA (L-19G) ??-4128 - 
Beech Debonair N -4307 - 
Beech (?) N5849K - Flown 1965. 
Cessna 3 10 8199M16-1 - 
Cessna 2 10 N-910V - Flown 1965. 
Flown 1965. 
Flown 1966. 
Flown 1963- 1964. 
Flown 1964- 1965. 
Flown 1964- 1965. 
Piper Apache N-4383P - 
Piper (?) N-7845Y - 
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4. Miscellaneous Models Flown on Experimental Research Flights, Continued 
Aircraft Serial Number NACNNASA Remarks 
Piper PA-30 N-8351Y NASA 808 Flown 1967, later as RPRV, 
and then as general mis- (later 
N -808NA) sion support aircraft. 
(later 
Aero Commander N-6297X NASA 80 1 Flown 1963; ongoing. 
N - 80 1 N A) 
Bell XV- 15 #I  N-702NA NASA 702" Flown 1981; ongoing. 
Bell XV-15 #2 N-703NA NASA 703" Flown 1980; ongoing. 
dNASA-Army tilt-rotor research program mdndged by Ames Research Center. 
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X- 1 Program Flight Chronology, 1946- 1958 
This chronology covers all the flights of X- 1 series aircraft built and flown. NACA 
operated the X- 1 #2, X- 1 A, X- lB, and X- 1E (the rebuilt X- 1 #2). In the interest of 
completeness, and because of the close NACA- Air Force-Bell relationship in the entire 
program, flights of the other aircraft are also listed. The X-1 series aircrafi were air- 
launched from modified Boeing B-29 or B-50 Superfortress bombers. 
1. XS-1 # I  ( X- 1  -l), Serial 46-062, Flights 
Date Remarks 
~ 
Bell Contractor Flights 
19 Jan. 1946 
5 Feb. 












At Pinecastle AAF, Florida 
Bell flight 1 ,  Jack Woolams, pilot. Familiarization. 
Bell flight 2, Woolams. 
Bell flight 3, Woolams. 
Bell flight 4, Woolams. Gear retracted, left wing 
damaged. 
Bell flight 5, Woolams. Nosewheel retracted on 
landing runout. Landing-gear door damaged. 
Bell flight 6, Woolams. Static directional stability 
investigation. 
Bell flight 7, Woolams. Longitudinal and direc- 
tional stability investigation. 
Bell flight 8, Woolams. Dynamic stability check. 
Bell flight 9, Woolams. Rate of roll investigation. 
Bell flight 10, Woolams. Static longitudinal stability 
investigation. 
At Muroc Dry Lake, California 
Bell flight 1 1 ,  Chalmers Goodlin. Glide flight and 
stall check. 
Bell flight 12, Goodlin. Nosewheel damaged. First 
powered flight of XS- 1 # 1 aircraft. 
Bell flight 13, Goodlin. Handling qualities check. 
Bell flight 14, Goodlin. Same as flight 13. 
Bell flight 15, Goodlin. Same as flight 13. 
Bell flight 16, Goodlin. Buffet-boundary investiga- 
tion. Aileron-damper malfunction. 
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1 .  X S - 1  # I  ( X- 1  - l ) ?  Serial 46-062, Flights, Continued 
Date Remarks 
19 May 1947 
21 May 
5 June 
Air Force Flights 

























Bell flight 17, Goodlin. Buffet-boundary investiga- 
Bell flight 18, Goodlin. Same as flight 17. 
Bell flight 19, Goodlin. Demonstration flight for 
tion. 
Aviation Writers Association. 
AF glide flight 1, Capt. Charles E. Yeager. Pilot 
AF glide flight 2, Yeager. Same as flight 1. 
AF glide flight 3, YeageI. Same as flight 1. 
AF powered flight 1, Yeager. Mach 0.85. 
AF flight 2, Yeager. About mach 0.89. Telemeter 
failure required repeat of this flight. 
AF flight 3, Yeager. Repeat of flight 2. 
AF flight 4, Yeager. Mach 0.91. Stability and 
control investigation. 
AF flight 5, Yeager. Mach 0.92. Check of elevator 
and stabilizer effectiveness. Also buffet investi- 
gation. 
familiarization. 
AF flight 6, Yeager. Same as flight 5. 
AF flight 7, Yeager. Airspeed calibration flight. 
Plane attained mach 0.925. 
AF flight 8, Yeager. Stability and control investi- 
gation. Plane attained mach 0.997. 
AF flight 9, Yeager. World’s first supersonic flight 
by a manned aircraft. XS- 1 #1 attained mach 
1.06 at 43,000 ft., approximately 700 mph. 
AF flight 10, Yeager. Electric power failure. No 
rocket. 
AF flight 11, Yeager. Telemeter failure. 
AF flight 12, Yeager. Repeat of flight 11. 
AF flight 13, Yeager. 
AF flight 14, Yeager. 
AF flight 15, Yeager. 
AF flight 16, Yeager. Mach 1.35 at 48 600 ft. 
AF flight 17, Yeager. Airspeed calibration. 
AF flight 18, Yeager. Pressure distribution survey. 
AF flight 19, Yeager. Same as flight 18. Mach 1.1. 
AF flight 20, Capt. James T. Fitzgerald, Jr. Engine 
fire after launch forced jettisoning of propel- 
lants; completed as a glide flight. 
AF flight 21, Yeager. Attained mach 1.25 in dive. 
AF flight 22, Yeager. Attained mach 1.45 at 40 130 
ft (957 mph) during dive. Fastest flight ever 





1. XS-1 #I (X-1 -l), Serial 46-062, Flights, Continued 
Date Remarks 
31 Mar. 1948 
6 Apr. 
7 Apr. 
AF flight 23, Yeager. Engine shutdown after launch. 
Propellants jettisoned, completed as glide flight. 
AF flight 24, Fitzgerald. Pilot-check flight. Mach 
1.1, during 4-cylinder run at 4 1 000 ft. 
AF flight 25, Maj. Gustav E. Lundquist. Glide 
flight only. 
AF flight 26, Fitzgerald. Familiarization flight. 
AF flight 27, Lundquist. Powered pilot-check flight. 
AF flight 28, Lundquist. Pressure distribution sur- 
vey. Only cylinders 2 and 4 ignited. 
AF flight 29, Fitzgerald. Aborted because of incon- 
sistent rocket operation. Reached mach 0.9. 
AF flight 30, Lundquist. Pressure distribution sur- 
vey. Attained mach 1.18. 
AF flight 31, Fitzgerald. Same as flight 30. Mach 
1.15. 
AF flight 32, Lundquist. Stability and control and 
buffeting investigation. Mach 0.92 
AF flight 33, Fitzgerald. Buffet investigation, wing 
and tail loads. Mach 1.08. 
AF flight 34, Yeager. Same as flight 33. Mach 1.05. 
AF flight 35, Lundquist. Left main gear door 
opened in flight. Nosewheel collapsed on landing. 
AF flight 36, Yeager. Handling qualities and wing 
and tail loads at mach 1. 
AF flight 37, Yeager. Same as flight 36. 
AF flight 38, Yeager. Wing and tail loads during 
supersonic flight at high altitudes. Mach 1.09. 
AF flight 39, Yeager. Rocket takeoff from the 
ground. 
AF flight 40, Capt. Jack Ridley, pilot. Familiariza- 
tion flight. Mach 1.23 at 35 000 ft. Small engine 
fire due to loose igniter. 
AF flight 41, Col. Albert Boyd, pilot. Familiariza- 
tion flight. Inflight engine fire and shutdown. 
AF flight 42, Maj. Frank Everest, Familiarization 
flight. Mach 1.22 at 40 000 ft. 
AF flight 43, Everest. Check of pressure suit for 
altitude operation. Mach 1.24 at 48 000 ft. Rocket 
fire and automatic engine shEtdown. 
transonic speeds. Mach 1.1 at 40 000 ft. 
cylinders fired. 
faulty engine ignition plug. 
jamming rudder. Everest landed safely. 













5 Jan. 1949 









AF flight 44, Ridley. Accelerated stall check at 
AF flight 45, Everest, Altitude attempt. Only 2 
AF flight 46, Yeager. Partial engine malfunction, 
AF flight 47, Everest. Engine chamber exploded, 
AF flight 48, Everest. Altitude attempt. Attained 
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1. X S- I  # I  (X- I  -I), Serial 46-062, Flights, Continued 
Date Remarks 











AF flight 49, Everest. Altitude attempt. Attained 
7 1 902-ft altitude. 
AF flight 50, Everest. First use of partial pressure 
suit to save life of pilot during flight at high 
altitude. X- 1 # 1 lost cockpit pressurizationabout 
69 000 ft. Everest made safe emergency descent. 
AF flight 51, Lt. Col. Patrick Fleming, pilot. Pilot 
familiarization; attained mach 1.2. 
AF flight 52, Maj. Richard L. Johnson, pilot. Pilot 
familiarization. 
AF flight 53, Everest. High-altitude wing-and-tail- 
loads investigation. 
AF flight 54, Everest. Same as flight 53. 
AF flight 55, Everest. Wing-and-tail-loads investi- 
AF flight 56, Yeager. Lateral stability and control 
AF flight 57, Ridley. Buffeting, wing and tail loads. 
AF flight 58, Ridley. Same as flight 57. 
AF flight 59, Yeager. Last flight of X- 1 #l. Flight 
made for camera footage for motion picture Jet 
Pilot. Aircraft subsequently retired and presented 
to the Smithsonian Institution. 
gation. 
investigation. 
2. X S- I  #2 ( X- I  -2), Serial 46-063, Flights 
Date Remarks 
Bell Contractor Flights 






8 Jan. 1947 
17 Jan. 
22 Jan. 
Bell flight 1, Chalmers Goodlin, pilot. Glide flight, 
Bell flight 2, Goodlin. Glide flight. 
Bell flight 3, Goodlin. Glide flight, stall check. 
Bell flight 4, Goodlin. Glide flight, check of fuel- 
jettison system. 
Bell flight 5, Goodlin. First XS- 1 powered flight. 
Mach 0.79 at 35 000 ft. Minor engine fire. 
Bell flight 6, Goodlin. Familiarization powered 
flight. 
Bell flight 7, Goodlin. Buffet boundary investiga- 
tion. Mach 0.80 at 35 000 ft. 
Bell flight 8, Goodlin. Same as flight 7. Full-power 
climb. Plane reached mach 0.82. 





2. XS- 1 #2 (X-1-2), Serial 46-063, Flights, Continued 
Remarks Date 

























Bell flight 10, Goodlin. Same as flight 8. 
Bell flight 11, Goodlin. Accelerated stalls. Partial 
power due to faulty engine igniters. Mach 0.75. 
Bell flight 12, Goodlin. Same as flight 7. Mach 0.7. 
Bell flight 13, Goodlin. Machmeter calibration. 
Bell flight 14, Goodlin. Same as flight 7. 
Bell flight 15, Goodlin. Accelerated stalls. 
Bell flight 16, Goodlin. Flight aborted after drop 
because of low engine-chamber pressure. 
Bell flight 17, Alvin M. Johnston. Pilot familiariza- 
tion flight. Mach 0.72, 8 g pullout. 
Bell flight 18, Goodlin. Airspeed calibration flight 
to mach 0.72. End of Bell contractor program. 
NACA acceptance flight. Capt. Charles E. Yeager. 
Number 4 cylinder burned out. 
NACA glide-familiarization flight for NACA pilot 
Herbert H. Hoover. Stall check. Nosewheel col- 
lapsed on landing. 
NACA powered flight 1, Hoover. Familiarization. 
Mach 0.84. No telemetry record. 
NACA flight 2, Hoover. Same as flight 1. Mach 0.8. 
NACA flight 3, Hoover. Turns and pull-ups to 
buffet. Mach 0.74. 
NACA flight 4, Hoover. Turns and pull-ups to 
buffet. Mach 0.83. 
NACA flight 5, Howard C. Lilly. Pilot familiariza- 
tion. 
NACA flight 6, Lilly. Turns and pull-ups to buffet. 
Sideslips. Mach 0.76. 
NACA flight 7, Hoover. Stabilizer effectiveness in- 
vestigation. Mach 0.82 at 29 000 ft. 
NACA flight 8, Hoover. Attempted high-speed 
run aborted at mach 0.83, drop in chamber 
pressure. 
NACA flight 9, Hoover. High-speed run to mach 
0.925 at 38 000 ft. Cylinders 2 and 3 failed to 
fire. 
NACA flight 10, Hoover. High-speed run to mach 
0.943 at 40 000 ft. 
NACA flight 1 1, Hoover. First NACA supersonic 
flight. First civilian supersonic flight. 
Mach 1.065. Nosewheel failed to extend for 
landing. Minor damage. 
NACA flight. 12, Hoover. Stability and loads in- 
vestigation. Mach 1.12. 
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2. X S- 1  #2 (X-1-2) ,  Serial 46-063, Flights, Continued 
Date Remarks 






















NACA flight 13, Hoover. Same as flight 12 Mach 
NACA flight 14, Lilly. Same as flight 12. Plane 
NACA flight 15, Lilly. Engine failed to ignite. 
NACA flight 16, Lilly. Save ?s flight 12. Mach 
NACA flight 17, Lilly. Same as flight 12. Plane’s 
0.90. 
attained mach 1.1. 
Propellants jettisoned, completed as glide flight. 
0.89. 
nosewheel collapsed on landing. Moderate dam- 
age. 
NACA flight 18, Hoover. Stability and control. 
Mach 0.9. Number 4 cylinder failed to fire. 
NACA flight 19, Hoover. Same as flight 18. Also 
pressure-distribution survey. Mach 0.98. 
NACA flight 20, Robert A. Champine. Pilot fa- 
miliarization. Check on handling qualities and 
pressure distribution. 
NACA flight 21, Champine. Check on handling 
qualities and pressure distribution. Mach 0.88. 
NACA flight 22, Champine. Same as flight 21. 
NACA flight 23, Champine. Same as flight 21. 
Plane exceeded mach 1 briefly. 
NACA flight 24, Champine. Check on airplane 
instrumentation. Mach 0.88 at 40 000 ft. 
NACA flight 25, Champine. Spanwise pressure 
distribution, stability and control. Mach 0.91. 
NACA flight 26, Champine. Same as flight 25. 
Mach 0.9 1 .  Stabi!izer found more effective than 
the elevator during pull-ups at mach 0.91. 
NACA flight 27, Champine. Same as flight 25. 
Rolls and pull-ups around mach 0.91. 
NACA flight 28, Champine. Same as flight 25. 
Rolls, pull-ups, check of stabilizer effectiveness. 
NACA flight 29, Champine. Same as flight 25. 
Rolls, pull-ups, check of stabilizer effectiveness. 
Mach 0.91. Number 2 cylinder failed to fire. 
NACA flight 30, Champine. Same as flight 25. 
Rolls, pull-ups, check of stabilizer effectiveness. 
Mach 0.91. Number 2 cylinder failed to fire. 
NACA flight 31, Champine. Same as flight 25. 
Rolls, pull-ups, check of stabilizer effectiveness. 
NACA flight 32, Champine. Same as flight 25. 
Sideslips, rolls, check of stabilizer effectiveness. 
NACA flight 33, John H. Griffith. Pilot familiari- 
zation. Mach 0.9. 





2.  X S- 1  #2 ( X - 1 - 2 ) ,  Serial 46-063, Flights, Continued 
Date Remarks 
12 May 1950 
17 May 
26 May 
NACA flight 35, Griffith. Same as flight 25. Pull- 
ups and rolls. 
NACA flight 36, Griffith. Same as flight 25. Push- 
downs and pull-ups. Mach 1.13 at 42 000 ft. 
NACA flight 37, Griffith. Same as flight 25. Push- 
downs, pull-ups, rolls. Mach 1.20. Nosewheel 
collapsed on landing. 
NACA flight 38, Griffith. For pressure distribution 
and stability and control data. Check of stabilizer 
effectiveness. Mach 0.98. 
NACA flight 39, Griffith. Same as flight 38. 
NACA flight 40, Griffith. Same as flight 38. Also 
drag investigation. Pull-ups. Mach 0.90. 
NACA flight 41, Griffith. Same as flight 40. 
NACA flight 42, Capt. Charles E. Yeager. Flight 
for RKO filmJet Pilot. Slight engine fire but no 
damage. 
zation. Reached mach 1.07. 
check. 
effectiveness. Aileron rolls at mach 0.90. 
Aileron rolls at mach 1.07. 
Abrupt rudder fixed aileron rolls left and right, 
from mach 0.70 to mach 0.88. 
9 Aug. 
1 1  Aug. 
21 Sept. 
4 Oct. 






NACA flight 43, A. Scott Crossfield. Pilot familiari- 
NACA flight 44, Crossfield. Plane and instrument 
NACA flight 45, Crossfield. Wing loads and aileron 
NACA flight 46, Crossfield. Same as flight 45. 






NACA flight 48, Crossfield. Same as flight 45. 
NACA flight 49, Crossfield. Same as flight 45. 
NACA flight 50, Crossfield. Same as flight 45. 
Elevator and stabilizer pull-ups. 
NACA flight 51, Crossfield. Same as flight 45. 
Elevator and stabilizer pull-ups, clean stalls. 
NACA flight 52, Joseph A. Walker. Pilot familiari- 
zation. Reached mach 1.16 at 44 000 ft during 
four-cylinder run. 
distribution survey. Number 1 cylinder failed to 
fire. Stabilizer pull-ups at mach 1.07. 
NACA flight 54, Walker. Vortex-generator in- 
vestigation. Engine cut out after two ignition 
attempts; propellants jettisoned and flight com- 
pleted as glide flight. Flap actuator failed, so 
landing made flaps-up. Plane subsequently 
grounded because of possibility of fatigue failure 
of nitrogen spheres. Later rebuilt as the mach 
2 +  X-1E. 
5 Sept. NACA flight 53, Crossfield. Fuselage pressure 
23 Oct. 
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3. X - 1  #3 (X-1-31, Serial 46-064, Flights 
Date Remarks 
20 Jul. 1951 
9 Nov. 
Bell flight 1, Joseph Cannon, pilot. Glide flight for 
familiarization. Nosewheel collapse on landing. 
Bell flight 2, Cannon. Captive flight with B-50 for 
propellant jettison test. X- 1-3 destroyed in 
postflight explosion and fire on gound. B-50 
launch plane also lost and Cannon injured. 
4 .  X-lA, Serial 48- 1384, Flights 
Date Remarks 
Bell Contractor Flights 
14 Feb. 1953 
20 Feb. 
Bell flight 1, Jean Ziegler, pilot. Familiarization. 
Fuel jettison test. Glide flight only. 
Bell flight 2, Ziegler. Planned as powered flight, 
but completed as glide flight following pro- 
pellant-system difficulties. 
Bell flight 3, Ziegler. First powered flight. False 
fire warning. 
Bell flight 4, Ziegler. Plane demonstrated successful 
4-cylinder engine operation. 
Bell flight 5, Ziegler. Pilot noted low-frequency 
elevator buzz at mach 0.93, did not proceed 
above this speed, pending buzz investigation. 
Bell flight 6, Ziegler. Buzz again noted at mach 
0.93. Turbopump overspeeding caused pilot to 





Air Force Flights (After USAF took over remaining Bell program on X- 1A and initiated 
its own flight program) 




Flight 7, Maj. Charles E. Yeager. First Air Force 
flight. Reached mach 1.15. Familiarization pur- 
poses. 
Flight 8, Yeager. Mach 1.5. 
Flight 9, Yeager. First high-mach flight attempt by 
X-IA. Mach 1.9 attained at 60 000 ft during 
slight climb. 
Flight 10, Yeager. Plane attained mach 2.44, but 
met violent instability above mach 2.3. Tumbled 
50 000 ft, wound up in subsonic inverted spin. 
Yeager recovered to upright spin, then into nor- 
mal flight at 25 000 ft. 
Fourteen Air Force flight attempts for high altitudes were made in the spring and 
summer of 1954. Of these, only 4 flights were successful. The rest were aborted for 
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4. X-lA,  Serial 48-1384, Flights, Continued 
Date Remarks 
various malfunctions, including ruptured canopy seal, failure of gear doors to close fully, 
turbine overspeed, faulty ignition operation. Of the 4 successful flights, one was Maj. 
Arthur Murray’s checkout flight. The rest were successful high-altitude tries by Murray. 
The successful altitude flights were: 




20 July 1955 
8 Aug. 
Flight 16, Murray. X- 1A attained 87 094 ft, un- 
official world altitude record for manned air- 
craft. 
Flight 17, Murray. X-1A reached 89 750 ft. En- 
countered same instability Yeager had, but at 
mach 1.97. Murray recovered after tumbling 
20 000 ft down to 66 000 ft. 
Flight 24, Murray. Murray attained 90 440 ft. Air 
Force then turned X- 1A over to NACA. 
NACA flight 1 ,  Joseph A. Walker. Familiariza- 
tion. Walker attained mach 1.45 at 45 000 ft. 
Noted severe aileron buzz at mach 0.90 to 0.92. 
Planned as NACA flight 2. Shortly before launch 
from B-29, X- IA suffered low-order explo- 
sion, later traced to detonation of Ulmer leather 
gaskets. Walker exited into B-29 bomb bay. 
Extent of damage prohibited landing crippled 
X- IA, and NACA B-29 launch crew jettisoned 
it into desert. It exploded and burned on impact. 
5. X-lB, Serial 48-1385, Flights 
Date Remarks 
Air Force Flights 







X- 1B Air Force flight 1, Lt. Col. Jack Ridley, 
pilot. Glide flight, because of turbopump over- 
speeding. 
aborted power flight because of evidence of high 
lox-tank pressure. 
X- 1B Air Force flight 3, Maj. Arthur “Kit” Murray. 
First powered flight. 
X- 1B Air Force flight 4 ,  Maj. Robert Stephens. 
X- 1B Air Force flight 5, Maj. Stuart R. Childs. 
X- IB Air Force flight 6, Col. Horace B. Hanes. 
X- 1B Air Force flight 7, Capt. Richard B. Harer. 
X- 1B Air Force flight 2, Ridley. Glide flight, 
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5. X- I B ,  Serial 48-1385, Flights, Continued 
~ 
Date Remarks 
26 Nov. 1954 
30 Nov. 
2 Dec. 
X-1B Air Force flight 8, Brig. Gen. J. Stanley 
Holtoner (commander, Air Force Flight Test 
Center) . 
X- 1B Air Force flight 9, Lt. Col. Frank K. Everest. 
X- 1B Air Force flight 10, Everest. Mach 2.3 
(approx. 1520 mph) at 65 000 ft. 
NACA Flights 
John B. McKay pilot on flights 1-13 
Neil A. Armstrong pilot on flights 14- 17 















X-1B NACA flight 1. Pilot check; nose landing 
X- 1B NACA flight 2. Cabin-pressure regulator 
gear failed on landing, minor damage. 
malfunction causes inner canopy to crack; only 
low-speed, low-altitude maneuvers made. 
X- 1B NACA flight 3. Speed run to 56 000 ft 
and mach 1.8. Limited heating data gathered. 
X- 1B NACA flight 4. Glide flight, due to erratic 
engine start. 
X- 1B NACA flight 5. Three-chamber engine run 
to 60 000 ft to obtain heating data. 
X-1B NACA flight 6. Mach 1.94 aerodynamic 
heating investigation (end of heating program). 
X- 1B NACA flight 7. Control pulses at mach 1.45 
at 60 000 ft. Flight for instrumentation check. 
X- 1B NACA flight 8. Supersonic maneuvers to 
mach 1.5 at 60 000 ft. to determine the dynamic 
and static stability and control characteristics. 
X- 1B NACA flight 9. Supersonic maneuvers to 
mach 1.5 at 60 000 ft to determine the dynamic 
and static stability and control characteristics. 
indication of open landing-gear door. Propellants 
jettisoned, completed as a glide flight. 
X- 1B NACA flight 11. Mach 1.65 at 60 000 ft. 
Control pulses, sideslips, and 2 g wind-up turn. 
X- 1B NACA flight 12. Enlarged wing tips installed 
to simulate wing tips to be used with reaction 
controls. Mach 1.55 at 60 000 ft. 
X- 1B NACA flight 13. Stability and control in- 
vestigation. Mach 1.5 at 60 000 ft, accelerated 
maneuvers, control pulses, and pull-ups. 
X- 1B NACA flight 14. Pilot check for Armstrong. 
Nose landing gear failed on landing, minor 
damage. 
X- 1B NACA flight 15. First reaction-control 
flight. 
X- 1B NACA flight 10. Aborted after launch, 
294 
X-1 FLIGHTS 
5. X -  1 B, Serial 48 - 1385, Flights, Continued 
Date Remarks 
16 Jan. 1958 
23 Jan. 
X- 1B NACA flight 16. Low-altitude, low-mach 
reaction-control investigation. 
X- 1B NACA flight 17. Reaction-control investi- 
gation. Mach 1.5 at 55 000 ft. Last NACA flight. 
6. X- ID,  Serial 48-1386, Flights 
Date Remarks 
Bell Contractor Flights 
24 Jul. 1951 
Air Force Flights 
22 Aug. 1951 
Bell flight 1, Jean Ziegler, pilot. Glide flight for 
familiarization. Nose landing gear broken on 
landing. Following repairs, plane turned over to 
the Air Force. 
AF flight 1 ,  Lt. Col. Frank K. Everest. Launch 
aborted, but X- 1D suffered low-order explosion 
during pressurization for fuel jettison. Plane 
jettisoned from B-50. X- ID exploded on 
impact with desert. Everest managed to get into 
B-50 bomb bay before drop. B-50 not damaged, 
no personal injuries. 
7. X - 1 E,  Serial 46 -063, Flights 
Date Remarks 
Joseph Walker pilot for flights 1-21 
John McKay pilot for flights 22-26 
3 Dec. 1955 
12 Dec. 
15 Dec. 
3 Apr. 1956 
30 Apr. 
Captive flight. 
X- 1E NACA flight 1.  Glide flight for pilot check- 
out and low speed evaluation. 
X- 1E NACA flight 2. First powered flight. Engine 
ran at excessive pressure, 4 overspeeds of turbo- 
pump and 2 automatic shutdowns. Power termi- 
nated by pilot. 
Damping characteristics good; number 1 cylinder 
failed to fire. 
no engine operation. 
X-1E NACA flight 3. Mach 0.85 at 30 000 ft. 
X- 1E NACA flight 4. Turbopump did not start; 
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Date 



















7. X - l E ,  Serial 46-063, Flights, Continued 
Remarks 
X- 1E NACA flight 5. Wind-up turns to CL, 
from mach 0.69 to 0.84; also control pulses. 
X- 1E NACA flight 6. Mach 1.55 at 45 000 ft 
(approx. 1020 mph). Longitudinal and lateral 
trim changes in transonic region found annoying 
to pilot. 
X-1E NACA flight 7. Mach 1.74 at 60 000 ft 
(approx. 1150 mph). Damaged on landing. 
X- 1E NACA flight 8. Subsonic because cylinders 
3 and 4 would not fire. 
X- 1E NACA flight 9. Mach 2.0 at 60 000 ft 
(approx 1340 mph). Sideslips, pulses, rolls. 
X-1E NACA flight 10. Mach 2.1 at 62 000 ft 
(approx 1385 mph). Stabilizer, rudder, and 
aileron pulses. 
X- 1E NACA flight 11. Brief engine power only; 
flight aborted, unspecified engine malfunction. 
X- 1E NACA flight 12. Only 60-sec rocket opera- 
tion; intermittent pump operation. Flight aborted, 
turbopump and engine replaced. 
X- 1E NACA flight 13. No engine operation, 
ignition failure and lack of manifold pressure. 
X-1E NACA flight 14. Mach 1.71 at 67 000 ft. 
(approx 1130 mph). Aileron and rudder pulses. 
X- 1E NACA flight 15. Mach 2.0 at 73 000 ft. 
(approx. 1325 mph). Aileron pulses and rolls, 
sideslips, and wind-up turns. Plane severely 
damaged upon landing. 
X- 1E NACA flight 16. Planned mach number not 
attained, loss of power during pushover from 
climb. 
X- 1E NACA flight 17. Mach 2.24 (approx. 1480 
X-1E NACA flight 18. First flight with ventral 
fins; longitudinal and lateral stability and control 
maneuvers. Engine airstart made at 70 000 ft. 
X- 1E NACA flight 19. Flight aborted after only 1 
cylinder of engine fired. Plane damaged on 
landing. 
X- 1E NACA flight 20. Stability and control in- 
vestigation with ventral fins. 
X-1E NACA flight 21. Stability and control with 
ventral fins and a new stabilizer bell crank 
permitting greater stabilizer travel. 
McKay. 
McKay, also check of low-speed stability and 
control. 
mph). 
X- 1E NACA flight 22. Checkout flight for John 
X- 1E NACA flight 23. Checkout flight for 
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7. X - 1 E ,  Serial 46 - 063, Flights, Continued 
Date Remarks 
16Oct. 1958 X- 1E NASA flight 24. First flight with elevated 
chamber pressure; cut short because overcast 
obscured pilot’s view of lakebed. 
X- 1E NASA flight 25. Elevatedchamber pressure; 
good stability and control data gathered. 
X- 1E NASA flight 26. Elevated chamber pressure; 
low-altitude and low-mach investigation of U- 
Deta fuel. Last NASA flight. 
28 Oct. 
6 Nov. 
SOURCE Richard P. Hallion, Supersonic Flight: Breaking the Sound Ba& and Beyond-The Story of 
the Bell X - 1  and D o u g h  D-558 (New York: Macmillan Company in association with 





Douglas D- 558 Program Flight Chronology, 
194’7- 1956 
This chronology covers flights by the three Douglas D-558-1 Skystreaks and the 
three Douglas D-558-2 Skyrockets. 
The D-558-1 Skystreak was a turbojet powered aircraft that took off from the 
ground under its own power. It featured a straight wing and tail section. 
The D-558-2 Skyrocket was powered both by a turbojet engine and a liquid-fuel 
rocket engine, and also took off from the ground. In 1950, however, the D-558-2 #2 
(BuAer no. 37974) was modified for all-rocket air-launch from a B-29 mothership, 
enhancing greatly its safety and performance potential. Another D-558-2 #2 (BuAer 
no. 37975) was also modified for air-launch, but retained both its turbojet and rocket 
engine. The D-558-2 #1 (BuAer no. 37973) was likewise later modified for all-rocket 
operation, but completed only one flight before termination of the entire Skyrocket 
program. 
1. D-558-1 #I, BuAer No. 37970 Flight Highlights 
This aircraft completed 101 flights during its Douglas contractor program. Douglas 
delivered it to NACA on 21 April 1949, but NACA never flew it, relegating it 
to spares support for the D-558- 1 #3. 
Date Remarks 
14 Apr. 1947 Douglas flight 1, Eugene F. May, pilot. For 
familiarization. Partial power loss forced 
immediate landing after takeoff. 
Douglas flight 14, May. Beginning of performance 
investigations at high mach numbers. Mach 
0.8 1. 
Douglas flight 25, Comdr. Turner F. Caldwell, Jr., 
USN. Set new world airspeed record of 
640.663 mph. 
Douglas flight (?), May. Plane exceeded mach 1 
during 35-degree dive, only time a Skystreak 
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2. D-558-1 #2, BuAer No. 37971, Flights 
Date Remarks 
Howard C. Lilly, pilot 
(27 previous flights made by Douglas, Navy, and Marine pilots) 
25 Nov. 1947 
26 Nov. 





NACA flight 1. Pilot familiarization; instrumenta- 
NACA flight 2. Landing gear would not lock up. 
NACA flight 3. Attempted airspeed calibration; 
NACA flight 4. Landing gear door would not lock. 
NACA flight 5. Landing gear door would not lock. 
NACA flight 6. Landing gear door would not lock. 
NACA flight 7. Landing gear door would not lock. 
NACA flight 8. Attempted airspeed calibration; 
NACA flight 9. Airspeed calibration, 30 000 ft. 
NACA flight 10. Airspeed calibration, 30 000 ft. 
NACA flight 1 1. Airspeed calibration, tower fly-by. 
NACA flight 12. Airspeed calibration, 30 000 ft. 
NACA flight 13. Smoke in cockpit after takeoff 
necessitated landing. Smoke due to burning 
400-cycle inverter in nose compartment; in- 
verter replaced. 
NACA flight 14. Sideslips at 10 000 ft from mach 
0.50 through 0.85, for static directional stability. 
NACA flight 15. Sideslips at 30 000 ft from mach 
0.50 through 0.85, for static directional stability. 
NACA flight 16. Right landing gear would not 
retract. 
NACA flight 17. Two speed runs; mach 0.70 at 
41 000 ft, mach 0.88 at 36 000 ft. Left and 
right rudder kicks at 10 000 ft. 
tion malfunction. 
instrumentation malfunction. 








3 May NACA flight 18. Landing gear would not retract. 
NACA flight 19. Crash after takeoff due to 
compressor disintegration; Lilly killed. 
-3. 0-558-1 #3, BuAer No. 37972, Flights 
Date Remarks 
(Four flights made in early 1948 by Douglas pilots and Howard Lilly) 




NACA flight 1, Robert A. Champine, pilot. For 
NACA flight 2, Champine. Pilot check; dive to 
NACA flight 3, Champine. Handling qualities 
pilot familiarization. 
mach 0.87. 
(rudder kicks, aileron rolls, sideslips); dive to 
mach 0.9. 
D-558 FLIGHTS 
3. D-558-1 #3, BuAer No. 37972, Flights, Continued 
Date Remarks 









26 Jan. 1950 
15 Feb. 
5 Apr. 
1 1  Apr. 
3 May 
NACA flight 4, Champine. Handling qualities; 
dive to mach 0.875. 
NACA flight 5, John H. Griffith, pilot check, 
handling qualities; trim run to mach 0.84. 
NACA flight 6, Griffith. Airspeed calibration 
using tower passes. 
NACA flight 7, Champine. Handling qualities; 
dive to mach 0.87. 
NACA flight 8, Champine. Aileron effectiveness 
investigation; no records taken. 
NACA flight 9, Griffith. Aileron effectiveness 
investigations; 16 rolls made, 4 above mach 0.87. 
NACA flight 10, Griffith. Beginning of pressure- 
distribution survey. 
NACA flight 1 1 ,  Griffith. Pressure-distribution 
investigation. 
NACA flight 12, Champine. Pressure-distribution 
investigation. 
NACA flight 13, Champine. Check of airspeed 
system. 
NACA flight 14, Champine. Aborted, engine mal- 
function. 
NACA flight 15, Griffith. Pressure-distribution 
investigation. Mach 0.95 attained. 
NACA flight 16, Griffith. Pressure-distribution 
investigation. Mach 0.98 attained. 
NACA flight 17, Griffith. Vortex generator- 
investigation as part of pressure-distribution 
investigation. Mach 0.97 attained. 
NACA flight 17A, Griffith. Vortex generator- 
investigation as part of pressure-distribution 
investigations. 
distributor investigation. Mach 0.87 attained. 
distributor investigation. Mach 0.98 attained. 
distributor investigation. 
distributor investigation. 
distributor investigation. Mach 0.98- 1 .O. Con- 
clusion of pressure-distribution investigation. 
NACA flight 23, Griffith. Instrument and opera- 
tional check flight in preparation for the buffeting 
tail loads and longitudinal stability investigation. 
NACA flight 24, A. Scott Crossfield, pilot check. 
Beginning of buffeting, tail loads, and longi- 
tudinal stability program. 
5 May 





NACA flight 18, Griffith. Vortex generator- 
NACA flight 19, Griffith. Vortex generator- 
NACA flight 20, Griffith. Vortex generator- 
NACA flight 2 1 ,  Griffith. Vortex generator- 
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NACA flight 25, Crossfield. Buffeting, tail loads, 
longitudinal stability investigation. 
NACA flight 26, Crossfield. Buffeting, tail loads, 
dynamic longitudinal stability added to longi- 
tudinal stability program. 
NACA flight 27, Crossfield. Longitudinal stability 
program. 
NACA flight 28, Crossfield. Longitudinal stability 
program. 
NACA flight 29, Crossfield. Longitudinal stability 
program. 
NACA flight 30, Crossfield. Longitudinal stability 
program. Aborted, fuel leak. 
NACA flight 3 1, Crossfield. Longitudinal stability 
program. 
NACA flight 32, Crossfield. Airspeed calibration, 
5 tower passes. 
NACA flight 33, Walter P. Jones. Pilot check; some 
buffeting, tail loads, and longitudinal stability 
data taken. 
NACA flight 34, Jones. Aborted after Jones suf- 
fered anoxia, faulty 0 2  regulator. 
NACA flight 35, Jones. Buffeting, tail loads, longi- 
tudinal stability investigation. 
NACA flight 36, Crossfield. Buffeting, tail loads, 
longitudinal stability investigation. Mach 0.84. 
NACA flight 37, Crossfield. Buffeting, tail loads, 
longitudinal stability investigation. Mach 0.86. 
NACA flight 38, Crossfield. Buffeting, tail ioads, 
longitudinal stability investigation. Mach 0.835. 
NACA flight 39, Jones. Buffeting, tail loads, longi- 
tudinal stability investigation. Mach 0.85. 
NACA flight 40, Joseph A. Walker, Pilot check. 
Mach 0.82. 
NACA flight 41, Walker. Buffeting, tail loads, 
longitudinal stability. 
NACA flight 42, Walker. Buffeting, tail loads, 
longitudinal stability. (Cut short, made without 
tip tanks.) 
longitudinal stability. 
longitudinal stability. Mach 0.83; cut short, bad 
cloud formation. 
longitudinal stability. Mach 0.85. 
longitudinal stability. Mach 0.84. 
tudinal stability. Mach 0.86. 
NACA flight 43, Walker. Buffeting, tail loads, 
NACA flight 44, Walker. Buffeting, tail loads, 
NACA flight 45, Walker. Buffeting, tail loads, 
NACA flight 46, Walker. Buffeting, tail loads, 
NACA flight 47, Jones. Buffeting, tail loads, longi- 
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NACA flight 48, Walker. Flight cut short due to a 
fuel leak. 
NACA flight 49, Walker. Buffeting, tail loads, 
longitudinal stability. Mach 0.875. 
NACA flight 50, Walker. Flight cut short, hydraulic 
line broke. 
NACA flight 51, Walker. Instrument malfunction. 
Mach 0.86. 
NACA flight 52, Walker. Buffeting, tail loads, 
longitudinal stability. Mach 0.86. 
NACA flight 53, Walker. Buffeting, tail loads, 
longitudinal stability. Mach 0.84. 
NACA flight 54, Walker. Buffeting, tail loads, 
longitudinal stability. Beginning of lateral 
stability investigation. Mach 0.86. 
NACA flight 55, Stanley P. Butchart. Pilot check. 
NACA flight 56, Butchart. Pilot check. 
NACA flight 57, Crossfield. Beginning of lateral 
stability and control (aileron effectiveness) 
investigation. 
NACA flight 58, Crossfield. Lateral stability and 
control. Mach 0.85. 
NACA flight 59, Butchart. Lateral stability and 
control. Also beginning of a simultaneous 
dynamic longitudinal stability investigation. 
NACA flight 60, Butchart. Lateral stability and 
control. Simultaneous dynamic longitudinal 
stability investigation. 
NACA flight 61, Butchart. Lateral stability and 
control. Simultaneous dynamic longitudinal 
stability investigation. 
NACA flight 62, Butchart. Lateral stability and 
control. Simultaneous dynamic longitudinal 
stability investigation. 
NACA flight 63, Butchart. Lateral stability and 






investigation. Conclusion of dynamic stability 
flights. 
NACA flight 64, Butchart. Dynamic stability 
NACA flight 65, Butchart. Dynamic stability 
NACA flight 66, Butchart. Dynamic stability 
NACA flight 67, Butchart. Dynamic stability 
NACA flight 68, Butchart. Dynamic stability 
NACA flight 69, John B. McKay. Pilot check. 
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NACA flight 70, McKay. Flight for dynamic stability 
fill-in data. 
NACA flight 71, McKay. Flight for dynamic 
stability fill-in data. 
NACA flight 72, McKay. Beginning investigation 
of tip tanks’ effect on Skystreak‘s buffet charac- 
teristics. Aborted, leak in tip tank. 
NACA flight 73, McKay. Tip tank-buffet investi- 
gation. No records taken. 
NACA flight 74, McKay. Tip tank-buffet investi- 
gation. 
NACA flight 76, McKay. Tip tank-buffet investi- 
gation. Also low-speed stability-and-control-in- 
coordinated-turns investigation. 
NACA flight 77, McKay. Tip tank-buffet investi- 
gation. Also low-speed stability-and-control-in- 
coordinated-turns investigation. 
vestigation. Also low-speed stability-and-control- 
in-coordinated-turns investigation. Last research 
flight flown by Skystreak. 
NACA flight 78, Crossfield. Tip tank-buffet in- 
4. 0-558-2 #I, BuAer No. 37973, Flights 
This aircraft completed 122 flights during its Douglas contractor program. The first 
flight was on 4 Feb. 1948, by John F. Martin. After initial flight testing, and addition of 
its rocket engine, Douglas began performance investigation in the aircraft on 25 Oct. 1949. 
Douglas delivered the craft to NACA on 31 Aug. 1951. NACA sent it to Douglas in 1954 
for all-rocket air-launch modification, for external stores tests at supersonic speeds. The 
aircraft returned to Edwards on 15 Nov. 1955. NACA research pilot John McKay com- 
pleted a familiarization flight on 17 Sept. 1956, but NACA subsequently canceled the 
remaining planned program. 
5. D-558-2 #2, BuAer No. 37974, Flights 
Date Remarks 
NACA Jet-Powered Flights 
Robert A. Champine and John H. Griffith, pilots 
24 May 1949 
1 June 
NACA flight 1, Champine. Pilot and instrument 
check, general handling qualities. Mach 0.74. 
NACA flight 2, Champine. Longitudinal and lateral 
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NACA flight 3, Champine. Longitudinal and lateral 
stability and control, wing and tail loads. 
NACA flight 4, Champine. Unsuccessful airspeed 
calibration, airspeed-altitude recorder failure. 
NACA flight 5, Champine. Successful airspeed 
calibration, using tower passes. 
NACA flight 6, Champine. Lateral control investi- 
gation. 
NACA flight 7, Champine. Longitudinal stability 
and control; inadvertent pitch-up to 6 g during 
a 4 g turn at mach 0.60. 
NACA flight 8, Champine. Longitudinal stability 
and lateral control investigation during maneu- 
vering flight. Mach 0.855. 
NACA flight 9, Champine. Aborted after takeoff, 
fluctuations in engine RPM and oil pressure. 
NACA flight 10, Griffith. Longitudinal and lateral 
stability and control. Only partial completion of 
mission, one JATO bottle failed to drop. 
NACA flight 11, Griffith. Longitudinal and lateral 
stability and control. High engine temperatures. 
NACA flight 12, Champine. Longitudinal and 
lateral stability and control, stall characteristics. 
NACA flight 13, Griffith. Same as flight 12. 








advertent pitch-up and snap-roll, later pitch-up 
followed by stall, spin. 
NACA flight 15, Champine. Lateral stability and 
control, and directional stability investigation 






6 Jan. 1950 
NACA flight 16, Griffith. Same as flight 15. 
NACA flight 17, Griffith. Same as flight 15. 
NACA flight 18, Champine. Same as flight 15. 
NACA flight 19, Griffith. Stall investigation with 
NACA flight 20, Griffith. Same as flight 19. 
NACA flight 21, Griffith. Same as flight 19. 
tufts. 
Douglas Air-Launch Rocket Flights 
William B. Bridgeman, pilot 
8Nov. 1950 
26 Jan. 1951 
5 Apr. 
0-558-2 #2 (37974) arrived at Edwards from 
Douglas via B-29 (P2B- IS) launch aircraft. 
Douglas flight 1. Air launch at 32 000 ft, climb to 
41 000 ft, level run to mach 1.28. Dutch-roll 
oscillation, loss of elevator effectiveness noted. 
Douglas flight 2. Drop at 34 000 ft, maximum mach 
of 1.36 at 46 500 ft. Severe lateral oscillation 
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NACA Air-Launch Rocket Flights 












forced Bridgeman to shut off engine prematurely. 
Rudder lock subsequently installed to control 
rapid rudder oscillation. 
Douglas flight 3. Launch at 34 000 ft, maximum 
mach of 1.7 at 62 000 ft. Loss of rocket power. 
Rudder locked at all speeds above mach 1.  
Douglas flight 4. Mach 1.79 at 64 000 ft. Low lateral 
stability, also a lightly damped longitudinal oscil- 
lation noted after burnout. 
Douglas flight 5. Mach 1.85 at 63 000 ft. Violent 
lateral oscillation necessitated engine shutdown. 
Wing rolling + and -80deg. (1.5 radians per sec). 
Douglas flight 6. Mach 1.88 at 66 000 ft. Dynamic 
lateral instability not as severe on this flight, for 
Bridgeman did not push over to as low an angle 
of attack as on previous flights. 
Douglas flight 7. Altitude flight to 79 494 ft. 
Unofficial world’s altitude record. 
D-558-2 #2 turned over to NACA. 
Plane delivered to NACA HSFRS. 
NACA flight 1 ,  A. Scott Crossfield. Pilot check, 
mach 1.2, rough engine operation. 
NACA flight 2, Crossfield. Stick impulses and 
rudder kicks, mach 1.28. 
NACA flight 3, Crossfield. Mach 1 .1  1 .  Longitudinal 
and lateral stability and control, loads data, and 
aileron effectiveness. 
NACA flight 4, Crossfield. Same as flight 3. 
Maximum mach 1.65 at 60 000 ft. 
NACA flight 5, Crossfield. Lateral stability and 
control, vertical tail loads. Mach 1.36. 
NACA flight 6, Crossfield. Stability and control, 
loads in low supersonic flight. Mach 1.05. 
NACA flight 7, Crossfield. Same as flight 6. Mach 
1.35. 
NACA flight 8, Crossfield. Longitudinal stability 
and tail loads. Mach 1.68 at 55 000 ft. 
NACA flight 9, Crossfield. Longitudinal stability 
and tail loads. Mach 1.05, engine malfunction 
caused low mach. 
NACA flight 10, Crossfield. High lift investigation 
at maximum mach. Mach 1.5 1 .  
NACA flight 1 1 ,  Crossfield. Aborted after launch, 
lox prime valve remained open. 
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1OOct. 1952 NACA flight 12, Crossfield. Longitudinal stability 




26 Mar. 1953 
2 Apr. 
NACA flight 13, Crossfield. Same as flight 12, 
NACA flight 14, Crossfield. Same as flight 12. 
NACA flight 15, Crossfield. Lateral stability and 
handling qualities investigation. Beginning of 
series of flights to evaluate lateral stability at 
various angles of attack above mach 1. 
NACA flight 16, Crossfield. Lateral stability 
investigation. 
NACA flight 17, Crossfield. Lateral stability 
investigation. 
NACA flight 18, Crossfield. Lateral stability 
investigation. 
NACA flight 19, Crossfield. Aborted after drop; 
engine running rough, so was shut down. 
NACA flight 20, Crossfield. Lateral stability 
investigation. Mach 1.878. 
NACA flight 21, Lt. Col. Marion Carl, USMC. 
Unsuccessful altitude attempt. 
NACA flight 22, Carl. Unsuccessful altitude attempt. 
NACA flight 23, Carl. Successful altitude flight to 
83 235 ft. 
NACA flight 24, Carl. Maximum mach flight 
attempt. Mach 1.5. Violent lateral motions. 
NACA flight 25, Carl. Maximum mach flight 
attempt, to mach 1.728 at 46 000 ft. 
NACA flight 26, Crossfield. 1st flight with nozzle 
extensions. Mach 1.85 at 74 000 ft. 
NACA flight 27, Crossfield. Lateral stability 
investigation. Mach 1.8 at 55 000 ft. Severe 
lateral instability. 
NACA flight 28, Crossfield. Lateral stability 
investigation. 
NACA flight 29, Crossfield. To obtain data on 
effect of rocket-nozzle extensions on rudder- 
hinge-moment parameter. 
investigation. Attained mach 1.96. 
investigation. No. 2 chamber failed to ignite, 
engine shut down prematurely. Subsonic flight 
only. 
NACA flight 32, Crossfield. Aerodynamic loads and 

















NACA flight 30, Crossfield. Lateral stability 
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NACA flight 33, Crossfield. Lateral and longitudinal 
NACA flight 34, Crossfield. First mach 2.0 flight. 
stability and control, loads research. 
Plane attained mach 2.005 in slight dive at 
62 000 ft. 
1 1  Dec. 
23 Dec. 
9 Jul. 1954 
14 Ju1. 
NACA flight 35, Crossfield. Aborted, fire warning 
light. Engine shut down, frozen valve. 
NACA flight 36, Crossfield. For rudder-hinge- 
moment data with rocket-nozzle extensions. 
NACA flight 37, Crossfield. Dynamic lateral 
stability investigation. 
NACA flight 38, Crossfield. Same as flight 37, also 




NACA flight 39, Crossfield. Same as flight 38. 
NACA flight 40, Crossfield. Static and dynamic 
stability and control, loads, and pressure 
distribution. Mach 1.7 at 60 000 ft. 
NACA flight 41, Crossfield. Same as flight 40. 
NACA flight 42, Crossfield. Same as flight 40. 
6 Aug. 
13 Aug. 
Pitch-up encountered in turn at mach 1.08, plane 






NACA flight 43, Crossfield. Same as flight 40. 
NACA flight 44, Crossfield. Same as flight 40. 
NACA flight 45, Crossfield. Same as flight 40. 
NACA flight 46, Crossfield. Dynamic lateral 
stability data to mach 1.5. 
NACA flight 47, Crossfield. Same as flight 46. 
Engine shut down, pump overspeed during 
climb. 
distribution and buffeting data at transonic 
speeds. 
familiarization. 
USAF. Pilot familiarization in preparation for 
X-2 program. Mach 1.46 at 68 000 ft. 
NACA flight 5 1 ,  Walker. For lateral stability and 
control data at low supersonic speeds. 
NACA flight 52, Crossfield. For wing and horizontal 
stabilizer pressure-distribution data to mach 
1.75. 
NACA flight 53, Crossfield. To gather lateral 
stability and structural loads data to mach 1.6; 
aborted when fire warning indicator came on. 
18 Mar. 1955 NACA flight 48, Crossfield. For pressure- 
29 Apr. 
5 May 
NACA flight 49, Joseph A. Walker. Pilot 
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8 June 1955 NACA flight 54, Crossfield. Lateral stability and 
aerodynamic loads data to mach 1.67 at 60 000 
ft. Subsequently, nozzle extensions removed 
from plane. 
NACA flight 55, Crossfield. Static and dynamic 
Stability investigation to mach 1.4. End of pressure- 
distribution program. Recording- manometers 
removed from aircraft. 
NACA flight 56, Crossfield. Supersonic dynamic 
stability and structural loads investigation. 
NACA flight 57, Crossfield. Same as flight 56. 
NACA flight 58, Crossfield. Same as flight 56. 
NACA flight 59, Crossfield. Same as flight 56. 
NACA flight 60, Crossfield. Same as flight 56. 
NACA flight 6 1 ,  Crossfield. Dynamic stability 
investigation. Beginning of vertical tail-loads 
research program. One rocket cylinder failed to 
ignite, so plane limited to mach 1.25 at 40 000 ft. 
NACA flight 62, John B. McKay. Pilot familiariza- 
tion, but some data on stability and control and 
tail loads taken. McKay had to use emergency 
hydraulic system to lower landing gear on this 
flight. 
NACA flight 63, Walker. Dynamic stability and 
structural loads investigation. Mach 1.34. Fol- 
lowing this flight, nozzle extensions were again 
fitted to the LR-8 engine. 
NACA flight 64, McKay. Structural heating survey. 
NACA flight 65, McKay. Same as flight 64, mach 1.2. 
NACA flight 66, McKay. Same as flight 64, mach 
1.25. Structural heating investigation program 
canceled after this flight. 
NACA flight 67, McKay. Plane jettisoned in inflight 
emergency from B -29 (runaway prop on #4 en- 
gine). McKay jettisoned propellants and made 
safe landing on lakebed. B-29 required exten- 
sive repairs. 
NACA flight 68, McKay. Vertical tail-loads in- 
vestigation to mach 1 . 1 .  
NACA flight 69, McKay. Same as flight 68. This 
marks end of vertical tail-loads research pro- 
gram. 
NACA flight 70, McKay. Static and dynamic stabil- 
ity investigation to approximately-mach 1.5. 
NACA flight 71, McKay. Same as flight 70. 
NACA flight 72, McKay. Same as flight 70. 
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14 Dec. 1956 NACA flight 74, McKay. For dynamic stability data 
at mach 1.4, and to obtain overall sound-pres- 
sure levels in aft fuselage at subsonic and su- 
personic speeds. 
NACA flight 75, McKay. Same as flight 74. This 
was last NACA research flight on D-558-2 #2. 
20 Dec. 
6.  0-558-2 #3, BuAer No. 37975, Flights 
Date Remarks 
15 Douglas flights completed before aircraft modified to air-launch configuration. 
Eugene F. May, pilot 
8 Sept. 1950 Douglas flight 16; Bridgeman pilot, 1st airdrop. 







Douglas flight 17, Bridgeman, 2d airdrop. 
Douglas flight 18, Bridgeman, 3d airdrop. 
Douglas flight 19, Bridgeman. Airspeed calibration. 
Douglas flight 20, Bridgeman. Airspeed calibration 
and air-launch demonstration. 
Douglas flight 2 1, Bridgeman. Airspeed calibration 
and air-launch demonstration. Turbojet engine 
malfunction, premature rocket shutdown. 
Plane delivered to NACA HSFRS, designated 
NACA 145. 
NACA flight 1, A. Scott Crossfield. Pilot and in- 
strument check, jet engine only. 
NACA flight 2, Crossfield. Same as flight 1. 
NACA flight 3, Crossfield. Slat-loads investigation 
jet only. Stalls, turns, rolls, to mach 0.7. 
NACA flight 4, Crossfield. Dynamic longitudinal 
stability investigation with slats locked to mach 
0.75; elevator and stabilizer pulses. 
NACA flight 5, Crossfield. First NACA rocket-jet 
flight. Jet engine shut off, flame instability. 
Mach 0.86 maximum. 
NACA flight 6, Crossfield. Jet only, rocket failed 
to fire, valve failure. Mach 0.84 maximum. 
NACA flight 7, Walter P. Jones, Pilot check, jet 
only. Mach 0.73. 
NACA flight 8, Crossfield. Rolls and accelerated 
turns to mach 1.14. Jet and rocket. 
NACA flight 9. Brig. Gen. Albert Boyd USAF. 
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27 Feb. 1953 
NACA hight 10, Jones. Jet and rocket, lateral and 
longitudinal stability investigation. Aileron rolls, 
elevator pulses to mach 1.10. 
NACA flight 11,  Jones. Jet only, rocket failure. 
Longitudinal stability investigation with acceler- 
ated pitching maneuver in landing configura- 
tion. Pitch-up followed by spin and normal 
recovery. 
NACA flight 12, Jones. Lateral control investiga- 
tion. Jet and rocket flight to mach 0.96. Rolls, 
sideslips, elevator pulses, accelerated turns. 
NACA flight 13, Jones. Beginning of pitch-up 
investigation. Evaluation of outboard wing 
fences at mach 0.7. Fences markedly aid 
recovery. 
NACA flight 14, Jones. Same as flight 13. Mach 
0.95. Fences subsequently removed. 
NACA flight 15, Crossfield. Jet only. Pitch-up in- 
vestigation with slats locked open. Mach 0.7. 
NACA flight 16, Jones. Same as flight 15. Mach 
0.96. 
NACA flight 17, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. Slat 
investigation, aborted in climb, faulty cabin 
heating. Some low-speed data. 
NACA flight 18, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. Same 
as flight 15. Mach 0.96. Inboard wing fences 
subsequently removed. Plane now in clean, no- 
fence configuration. 
NACA flight 19, Crossfield. Slats still locked open. 
Flight to check effect of removing wing fences. 
Removal indicates inboard fences had little 
effect on aircraft behavior. Following flight, 
slats moved and locked in half open position. 
Evaluation of effect of slats half open on pitch- 
up. Plane pitched to 36". Mach 0.97. Slats subse- 
quently restored to free-floating condition. 
NACA flight 2 1 ,  Crossfield. Jet and rocket. Plane 
in basic no-fence configuration. Longitudinal 
and lateral stability and control investigation. 
Pitch-ups encountered during turns. Chord 
extensions subsequently installed on outer wing 
panels. 
with chord extensions. Mach 0.7. Wing-up turns 
and I g stalls. Maneuvers terminated when decay 
in longitudinal or lateral stability became 
apparent. 
NACA flight 20, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. 
NACA flight 22, Crossfield. Jet only. First flight 
31 1 
ON THE FRONTIER 
6. 0-558-2 #3, BuAer No. 37975, Flights, Continued 
Date Remarks 













7 May 1954 
12 May 
2 June 
NACA flight 23, Crossfield. Jet only; rocket failed 
to fire, frozen valve. Wind-up turns, aileron rolls, 
sideslips, 1 g stalls. 
NACA flight 24, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. Mach 
1.03. Same as flight 23. Pitch-up not alleviated 
by chord extensions, so extensions removed after 
flight and slats reinstalled on wings. 
NACA flight 25, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. Slats 
locked open. Accelerated longitudinal stability 
maneuvers performed with control bungee 
installed. Decay in stability noticed at all speeds 
except at mach 1.  Stiff bungee subsequently 
installed. 
NACA flight 26, Crossfield. Jet only. Slats locked 
open, stiff bungee. Airplane appeared con- 
trollable at high angles of attack; stability decay 
less objectionable. 
NACA flight 27, Stanley P. Butchart. Pilot checkout. 
Slats locked open and stiff bungee installed. Jet 
only. 
NACA flight 28, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. Plane 
in basic configuration. Transonic lateral and 
directional stability and control. Mach 1.05. 
NACA flight 29. Lt. Col. Marion Carl USMC. Pilot 
check out in D-558-2 #3 before flying all- 
rocket D-558-2 #2. Jet power only. 
NACA flight 30, Carl. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 29. 
NACA flight 3 1, Crossfield. Longitudinal, lateral, 
and directional stability investigation, from 
mach 0.4 to mach 1.08. 
NACA flight 32, Crossfield. Same as flight 31. 
NACA flight 33, Crossfield. Same as flight 31. 
Because of malhnction, only 2 rocket chambers 
fired. 
NACA flight 34, Crossfield. Transonic longitudinal 
stability investigation. Turns, stalls. 
NACA flight 35, Crossfield. Same as flight 34. Jet 
only, rocket did not ignite. Plane subsequently 
modified for external-stores program. 
NACA flight 36, Joseph Walker. Pilot checkout, 
plane in basic configuration. Jet only. 
NACA flight 37, Walker. Same as flight 36. Jet and 
rocket. Mach 0.97. 
NACA flight 38, Crossfield. First flight with ex- 
ternal stores pylons. Jet only. Evaluation of 
handling qualities to mach 0.72. 
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NACA flight 39, Crossfield. First flight with ex- 
ternal stores (1000-lb bomb shapes). Jet only. Nq 
apparent adverse effects. Mach 0.72. 
NACA flight 40, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. Stores 
decreased transonic performance and increased 
buffet. Mach 1.0. Stores shapes later removed 
as being too small. 
NACA flight 41, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. Plane in 
clean configuration. Transonic directional and 
longitudinal stability and control. Mach 1.05. 
Sideslips, elevator and rudder pulses. 
Transonic lateral stability and control investiga- 
tion. Rolls from mach 0.5 to 1.05. 
NACA flight 43, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 42. Mach 1.1. 
NACA flight 44, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. 
Dynamic stability investigation from mach 0.5 to 
1.05. Elevator, aileron, and rudder pulses. 
NACA flight 45, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 44. 
NACA flight 46, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 44. 
NACA flight 47, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. Slats 
unlocked, flight for longitudinal stability and 
control and buffet characteristics of aircraft in 
this configuration. 
NACA flight 48, Crossfield. Resumption of stores- 
investigation program. Handling qualities with 
150 gal tanks. Jet only. Mach 0.74. 
NACA flight 49, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 48. No adverse effects, but pilot noted 
drag rise and heavier buffet in longitudinal 
maneuvers. As a result of strain-gauge-loads 
measurements, stores program again temporarily 
suspended while Douglas checked strength 
factor of pylon and wing. 
NACA flight 50, Lt. Col. Frank K. Everest, Jr., 
USAF. Pilot checkout, jet-and-rocket flight in 
clean configuration in preparation for Bell X-2 
program. 
NACA flight 51, John B. McKay. Pilot check in 
clean configuration, jet only. 
NACA flight 52, McKay. Jet and rocket. Underwing 
pylons installed. Sideslips, rolls, elevator and 
rudder pulses. For handling qualities, wing and 
pylon loads, and buffet data. Mach 1.0. 
NACA flight 42, Crossfield. Jet and rocket. 
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23 May 1955 NACA flight 53, McKay. Jet and rocket, 150-gal 
stores attached. Same maneuvers as flight 52. 
Buffet levels higher with stores than with pylons 
only. 
NACA flight 54, McKay. Jet and rocket. Pylons only. 
Same maneuvers as flight 52. Mach 1.0. 
NACA flight 55, McKay. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 54. 
NACA flight 56, McKay. Jet and rocket. 150-gal 
stores attached. Same maneuvers as flight 52. 
NACA flight 57, McKay. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 56. 
NACA flight 58, McKay. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 56. 
NACA flight 59, McKay. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 56. Plane damaged on landing when tail 
cone touched lake first. 
NACA flight 60, Butchart. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 56. 
NACA flight 61, McKay. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 56. 
NACA flight 62, McKay. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 56. 
NACA flight 63, McKay. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 56. Concluded stores-investigation pro- 
gram. Plane returned to clean configuration. 
NACA flight 64, McKay. Jet and rocket. To obtain 
wing-loads data for comparison with external- 
stores data previously acquired. Lateral, 
directional, and longitudinal maneuvers. 
Mach 1.0. 
NACA flight 65, McKay. Jet and rocket. Rocket 
engine pump overspeed prevented acquisition of 
data at mach 0.9. Flight for same purpose as 
flight 64, so one more flight scheduled to 
complete research program. 
NACA flight 66, McKay. Jet and rocket. Same as 
flight 64. Mach 0.96. Completed research pro- 











1 Feb. 1956 
3 Feb. 
28 Aug. 




X-2 Program Flight Chronology, 1954- 1956 
NACA itself never flew the X-2 research aircraft in a research program. However, 
NACA did expect to receive the aircraft following its Air Force flight test program, and 
the High-speed Flight Station supported the X-2 program with advice and data analysis. 
Two X-2 aircraft were built, the X-2 #1 (46-674) and the X-2 #2 (46-675). The 
X-2 #2 was lost in an inflight explosion while at the Bell plant in captive flight trials in 
1953. Two crewmen were killed. The X-2 #I  arrived at Edwards AFB for testing in the 
summer of 1954. The following chronology is for the X-2 #1, 46-674, from 1954 
through the crash of this aircraft in 1956. It was air-launched from a modified Boeing 
B-50 Superfortress bomber. 
Bell X - 2  # I  (46-674) 
Date Pilot Remarks 
25 Oct. Everest 
18 Nov. Everest 
24 Mar. 1956 Everest 
25 Apr. Everest 
1 May Everest 
11 May Everest 
22 May Everest 
5 Aug. 1954 1st glide flight. Damaged on landing. 
8 Mar. 1955 Everest 2d glide flight. Propellant system 
check. Minor damage on landing. 
6 Apr. Everest 3d glide flight. Damaged on landing. 
Following flight, plane returned to 
Bell plant for extensive modifica- 
tions to landing gear system to pre- 
vent further landing accidents and 
for installation of its rocket engine. 
became 4th glide flight. 
35 000 ft. Slight fire damage from 
engine bay fire. 
mach 0.91. 
mach 1.4 at 50 000 ft. 
mach 1.683 at 53 700 ft. 
mach 1.8 at 60 000 ft. 
mach 2.53 at 58 370 ft. 
Maj. F. K. Everest 
Aborted powered flight attempt; 
1st powered flight. Mach 0.992 at 
Flight 1-56 (2d powered flight), 
Flight 2-56 (3d powered flight), 
Flight 3-56 (4th powered flight), 
Flight 4-56 (5th powered flight), 
Flight 5-56 (6th powered flight), 
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Bell X- 2  # I  (46-674), Continued 
Date Pilot Remarks 
25 May 1956 Flight 6-56 (7th powered flight), 
pilot checkout, mach 1 + . 
12 Jul. Everest Flight 7-56 (8th powered flight), 
premature engine shutdown. 
23 Jul. Everest Flight 8-56 (9th powered flight), 
mach 2.87 at 68 205 ft. 
3 Aug. Kincheloe Flight 9-56 (10th powered flight), 
mach 2.5+, 87 750 ft. 
8 Aug. Kincheloe Flight 10-56 (1 lth powered flight), 
premature engine shutdown. 
7 Sept. Kincheloe Flight 1 1-56 (12th powered flight), 
mach 1.7, reached 126 200 ft. 
27 Sept. Capt. M. Apt Flight 12-56 (13th powered flight), 
mach 3.2 at 65 500 ft. Subsequent 
loss of control from inertial cou- 
pling led to the destruction of the 
aircraft and the death of the pilot. 
Capt. I. C. Kincheloe 
SOURCE: X-2 flight progress'reports, 1954- 1956. 
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X-3 Program Flight Chronology, 1954- 1956 
Following completion of contractor testing (1953) and a brief Air Force evaluation 
(1953-1954), NACA received the sole Douglas X-3 (49-2892) for testing in 1954. All 
subsequent NACA flights were piloted by High-speed Flight Station research pilot 
Joseph A. Walker. 
X - 3 Flights 
Flight Date Remarks 
1 23 Aug. 1954 Pilot familiarization. 
2 3 Sept. Static longitudinal stability and control, wing and 
3 9 Sept. Same as flight 2. 
4 9 Sept. Same as flight 2. 
5 16 Sept. Same as flight 2. 
6 19 Oct. Same as flight 2. 
7 21 Oct. Same as flight 2. 
8 21 Oct. Investigation of lateral and directional stability 
9 21 Oct. Same as flight 8. 
tail loads, and pressure distribution. 
and control. 
10 27 Oct. Same as flight 8. Aircraft experienced violent 
coupled motions during abrupt rudder-fixed 
aileron rolls at mach 0.92 and 1.05, fully demon- 
strating load envelope of aircraft about all 3 
axes in 1 sec. Aircraft grounded for thorough 
inspection and analysis. 
11 20 Sept. 1955 Investigation of longitudinal stability and control, 
wing and tail loads, and wing pressure 
distribution. 
12 22 Sept. Same as flight 11. 
13 6 Oct. Directional stability and control, vertical tail loads. 
14 12 Oct. Same as flight 13. Drag chute inadvertently 
15 20 Oct. Dynamic lateral stability and control, vertical 
16 21 Oct. Same as flight 15. 
17 23 Oct. 
deployed in flight without damage to aircraft. 
tail loads. 
Same as flight 15. Flight marked conclusion of 
NACA X-3 static and dynamic stability and 
control and tail loads programs on the aircraft. 
317 
ON THE FRONTIER 
X- 3  Flights, Continued 
Flight Date Remarks 
18 13 Dec. 1955 Control system evaluation. One engine damaged 
from ingestion of pressure probe; X-3 
grounded for maintenance and repairs. 
mentation compartment fire caused minor 
damage to flight-test instrumentatidn. 
Plane retired. 
19 4Apr.  1956 Pressure distribution measurements. Nose instru- 
20 23 May Lateral control investigation; last NACA flight. 
SOURCE: X-3 flight progress reports, 1954- 1956. 
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X-4 Program Flight Chronology, 1950- 1953 
The NACA High-speed Flight Research Station operated the Northrop X-4 #2 
(46-677) research airplane from 1950 through 1953. NACA also had the X-4 # I  
(46-676) in charge, but used it only for spares support. In cooperation with NACA, the 
Air Force Air Materiel Command ran a brief program on the craft during the summer of 
1950 before delivering it to NACA. Since NACA instrumentation was carried and data 
was collected on these flights, they were also logged as NACA test missions. 
X - 4  Flights 
Flight Date Pilot Remarks 
- 
2 22 Aug. 
3 22 Aug. 
4 30 Aug. 
5 31 Aug. 














20 7 Nov. 
21 17 Nov. 
22 6 Dec. 
23 6 Dec. 
24 15 Dec. 
25 28 Dec. 
1 18 Aua. 1950 C. E. Yeager AF flight, pilot check. 




















R. L. Johnson 
A. S. Crossfield 
Cross field 
Cross field 
Aborted, landing gear malfunction. 
Handling qualities. 
Same as flight 4. 
Longitudinal and latitudinal stability and 
Aborted, faulty canopy lock. 
Longitudinal and latitudinal dynamic stability 
and control. 
Same as flight 8. 
Same as flight 8. 
Same as flight 8. 
AF flight, pilot check. 
Same as flight 12. 
Same as flight 12: airspeed calibration. 
First NACA pilot checkflight. 
Longitudinal, latitudinal, directional stability, 
and control. 
Same as flight 16. 
Same as flight 16. 
Same as flight 16. 
Same as flight 16. 
Same as flight 16. 
AF flight, pilot check. 
NACA pilot check; aborted. 
Aborted; instrument malfunction. 
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X - 4 Flights, Continued 














































4 Jan. 1951 Crossfield 
17 Jan. Crossfield 
19 Jan. Crossfield 
24 Jan. Crossfield 

















W. P. Jones 
Cross field 
27 Apr. Jones 
3 May Jones 
9 May Cross field 
16 May Cross field 
18 May Cross field 
29 May Crossfield 
20 Aug. Jones 
2 Oct. Cross field 





























S. P. Butchart 
Jones 
6 Aug. Crossfield 
11 Aug. - 
16 Sept. - 
22 Sept. - 
23 Sept. Cross field 
27 Mar. 1953 Crossfield 
Same as flight 25. 
Same as flight 25. 
Aborted, landing gear malfunction. 
Aborted, instrument malfunction. 
Longitudinal, latitudinal directional stability, 
and control. 
Same as flight 30. 
Same as flight 30. 
Same as flight 30. 
Same as flight 30. 
Same as flight 30. 
Same as flight 30. 
Same as flight 30. 
NACA pilot check. 
Longitudinal, latitudinal, directional stability, 
and control. 
Same as flight 39. 
Same as flight 39. 
Same as flight 39. 
Same as flight 39. 
Same as flight 39. 
Same as flight 39. 
First flight with thick trailing edge on speed 
Stability and control with thick trailing edge. 
Lift-to-drag variation using various speedbrake 
Landings at various lift-to-drag ratios. 
Same as flight 49. 
Same as flight 49. 
Constant speed-drag ratios. 
NACA pilot check; handling qualities. 
Maneuvers and speed runs. 
General stability and control. 
Lift-to-drag at various speedbrake settings. 
Directional trim change invest. 
Lift-to-drag variation with speedbrakes. 
Lift-to-drag variation studies.. 
Dynamic stability invest. 
Same as flight 60. 
NACA pilot check. 
Check flight with thickened trailing edge on 
Stability and control with thickened elevons. 
Aborted; engine malfunction. 
Aborted; instrument malfunction. 
Stability and control with thickened elevons. 





X- 4  Flights, Continued 
Flight Date Pilot Remarks 
70 29 Apr. 1953 Crossfield Airspeed calibration with thickened elevons. 
71 30 Apr. Cross field High-lift stability and control. 
72 20 May Butchart Dynamic stability without thickened elevons. 
73 1 Jul. Butchart Same as flight 72. 
74 3 Jul. Butchart Same as flight 72. 
75 - George Cooper NACA pilot check for Ames pilot. 
76 11 Aug. John McKay NACA pilot check. 
77 - Dynamic stability. 
78 to - Dynamic stability. 
79 31 Aug. - NACA pilot check. 
80 - NACA pilot check. 
81 to - NACA pilot check. 
82 (?) Sept. - Aileron pulses, low-speed turns with dive 
brakes. 
SOURCE: NACA X-4 flight reports, 1950- 1953; X-4 chronology prepared by Robert Mulac of 







X-5 Program Flight Chronology, 1952- 1955 
The NACA High-speed Flight Station operated the Bell X-5 #1 (50- 1838) from 
1952 to late 1955. Following the conclusion of the contractors program in October 1951, 
the airplane was grounded for installation of a NACA instrument package. In December 
195 1, the Air Force completed a brief evaluation program involving six flights; because 
data were taken, these were considered part of the overall NACA effort and were logged 
as joint AF-NACA flights. The first all-NACA flight was flight 7, and it is with this flight 
that this chronology begins. The second X-5 (50- 1839) was operated only by Bell and 
the Air Force and was lost in a spin accident in 1953. 
Bell X - 5  #I (50-1838) Flights 




























































A. S. Crossfield 




Static and dynamic longitudinal and 
latitudinal stability and control. 
Same as flight 8. 
Airspeed calibration. 
Static and dynamic longitudinal and 
latitudinal stability and control. 
Same as flight 11. 
Same as flight 11. 
Same as flight 1 I .  
Air Force pilot check flight. 
Lateral stability at 60" sweep. 
Flight aborted. 
Latitudinal and longitudinal stability 
Airspeed calibration. 
Static and dynamic longitudinal and 
-'latitudinal stability and control. 
Gust loads investigation 20" and 60" 
sweep. 




Static and dynamic longitudinal and 
Same as flight 26. 
and control at 60" sweep. 
lateral stability and control. 
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Bell X - 5  # I  (50-1838) Flights, Continued 




























































































































Same as flight 26. 
Same as flight 26. 
Same as flight 26. 
Same as flight 26. 
Same as flight 26. 
Aborted; gear door opened in flight. 
Static and dynamic longitudinal and 
Same as flight 34. 
Same as flight 34. 
Same as flight 34. 
Same as flight 34. 
Gust loads investigation. 
Pilot check for Langley pilot. 
Static and dynamic longitudinal and 
lateral stability and control. 
Same as flight 41. 
Static and dynamic longitudinal 
Same as flight 43. 
Static longitudinal and lateral stability 
and control. 
Lateral control, longitudinal stability. 
Static longitudinal control. 
Static longitudinal stability and 
Inadvertent spin. 
Longitudinal stability and control. 
Lateral stability and control. 
Pilot check. 
lateral stability and control. 




Aborted, inoperable stabilizer motor. 
Static and dynamic longitudinal and 
lateral stability and control. 
Vertical tail loads in maneuvers. 
Stalls and maneuvers at 20" sweep. 
Vertical tail loads in rolling pullouts. 
Drag study (ti-ailed F-80 jet). 
Drag study (trailed B-29 bomber). 
AF flight for comparison with AF X-5. 
Drag study (trailed B-29). 
Gust loads investigation. 
Gust loads investigation. 
Effect of wing translation on trim. 
Same as flight 66. 
Gust loads investigation. 
X-5 FLIGHTS 
Bell X-5 # I  (50-1838) Flights, Continued 

































































































































Longitudinal stability and control 
Emergency landing, gear failure. 
Longitudinal stability and control. 
Same as flight 71. 
Same as flight 71. 
Same as flight 7 1. 
Strain gauge response to temperature. 
Buffet-induced tail loads. 
Wing and horizontal tail loads. 
Dynamic lateral stability. 
Aborted, cabin pressurization 
Buffet-induced tail loads. 
Buffet-induced tail loads. 
Longitudinal stability and control wing 
and tail loads. 
Same as flight 82. 
Airspeed calibration of NACA B-47. 
Pacer for NACA B-47 aircraft. 
Lateral stability and control. 
Wing twisting and bending tail loads. 
Tail loads. 
Longitudinal stability and control. 
Aborted, landing gear door malfunction. 
Lateral stability and control. 
Gust loads at various wing sweeps. 
Vertical tail loads. 
Longitudinal stability and control. 
Same as flight 94. 
Lateral stability and control at 45" and 
59", longitudinal stability and con- 
trol at 59". 
wing and high tail loads. 
during wing transition. 
malfunction. 
Longitudinal stability and control, 
Dynamic pressure effects on buffet. 
Same as flight 98. 
Same as flight 98. 
Same as flight 98. 
Same as flight 98. 
Same as flight 98. 
Same as flight 98. 
Same as flight 98. 
Same as flight 98. 
Same as flight 98. 
Vertical tail loads. 
Vertical tail loads. 
Instrumentation check. 
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Bell X-5 # I  (50-1838) Flights, Continued 
























14 Dec. 1954 
to 









































Longitudinal stability and control. 
Longitudinal stability and control. 
Longitudinal stability and control. 
Longitudinal stability and control. 
Longitudinal and lateral stability and 
Longitudinal stability and control. 
Longitudinal stability and control. 
Longitudinal stability and control. 
Lateral stability and control. 
Lateral stability and control. 
Lateral stability and control. 
Lateral stability and control. 
Lateral stability and control. 




Pilot check. Landing gear door 
control. 
separated in flight. Plane sub- 
sequently was retired. 
SOURCE: NACA X-5 flight reports, 1952-1955; X-5 chronology prepared by Robert Mubdc of 
Langley Research Center. 
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XF-92A Program Flight Chronology, 1953 
NACA flight-tested the Convair XF-92A (46-682) during 1953. This program fol- 
lowed earlier flight testing of the aircraft by Convair and the Air Force 1948-1953. 
Project pilot for the NACA tests was High-speed Flight Research Station research pilot 
A. Scott Crossfield. 
XF - 92A Flights 
Flight Date Remarks 
1 9Apr. 1953 Pilot check; static longitudinal stability 
2 16 Apr. Static and dynamic stability and control. 
3 21 Apr. Longitudinal stability and control. 
4 27 May Longitudinal stability and control. 
5 3 June Lateral and directional stability and control. 
6 5 June Longitudinal stability and control. 
7 9 June Longitudinal stability and control. 
8 1 1  June Longitudinal stability and control. 
9 16 June Longitudinal stability and control. 
10 19 June Longitudinal stability and control. 
1 1  24 June Longitudinal stability and control. 
12 24 June Longitudinal stability and control. 
13 26 June Low-speed stability and control. 
14 3 Jul. First flight with wing fences. 
15 3 Jul. Second fence flight. 
16 22 Jul. Modified fence design; fences buckled in flight. 
17 17 Aug. Engine malfunctioned, aborted flight. 
18 20 Aug. Longitudinal stability and control with modified 
19 20 Aug. Same as flight 18. 
20 30 Sept. Low-speed lateral and directional control with 
fences. 
21 30 Sept. Same as flight 20. 
22 2 Oct. Same as flight 20. 
23 5 Oct. Same as flight 20. 
24 14 Oct. Low-speed lateral and directional control without 




Same as flight 24. Nose landing gear collapsed 
during landing rollout. Plane was retired. 
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XB - 70A Program Flight Chronology, 1967 - 1969 
FRC operated the XB-70A #1 (62-0001) aircraft from 1967 through early 1969. 
This aircraft was the sole survivor of two prototypes. The second aircraft (62-0207) was 
destroyed in a mid-air collision on 8 June 1966. By this time, both aircraft had 
accumulated a total of 95 flights, 49 by # I ,  and 46 by #2. 
A joint Air Force-NASA program began in November 1966 and lasted through 
January 1967. The all-NASA program (with Air Force support) began with the 107th 
flight of the XB-70A series, on 25 April 1967. Because the XB-70A #1 formally began its 
NASA research career at that point, that flight has been chosen to head this chronology. 
XB - 70A Flights 
Flight Date PilodCopilo t Remarks 
107 (1-61) 

























Cotton/Fulton Flight aborted after crew entry 
door opened and landing 
gear malfunctioned. 
airspeed calibration. 
Fulton/Cotton Low-speed handling qualities; 
Cotton/Van Shepard Mach 1.43; handling qualities. 
FultodDonald Mallick Pilot checkout; mach 1.83. 
Cotton/Col. E. Pilot checkout; mach 0.92 
Sturmthal 
FultodMallick Mach 2.24 at 17 600 m. 
CottonISturmthal Mach 2.3; inlet studies. 
FultodMallick Mach 2.43 at 17 700 m. 
Cotton/Sturmthal Mach 2.55; inlet studies, longi- 
tudinal handling qualities. 
Fulton/Mallick Mach 2.55 at 20 400 m; stability 
and control. 
MallicMCotton Mach 1.18; handling qualities. 
Fulton/Sturmthal Landing gear malfunction. 
Cotton/Fulton Gear-down, low-speed studies. 
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XB - 70A Flights, Continued 
Flight Date PilotlCopilot Remarks 
120 (1-74) 11 June 1968 MallicWFulton Landing gear malfunction. 
121 (1-75) 28 June SturmthaYCotton Mach 1.23, structural dynamics. 
122 (1-76) 19 Jul. Mallic WFulton Mach 1.62, structural dynamics. 
123 (1-77) 16 Aug. FultodSturmthal Mach 2.47, structural dynamics. 
Inlet unstart, loss of #6 
engine. 
124 (1-78) 10 Sept. MallicMFulton Mach 2.5 at 19 140 m. 
125 (1-79) 18 Oct. SturmthaYFulton Mach 2.18, structural dynamics. 
126 (1-80) 1 NOV. SturmthaYFulton Mach 1.62, structural dynamics, 
127 (1-81) 3 Dec. Fulton/Mallic k Mach 1.64, same as flight 126. 
128 (1-82) 17 Dec. FultonlSturmthal Mach 2.53, same as flight 126. 
129 (1-83) 4 Feb. 1969 Fulton/Sturmthal Subsonic, ferry flight to USAF 
stability and control. 
Museum, Wright-Patterson 
AFB, Dayton, Ohio. 
X B  - 70A Program Summary 
Total Flights 
By XB-70A #1 83 
By XB-70A #2 46 
Total Flying Time (both aircraft): 252 hours 38 minutes 
Total time above mach-1: 55 hours 50 minutes. 
Total time above mach 2: 49 hours 32 minutes. 
Total time above mach 3: 1 hour 48 minutes. 
SOURCE: XB-70A program flight chronology, prepared by the DFRC Pilots Office. 
348 
Appendix P 
YF- 12 Program Flight Chronology, 1969- 1978 
The NASA YF- 12 program flew three aircraft, YF- 12A #60-6935 (935), YF- 12A 
#60-6936 (936), and YF- 12C #60-6937 (937). YF- 12A 936 completed 62 flights, pri- 
marily by Air Force flight test crews, before being lost in an inflight fire on 24 June 1971. 
The Air Force crew ejected safely. 
NASA's program on the YF- 12A and'YF- 12C aircraft lasted from 1969 through 1978. 
The first NASA flight was on 5 March 1970, when test pilot Fitzhugh L. Fulton piloted 
YF- 12A 936 on a checkout flight. He followed this with flights on 9 March and 1 1 March. 
NASA's first flight in YF- 12A 935 was by Donald Mallick on 1 April 1970. The first NASA 
flight in YF- 12C 937 was by Fitzhugh L. Fulton on 24 May 1972. 
The FRC flight crews for the YF- 12 were pilots Fitzhugh Fulton and Donald Mallick, 
and flight-test engineers Victor Horton and Ray Young. Before retirement, aircraft 935 
was used to check out other center pilots on familiarization flights. 
YF - 12A 935 Flights 

















1 1 Dec. 1969 
17 Dec. 














Col. J. Rogers/ USAF test. 
Maj. W. Campbell/ USAF test. 
Maj. G. Heidlebaugh 

























Ventral fin damage in sideslip. 
First flight with NASA engineer. 
First flight of 935 with NASA 
pilot. 
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YF - 12A 935 Flights, Continued 














































































































Mach 1.5 phugoid investigation. 
Phugoid investigation. 
Same as flight 18; mach 2. 
“Engine problems.” 
Intercept of YF- 12A 936. Fol- 
lowing flight, 935 grounded 
for instrumentation changes. 
Ventral fin removed following 
flight to assess performance 
of p!ane without ventral fin. 
Ventral off. 
Ventral off. 
Ventral off; 2 unstarts. 
Ventral off. Mach 2.8. Ventral 
First flight with ventral backon. 
installed after this flight. 
Hydraulic systems failure- 
abort. 
Ferry from Palmdale. 
Loads, handling qualities, air- 
Same as flight 49. 
Same as flight 49. 
Same as flight 49. 
frame-propulsion interactions. 
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YF - 12A 935 Flights, Continued 
Flight Date Pilot/Test Engineer Remarks 
53 23 Feb. 1972 MallicEdYoung Refuel over El Paso for max. 
time at mach 3; 2 hr 30 min 
flight. Following this flight, 
aircraft was grounded for 
more than a year for studies 
in FRC heat loads laboratory. 
tory. 















































































































KC- 135Q tanker malfunction. 
Aborted after takeoff. 
First “coldwall” experiment. 
Second coldwall. 
Plane shed ventral at mach 0.9; 
landed safely, grounded for 
repairs. No ventral until #97. 
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YF- 12A 935 Flights, Continued 







































































































Third coldwall flight. Mach 2.4. 
Fourth coldwall flight. Mach 
Fifth coldwall flight. 
Flowfield studies stability and 
Same as flight 94. 
Stability and control investi- 
First flight with Lockalloy 
Landing-gear taxi tests. 
Landing-gar taxi tests. 
Lockalloy ventral check flight. 
Same as flight 100. 
Same as flight 100. 
Same as flight 100. 
Same as flight 100. 
“High-speed flight.” 
Completed ventral testing. 
Ventral and coldwall envelope 
Coldwall envelope studies 
Coldwall profile “hot” data. 
Same as flight 109. 
Skin-friction cooling studies. 
Continued “hotwall” data study. 
Coldwall insulation prematurely 












Coldwall experiment. 1st “good 
Bad unstarts on flight. 
Coldwall flight. 
Final coldwall-good results. 
Boundary layer and handling 
qualities studies. 















































YF- 12 FLIGHTS 
YF- 12A 935 Flights, Continued 
Flight Date PilotlTest Engineer Remarks 
Gary Krierhoung Pilot familiarization. 9Dec. 1977 
E. Enevoldson/Y&ng Pilot familiarization. 
T. McMurtry/Horton Pilot familiarization. 
MallicWYoung Landing-gear-system taxi tests. 
Mallic WYoung Landinggear taxi tests. 
Fulton/Horton Landing-gear taxi tests. 
Fulton/Horton Landing-gear taxi tests. 
MallickJYoung Landing-gear taxi tests. 
MallicWYoung Landing-gear taxi tests. 
FuIton/Horton 
landing program. 
EnevoldsonlYoung Same as flight 134. 
DandHorton Same as flight 134. 
FultodHorton Shaker vane study. 
Fulton/Horton Shaker vane study. 
MallicMYoung Shaker vane study. 
Fulton/Horton Shaker vane study. 
Mallic WYoung Shaker vane study. 
Fulton/Horton Shaker vane study. 
Stephen Ishmael/ 
Michael Swann/Horton Pilot familiarization. 
Fulton/Horton Last NASA flight. 
Col. J. Sullivan/ 
Tests in support of Shuttle 
Pilot familiarization, mach 3. 
Horton 
Ferry to USAF Museum, 
Col. R. Uppstrom Wright-Patterson AFB, 
(USAF crew) Dayton, Ohio. 
YF-12C 937 Flights 









16 Jul. 1971 















Delivery to FRC. 
First NASA flight by 937. 
Airspeed calibration. 
Propulsion studies for baseline 
data, stability and control. 
Same as flight 5. 
Same as flight 5; phugoid study. 
Same as flight 5. Target for 
F- 14 intercept trials. 
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YF - 12C 93 7 Flights, Continued 







































































































Airspeed lag calibration, 
stability and control. 
Navigation equipment failure. 
Experienced fuel leak. 










Propulsion and jet wake 
Propulsion studies, F- 14 
Propulsion studies, F- 14 
Propulsion studies, F- 14 
Propulsion studies, F- 14 






fuel consumption and 
emergency landing at Fallon 
NAS, Nev. 
NAS. 












YF- 12 FLIGHTS 
YF - 12C 93 7 Flights, Continued 


















































































































Chase for 935, propulsion 
Propulsion studies. 
Propulsion studies. 
Engine stalls study. 
Engine stalls study. 
Boattail drag study. 
Boattail drag study. 
Chase for 935. 
Inlet studies. 
studies. 
Chase for 935, inlet studies. 




Chase for 935 coldwall. 
Inlet studies, interactions. 




Chase for 935 coldwall. 
Chase for final 935 coldwall. 
Following this flight, the air- 
craft was grounded for modi- 
fications to begin a “co-op” 
control program. 




ON THE FRONTIER 
YF - 12C 937 Flights, Continued 
Flight Date Pilot/Test Engineer Remarks 
80 16 June 1978 Fulton/Horton Digital computer system check. 
81 17 Jul. Mallic WYoung Digital computer system check. 
82 3 Aug. Fulton/Horton Computer checkout. 
83 18 Aug. MallicUYoung Computer checkout. 
84 31 Aug. Fulton/Horton Computer checkout. 
85 7 Sept. Mallic WYoung Co-op control test. 
86 13 Sept. Fulton/Horton Co-op control test. 
87 25 Sept. Fulton/Horton Co-op control test. 
88 28 Sept. MallicldYoung Co-op aborted. Final NASA 
89 27 Oct. J. Sullivan/ Transfer flight to USAF. 
Maj. W. Frazier (AF) 





YF- 12 Program Summary 
By YF- 12A 935: 146 
By YF- 12A 936: 62 
By YF-12C 937: 89 
Total Flying Time (935 plus 937) 
Approximately 450 flight hours. 
Total Flying Time at or above mach 3 
Approximately 37 flight hours. 
SOURCE: YF- 12 program flight requests, information supplied by flight crews, information from 
the files of Richard Klein, Gene Matranga, Ming Tang, and Paul Reukauf, DFRC. 
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Appendix Q 
Space Shuttle Orbiter Approach and Landing 
Tests Program Flight Chronology, 1977 
During 1977, in conjunction with the NASA Johnson Space Center, DFRC under- 
took verification testing of the Space Shuttle’s approach and landing behavior. 
Tests air-launched the Space Shuttle orbiter OV- 101, Enterprise, from a modified 
Boeing 747-100 jet transport. The approach and landing test (ALT) program was 
intended to certify the low-speed airworthiness of the Shuttle orbiter, as well as its 
pilot-guided and automatic approach and landing capabilities. For this reason, the 
Enterprise differed in a number of respects from a Shuttle ready for orbital spaceflight. 
During the testing, the Enterprise was fitted with a drag-reducing and airflow-smoothing 
tailcone. Subsequently, two glide flights were made without the tailcone and with the 
Shuttle’s engine installation simulated so as to acquire data more closely approximating 
the Shuttle’s configuration when returning from orbit. 
The ALT program had three phases: a captive inactive phase with the Enterprise 
unmanned and with its systems inert; a captive active phase, with the Enterprise piloted 
and all systems operational; and, finally, a free-flight test phase, with the Enterprise 
actually launched in flight from the back of the 747 aircraft becoming, in effect, the 
worlds largest glider. 
SPACE SHUTTLE ORBITER OV-101, ENTERPRISE 
I .  Captive Inactive Tests 
Flight Date Crew Duration Remarks 
__ -~ 
2 hrs 5 rnin 462 kph (287 mph) at 
4900 m (16 000 ft) 
1 18 Feb. 1977 - 
2 22 Feb. 
3 25 Feb. 
4 28 Feb 
5 2 Mar. 
- 3 hr 13 rnin 528 kph (328 mph) at 
- 2 hr 28 rnin 684 kph (425 mph) at 
- 2 hr 1 1  rnin 684 kph (425 mph) at 
- 1 hr 39 rnin 763 kph (474 mph) at 
6900 m (22 600 ft) 
8100 m (26 600 ft) 
8707 m (28 565 ft) 
9100 m (30 000 ft) 
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II .  Captive Active Tests 
During this test phase, the Enterprise was crewed on each flight by a team of 
astronauts-either Fred Hake and Charles Fullerton or Joseph Engle and Richard Truly. 
Haise was a former FRC research pilot; Engle had flown the X- 15 at the center as well. 
Flight Date Crew Duration Remarks 
1 18 June 1977 Haise/Fullerton 55 min 45 sec 335 kph (208 mph) at 
2 28June EngleITrul y 1 hr 2 min 499 kph (310 mph) at 
4563 m (14 970 ft) 
6715 m (22 030 ft) 
3 26 July Haise/Fullerton 59 min 53 sec 502 kph (312 mph) at 
8532 m (27 992 ft) 
4 Canceled as unnecessary. 
III. Free-Flight Tests 
Dura- Tail- Launch Launch Landing 
Flight Date Crew tion cone Altitude Speed Speed 
1 12Aug. 1977 H/F 5-21 On (24 100 ft) 500 kph 343 kph 
2 13 Sept. E/T 5-28 On (26 000 ft) 498 kph 359 kph 
3 23 Sept. H/F 5-34 On (24 700 ft) 463 kph 354 kph 
4 12 Oct. E/T 2-34 Off (22 400 ft) 445 kph 369 kph 
5 26 Oct. HIF 2-01 Off (19 000 ft) 454 kph 350 kph 
(min-sec) 
(270 knots) (185 knots) 
(269 knots) (194 knots) 
(250 knots) (191 knots) 
(240 knots) (199 knots) 
(245 knots) (189 knots) 
Crew: HIF = HaiseIFullerton. E/T = EngleKruly. 
Launch altitude: altitude at separation from 747. 
SOURCE: NASA release 77-224; NASA, Space Shuttle Orbiter Approach and Landing Test: Finul Report 
(Washington, DC: NASA, Feb. 1978). 
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Appendix R 
Accident Statistics, 1954- 1975 
Number of Accidents 


























































































Period Rate per 100 000 Rate per 100 000 
Flight Hours Flights 
197 1 - 1975 0 0 
1966- 1970 34.1 40.2 
1961 - 1965 42.4 N/Ad 
1956- 1960 76.8 77.3 
1954 - 1955 230.7 223.0 
"Data lacking for total number of flights in 1964 and 1965. 
SOURCE: DFRC Safety Office files. 
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HSFSIFRCIDFRC Flight Accidents 
Calendar Year Aircraft Remarks 
1948 Douglas D-558- 1 Engine failure on takeoff. 
1953 Convair XF-92A Landing gear failure on 
Howard Lilly killed. 
rollout after landing. 
Aircraft retired. 
after emergency landing. 
Minor damage to aircraft. 
lamch. Plane jettisoned, 
destroyed. 
gear collapse. Plane 
damaged. 
damaged beyond repair. 
failure, followed by 
tailskid collapse on 
landing. Pilot Jack 
McKay seriously injured; 
plane virtually destroyed 
but rebuilt as X- 15A-2. 
Pilot undershot landing 
at Norton AFB; plane 
damaged beyond repair. 
flap deployment caused 
uncontrollable rolling. 
Pilot Milton Thompson 
ejected safely. 
XB-70A #2. Pilot Joseph 
Walker killed, as was 
XB-7OA copilot. Both 
aircraft lost. 
Bruce Peterson seriously 
injured; plane rebuilt as 
M2-F3. 
1954 North American F- lOOA Collision with hangar 
1955 Bell X- 1A Inflight explosion before 
1956 Bell X- 1E Landing accident; nose- 
1959 North American F- 107A Takeoff accident. Plane 
1962 North American X- 15 #2 Inflight powerplant 
Inflight asymmetric 
Mid-air collision with 
1967 Northrop M2-F2 Landing accident. Pilot 
1967 North American X- 15 #3 Break-up during reentry; 
pilot Michael Adams 
killed. 
Lockheed T-33A 
Lockheed F- 104A 
Lockheed F- 104N 
- ~~ 
SOURCE: DFRC Safety Office files. 
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A Note on Sources 
The majority of sources cited in this study are records such as 
memorandums, policy statements, progress reports, and planning docu- 
ments found within Record Group 255, Records of the National Advi- 
sory Committee for Aeronautics and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, maintained by the National Archives and Records Service. 
Many other documents are in the files of Dryden Flight Research Facility; 
at other NASA centers such as Ames, Langley, and Johnson; and in the 
possession of present and former employees. Other sources include 
documents held by the USAF Systems Command Historical Office, and 
the Historical Office of the USN’s Naval Air Systems Command. Finally, 
some documentation was provided by individuals at major aircraft and 
aerospace manufacturing concerns such as McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell, 
and Lockheed. 
As with other aspects of aviation history, there are few useful 
published sources dealing with the subjects discussed in this work; 
indeed, only one previous book had dealt with the origins of supersonic 
flight in America, and that by the author of this study. The lack of 
published works dealing with the development of postwar aerospace 
technology and the management and utilization of that technology can be 
taken as a general indication of the future studies that are required to 
enhaqce our understanding of the impact and role that aviation and 
aerospace science have had upon modern society. 
The following discussion of sources useful to this study should 
indicate the scope of records available to a researcher examining other 
aspects of NACA-NASA history as well. 
My research began in the NASA History Office at NASA Headquar- 
ters, Washington, D.C. The History Office provided great assistance over 
a number of years, both on this topic and others. The History Office 
archives consist of 500 cubic feet of records, with another 395 cubic feet 
stored at the Federal Records Center at Suitland, Maryland. The series 
that contain information useful to this study are: Congressional Docu- 
ments, Industry, Organization and Management, Budget Documentation, 
NASA Headquarters, NASA Centers, Manned Space Flight, Tracking 
and Data Acquisition, Biography File, and Aeronautics. 
The Dryden Flight Research Center records are retired to the Fed- 
eral Records Center, Laguna Niguel, California. (Previously, they were at 
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the Federal Records Center at Bell, California.) Record Group 255 boxes 
that proved of particular value at Bell are 310 and 312 (X- 1 reports), 
321 (X-2 documentation), and 361, 362, and 366, all on the D-558 
program. The files of the NASA Langley Research Center contain much 
useful material on the early days of Dryden when it operated as a satellite 
of Langley, including the annual and semiannual reports of the NACA 
Research Airplane Projects Panel and the NACA High-speed Flight 
Station. The retired records of Ames Research Center at the Federal 
Records Center at San Bruno, California, contain documentation pertain- 
ing to Ames’s role in Dryden’s affairs during the 1940s and 1950s. The 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center’s History Office maintains a large col- 
lection of records on manned spaceflight. This was particularly useful for 
the Space Shuttle project and its origins. 
Since Dryden operates as a tenant on Edwards Air Force Base, Air 
Force records reveal the nature of the relationship between the service 
and this civilian agency. Particularly pertinent are the semiannual and 
annual historical reports submitted to higher command concerning the 
activities of the Air Force base. These reports, including primary 
documents in appendixes, are on file at Edwards, but copies are also held 
by the Air Force Systems Command History Office at Andrews AFB, 
Maryland, and at the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, 
Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Though Dryden’s connections with naval avia- 
tion never equaled those with the Air Force, there was a significant 
interchange of ideas between the Navy and Dryden especially in the 
1940s and 1950s. The files of the Naval Air Systems Command contain 
memorandums and reports of the Bureau of Aeronautics. 
This history could not have been prepared without the cooperation 
and assistance of a number of persons, especially the staff of the Dryden 
center itself. Many preserved key documents over the years, and these 
were made available to the author. More important, however, many of 
the staff consented to interviews, as did many former NACA, NASA, Air 
Force, Navy, and industry officials. These interviews provided insight 
into the human story of Dryden-the working of the staff, viewpoints 
and goals, what individuals felt they had accomplished. While oral history 
is no substitute for written records, it is a supplement that can flesh out 
and elaborate on the more traditional sources. 
What remains to be done? Dryden’s story offers a view of a unique 
research center operating at the forefront of technological change in a 
critical period of aeronautical and astronautical development. We have 
seen the emergence of aerospace technology. In many sections of the 
manuscript, the fulfillment of that technological promise is alluded to. 
Further study is indicated on the supersonic breakthrough and the turbo- 
jet revolution and their impact on modern business, industry, transpor- 
tation, military affaip, and society as a whole. We are an aerospace soci- 
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Flight Station and Muroc Flight Test Unit. 
aeronautical research, 3,6, 172,215-16,251, 
military aircraft, 171, 222, 230-33, 250-51 
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and NACA, 14,25,29,31,32,85, 107, 109 
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106, 107, 117, 122, 136-37, 152 
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and NACA, 41-44,46,47, 73 
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Space Shuttle, 240, 250, 251 
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Electronic controls, 2 16-22 
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162, 164, 166, 167, 168 
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F-14, F-14A (Tomcat; fighter), 217, 233, 251, 
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231 ill., 283 
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Fleming, Patrick, 288 
Fletcher, .James C., 207, 235 
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Flight Research Center (NASA), xix, 42, 103, 
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Research Center, High Speed Flight Sta- 
tion, and Muroc Flight Test Unit 
aeronautical research, 134-35, 172, 177-78, 
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Goodman, Hal, 16 
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Grumman Aircraft Co., 87, 140-41, 217, 251 
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380 
port aircraft), 225 ill. 
339,340, 341, 342 
304-05, 3 19 
174 ill. 
flight testing, 153,154,157,159,160,161-63, 
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and Space Shuttle, 163 
Haise, Fred W., 158, 223, 242, 243, 244, 245- 
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Hansen, Grant, 212 
Harer, Richard B., 293 
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lifting body research, 148, 149 
military research, 46-48, 59-60, 87, 88, 89, 
X series research, 55, 57, 58, 62, 67-68, 71- 
46,247,249 
91, 92, 94-96, 97-98 
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349,350,351,352,353,354,355, 356 
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House of Representatives. Committee on 
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Hypersonic aircraft, 101-03, 107, 108 ill., 109, 
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JTB-29A (USAF-NACA rocket airplane launch 
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.Jet aircraft, xvi-xvii, 2 I ,  fil,89, 177-78,224,225 
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Jewett, C;., 356 
Johnson, Clarence (“Kelly”), 80, 189-90 
Johnson, Lyndon B., 184, 189, 190 
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.Johnson Space Center USC), 172, 225, 240, 
Johnston, Alvin M., 289 
Joint Parachute Test Facility, 227n 
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Kennedy, John F., 189 
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241, 242, 246,256, 357 
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Krier, Gary, 204, 205, 218, 221, 393 
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Langley Research Center (LaRC), 72, 119, 170, 
aeronautical research, 31,52,57,79,89, 177, 
lifting body research, 148, 153, 161 
manned spaceflight, 102, 138, 141 
military aircraft, 107-08, 118 
125, 251, 335,336 
145 
See Langley Research Center. 
171,219, 223, 254-55, 256, 277 
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and Muroc FTU, xviii, 6, 7, 9, 13-14, 26, 
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29-30, 33,42, 44 
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169, 170, 177-78, 240 
227, 228, 230, 232-233, 347, 349 
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also X-F4A), 148, 155, 156-57, 163-64, 
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Soule, Hartley A., 7, 13, 18, 21, 24, 25, 31-33, 
Sound barrier. See Supersonic research. 
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Soviet Union, 112, 168, 178, 188 
Spacecraft Technology and Advanced Reentry 
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T-33, T-33A (Shooting Star; trainer), 158, 228, 
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TF30-P9. See Engines, aircraft. 
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67-7 1 ,  74, 76-78, 84 
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See also names of individual pilots. 
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configuration studies, 59-60, 88, 178, 207, 
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Vensel, Joseph, 13, 17 ill., 43 ill., 45 ill., 46, 72 
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